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Promises to improve the UK’s food security feature in the election manifestos that have been published ahead of the vote on 4 July.

The Conservatives say they can provide a future where “national, border, energy and food security are put first”. Labour says that “food security is national security”.

Food supplies have been impacted by geopolitical conflicts, extreme weather events and rising costs around the world in recent months.

The UK government recently described its food security situation as “broadly stable”, but that it is facing “longer-term risks” from climate change.

Food security is “very low on the political agenda”, a food policy expert tells Carbon Brief, adding that “politicians really don’t yet get how important and how fragile the food system is”.

Below, Carbon Brief examines the range of factors tying into the UK’s food security, how they are impacted by climate change and how some of the biggest parties discuss these issues.

How food secure is the UK?

In a broad sense, food security refers to people in a particular country or region having enough access to food.

This is achieved when “all people, at all times” have access to enough “safe and nutritious food” to meet their needs and preferences for an “active and healthy life”, according to a definition agreed at a 1996 World Food Summit.

Sufficient “access” to food depends on a number of different factors, including costs, supply, types of food, nutritional needs and where the food comes from. These factors vary on a national and local level.

Food security in the UK is “broadly stable”, according to the government’s first food security index released last month. However, this follows a “challenging period of global supply chain shocks”.

The government says that this stability should also be taken in the context of “longer-term risk from climate change”. (See: How does climate change impact food security?

In terms of food supply, it says that the ratio of food produced in the UK to food imported from other countries was “broadly stable” in 2022, which is the most recent data available.

The UK produced 60% of its own food and 73% of “indigenous foods” that are natively grown, such as carrots and onions. This was a drop of 1% in each case compared to 2021.

Overall, the UK imports around 40% of its food, the government notes. As the chart below shows, these imports come from a range of countries, including the Netherlands, France and Ireland.

The countries from which the UK imported food and drink in 2022, shown in the value of imports in millions of pounds. Source: Department for Environment and Rural Affairs.
The countries from which the UK imported food and drink in 2022, shown in the value of imports in millions of pounds. Source: Department for Environment and Rural Affairs.

The UK produces most of the cereals, meat, dairy and eggs eaten by people across the country. It is much more reliant on imported fruit and vegetables than any other type of food, which is a similar situation to Ireland.

The chart below outlines the “production to supply ratio” of raw foods. The figures indicate, as a percentage, how much of each of the consumed food types are produced in the UK. So, for example, the UK produces 17% of the fruit and 55% of the vegetables it consumes. In contrast, the UK produces more lamb and milk than it consumes. 

The production to supply ratio of different food types in the UK in 2022. This compares the amount of food produced in the UK with what is consumed. Source: Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
The production to supply ratio of different food types in the UK in 2022. This compares the amount of food produced in the UK with what is consumed. Source: Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

Different foods are imported from different countries around the world, such as citrus fruits from Spain, tomatoes from the Netherlands and India, and rice from Pakistan.

Supplies can, therefore, be hit by extreme weather abroad. This has happened numerous times, including when cold weather in Spain and Morocco led to severe shortages of lettuce, tomatoes and other crops in the spring of 2023.

In terms of production, the balance between home-grown and imported food is “integral to UK food security” as the country’s climate is unsuitable for products such as rice, bananas and tea, the government index says.

It adds that the government is “not complacent” about food security risks, especially from global “volatility”, climate change and biodiversity loss – all of which have “intensified” in recent years, it notes.

Another key aspect of food security is affordability. Food prices have risen substantially around the world in recent years.

Carbon Brief recently spoke to a range of scientists and policy experts about the reasons for this, which include geopolitical conflicts, extreme weather events, high input costs and increased demand.

In the UK, the overall cost of food and non-alcoholic drinks increased by 25% between January 2022 to January 2024, according to the Office of National Statistics.

Around half of the respondents to a Food Standards Agency survey of the general public said they are “highly concerned” about the affordability of food. This figure doubled over the course of three years – from 26% in 2020 to 51% in 2023.

The percentage of survey respondents classified as “food insecure” stood at 25% by January 2023. Food insecurity means having limited or uncertain access to adequate amounts of food, the FSA says.

These results show that “the majority of people are worried about food prices”, the FSA chief Emily Miles said in a statement.

Prof Tim Lang, an emeritus professor of food policy at City University of London, says that food security is “very low on the political agenda” in the UK. He tells Carbon Brief:

“Politicians really don’t yet get how important and how fragile the food system is and its reliance on not just fossil fuels, but over half a century of investment into a particular model of efficiency which has all been about cutting options, cutting slackness, or perceived slackness, in the food system.”

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What have UK political parties pledged on food security?

