China has seen a series of temperature records broken this summer, as heatwaves have struck various regions across the country.
Between mid-March and mid-July 2025, it was hit by an unprecedented number of “hot days” – where temperatures reach or exceed 35C – according to the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) .
In both May and June, heatwaves swept across northern regions, with temperatures in Xinjiang reaching as high as 46.8C.
Such a record-breaking summer is becoming increasingly common, with the CMA’s annual Climate Bulletins showing that hundreds of local heat records have been surpassed over the past decade.
The CMA says that “extreme high temperatures” have shown an “increasing trend” in China since its records began in 1961.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that heatwaves strongly affect public health, agricultural output and economic activity.
They also put significant strain on the electricity system.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief looks at how heat extremes are changing in China, the role of climate change in making these worse and how the country is adapting to the impacts.
How are heat extremes changing in China?
The latest science report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that it is “virtually certain” that “the frequency and intensity of hot extremes have increased” across the world since 1950.
The IPCC adds that it is “virtually certain” that human-caused greenhouse gas emissions are “the main driver”.
China is no exception. In a press release for its latest 2025 “blue book on climate change in China”, the CMA says China is “susceptible to the impacts of global climate change”, noting:
“[China’s] warming rate is higher than the global average…and extreme weather and climate events are becoming more frequent and intense.”
Data from the CMA’s Climate Bulletins show how the average annual temperature in China is rising and how 2024 was the hottest year on record, as shown in the chart below.
While 2024 was the hottest year on record overall, this was a result of consistently high temperatures throughout the seasons.
At a CMA press conference in 2025, Chan Xiao, deputy director of the CMA commented:
“Temperatures were consistently high throughout the year, with significant fluctuations in temperature during winter. Spring, summer and autumn temperatures were all record highs for the same period.”
In contrast, more heat records were broken during 2022, even though it was not quite as hot overall. Explaining this, Prof Yang Chen from Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences, which falls under the CMA, tells Carbon Brief:
“[For] the annual mean air temperatures, every day counts. So even if the 2022 was exceptional for its large number – actually also very long duration-consecutive days and high-magnitude – of hot extremes, mainly during summer and in the Yangtze River Valley, it does not mean the remaining days were hotter than the counterparts in 2024.”
The CMA defines a “hot day” or “high temperature day” as one that reaches or exceeds 35C. It adds that “high temperatures for several consecutive days constitute a heatwave”.
As the global climate has warmed, the number of “hot days” that China is experiencing has been on the rise, shown in the figure below.
The year 2022 set a new record, with meteorological stations in China recording an average of 16.4 hot days. This was 7.3 more than the average for 1991-2020. The year 2024 came close to this record, with 15.6 hot days. These two years have also seen China’s hottest summers on record.
In 2022, more than 1,000 meteorological stations in China reported heatwaves, with 441 breaking “historical records”. For 2024, 74 stations reported “consecutive high temperature days” and 81 of them broke records.
Xiao said at a press conference in 2023 that “continuous high temperatures” in China’s central and eastern regions lasted for 79 days in the summer of 2022. The provinces of Gansu and Xinjiang in north-west China, Hubei in central China and Sichuan in south-west China all reported their “highest temperatures since 1961”.
In addition, the “maximum daily temperature [in the summer of 2022] at 361 national meteorological stations – accounting for 14.9% of the total number of stations in the country – reached or exceeded historical extremes”, Xiao added.
The CMA has also highlighted that summer is arriving earlier for much of China. In 2024, for example, summer in regions including most of Hainan province in south China, central Yunnan province in south-west China as well as central and southern Xinjiang province in north-west China arrived more than 20 days earlier than average.
“If a year’s spring and summer are longer, the potential heatwaves…will also be longer,” Prof Wenjia Cai, from the department of earth system science of Tsinghua University, tells Carbon Brief.
Cai notes that there are more ways to define heatwaves than CMA’s absolute threshold of 35C.
For example, a heatwave can also be defined by how long the hot weather persists, or based on “the daily maximum temperature, daily average temperature, or even nighttime temperature”, she tells Carbon Brief.
However, regardless of the definition used, the “number of heatwave days is definitely increasing as a result of climate change”, she adds.
What role does human-caused climate change play?
A field of climate science called “attribution” has emerged over the past two decades to establish the role that human-caused warming plays in individual extreme weather events, including heatwaves, floods, droughts and storms.
