The UK government has set out a long-awaited plan explaining how it will cut emissions in the 2030s, on its legally bound path to net-zero by the middle of the century.
Under the Climate Change Act, the government must lay out “carbon budgets” that set limits on the UK’s emissions over five-year periods.
In 2021, the government announced it would cut emissions by 78% by 2035 under its sixth carbon budget, but the “delivery plan” detailing how this would be achieved proved contentious.
The new “carbon budget and growth delivery plan” (CBGD) is the third draft, after the previous two delivery plans were successfully challenged in court.
Unlike previous versions, in this plan the government concludes that it has sufficient climate policies to achieve its sixth carbon budget and “96-99%” of its international obligations under the Paris Agreement.
This is in spite of the government scaling back its expectations for various climate policies, including clean-hydrogen production, tree-planting and carbon capture and storage (CCS).
The CBGD plan comes amid a fractured political consensus in the UK on climate action, with the Conservative party vowing to repeal the Climate Change Act and the hard-right Reform UK party repeatedly attacking net-zero.
Below, Carbon Brief gives an overview of the 363 pages of documents included in the plan, what it says about meeting UK emissions targets and what it means for individual sectors.
- Why is there a new ‘carbon budget delivery plan’?
- What does the new delivery plan say?
- How does the new delivery plan meet the UK’s emissions targets?
- What does the delivery plan mean for the UK economy?
Why is there a new ‘carbon budget delivery plan’?
This is the third version of the sixth carbon budget delivery plan produced by the UK government, with the previous two having been ruled unlawful by the High Court.
The then-Conservative government passed the sixth carbon budget in 2021, legislating an emissions cut of 78% below 1990 levels by 2035. Carbon budgets are interim targets that act as “stepping stones” on the pathway to net-zero emissions by 2050.
However, in July 2022, the High Court ruled that the government had breached sections 13 and 14 of the Climate Change Act in adopting the delivery plan for the budget.
These sections refer to the government’s duty to prepare and adopt policies to meet its climate targets and publish on these policies so that parliament and the public can “scrutinise” them.
It ruled that the then-secretary of state Kwasi Kwarteng had “insufficient knowledge” to adopt the plan, as he did not know what emissions savings individual policies would be responsible for.
The plan also lacked “critical information” on a number of elements – for example, the reason for a shortfall in the emissions cuts, according to the claimants Friends of the Earth, ClientEarth and Good Law Project.
The High Court ordered the government to revise its strategy to correct these errors and a new plan was published in March 2023.
Once again, this was challenged in the High Court. The same claimants argued that the government did not consider “delivery risk” in a lawful way or publish sufficient information to allow meaningful scrutiny of its net-zero policies, among other breaches of sections 13 and 14.
In May 2024, the court sided with the claimants, finding that the secretary of state – by that time Claire Coutinho – had not been adequately informed about the delivery risks associated with the proposed policies. It also called for transparent, evidence-based policies to meet the carbon budget.
The government was given a new deadline of May 2025 to publish another version of the delivery plan. This was later extended to October 2025, as a result of last year’s general election.
What does the new delivery plan say?
The new plan includes an overview document highlighting the government’s key political messages and a 238-page report laying out the details of expected emissions cuts.
The government emphasises how its policies will help the UK to “take back control of our energy” by expanding domestic renewables – cutting bills and boosting jobs in the process.
It also highlights how Labour’s climate plans will improve “quality of life and health”, plus help to “protect our natural environment”.
Other components of the delivery plan include a “technical annex” with details of modelling and accounting, an “investor prospectus” that outlines net-zero investment opportunities in the UK and a methane action plan, with sectoral plans for cutting the greenhouse gas.
The plan confirms that the government has all the climate policies in place to meet the UK’s fourth and fifth carbon budgets, covering the period 2023-2032.
Crucially, it also establishes that the government has enough extra policies in the pipeline to ensure 100% of the emissions cuts required for the sixth carbon budget are also achieved.
This is a step up from the plan released by the previous Conservative government, which only covered 97% of the cuts required for the period 2033-2037.
The new report explains that 76% of emissions cuts for the sixth carbon budget are covered by policies that have already been “implemented, adopted or planned”.
The remaining emissions cuts come from 169 additional proposals and policies that have been modelled by the government for the coming years, ranging from electrified steel plants to accelerated rates of tree-planting. The plan also accounts for another 12 “early-stage” proposals.
In addition to its domestic carbon-budget goals, the UK also has international climate targets under the Paris Agreement, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
Unlike carbon budgets, which provide flexibility by allowing a set amount of emissions over a five-year period, the UK’s NDC goals involve specific emissions-reduction targets for single years, compared to a 1990 baseline.
The government calculates that its plans will cut emissions by 66% below 1990 levels by 2030 and 81% by 2035. These reductions are just shy of the UK’s NDC targets for 2030 and 2035 – representing 96% and 99% of the required cuts, respectively.
(Notably, the 2030 NDC target is more ambitious than the UK’s domestic climate target for that period, as the latter was set prior to the UK committing to net-zero emissions by 2050.)
In the delivery plan, the government says it will “seek to improve delivery and, where appropriate, will explore further measures, to ensure that the UK will meet its international commitments”.