In an interactive manifesto tracker, Carbon Brief recently examined the pledges made by the UK’s main political parties ahead of the election.

Both the Conservative government and the Labour opposition have been criticised by farming and food industry groups for not going far enough in their plans on food and agriculture. 

The Conservatives say they can provide a future where “national, border, energy and food security are put first”. They pledge to introduce a legally binding target to enhance the UK’s food security.

Introduce a legally binding target to enhance our food security. The target will apply UK-wide alongside our UK Food Security Index, the first of its kind, helping us determine where the best to concentrate farming funds. This will also feed into the development of the Land Use Framework.
A Conservative manifesto pledge about food security. Source: Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2024.

They also pledge to deliver the goal for at least half of the money spent on food in schools, hospitals and other public sector services to be used for food produced locally or to “higher environmental production standards”.

This proposal from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs defined “locally produced” as food that is grown or made in the same region, or a neighbouring county, as it is consumed.

These “higher” standards of production include organic farms or farmlands showing integrated management of natural habitats and biodiversity, soil management, pollution control and nature conservation.

Queries from Carbon Brief to the Conservative press office asking for more detail on their food security policies were left unanswered. 

Labour’s manifesto says that “food security is national security” and that the party will “champion British farming whilst protecting the environment”.

Support British farmers.
A Labour manifesto pledge about food security. Source: Labour Party Manifesto 2024.

Similar to the Conservative goal, the party will set a target to produce half of food purchased in the public sector either locally or in a way that is “certified to higher environmental standards”.

Carbon Brief’s request for more detail on this policy from the Labour press office also went unanswered.

A letter from the National Farmers’ Union (NFU), the British Retail Consortium and other groups to the leaders of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties criticised the lack of focus on food security in their manifestos, the Guardian reported last week.

The letter said the groups “heard very little about food security” compared to defence and energy security in recent weeks, the newspaper said. It added:

“The lack of focus on food in the political narrative during the campaigns demonstrates a worrying blind spot for those that would govern us.”

The Conservative manifesto pledges to increase the UK’s farming budget by £1bn over the term of the next parliament. 

Labour committed to maintaining England’s post-Brexit funding programme, the Environmental Land Management Schemes (read Carbon Brief’s Q&A here), but did not explicitly mention the UK’s agricultural budget.

NFU president Tom Bradshaw described this as “concerning”, the Daily Express reported. He told the outlet:

“Looking at the profitability of the farming sector, it’s on a knife edge.”

The Scottish National Party does not directly mention food security in its manifesto. It discusses agricultural funding, saying that the devolved Scottish government has received “no commitment from Westminster on any future funding for farming after 2025”.

The SNP calls for the UK government to increase farm funding and provide “certainty through multi-annual funding frameworks”.

The Liberal Democrats has pledged to introduce a “holistic and comprehensive national food strategy to ensure food security” alongside tackling food prices, ending food poverty and improving health and nutrition.

The party also promises to put an extra £1bn per year towards England’s Environmental Land Management Schemes.

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How does climate change impact food security?

Extreme weather can harm food supply and production, therefore impacting food security.

Heatwaves destroy crops and endanger agricultural workers. Heavy rainfall floods fields. Drought reduces crop yields. Climate change is a key driver in the increasing frequency and severity of these extremes.

Farmers in the UK have recently been affected by “soggy and turbulent weather”, Bloomberg reported. 

Muddy and waterlogged fields of brassica plants in Lancashire, England in November 2023.
Muddy and waterlogged fields of brassica plants in Lancashire, England in November 2023. Credit: Radharc Images / Alamy Stock Photo.

The UK had its eighth-wettest winter on record last year and a wetter-than-normal spring. Carbon Brief analysis shows that UK winters have become 1C warmer and 15% wetter in the past century.

Earlier this year, the Guardian reported that there could be food shortages and price rises due to this extreme weather.

This could lead to more shipments from abroad, but the newspaper said that “similarly wet conditions in European countries such as France and Germany, as well as drought in Morocco, could mean there is less food to import”.

In 2022, the heatwave which saw UK temperatures hit 40C for the first time pushed farmers “closer to the brink”, the Daily Telegraph reported at the time.

The hot, dry weather in July left farmers “watering crops which wouldn’t normally need watering such as sugar beet and maize”, the newspaper said, while “industry chiefs warned that very hot and sunny days were starting to stress apple trees and scorch fruit”.

It added that “fears that high temperatures will damage this year’s harvest in Britain, Europe and North America sent crop prices 7% higher last week, the biggest jump since the early days of the conflict in Ukraine”.

A dry field in Hertfordshire, England during the 2022 record-breaking UK summer.
A dry field in Hertfordshire, England during the 2022 record-breaking UK summer. Credit: Stephen Chung / Alamy Stock Photo.