Attribution studies can also be used to find the “fingerprint” of human-caused climate change in longer-term trends, such as the gradual increase in surface temperatures over multiple decades.
Heat is the most-studied extreme event in attribution literature, as it is mainly driven by thermodynamic influences – in other words, it is relatively easy to study.
In contrast, storms and droughts are more strongly affected by complex atmospheric dynamics and, as such, can be trickier to simulate in a model. Cai tells Carbon Brief:
“High temperature is the most obvious trend against the background of climate change. Heatwaves, in comparison to events such as rainfall and typhoons, are also more predictable.”
Carbon Brief has produced an interactive map showing every attribution study published up to November 2024. In total, 114 extremes and trends in China have been the subject of an attribution study, including more than 20 relating specifically to extreme heat.
One study included on the map looks at the change in the intensity and frequency of extreme temperatures across China over 1951-2018. The authors say that, over this time period, “more intense and more frequent warm extremes” were observed across “most regions” in China – and that “greenhouse gas forcing plays a dominant role” in this.
Looking at individual extreme events, one analysis by the “rapid attribution” group World Weather Attribution investigates the then-record-breaking heat across China in July 2023. The analysis says that temperatures exceeded 50C in north-west China, adding that Sanbao, in Xinjiang, hit 52.2C on 16 July of that year.
The study finds that, in a world without climate change, such an extreme heat event would have been “extremely rare” and would only have happened once every 250 years. However, in today’s climate, as a result of human-caused climate change, a heatwave of this intensity is now expected once every five years.
This means China’s extreme heat of July 2023 was 50 times more likely due to climate change. The study also finds that in a world without climate change, the heatwave over China would have been 1C cooler.
A separate study finds that human-caused climate change also caused a more than 60-fold increase in the likelihood of the extremely warm 2013 summer, compared to the early 1950s.
It adds that other factors such as urbanisation and changes in atmospheric circulation patterns can also make heat extremes more intense and frequent.
What impact are these heatwaves having?
Heatwaves have a wide variety of impacts on human activities, such as public health, crop yields and economic output.
Older people are particularly vulnerable to extreme heat. The 2024 report from the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change found that, in 2023, demographic changes alone could have driven a 65% increase in heat-related deaths among over-65s, compared to the 1990-99 average.
Cai, who is also the lead author of the Lancet Countdown’s China report, tells Carbon Brief that older people are the “most commonly mentioned vulnerable group” and that the number of people affected by heatwaves will grow as societies age.
However, heatwaves also “affect outdoor activities” regardless of age group, she adds, as well as having impacts on sleep and allergies:
“We don’t want anyone to think they are in a group of people unaffected by heatwaves.”
Cai says that heat exposure can increase the incidence of certain dangerous behaviours, such as domestic violence, as well as a wide range of diseases – including cardiovascular diseases and respiratory diseases – and mental health disorders.
In 2023, more than 30,000 deaths were related to heatwaves in China – 1.9 times higher than the average over 1986-2005, according to Cai and her colleagues’ China report.
This was a result of increased heat exposure – the average number of “heatwave exposure days” per person reached 16 days in 2023, more than three times the historical average (1986-2005), the report adds.
A 2022 attribution study on China notes that extreme heat can also increase the risk of preterm births. The authors find that over 2010-20, an average of 13,262 premature births were recorded in China due to heatwave exposure. The study linked one-quarter of these early births to climate change.
Another profound impact of heatwaves is that they can exacerbate droughts, with knock-on impacts for agriculture.
Reuters reported last June that “China’s agriculture ministry said…searing temperatures have adversely impacted summer planting and that fighting drought and protecting summer planting were arduous tasks”.
Droughts in 2024 hit more than 11 million people in China, with more than 1.2m hectares of affected crops and direct economic losses topping nearly 8.4bn yuan ($1.2bn), the Ministry of Emergency Management said in early 2025.
Heat-related economic losses could reach nearly 5% of China’s GDP by 2060, according to a recent guest post for Carbon Brief. Authors Prof Guan Dabo and doctoral student Sun Yida from Tsinghua University wrote:
“By 2060, China’s heat-induced economic losses could total about 1.5% of total GDP under 1.5C of global warming, 3% under 2C of warming and 4.9% under 2.5C of warming.”
Those predicted losses include “indirect economic losses”, which “could be due to changes in production, consumption or employment” in the global supply chain, including crop failures and labour slowdowns, they explained.