The CBGD plan also considers the risk that government climate programmes underdeliver – for example, due to slow consumer uptake of low-carbon technologies.
Part of the legal case against the previous iteration of the plan was centred on its lack of adequate information about delivery risk. The new strategy appears to include a more extensive consideration of risk, stressing that there are “mechanisms in place to monitor and mitigate risks for each individual policy”.
It also states that the emissions savings for each policy are “credible” because, in cases where risks could not be avoided, the government revised down the emissions savings.
As a result, it concludes
“We, therefore, have confidence that each and every proposal and policy will deliver its planned scenario emissions savings.”
How does the new delivery plan meet the UK’s emissions targets?
The government’s CBGD plan lays out what it describes as a “credible level of emission savings”, enabling the UK to hit all of its upcoming domestic carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act.
Yet, a striking aspect of the plan is that the government has, in fact, significantly scaled back its expectations for several important sectors.
Government forecasts of low-carbon hydrogen production and peatland restoration are among the elements that have been downgraded since the 2023 plan. Expectations for biofuel-crop planting have also dropped to zero hectares in the near term.
Some of these policy areas have underperformed so far, such as tree-planting, or are less-established technologies, such as industrial carbon capture and storage (CCS).
These deployment assumptions have been highlighted in red in the table below. The relatively few sectors that have seen ambition ramped up are highlighted by Carbon Brief in green, while those that have remained steady since 2023 are grey.
Comparison of sectoral deployment assumptions in the new carbon budget delivery plan (2025), compared to previous versions from 2023 and 2021. Source: DESNZ. Chart: Carbon Brief
The rolling back of expectations for key emissions-cutting policies raises the question of how the new plan can still put the UK on track to meet its sixth carbon budget, which covers the period 2033-2037.
First, the “baseline” emissions from which future reductions are calculated is considerably lower in 2025 than it was in the 2023 delivery plan.
This is largely because a set of policies that were previously “under development” have now been integrated into the baseline, as they are considered “implemented or developed”.
These include the zero-emissions vehicle (ZEV) mandate to encourage electric-car sales and the “sustainable aviation fuel” (SAF) mandate to drive the uptake of “clean” aviation fuels.
Together with some modelling adjustments, these changes reduced baseline emissions by 46.1m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) during the sixth carbon budget period. This shrinks the emissions gap that must be filled by upcoming climate policies and proposals.
Crucially, there are also three new categories of emissions savings that the Labour government has introduced, all of which further reduce this gap.
First, the government has captured the impact of various societal shifts that could affect decarbonisation, using the term “wider factors” to describe such changes. As an example, it mentions “developments in digital technologies including AI”.
Together, the plan states that these factors could “credibly” cut emissions by an extra 99MtCO2e in the sixth carbon budget period.
Second, the government also has a new category termed “other early-stage policies and proposals”. These are ideas deemed too preliminary to fully model, except for the sixth carbon budget period, during which the government estimates they could contribute an extra 43MtCO2e in emissions cuts.
Among these proposals are marine CO2 removals, saltmarsh restoration and policies to boost the market for “low-carbon industrial products”.
Finally, another 24MtCO2e over the sixth carbon budget period comes from what the government calls “cascade effects”. These “occur when changes in one system propagate through connected systems” – for example, when the uptake of net-zero technology becomes a “social norm”, the plan explains.
The combined impact of these three additional factors – none of which were considered in the 2023 plan – can be seen in the chart below.
Collectively, these components help to cut the remaining emissions during the sixth carbon budget period by 34MtCO2e, compared to the 2023 plan, in the government’s forecast. This is enough to meet the target, according to the government, rather than breaching it by 32MtCO2e as the previous plan did.
What does the delivery plan mean for the UK economy?
The CBGD plan includes an overview of how the government plans to make changes across different sectors of the economy, in order to bring down their emissions in the 2030s.
Transport
The transport sector continues to be the UK’s biggest source of emissions, accounting for 26% of the country’s total, the CBGD plan says. This figure rises to 35% when the UK’s contribution to international aviation and shipping is considered.
In 2023, road travel accounted for around 90% of domestic transport emissions, the plan continues, chiefly from journeys by petrol cars and vans.
After entering power in July 2024, the Labour government met a manifesto pledge to reinstate a 2030 ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel vehicles.
This target was originally set by the Conservative government under Boris Johnson’s leadership in 2020, but then delayed to 2035 by Rishi Sunak in 2023 as part of a wider rollback of net-zero policies.
Johnson’s government had also pledged to introduce a zero emissions vehicle (ZEV) mandate to set specific sales targets for car manufacturers in the lead up to the ban.
The ZEV mandate came into force in January 2024. Labour’s CBGD plan notes that it is “driving sales that made the UK Europe’s largest zero-emission car market in 2024 and the third largest globally”.
However, despite growing numbers of EVs on UK roads, the market is currently set to miss the ZEV mandate for 2025. In May, EVs accounted for 21.8% of new car registrations, below the 28% target set by the ZEV mandate.
In April this year, the government made some “tweaks” to the ZEV mandate, including introducing rules allowing manufacturers to count hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles towards their pure EV sales goals.