A rapid attribution analysis suggested that human-caused climate change had made the UK’s record-breaking heatwave at least 10 times more likely. A separate study found that climate change had made the droughts across the northern hemisphere in 2022 at least 20 times more likely.

Speaking to Carbon Brief for a recent article, Prof Andy Challinor, a professor of climate impacts at the University of Leeds, said that “climate change is beginning to outpace us because it is interacting with our complex interrelated economic and food systems”.

He added that the way food systems have been set up “has huge implications for stability and resilience – or lack thereof”.

Lang tells Carbon Brief that there is some “lip service [and] some good initiatives” to address risks from climate change and biodiversity loss, but he adds:

“There are great things going on, but they are small compared to the enormous change that needs to happen.”

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How can the UK food system better prepare for shocks?

Lang says the next UK government has a “horrendous task” in tackling issues such as extreme weather, global shocks and other impacts negatively affecting food production.

He has been working on a report about UK food security and preparing for food shocks for the National Preparedness Commission, an independent body that promotes policies to prepare the UK for shocks. This is due to be released by the end of this summer.

Lang believes that a system change is necessary to deal with the range of different shocks and to tackle the food system’s contribution to climate change.

The global food system is responsible for around one-third of all human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. Within this, as much as half of those emissions come from rotted or otherwise wasted food, a 2023 study found.

In the UK, 12% of all greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture. Livestock is by far the biggest contributor to these emissions, as shown in the chart below. 

Greenhouse gas emissions (MtCO2e).
The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture in million tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions from 1990 to 2022, broken down by source: agricultural combustion (medium purple), livestock (black), agricultural soils (light purple) and other agricultural sources (dark purple). Source: Department for Energy Security & Net Zero.

Around 70% of the UK’s land is used for agriculture. Globally, half of all liveable land is used for agriculture. 

England’s National Food Strategy, published a few years ago, called for a rural land-use strategy to figure out the best ways to use land for nature, carbon sequestration, agriculture and other purposes.

The UK is due to release its delayed land-use report for England later this year. Before the general election was called, a conservative peer said the report would be published before the parliament’s summer recess.

A spokesperson for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs declined to comment on the current status of this report as it is an issue for the next government.

Food security should be a “central tenet” of this framework, the UK parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee said in December 2023.

The chart below highlights how land is currently allocated in the UK (left) and how much overseas land is used to produce food for the UK (right).

UK land area divided up by purpose. About 70% is devoted to agriculture, mainly livestock and livestock feed and pasture. The right-hand side of the chart, using the same scale, shows how much land is used overseas to produce food for the UK. About half of the total land use is overseas. The combined land area for rearing beef and lamb for UK consumption is larger than the UK itself. Source: National Food Strategy
UK land area divided up by purpose. About 70% is devoted to agriculture, mainly livestock and livestock feed and pasture. The right-hand side of the chart, using the same scale, shows how much land is used overseas to produce food for the UK. About half of the total land use is overseas. The combined land area for rearing beef and lamb for UK consumption is larger than the UK itself. Source: National Food Strategy.

On next steps, Lang says that he would like to see a number of actions from the next government on food security. He tells Carbon Brief:

“We need a national council of food policy. We need to have high priority to agri-food reform. We have got to actually start a programme of educating and teaching people better how to do things. We have got to get a grip on the runaway food manufacturing industry.

“At the moment, the politics of food is just blame. And blame doesn’t get political change.”

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The post Q&A: The state of the UK’s ‘food security’ in a fast-warming world appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: The state of the UK’s ‘food security’ in a fast-warming world

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Cropped 22 October 2025: Global forest loss dips; Bird species in peril; Climate impact on Thai trees

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We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Deforestation dropping, but not fast enough

LOSING FOREST: The world lost almost 11m hectares of forest each year over the past decade – an area almost the same size as Iceland, the UN Global Forest Resources Assessment found. The overall rate of deforestation slowed over 2015-25 – compared to annual losses of 13.6m hectares over 2000-15 and 17.6m hectares over 1990-2000. [Carbon Brief will publish an article later this week detailing more key findings.] Elsewhere, a different UN report found that annual spending on forests must more than triple to $300bn by 2030 to meet climate and nature goals.

Subscribe: Cropped
  • Sign up to Carbon Brief’s free “Cropped” email newsletter. A fortnightly digest of food, land and nature news and views. Sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

POOR PROGRESS: At the same time, a third report found that more than 8m hectares of forest was destroyed in 2024 – which is 63% above the trajectory needed to put an end to deforestation by 2030. The Forest Declaration Assessment report said that countries are off track to meet a pledge from more than 100 countries to halt and reverse global deforestation by 2030. It noted that agriculture caused 86% of global deforestation in the past decade. In its coverage of the report, Climate Home News noted that experts said the findings were a “wake-up call” ahead of COP30 in the Amazon.