The figure below, based on their study, shows Chinese GDP losses under three different scenarios of future emissions, called “shared socioeconomic pathways” (SSPs).
The SSP1-1.9, SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5 scenarios project average global temperature rises of around 1.5C, 2C and 2.5C by mid-century, respectively.
Economic losses are split into indirect losses (dark blue), labour losses (blue) and health losses (light blue).
Sectors such as the extractive industries, construction and non-metallic manufacturing “could see the highest losses” of about 4.6-6.4% of their “value-added” – the increase in worth of a product or service as it moves through different stages of production – largely because they are in Chinese “regions with significant warming”, according to Guan and Sun.
Those industries also have close business connections with south-east Asia, Africa and South America, which are “expected to face heightened exposure to production volatility caused by high temperatures”, they add.
The total economic loss globally could reach up to 4.6% by 2060, according to their study, and manufacturing-heavy countries such as China and the US, in particular, could be “strong[ly] hit”.
Other than manufacturing, electricity supplies in China have also been frequently reported to be affected by hot days.
Chinese news outlet China Business Network reports that China’s National Energy Administration said last year that summer was the hardest time to ensure sufficient electricity supply during a year and that extreme weather would make the supply even harder.
For 2025, China’s State Grid Corporation expected maximum electricity demand to exceed 1,200 gigawatts (GW), a new record.
Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief that “when temperatures soar, electricity demand spikes – mainly due to air conditioning – and that can stretch the grid, especially in already tight systems”.
Biqing Yang, energy analyst at Ember, adds:
“In the third quarter of last year, for example, China’s residential electricity consumption rose significantly, by 17.8% year-on-year, largely due to elevated temperatures…It is clear that we are now entering an era [w]here climate change is having a real-time impact on our energy system.”
China’s electricity demand reached a new record in July 2025 after year-on-year growth of 8.6%, consuming more power in one month than Japan did in all of 2024, according to David Fishman, Shanghai-based principal at consultancy the Lantau Group.
The “staggering” July 2025 figures – including another 18% year-on-year rise in residential demand, partly due to rising household incomes, as well as air conditioning use – illustrates the impact of climate change on China’s power sector, Fishman writes on LinkedIn:
“We know it’s hot out and everyone knows every summer the intense heat seems to last for longer and longer. But these power consumption numbers are telling a story about China’s climate patterns like few other datasets can…and it’s a scary story.”
Yang, Chen and Cai tell Carbon Brief that it is important for China to adapt to the rising temperature and intensive heatwaves.
Chen specifically describes “successful” forecasts and early warnings as “critical” , saying that they are the “very first step toward adaptation”.
In his LinkedIn post, Fishman notes that the rapidly rising demand for electricity, including as a result of growing air conditioning use, also poses a “considerable challenge to China’s ability to meet rising demand solely with clean power sources”.
How is China adapting to heatwaves?
In recent years, China has implemented more and more policies aimed at adapting to heatwaves.
For example, weather forecasts and heatwave alerts have been provided.
Central and local governments have also issued labour policies aimed at protecting workers against extreme heat.
Under a policy from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, for instance, outdoor works are not expected to be undertaken when temperatures exceed 40C. In addition, outdoor working hours should be shorter than six hours when the temperature is 37-40C.
Similarly, school students in some cities, such as Wuhan and Chengdu, have been advised to study from home during hot days in recent years.
Since 2021, the city of Tianjian has been sending text warnings of heatwaves to its residents, reminding people of the health risks it poses. The messages, according to Southern Metropolis Daily, warn that strokes might be triggered in the coming hot days and advises people to avoid outdoor activities and take medication if needed.
These text reminders have “significantly” reduced the number of hospitalised people in Tianjin, saving the city 140m yuan ($19.5m) since being introduced, adds the outlet.
In 2013, the central government published its first “national climate change adaptation strategy” – an attempt to implement the “clear requirement” of “enhancing our ability to adapt to climate change” included in the 12th “five-year plan” (2011-15).
In the latest version for 2035, heatwaves appear in sections related to the power sector, as well as agriculture and health.
The strategy aims to “improve” and “reinforce” nationwide “labour protection standards”, as well as “work system[s] that adapt to change and reduce agricultural disasters”. Its purpose is also to ensure the energy and electricity sectors’ abilities to “withstand extreme weather and climate events” in relation to heatwaves.
The strategy says that “health-risk assessment guidelines” and public health-related “implementation plans for adaptation under major extreme weather and climate events”, such as heat and heatwaves,in “various regions”, will be developed.