In a letter to the transport secretary, the Climate Change Committee warned that the changes “could encourage a greater role for hybrid vehicles and a reduction in emissions savings”.
In addition, Labour’s CBGD plan sets out less ambitious targets for the total proportion of ZEV cars on UK roads than previous strategies set out under the Conservatives in 2021 and 2023.
Namely, the CBGD plan sets targets of 21% of all cars being ZEV by 2030 and 48% by 2035. This compares to targets of 24% by 2030 and 53% by 2035 set under the 2021 net-zero strategy.
The government’s new CBGD plan notes that key risks to delivering its planned cuts to transport emissions include that “zero emission cars and vans do not displace their petrol and diesel counterparts at the rate we forecast”. This is as a result of lower than anticipated demand or “wider global supply chain challenges”.
Another key risk could be “unanticipated growth in travel demand”, with this being “most acute for our projections of emissions from cars, vans and air travel”, the plan says.
Commentators have noted a lack of new action in the plan to tackle emissions from rising demand for air travel in the UK.
Juliet Michaelson, director of climate charity Possible, said in a statement that the plan “still lacks realistic thinking on the most difficult to decarbonise areas, such as aviation”.
Colin Walker, head of transport at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), added that the government is continuing to “pin its hopes for cutting aviation emissions on sustainable aviation fuels and technological innovations that are still very much in their infancy”, while “failing to encourage ultra-frequent flyers from making more sustainable choices”.
Heat and buildings
Buildings remain one of the biggest sources of emissions in the UK, accounting for 74MtCO2e in 2023, or 17% of the country’s emissions.
This is predominantly due to the use of gas in heating systems, with 85% of UK homes using the fossil fuel to keep warm, according to the NGO Nesta.
However, efforts to decarbonise emissions from heating, in particular, have been viewed as contentious in some sections of the UK media, with outlets often referencing the “fury” of the public at policies dubbed “boiler bans” or “boiler taxes”.
One of the most significant policies to cut emissions in the sector is the “warm homes plan”, which the government is planning to publish “shortly”. The plan was set to be published in October, but is now expected after the autumn budget in November.
The scheme was first announced in spring 2025 by the newly appointed Labour government, with the goal of lifting more than a million households out of fuel poverty by 2030. During the spending review over the summer, the government said £13.2bn would be allocated to the scheme.
The policy is set to support the rollout of heat pumps and heat networks, alongside energy efficiency measures and other technologies, such as solar and batteries. More details are set to follow when the warm homes plan is published.
Beyond this, the CBGD plan includes other previously announced policies, such as the “boiler upgrade scheme”, which provides vouchers of up to £7,500 to support the rollout of heat pumps. The plan notes that the budget for this scheme has been almost doubled this financial year to £295 and funding will continue to increase each year up to 2029/30.
The delivery plan states that the government’s “vision is that, over the next decade, low-carbon solutions will become the natural choice for all households”.
It adds that, by the early 2030s, the government expects that more than one million existing homes will transition to low-carbon heating, as part of the “normal cycle of replacing an existing heating appliance (such as a gas boiler) at the end of its life”. By 2035, low-carbon heating will represent the majority of all heating-system replacements.
This new target seems to take over from the previous goal of 600,000 installations a year by 2028, which was included in the previous two versions of the CBGD plan. While the number of installations has been increasing, the UK has consistently fallen short of the level needed to meet this goal.
Additionally, the delivery plan removes the controversial “ban” on the sale of gas boilers in 2035, set under the previous Conservative government. The government notes that it will “continue to refine” its approach in coming years and consider additional interventions if needed.
The delivery plan’s technical annex notes that the modelling does not include any use of hydrogen for heating at present, but that the government will consult on it further in the future. It adds:
“As hydrogen is not yet a proven technology for home heating, any role would come much later and would likely be limited. If we conclude that hydrogen could play a role then some of the savings to be delivered by heat pump deployment in on gas grid homes could instead be delivered through hydrogen heating.”
Industry, CCS and hydrogen
In 2023, the UK’s industry emissions were 64MtCO2e, equivalent to 15% of total territorial emissions, the government says.
According to the CBGD plan, this represents a 12% decrease from 2019 levels and a 60% drop from 1990 levels.
The plan notes that the industrial sector “has a significant contribution to make to enable carbon budgets to be met”.
In June, the government set out a 10-year industry strategy, which it says aims to “drive long-term sustainable, inclusive and secure growth through securing investment into crucial sectors of the economy”.
The plan says that the government will also set out a “refreshed industrial decarbonisation plan”, which will “set the strategic direction for our approach to working with industry towards a competitive and low-carbon industrial base in the UK”.
It continues that the government is “looking at what could be delivered with further government action on resource and energy efficiency, fuel switching and CCUS [carbon, capture, utilisation and storage]”.
The plan says that the government is supporting fuel-switching and energy efficiency through its industrial energy transformation fund, which was launched in 2020 with plans to support the deployment of projects until 2028. (In July, the government confirmed that it is closing the fund to new applicants.)
In June, Miliband confirmed that £200m will be provided to progress the Acorn carbon capture and storage (CCS) scheme in Aberdeenshire, Scotland.