FOREST FINANCE: An investigation from Global Witness found that banks and asset managers around the world generated $26bn from “financing deforesting companies” through investments, loans and other financial services between 2016 and 2024. US financial institutions earned the biggest gains, it said. Elsewhere, the EU “u-turn[ed]” on plans to delay its anti-deforestation law until 2026, instead suggesting tweaks to allow more time for compliance, according to Politico. Separately, an NGO report found that timber imports from companies operating in the EU “can be traced to logging on Indonesia’s Borneo island”, Agence France-Presse said.

Nature congress 

EXTINCTION RISK: A new global assessment published by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) found that more than 60% of the world’s bird species are in decline, the Guardian reported. In 2016, the equivalent figure was 44%. The outlet underscored that deforestation, largely bolstered by the expansion of agriculture and human development, is the main cause of falling populations. The Washington Post added that Arctic mammals, such as seals, whales and polar bears, are also “increasingly threatened by extinction” due to pressures from climate change.

SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT: The IUCN report also showed some “bright spot[s]”, as is the case with green sea turtles, which “have recovered substantially thanks to decades of conservation efforts”, explained the Washington Post. A scientist leading the sea turtle assessment told the New York Times that the rebound “comes down to reducing threats”. As another example of species recovery, the outlet pointed to the island of Rodrigues in the Indian Ocean, where two bird species on the brink of extinction are now listed as species of least concern, thanks to restoration work carried out by conservationists.

BIODIVERSITY CONGRESS: The report was published against the backdrop of this year’s IUCN congress on biodiversity conservation, which saw members adopt a 20-year strategic vision that boosts human rights and social justice alongside conservation, according to the IUCN. EFE Verde reported on the congress, where there was a call to action for countries to speed up the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and to ensure that 30% of the planet is protected by 2030. However, new analysis from Carbon Brief showed that just 28% of countries have submitted their plans for biodiversity conservation to the UN a year after the deadline.

News and views

WILDFIRE WATCH: The annual “state of wildfires” report found that extreme wildfires released more than 8bn tonnes of CO2 during the March 2024-February 2025 global fire season. The report, published by an international team of scientists and covered by Carbon Brief, showed that wildfires covered at least 3.7m square kilometres – an area larger than India – and exposed more than 100 million people around the world to these extremes.

BIOFUEL BOOST: At COP30, Brazil is expected to ask countries to quadruple their use of “sustainable fuels” over the next decade, including biofuels, biogas and hydrogen, as reported by the Guardian. A leaked document seen by the outlet revealed that Brazil argues biofuels will displace fossil fuels. However, biofuels – which are fuels derived from organic matter – are considered controversial by environmental experts, due to their potential to increase deforestation and promote monocultures, the outlet added. Separately, a new Carbon Brief Q&A explored how countries are using biofuels to meet their climate targets.

AGRIBUSINESS MOVE: Brazil’s agribusiness – the largest emitting-sector in the country and a major driver of deforestation – plans to present the country as a leader in sustainable agriculture at the upcoming COP30, Bloomberg reported. The farm lobby faces international pressure from policies such as the EU law that requires Brazil to ensure that its crop exports are free from deforestation, the outlet said.

LONG LIVE THE WHALES: A “historic lawsuit” to protect whales in the Gulf of California has been accepted for a hearing by two district courts in Mexico, Animal Político reported. The suit aims to declare the area a “critical habitat” and rule that previously granted permits for shipping liquefied natural gas through the gulf are unconstitutional. El País also covered the news and added that a coalition of civil-society organisations is advocating for the recognition of whales as “subjects of rights”.

LARGE EMISSIONS: In 2023, 45 major meat and dairy companies emitted more than 1bn tonnes of greenhouse gases, comparable to the emissions of top fossil-fuel producers, according to a new report by civil society organisations. The report found that the top five highest-emitting firms – JBS, Marfrig, Tyson, Minerva and Cargill – were responsible for 480m tonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions. The 45 firms’ methane emissions exceeded those from the EU and UK, it added. Elsewhere, Nestle withdrew from a global alliance of dairy producers for reducing methane emissions, without providing a reason, Reuters reported.

PRICE HIKE: Over the past year, extreme weather has driven up prices by 16% for five products – butter, beef, milk, coffee and chocolate – together responsible for 40% of food inflation over that time, according to research covered by the Daily Mail. The outlet said that “alternating periods of drought, extreme heat and heavy rainfall are affecting farmers” globally. The Financial Times also covered the report, writing that its “findings challenge the narrative promoted by industry groups that have linked high grocery bills to domestic policies”.