Last year, following the release of the latest overall adaptation strategy, China published the “national climate change health adaptation action plan (2024-30)”.
Cai calls the document a “very very important” blueprint for health risk management, bringing together a range of organisations, including hospitals, to form a “system related to climate change and health” that has “monitoring and early warning capabilities”.
She adds that this plan will also see heat-health alerts being issued nationwide:
“It is worth mentioning that the National Administration of Disease Control and Prevention and the China Meteorological Administration signed a joint agreement [in May 2025] on issuing [nationwide] health alerts – and that the first product is related to heatwaves.”
Ember’s Yang says that in terms of electricity, China is moving toward building a “‘new electricity system (新型电力系统)’ that is more compatible with high shares of renewables”. But, he adds, the old “planning psychology” needs to change so that it can better cope with extreme heat:
“Traditionally, the mindset has been very supply-driven – just keep adding enough generation and network capacity to meet demand…[With the new system] the demand side has to become an active player – a prosumer – that can actually support grid reliability.
“For example, during extreme heat, instead of just ramping up supply, we should also be encouraging users to reduce or shift their electricity use during peak hours, using price signals or incentives…This is the essence of what we call ‘coordinating generation, grid, load, and storage’ (源网荷储一体化) – a system that works together [and works] more efficiently and flexibly.”
The post Q&A: How China is adapting to ‘more frequent and intense’ heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: How China is adapting to ‘more frequent and intense’ heat extremes
The UK’s climate-aid spending on “nature protection and restoration” reached record levels of nearly £800m last year, according to government figures obtained by Carbon Brief.
The data suggests the UK is on track to achieve its five-year pledge to provide £3bn in nature-related funds for developing countries by 2026.
Funding for forest protection has also increased, but will need to rise by an additional £100m this year in order to meet the target of £1.5bn, within the £3bn total.
The latest figures, provided to Carbon Brief via freedom-of-information (FOI) requests, include climate-aid contributions to forest-dense regions, from the Amazon to the Congo Basin.
By far the largest slice of last year’s finance – amounting to almost half of forest funds – came from a £153.9m project supporting controversial carbon-offsetting schemes in developing countries.
This is one of the largest donations the UK has made to a nature-and-forests project since 2021, outstripping others that have been underway for years.
Targets on track
The UK has a target to provide £11.6bn in climate finance over a five-year period ending in 2026. This is the nation’s contribution to a wider effort under the Paris Agreement to provide developing countries with funds that help them deal with climate change.
Within this target, the previous government had pledged in 2021 that £3bn would go to projects that “protect and restore nature”. This, in turn, was to include £1.5bn for forest-related projects.
Last year, the Labour government confirmed that it would “continue to honour” these sub-goals, along with the overall £11.6bn target it inherited.
Alongside many other developed countries, however, the UK has announced major cuts to its aid budget in recent years, placing climate-focused spending under pressure.
Nevertheless, Carbon Brief analysis suggests that the country is on track to meet its £11.6bn climate-finance target. This is partly due to accounting changes that have allowed the government to include additional forms of finance in its figures, without committing as much new money.
Government data obtained by Carbon Brief via FOI suggests that the UK is broadly on track to meet its nature-and-forest targets as well.
UK spending on nature-related programmes reached £796.6m in 2024-25, bringing the cumulative total to £2.3bn. This means it would need to spend £684.8m on such projects in 2025-26 to hit the target, as shown in the chart below.
Projects covered by the “nature” target include an initiative tackling water insecurity and pollution in Nepal, support for “climate-smart agriculture” in African countries and a fund aimed at delivering the global target to protect “30% of earth’s land and sea for nature”.
For the forest-finance target, which only covers projects addressing deforestation or forest restoration, spending on relevant projects reached £341.6m in 2024-25. This brings the cumulative figure up to just over £1bn since 2021.
Forest aid would, therefore, need to increase by more than £100m to £466m in 2025-26, in order to meet the £1.5bn goal, as shown in the chart below.
While this is a fairly steep increase, the government’s climate-finance targets were always designed to be backloaded, with more spending planned towards the end of the five-year period.
UK aid spending is set to drop sharply again in 2026-27, beyond the timeframe of current climate-finance goals.
The government has said it will continue to prioritise climate projects, but unpublished analysis of government forecasts by the Center for Global Development (CGD) – shared with Carbon Brief – suggests the departments financing these areas face major cuts.