Despite this, the CBGD plan is less ambitious on both industrial resource efficiency and industrial CCS than previous net-zero strategies under the Conservatives in 2021 and 2023.
The government’s 2021 net-zero strategy set a target of industrial resource efficiency providing 11MtCO2e in savings by 2035. However, the CBGD plan has a target of just 5.4MtCO2e.
In addition, the 2021 net-zero strategy targeted 7MtCO2e of industrial CCS by 2035. The CBGD plan targets just 4.3MtCO2e.
The CBGD also cuts back a separate target for engineered greenhouse gas removal (GGR) techniques to provide 5MtCO2 in emissions savings by 2030, first made in the 2021 net-zero strategy.
(Engineered GGRs are technological methods for removing CO2 from the atmosphere, such as by using giant fans to suck the gas out of the air.)
The CBGD revises down this target to just 0.51MtCO2 a year from 2028-32.
Commenting on this decision, Prof Steve Smith, a GGR scientist at the University of Oxford, posted on LinkedIn, saying:
“This revision is reflective of the fact that little-to-no removal tech has actually been deployed in the UK since the 5Mt target was set. 2030 is really not far away in project development terms. We know from 20 years of experience with emission reductions that plans often fall behind (e.g. home insulation, CCS). Sensible strategy involves pursuing new technologies while being live to the risk of over-optimism in them.”
On hydrogen, the CBGD plan says the government is continuing to “support the rollout of hydrogen production to meet demand across sectors requiring hydrogen to decarbonise”.
It notes that, as part of the autumn 2024 budget, the government confirmed support for 11 green hydrogen projects and shortlisted another 27 projects for potential approval in April 2025.
However, the CBGD also significantly reduces ambition on clean hydrogen production, compared to previous net-zero strategies.
The CBGD targets 4 terawatt hours (TWh) of clean hydrogen production by 2030 and 24TWh by 2035. This compares to 40TWh by 2030 and 80-140TWh by 2035 under the 2021 net-zero strategy.
On LinkedIn, Harry Smith, an industrial emissions expert at the consultancy Aether, posted that the “deployment of low-carbon hydrogen no longer meets the 2030 targets set out in the 2021 UK hydrogen strategy”.
A new hydrogen strategy is due to be published this autumn.
Electricity
The power sector now makes up 10% of the UK’s emissions, accounting for around 44MtCO2e in 2023. Of this, gas combustion makes up around 75%.
Overall, the sector has decarbonised significantly, with CO2 emissions per unit of electricity falling by more than two-thirds in a decade, according to previous Carbon Brief analysis.
This is due to the rollout of renewable energy technologies and the closure of coal-fired power plants.
However, the UK has some of the most expensive electricity in the world. While this is due predominantly to gas prices – which set the wholesale cost of electricity 98% of the time – it remains a challenge for driving decarbonisation through electrification.
The cost of electricity in the UK is a key focus of the CBGD plan, which notes:
“The price disparity between electricity and gas needs to be addressed to make it more attractive for consumers to install clean technologies like heat pumps. Over this parliament, the government will be working relentlessly to translate the much cheaper wholesale costs of clean power into lower bills for consumers. This will be core to every decision we make. We will set out our plan in due course.”
The new CBGD plan does not include “rebalancing” the cost of gas bills relative to electricity, as the previous delivery plan did. It also does not consider shifting levies away from electricity bills.
Instead, the focus is broadly on the expansion of clean-power technologies, predominantly through pre-existing policies.
This includes investing in 80 power networks and enabling infrastructure projects, costing an estimated £40bn annually in the coming years. The plan recognises that the electricity network “must undergo unprecedented expansion”. (It is worth noting that, with or without net-zero targets in place, the UK’s grid would need constant investment and upgrades.)
The government also notes that it will work to “ensure appropriate planning arrangements, acceleration of grid connections and strong supply chains” to underpin this.
For example, the “strategic spatial energy plan” was commissioned to the National Energy System Operator in October 2024 and aims to “support a more actively planned approach” to electricity infrastructure.
The CBGD plan often points to the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, published in December 2024, which set out the government’s approach to decarbonising the electricity sector by 2030.
It states that the government is investing “record amounts in clean energy, climate and nature”, including £63bn in capital funding.
The plan specifically highlights a final investment decision that was taken earlier this year to build Sizewell C nuclear power plant in Suffolk, with £14.2bn in funding allocated to the project. The government has also brought in reforms to the upcoming contracts for difference renewable energy subsidy auction to “maximise competition between bidders and reduce the costs to consumers”.
In addition, the first projects by the government’s new, publicly owned clean-energy company, Great British Energy, have also now been launched.
To support the rapid expansion of power-sector infrastructure, the plan notes that the “urgent need for change means we must undertake a wide-ranging reform programme”.
Finally, the plan notes that “hydrogen to power” has the “potential to play a key role” in the electricity system, along with other technologies that offer flexibility, such as power CCUS and energy storage.
Farming and land use
In 2023, agriculture and other land use accounted for 11% of the UK’s total greenhouse gas emissions, when international aviation and shipping is included, the CBGD plan says.
It adds that cow and sheep farming “currently make up the largest share of these emissions”.