Spotlight

Researching climate impacts on Thai tree seeds

This week, Carbon Brief details how Kew Gardens researchers are studying the effects of extreme heat and drought on trees in Thailand.

Forests in Thailand, as in many other parts of the world, are feeling the effects of climate change – from the country’s mountain peaks in the north to its mangroves on the southern coast.

Scientists at Kew Gardens are assessing how certain tree species react to high temperatures and drought to help inform efforts in re-planting degraded forests across the country.

The is one of several projects from Kew’s Millennium Seed Bank, which this week marks its 25th anniversary. It is the world’s largest collection of wild plant seeds, holding almost 2.5bn seeds from 40,000 different species.

Incubating seeds

For the Thailand project, researchers collected 60,000 seeds from three tree species growing across the country. They focused on tree types which benefit local people, such as the Sapindus rarak, whose seed can be used as a washing detergent.

Dr Jan Sala and PhD student Nattanit Yiamthaisong sorting baskets of seeds
Dr Jan Sala and PhD student Nattanit Yiamthaisong, who was also involved in the research, collecting tree seeds in Thailand. Credit: Jan Sala/RBG Kew

The scientists sought seeds from areas with “different climates and altitudes” – ranging from the country’s highest mountain, Doi Inthanon, to its lowlands – to try to find out which areas yield resilient seeds, Dr Jan Sala, a researcher at the seed bank, told Carbon Brief.

The Kew team is collaborating on the project with the Forest Reforestation Research Unit (Forru), a research team at Chiang Mai University in Thailand that restores degraded forests.

The researchers are still analysing their data and hope to publish the findings next year, but Sala said initial observations show some “interesting” differences in how the thousands of tree seeds respond to warming and drought. He told Carbon Brief:

“We cannot say this for sure because we have not finished the analysis, but hopefully we identify a couple of populations…that are resilient to climate change.”

To study this, they put each of the thousands of seeds into incubators and subjected them to temperatures ranging from 5C to 50C across different periods of time. They wanted to see how the seeds germinate under various conditions and identify “whether a population or species reacts differently to temperature rising”, Sala says.

Building resilient forests

Dr Inna Birchenko, a research associate at the Millennium Seed Bank who was also involved in the project, told Carbon Brief that the Thailand study findings can help to ensure that restored forest plots have the “best chance for long-term survival”.

She noted that resilient forests “contribute to decarbonisation by locking carbon in the trunks, as opposed to just being a wasteland or being an agricultural land”.

Sala said the researchers hope to not only help Forru decide which seeds to use in different restoration projects, but also provide more information to “all practitioners across Thailand”.

Birchenko noted that while temperate trees are generally well-researched, tropical species are “so understudied”. She told Carbon Brief:

“Every day, I’m trying to find extra information about the genetics of this or that species, and there is absolutely nothing…So we are hoping that this potentially snowballs into more effort into this area.”

Watch, read, listen

FLYING HIGH: A Guardian article visualised how bird migration around the world is being reshaped by “new threats”, including climate change.

ON THE MOVE: Yale Environment 360 explored how US border-wall construction is “creating a roadblock” to the return of jaguars in the country’s south-west as Mexico’s populations recover.

OVERFISHING ISSUES: An article in Vox looked at how nature conservation projects in Madagascar could be reshaped to prevent them “mak[ing] it harder for desperately poor people to make a living”.
VALUABLE VOCABULARY: An Atmos video addressed a study on how the English language is losing nature-related words, undermining people’s connection to nature.

New science

  • China’s demand for Brazilian soya beans – used as animal feed – is driving agricultural expansion and deforestation in Brazil, with nearly 18m hectares of land in the South American country used to grow soya for export to China | Nature Food
  • A review of climate adaptation practices among vegetable farmers in Africa found that most solutions focused on addressing drought, flooding and rainfall, primarily through technological solutions | Communications Earth and Environment
  • Aboveground vegetation in Australian humid tropical forests has become a carbon source due to extreme temperatures and other climate anomalies, leading to higher rates of tree mortality and losses in biomass | Nature

In the diary

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 22 October 2025: Global forest loss dips; Bird species in peril; Climate impact on Thai trees appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Cropped 22 October 2025: Global forest loss dips; Bird species in peril; Climate impact on Thai trees

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Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules

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Only half of China’s provinces have finalised new rules for pricing wind and solar power, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Local governments are required to have published final plans to reform the way wind and solar power is priced in their jurisdiction before the end of this year.

This follows the release of a central government directive in February – known as “Document 136” (136号文) – that calls for developing a more “market-based” approach to pricing newly installed renewable projects.

The new rules will replace the previous pricing mechanism, which gave wind and solar generators guaranteed sales at a fixed price tied to the benchmark electricity price from coal.

The shift towards market-based pricing for wind and solar is seen as a key uncertainty for the sector, with implications for China’s wider energy and emissions targets.

Carbon Brief analysis finds that, as of 15 October 2025, only 18 provinces had issued finalised “Document 136” plans.

Another 10 have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet have yet to indicate what their strategies will be.

Central direction, local rules

In February this year, China’s central government issued a notice on “deepening market-based reform of feed-in tariffs for new energy”, also known as “Document 136”.

The document calls on local governments to develop plans for new pricing mechanisms for wind and solar power, applicable to projects completed on or after 1 June 2025.

Local governments are expected to develop “sustainable new-energy pricing mechanisms” (新能源可持续发展价格结算机制), in which they only offer a fixed price to a set amount of new wind and solar capacity each year.

The amount offered a fixed price is to be linked to each province’s annual clean-energy installation quotas. Moreover, the fixed price is to be determined at auction, through a mechanism resembling the UK’s contract for difference (CfD).

Any additional wind and solar projects, which are unable to secure contracts via the provincial auction mechanism, would need to find buyers for their electricity on the open market. This could be done through a “power purchase agreement” with a grid operator or a large industrial user, for example, or by selling their power in spot markets.

The move is part of wider efforts to shift China’s giant electricity system towards more market-based operation, rather than running on rules set by the government, including prices for coal-fired power plants determined by bureaucrats.

The shift towards market-based pricing for renewables has been attributed to both the falling costs of building new solar and windfarms, as well as to the grid challenges created by record renewable capacity additions.

At the time of the policy’s release earlier this year, analysts expected the rules to have a chilling effect on China’s wind and solar buildout in the short term, as developers adjust to the new rules and to lower – and more uncertain – prices set at auction.

The notice led to a rush of new capacity additions ahead of the June cut-off, with an estimated 100 solar cells being installed every second in the month of May.

However, a subsequent policy requiring cement, polysilicon and iron and steel manufacturers, as well as certain types of data centres, to use renewable power to fulfil a certain proportion of their overall consumption has been seen as a “backstop” that may buoy industry demand for new wind and solar capacity.

Furthermore, analysts believe that “Document 136” may strengthen China’s clean-energy industries in the long term, by forcing companies to become more innovative and competitive.

Below, Carbon Brief lists which provinces have published finalised “Document 136” pricing plans (green), which provinces have published a form of draft plan (yellow) and which provinces have yet not published their plans at all (white).

By default, provinces are listed in order of the size of their energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, based on a dataset for 2022 from the thinktank Institute of Global Decarbonization Progress.

New territory

So far, Carbon Brief finds, only just over half of provinces have issued finalised plans. Collectively, these provinces account for 61% of China’s energy-related emissions.

Another 10, representing 31% of emissions, have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet – the final 8% of CO2 – have yet to publish anything.

A few provinces published finalised rules in early June, including renewable-power heavyweights Shandong and Inner Mongolia.

(Inner Mongolia’s power grid is split into two zones – “Inner Mongolia East” and “Inner Mongolia West” – which are administered separately.)

In a nationwide conference call at the end of August, National Energy Administration officials urged provinces to “promptly promote” concrete plans.

Eleven provinces have published finalised rules since then, including major polluters Heilongjiang, Hebei and Guangdong, with a further eight publishing draft rules, according to Carbon Brief calculations. 

The delay in provinces completing their plans can be attributed to the fact that local policymakers are trying to establish a completely new system of pricing power from scratch, says David Fishman, principal at energy consultancy the Lantau Group.

He tells Carbon Brief that, for some of the provinces that have issued finalised rules, “fairly meaningful differences” can be found between the final version and earlier drafts – indicating a high level of debate on the best path forward.

Shandong province was the first to issue draft rules, setting the tone for other local governments’ documents.

The eastern province is seen as a leader both in renewable energy additions and in undertaking power-market reforms. It is also the largest source of energy-related emissions in China.

Its plan saw notable policy innovations, such as setting an auction subscription threshold of 125% to encourage competition, by ensuring that not all bidders will be successful.

In September, it also became the first province in China to hold auctions for solar and wind power under the new rules, with the winning bidders securing prices of 0.319 yuan per kilowatt-hour (yuan/kWh) for wind and 0.225 yuan/kWh for solar.

These prices are equivalent to £33.8 per megawatt hour (MWh), or $44.8/MWh, for wind and £23.8/MWh, or $31.6/MWh, for solar.