The CBGD lists some of the government’s major policies for cutting emissions from agriculture and land use.
This includes the environment land management schemes (Elms), a post-Brexit project to pay farmers to cut CO2 emissions and protect nature on their land, first introduced by Boris Johnson’s government in 2020.
The CBGD plan says that “half of all farmed land” is now under Elms and that spending for the schemes will increase from £800m in 2023-24 to £2bn by 2028-29.
The National Farmers Union (NFU) has previously called the claim that spending had increased “misleading”, as farmers were originally promised a figure of £2.4bn a year from Elms after Brexit, the Guardian reported.
The largest of the Elms schemes is the sustainable farming initiative, the CBGD plan says.
In May, the government was forced to reverse a decision to close applications for the scheme after the NFU threatened legal action, according to Edie.
More widely, Labour’s plans to introduce an inheritance tax on farmers when businesses are worth more than £1m has caused mass protests across the country in recent months.
The CBGD plan revises down its deployment assumptions for the percentage of farmers taking up low-carbon practices, when compared to net-zero strategies from the Conservatives in 2021 and 2023.
Previous net-zero strategies set an assumption of 75% of farmers taking up low-carbon practices by 2030 and 85% by 2035. The CBGD sets assumptions of 67% by 2030 and 74% by 2035.
The Climate Change Committee has said the government must have a comprehensive plan for restoring peatlands if it is to meet the UK’s net-zero goal.
Healthy peatlands are carbon-rich habitats that support a range of species. However, some 80% of the UK’s peatlands are degraded, with the carbon they release accounting for 5% of the UK’s total greenhouse gas emissions.
The CBGD plan says that, under the Elms landscape recovery scheme, 35,000 hectares of peatlands will be restored, in addition to the 30,000 hectares targeted for restoration under a separate nature for climate peatland grant scheme.
However, the CBGD also revises down its deployment assumptions for peatland restoration, compared to previous net-zero strategies.
The 2021 net-zero strategy assumed that just over 10,000 hectares of peatlands would be restored in 2030. The CBGD plan has a lower figure of just under 8,000 hectares for the same date.
The CBGD plan also significantly revises down expectations for tree-planting, compared to previous strategies.
The 2021 net-zero strategy assumed that 40,000 hectares of new trees would be planted in 2030. The CBGD has a much lower number of 7,455 hectares for 2030.
Tom Cantillon, senior analyst at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), noted in a statement that the CBGD plan “seems to reduce ambition” on restoring peatlands and planting trees. He adds:
“With climate change worsening flooding in the UK, unless we work with nature by planting more trees and restoring habitats like peatlands to capture rainfall, people’s homes and farmers’ fields will be at ever greater risk.”
The post Q&A: The UK government’s ‘carbon budget delivery plan’ for 2035 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: The UK government’s ‘carbon budget delivery plan’ for 2035
Alexandria Gordon is manager of policy and development at the Women’s Environment & Development Organization) and Demet Intepe, PhD, is a climate adaptation and resilience expert with Practical Action.
If the world genuinely intends to help people adapt to climate change, including women cannot be treated as optional. It must be the starting point for every plan and policy.
Across the Global South, climate impacts are already reshaping daily life. Floods, droughts and heatwaves are destroying homes, crops and livelihoods.
Evidence consistently shows that when women and girls participate fully in adaptation efforts, entire societies benefit. Putting gender at the centre makes adaptation stronger, more equitable, and more sustainable.
COP30 was expected to cement this understanding. Touted as “the COP of Adaptation,” it fell far short. Once again, decisions were made without meaningful consideration for the people already facing the harshest climate impacts. Communities trying to protect their homes, harvests and livelihoods are still denied the resources and action they urgently need.
“Coordinated backlash”: Activists say COP30 gender spat reflects wider threat
The UN Environment Programme’s annual Adaptation Gap Report outlines the scale of investment required to address escalating climate risks. What remains missing is political will – the willingness to respond to communities already facing loss, and to acknowledge that adaptation fails without women because it ignores half the knowledge and leadership societies depend on.
Women are central to decisions about land, food, water, care and community organising on farms, in markets, in local government, cooperatives or social movements. When their rights, voices and priorities are excluded, policies address only part of the risk, funding bypasses those best placed to use it, and solutions fail to reflect how communities actually adapt.
Women leading adaptation on the ground
Purnima Rani Biswas in Bangladesh rebuilt her livelihood after Cyclone Amphan devastated her village in 2020. When floodwaters finally receded, she and her community received training to restore their fields and strengthen resilience. Purnima began growing crops on elevated dykes above future flood levels.
Her success inspired neighbours, proving that farming on shifting, flood‑prone land is possible. Recovery has been slow, but the community now believes adaptation is achievable.
Saraswati Sonar, chair of her local Community Disaster Management Committee in Nepal, plays a crucial role in keeping her community safe. She regularly contacts government hotlines for weather updates and alerts elderly people, pregnant women, and families with young children when evacuation is necessary. Her leadership ensures timely, life‑saving action.
These examples show that women are not passive victims of climate change - they are active agents of resilience.
What gender‑responsive adaptation really means
Language shapes action. Terms like “gender‑sensitive” often become symbolic rather than transformative. “Gender‑responsive,” however, demands concrete action. It means:
- Integrating gender as a priority across planning, budgeting, implementation, and monitoring
- Recognising unequal access to land, income, technology, mobility and decision‑making, and how these shape people’s ability to adapt
- Acknowledging who grows food, collects water, rebuilds homes, and who is left behind during crises.
Gender-responsive adaptation is not about elevating women above others. It is about making climate policy effective. Without women, climate action fails – and risks deepening existing inequalities rather than reducing vulnerability.
Yet at COP30, some governments resisted the term “gender-responsive,” preferring weaker language that allows them to avoid meaningful commitments to equity and justice.
What COP30 achieved and where it fell short
Despite major shortcomings, COP30 delivered a few important steps for gender and adaptation. A new Gender Action Plan was adopted, intended to help mainstream gender across national plans and global policies. Its impact will depend on whether governments implement it meaningfully.
Under the Global Goal on Adaptation, countries adopted 59 indicators to track progress, including a gender-specific indicator. This is a significant step forward: for the first time, global reporting will show whether national adaptation policies are genuinely gender-responsive.
Tripling adaptation finance is just the start – delivery is what matters
However, progress was uneven. National Adaptation Plans moved in the wrong direction, with gender commitments weakened and made conditional “only when applicable”, rather than central. This risks sidelining gender entirely unless civil society holds governments to account.
Adaptation finance was COP30’s biggest failure. The decision to “triple adaptation finance by 2035” remains vague and falls short of meeting adaptation needs. The Adaptation Fund, a leader in integrating gender into climate finance, received pledges of only around $135 million – less than half its $300 million target. Without predictable, grant-based finance, even the strongest plans cannot reach the communities that need them most.
What needs to happen next
Real adaptation happens in homes, fields, forests and coastal villages, not in negotiation rooms. Communities living through climate impacts already know what works. Community‑led, gender‑just approaches consistently reduce climate risk and build resilience.
To turn the Gender Action Plan’s commitments into action, governments must:
- Make gender-responsive adaptation non‑negotiable
- Invest in locally led solutions that prioritise community leadership and women’s intergenerational knowledge
- Ensure finance reaches frontline communities without creating new debt
- Use the GGA indicators to strengthen transparency and accountability
Organisations such as the Women’s Environment and Development Organization and Practical Action already work with communities using rights-based, gender-just approaches that reflect local needs and priorities. It is crucial for organisations that work directly with most impacted communities to be part of conversations on adaptation, including countries’ policy development.
From commitments to action
For COP decisions to matter, they must translate into action on the ground. Adaptation can no longer remain the slow lane of climate action, and gender can no longer be sidelined. Every global decision and national action must now be intentionally gender-responsive.
Why adaptation fails without women is no mystery. The question is who will act on what we already know?
The post Women must be a starting point, not an afterthought, for adaptation appeared first on Climate Home News.
Women must be a starting point, not an afterthought, for adaptation
Climate Change
Bridging Knowledge Systems: Indigenous Nations and Academia Collaborate on Climate Research in Canada
On the tundra in Inuit Nunangat, an Elder kneels by thinning sea ice, pointing to the cracks forming earlier each spring. Nearby, community youth work with researchers to set up monitoring equipment that tracks ice thickness, temperature shifts, and permafrost thaw. Together, they are documenting climate change not from separate vantage points, but in conversation, where Inuit knowledge of the land and Western science meet.
Across Canada, such collaborations are on the rise. Indigenous Nations and academic institutions are joining forces to confront climate change, weaving together Indigenous ways of knowing with scientific methods. These partnerships hold immense promise: they deepen understanding, inform adaptation strategies, and strengthen resilience for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. But they also raise urgent questions about ethics, ownership, and how to move beyond colonial legacies that have historically extracted and exploited Indigenous knowledge.
The Promise and Pitfalls of Collaboration
When done respectfully, Indigenous–academic partnerships generate knowledge that neither system could produce alone. Indigenous expertise, rooted in millennia of relationship with land, water, and sky, offers insights into biodiversity, ecosystem health, and patterns of climate change that Western science is only beginning to measure. Meanwhile, academic research provides tools like data modelling, satellite mapping, and policy advocacy that can elevate Indigenous voices in national and global decision-making spaces.
Yet the pitfalls are significant. Indigenous intellectual property (IP), the stories, practices, symbols, and innovations that belong to Indigenous Peoples, has too often been taken without consent, acknowledgment, or benefit. In Canadian history, knowledge of plants, medicines, and land-use practices has been extracted and patented, leaving communities with nothing but loss and mistrust. These harms are not distant memories; they shape the caution and hesitation many Indigenous Nations feel when approached by universities today.
For Indigenous communities, protecting IP is not only about legal safeguards. It is about sovereignty: the right to control how knowledge is shared, by whom, and for whose benefit. Without this, collaboration risks reproducing the very colonial patterns it claims to resist.
Academia’s Growing Commitment to Ethical Partnerships
Thankfully, many Canadian academic institutions are beginning to come to terms with this history and adopt new approaches to research. Universities are developing frameworks and policies that embed principles of respect and accountability, such as:
- Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC): Research can only proceed with the voluntary and fully informed agreement of Indigenous Nations.