While the wind prices are seen as high enough to be relatively acceptable to project developers, the price for solar is below the level thought to be needed to finance such developments. As such, it could “discourage” further solar investment in the province, Reuters reports.

Shortly afterwards, the southwestern province of Yunnan also held its first renewables auction, setting a price of 0.33 yuan/kWh for both wind and solar projects.

Effect on future additions

Analysts disagree about what impact the “Document 136” policy will have on the pace of China’s clean-energy additions.

The country installed a record 360 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar in 2024, followed by an even higher 212GW in the first half of 2025 for solar alone, as developers rushed to complete ahead of the June deadline.

In September, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a target of 3,600GW of wind and solar capacity by 2035 as part of the country’s new “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) to the Paris Agreement.

While hugely ambitious in the context of current global wind and solar capacity, which stood at 1,400GW at the end of 2024, this new goal is equivalent to just 200GW of new wind and solar per year. This would be a significant slowdown compared with China’s recent pace of expansion.

Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief that he does not see the pricing reforms as a “signal of a structural slowdown in clean capacity [additions]”. He adds:

“Adding panels and turbines is the easy part…China is rewiring the world’s largest power sector, with multiple layers of interests and legacy assets to manage. In navigating this complexity, pledge targets act as a floor, providing certainty to clean-energy developers and clean-tech manufacturers. The NDC goal reflects what decision-makers are confident China can deliver given these constraints.”

But Fishman, writing on LinkedIn, notes that the pricing reforms could make it “challenging” for China to hit Xi’s new 2035 target.

Renewables developers are not incentivised to sustain previous years’ high installation figures under the local rules that have been rolled out so far, he notes, adding: “We will be lucky to see 200GW in a single year again for a long time.”

In its Renewables 2025 report, published in October 2025, the International Energy Agency (IEA) shaved 5% off its outlook for wind and solar growth in China out to 2030, a reduction of 129GW. It attributes this downgrade to the country’s renewable pricing reforms “impacting project economics and lowering growth expectations”.

Nevertheless, it adds that China is still projected to add “nearly 2,660GW” of new renewable capacity between 2025 and 2030, meaning that it would reach its 2035 wind and solar target “five years ahead of schedule”.

Bolstering storage demand

Beyond wind and solar capacity, “Document 136” also signalled potentially disruptive changes for China’s energy storage sector. It removed requirements at the central level that wind and solar projects must include a storage component.

This led to concerns at the time that demand for battery energy storage facilities could drop substantially.

In practice, however, different provinces have designed their own approaches to commissioning energy storage under their “Document 136” plans.

Some, such as Shandong, have eliminated energy storage requirements, while others, such as Yunnan and Guizhou have kept them.

A recent analysis by consulting firm Infolink argues that a significant drop in demand for energy storage projects is, therefore, “unlikely”, due to expected ongoing demand for “renewable integration and grid flexibility”.

Pumped storage and gas-fired power capacity make up only 7% of China’s electricity system – compared to 34% in Spain and 50% in the US, according to analysis by NGO Greenpeace. As such, it says there will likely be ongoing demand for battery storage as a major contributor to power flexibility in China.

The Chinese government set a target in a recent action plan for 180GW of new-energy storage by 2027, up from just over 100GW at the end of June 2025.

The target “directly addresses the issue of low short-term economic viability” of the energy storage sector caused by “Document 136”, economic news outlet Jiemian reports, although it notes that “uncertainties” still remain.

However, unnamed industry participants tell financial news outlet Yicai that the pricing reform has removed the storage sector’s “fig leaf”, meaning it is likely to result in the number of energy storage companies falling from the current figure of more than 200,000.

Yang tells Carbon Brief that the reforms will likely lead to “more storage-paired and hybrid projects” that better meet province-specific needs and “prioritise reliability and integration over headline [megawatts]”.

The post Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules

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Analysis: Just 28% of countries have released nature pledges a year after UN deadline

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Just 28% of countries have met a UN call to submit new plans on addressing nature loss – a year after the original deadline, Carbon Brief analysis shows.

Several of the world’s most biodiverse countries – including Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa – are among those that have not yet released their nature plans.

Countries were asked to submit their pledges, known as national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs), by the start of the COP16 biodiversity summit in Colombia on 21 October 2024.

After only 15% of nations met the original deadline, countries agreed at the summit to a new text that “urges” countries to release their NBSAPs “as soon as possible”.

Many developing countries have expressed that a lack of available funding has prevented them from publishing their NBSAPs.

A spokesperson for the Global Environment Facility (Gef), the multilateral fund that provides funding to help with the preparation of NBSAPs, tells Carbon Brief that 120 out of 139 countries that have requested financial support since COP16 have been able to access it.