- Respect for Indigenous data sovereignty: Communities must control how data is stored, accessed, and used.
- Co-creation of research questions and methods: Projects must be shaped together, not imposed by academics.
- Equitable sharing of benefits and authorship: Indigenous collaborators must be credited and compensated fairly.
- Long-term accountability: Partnerships should outlast funding cycles and continue to serve community priorities.
This shift is not perfect, nor is it complete. But the trajectory is encouraging: Indigenous governance and ethics are increasingly central to climate research in Canada.
Consequences of Collaboration: Good and Bad
The outcomes of these partnerships are not abstract. They have real consequences for climate action on the ground. Where research has gone wrong, communities recall sacred sites being surveyed without consent, knowledge of medicinal plants being patented for corporate use, and environmental studies that used Indigenous stories but excluded Indigenous voices from authorship. These failures reinforce mistrust and make communities wary of outsiders.
By contrast, when done well, collaboration strengthens both knowledge and resilience. For example:
- The Kainai Nation and the University of Calgary collaborate on drought adaptation, combining climate modelling with traditional food system knowledge to develop locally grounded strategies.
- The Tłı̨chǫ Government and Carleton University are monitoring permafrost thaw in the Northwest Territories, where Indigenous knowledge guides interpretation while scientific tools quantify the scale of change.
- The Anishinabek Nation and Lakehead University collaborate to restore wild rice beds, combining ecological monitoring with stewardship practices that sustain both ecosystems and culture.
These projects illustrate what is possible when Indigenous leadership is respected and academic expertise is aligned with community priorities.
Youth, Future Generations, and the Global Context
Collaboration is not only about research results, but also about building capacity for future generations. Training Indigenous youth in both traditional and scientific methods ensures continuity of stewardship and opens pathways into climate sciences, data analysis, engineering, and policy. This intergenerational transfer is critical, as it is young people who will live most directly with the consequences of climate change.
Canada is not alone in this work. Around the world, Indigenous communities are leading partnerships with academia. Māori researchers in Aotearoa, New Zealand, develop coastal restoration strategies grounded in whakapapa (genealogy), and Sámi leaders in Scandinavia combine herding knowledge with climate models to track changes in snow and migration patterns.
Canada has an opportunity and a responsibility to lead globally by embedding Indigenous governance within research institutions and climate policy.
What Indigenous Communities Should Consider
When invited into research collaborations, Indigenous Nations should feel empowered to set terms, ask questions, and safeguard their knowledge. Key considerations include:
- Consent: Has Free, Prior, and Informed Consent been obtained, clearly and respectfully?
- Intellectual Property: Who owns the data and knowledge? How will it be used, stored, and protected?
- Community Benefit: Does this project address our priorities and bring tangible benefits to our people?
- Co-creation: Were we part of shaping the questions and methods, or are we being slotted into a pre-existing framework?
- Cultural Protocol: Are researchers prepared to follow our laws, ceremonies, and privacy requirements?
- Data Sovereignty: Will data remain under our governance?
- Capacity Building: Will this train our youth, employ our people, or build local expertise?
- Publication Rights: Do we have control over how findings are published, and will our members be acknowledged as co-authors?
- Exit Plan: What happens when the project ends? Will knowledge, data, and benefits remain with us?
These questions are not barriers; they are safeguards to ensure collaboration is ethical, reciprocal, and grounded in Indigenous sovereignty.
Strengthening Indigenous–Academic Partnerships
To move forward, Canada must think beyond project-by-project partnerships and build systemic change built in true collaboration with Indigenous-led initiatives such as:
- Embedding Indigenous governance in research ethics boards.
- Supporting Indigenous-led research universities and centres of excellence.
- Creating funding streams that prioritize Indigenous research sovereignty.
- Establishing national policy frameworks to protect Indigenous knowledge.
- Formalizing spaces for reciprocal knowledge exchange that place Indigenous and Western knowledge systems on equal footing.
These steps shift collaboration from a transactional to a transformational approach.
A Call to Action
The convergence of Indigenous knowledge and academic research offers immense promise in confronting climate change. Together, these systems can generate insights grounded in centuries of relational stewardship and sharpened by scientific rigour. But true collaboration demands more than goodwill. It requires dismantling colonial patterns, affirming Indigenous intellectual sovereignty, and ensuring that research benefits the lands and peoples from which it arises.
To academia: move beyond consultation and share governance of research with Indigenous Nations.
To governments: fund Indigenous-led research and respect Indigenous sovereignty in climate policy.
To Indigenous Nations: know your power, set the terms, protect your knowledge, and demand reciprocity.
The path forward shines brightest when Indigenous and academic knowledge systems walk side by side. If Canada adopts this model, the future will not only be more just, but also more resilient for the land, the waters, and future generations.
Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock
Image Credit : Julian Gentile, Unsplash
The post Bridging Knowledge Systems: Indigenous Nations and Academia Collaborate on Climate Research in Canada appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.
In 2025, greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities turned what should have been a cooler year into one of the hottest ever, fuelling more dangerous and frequent heatwaves, droughts, storms and wildfires, climate scientists said in an annual report.
Planet-heating emissions primarily caused by burning fossil fuels pushed temperatures this year to “extremely high” levels, worsening extreme weather with devastating consequences – especially for the world’s most vulnerable, concluded scientists working with the World Weather Attribution (WWA) group.
Despite the return of La Niña – a climate pattern linked to large-scale cooling of the Pacific Ocean, which can temporarily bring milder global temperatures – the EU monitoring service Copernicus has said 2025 is “virtually certain” to end as the second- or third-warmest year on record.
In its report released on Tuesday, the WWA research group found that climate change made 17 of the 22 extreme weather events it assessed this year more severe or more likely, while its remaining studies were inconclusive, mostly due to a lack of weather data from remote areas.
Ranging from heatwaves in South Sudan and Western Europe to extreme rainfall in Southeast Asia and wildfires in Los Angeles, those disasters killed thousands of people and displaced millions from their homes.
11 extra hot days since Paris Agreement
Theodore Keeping, a researcher at Imperial College London, said the catastrophic wildfires, record-breaking rainfall, unprecedented temperatures and devastating hurricanes seen in the last 12 months provide “undeniable evidence” of a rapidly changing global environment.
“We are living in the climate that scientists warned about a decade ago, when the Paris Agreement was signed,” he added.
Since the landmark accord was adopted in 2015, global average temperatures have risen by about 0.3C, and the world now experiences an average of 11 additional hot days each year, according to WWA’s research.
-
Nine of our best climate stories from 2025
This year, we reported on palm oil being passed off as ‘sustainable aviation fuel’, on creative accounting in climate finance and on African countries’ challenges using transition minerals to develop -
UN accepts overshooting 1.5C warming limit – at least temporarily – is “inevitable”
UN chief António Guterres says the world’s temperature will rise by more than 1.5C over pre-industrial levels but can be brought down
For the first time, global average temperatures over the last three years are on track to exceed 1.5C, the most ambitious goal governments agreed in Paris, according to the EU’s Copernicus service. The UK’s Met Office expects 2026 to be between 1.34C and 1.58C hotter than preindustrial levels.
“The continuous rise in greenhouse gas emissions has pushed our climate into a new, more extreme state, where even small increases in global temperatures now trigger disproportionately severe impacts,” said Sjoukje Philip, a researcher at the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI). “We are entering a new era of climate extremes, where what was once an anomaly is quickly becoming the norm,” she added.
Silent-killer heatwaves
While heatwaves don’t leave a visible trail of destruction and often go underreported, the research group found they were the deadliest extreme weather event of 2025. One study estimated that climate change more than tripled the number of deaths caused by searing temperatures recorded across Europe this summer.
In South Sudan, extreme heat forced schools to close for two weeks in February 2025 after dozens of children collapsed with heatstroke. Human-made climate change made that heatwave 4C hotter and transformed an exceptionally rare event into a common one, now expected to happen every other year in South Sudan, a WWA assessment found.
Keeping of Imperial said the impacts are disproportionately shouldered by women and girls who predominantly work in sectors with high heat exposure such as agriculture and street-vending.
Flood risks rise as adaptation limits near
Floods were the disasters most studied by the WWA team in 2025, with devastating downpours made worse by climate change hitting Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the Mississippi River Valley in the US and Botswana.
In the Southern African nation, spells of extreme rainfall are becoming more frequent within a single year, while the rapid expansion of urban centres without adequate infrastructure upgrades makes them more susceptible to severe flooding, according to WWA.
The research group said this underscores the urgency of investing in measures to adapt to a warming world which can prevent many deaths and widespread destruction but remain critically underfunded.
However, the scientists also warned that even strong efforts to prepare for disasters cannot prevent all impacts, as climate change is already pushing millions close to the “limits of adaptation”.
“Jamaica was in a state of preparedness for Hurricane Melissa five days before landfall,” noted Keeping, “but when such an intense storm hits a small island nation in the Caribbean, even high levels of preparedness cannot prevent extreme losses and damages”.
Fossil fuel dependency is “costing lives”
Hurricane Melissa caused an estimated $8.8 billion in physical damage in Jamaica, equal to 41% of the country’s 2024 GDP, with only a small share of the losses expected to be covered by innovative insurance schemes.
In their report, WWA researchers said that drastically reducing fossil fuel emissions remains the key policy to prevent the worst climate impacts.
“Decision-makers must face the reality that their continued reliance on fossil fuels is costing lives, billions in economic losses, and causing irreversible damage to communities worldwide,” said Friederike Otto, WWA’s co-founder.
The post “New era of climate extremes” as global warming fuels devastating impacts in 2025 appeared first on Climate Home News.
“New era of climate extremes” as global warming fuels devastating impacts in 2025
CICNDT Brings Advanced Blade Inspections to Wind Energy
Arby’s Leaves Eight States and Cans 1400 Workers
Women must be a starting point, not an afterthought, for adaptation
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Climate Change5 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases5 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change Videos2 years ago
The toxic gas flares fuelling Nigeria’s climate change – BBC News
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Why airlines are perfect targets for anti-greenwashing legal action