The spokesperson adds that the UN Environment Programme is “working to resolve outstanding issues” to allow the remaining 19 countries to access financial assistance.

Lack of action

In 2022, nations signed a landmark agreement called the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), which aims to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030. It is often described as the “Paris Agreement for nature”.

As part of the agreement, countries agreed to submit new NBSAPs “by” COP16, which began on 21 October 2024 in Cali, Colombia. (Countries failed to find agreement on some key issues in Colombia and met again in Rome, Italy, in February 2025 for a resumed session of COP16.)

NBSAPs are blueprints for how individual countries plan to tackle biodiversity loss and ensure they meet the targets outlined in the GBF.

They are similar to nationally determined contributions (NDCs), the plans that outline how individual countries envisage meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. However, a key difference is that countries are legally obliged to submit NDCs, but not NBSAPs.

The publishing of new NBSAPs was meant to ensure that countries actually implement the targets of the GBF within their borders.

A lack of implementation was widely cited as one of the major factors behind the failure of the last set of global biodiversity rules, the Aichi targets, which were agreed in 2010.

A joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian found that 85% of countries missed the UN deadline to submit their NBSAPs by COP16.

At COP16, many countries lamented the lack of NBSAP submissions. At the summit, they agreed to a new text that notes the lack of action and “urges” countries to release their NBSAPs “as soon as possible”.

Now, new Carbon Brief analysis reveals that just 28% of nations (55 of 196 parties) have released their NBSAPs – a year after the deadline.

The map below shows countries that submitted their plans to the UN by the 21 October 2024 deadline (light green) and after the deadline (dark green).

Countries with national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) by the 21 October 2024 deadline (light green) and after (dark green). Source: UN Convention on Biological Diversity. Map by Joe Goodman for Carbon Brief.
Countries with national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) by the 21 October 2024 deadline (light green) and after (dark green). Source: UN Convention on Biological Diversity. Map by Joe Goodman for Carbon Brief.

Since the original deadline, both Germany and the UK have submitted their NBSAPs. This means that the US, which is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, is now the only G7 nation without a nature plan.

Eight of the “megadiverse countries” – 17 nations that together provide a home to 70% of the world’s biodiversity – are yet to produce their NBSAPs.

This includes Brazil, the world’s most biodiverse nation and host of the upcoming COP30 climate summit.

The other megadiverse countries that have not yet submitted their NBSAPs are the DRC, Ecuador, Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Africa and the US.

The host of next year’s COP17 biodiversity summit, Armenia, is also among those yet to produce an NBSAP.

According to the GBF and its underlying documents, countries that were “not in a position” to meet the deadline to submit NBSAPs ahead of COP16 were requested to instead submit national targets.

These submissions simply list biodiversity targets that countries will aim for, without an accompanying plan for how they will be achieved.

By the end of the COP16, some 119 parties had produced at least one national target. A year later, this figure has risen to 141, or 72% of countries.

Finance flows

At COP16 in 2024, many developing nations said that a lack of timely funding available from the Gef had prevented them from being able to produce new NBSAPs.

In acknowledgement of this, the NBSAPs text agreed at the summit “requests” the Gef to “provide timely support to all eligible parties, aligned with national circumstances and needs, upon request, to enable them” to release their plans.

A spokesperson for the Gef tells Carbon Brief that 120 out of 139 countries that requested financial support have been able to access it, saying:

“Since 2022, the Gef has approved $123.2m in two tranches to support 139 eligible countries through implementing agencies with their NBSAPs updates or revisions. The 138 countries that requested it had access to a first tranche of support of $44.7m.

“Since October 2024, the second tranche of support has been disbursed by UNDP and UNEP to 120 out of the 139 countries that requested it. UNEP is working to resolve outstanding issues and expedite pending disbursements of the second tranche of support for the remaining 19 countries.”

Panama to Yerevan

Country representatives are currently gathered in Panama City, Panama, for preparatory talks for the next UN biodiversity summit, COP17, which will take place in Yerevan, Armenia, over 19-30 October in 2026.

At COP17, the first global review of nations’ progress to achieving the goals of the GBF is set to take place.

This review will draw from the available NBSAPs, as well as national targets and separate national reports, which are due to be submitted by February 2026.

There is little evidence to suggest that the world is on track to meet the GBF’s mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss in just five years.

For example, an investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian published this year revealed that more than half of nations that have submitted NBSAPs do not commit to the GBF’s flagship target of protecting 30% of land and seas for nature by 2030.

The post Analysis: Just 28% of countries have released nature pledges a year after UN deadline appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Just 28% of countries have released nature pledges a year after UN deadline

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