The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), provided nearly half of all nature finance in 2024-25. They will see their aid spending drop by 59% and 45%, respectively, in 2026-27, which is a steeper drop than the aid budget as a whole, according to the CGD estimates.
Besides setting climate-finance targets, the UK also has obligations to provide biodiversity finance under the UN’s Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).
In its FOI responses, the government stated that it has not recorded project-level biodiversity-focused spending over the five-year period covered by its climate-finance targets.
However, the government cites the £3bn nature target in its national biodiversity strategy and action plan (NBSAP) as one of the ways the UK is “clos[ing] the global biodiversity finance gap”. This indicates that the money is counted as both climate and biodiversity finance.
Carbon-offsetting
The largest portion of UK nature and forest spending last year was £153.9m from DESNZ for a project called “Scaling Climate Action by Lowering Emissions (SCALE)”.
This World Bank-backed programme funds projects that generate “high-integrity carbon credits” and provides technical assistance to help developing countries trade them.
The carbon credits will be generated via projects that curb carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by preserving or restoring forests and other ecosystems. These credits could then be purchased by companies or state actors, which may allow them to comply with climate targets while still producing emissions.
Combined with a smaller associated programme called “EnABLE” – which is designed to ensure that local communities receive benefits from carbon trading – the SCALE initiative made up a fifth of the total nature finance and 45% of forest funding in 2024-25.
(The government acknowledges in its FOI response that, despite counting 100% of the SCALE funding as forest-related, it “may benefit various ecosystems, not just forests”.)
The chart below shows the nature-and-forest projects that received the most funding from the UK in 2024-25, with combined spending on SCALE and EnABLE in the top spot.
Another initiative involving forest-related carbon credits – the Brazilian Amazon Fund – was also one of the top recipients of UK support last year, with £28.5m.
Carbon-offsetting is viewed by many as an important way to encourage external investment in nature protection, particularly for densely forested global-south nations.
Nevertheless, carbon credits, particularly those based on forest conservation, have been dogged by controversies. These range from Indigenous people being driven off their land to companies exaggerating the extent of forest protection and emissions savings.
Sarah Colenbrander, director of the climate and sustainability programme at ODI, tells Carbon Brief that the “risks to nature-based carbon offsets are well-documented”. She adds:
“Carbon and biodiversity markets have a role to play in tackling climate change and nature loss – but it is not obvious that the UK should allocate such large grants to this topic when there are many more proven, cost-effective options to cut emissions and protect the environment.”
The single payment of £153.9m means SCALE and EnABLE have received more money from the UK government than virtually any other nature projects since 2021.
The only larger overall recipients have been multilateral funds such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which tend to be viewed favourably by developing countries.
These funds, which provide grants to developing country applicants, received large contributions from the UK last year of £90.8m and £64.8m, respectively.
When asked about the funding given to SCALE and EnABLE, a government spokesperson stresses the importance of tackling “the existential climate crisis”, adding:
“This includes putting Britain back in the business of climate leadership by supporting the reform of the global financial system and mobilising private finance for nature and to help developing countries accelerate the energy transition.
“This comes on top of working alongside other countries and the EU in the forests and climate leaders’ partnership to drive progress towards halting and reversing forest loss.”
Of the other top projects funded by the UK, some have a clear focus on nature, such as the Darwin Initiative. This project, which received £27.8m in 2024-25, is the “UK’s flagship international challenge fund for biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction”.
For others, nature is not the primary goal. Ethiopia Crises 2 Resilience, which received £24.9m last year, focuses on providing humanitarian relief from war and drought, but its annual review mentions “land treated through area enclosures, rangeland management, soil and water conservation, forage and forestry activities”.
Methodology
The nature-and-forest climate finance figures were provided to Carbon Brief via FOI by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO); the Defra and DESNZ.
The path to the £1.5bn and £3bn targets appears more achievable than it did in Carbon Brief’s previous analysis of nature-and-forests data, as the final 2023-24 figures provided by the government are higher than those obtained last year.
Unlike the other departments, FCDO declined to provide its 2023-24 figures last year, so Carbon Brief estimated the figures based on a dataset containing “provisional” figures for all climate-finance projects that year. However, this resulted in an underestimate, due primarily to larger-than-expected contributions to multilateral funds and banks being counted as nature-related.
Unlike the previous analysis, most of the figures provided via this year’s FOIs are the government’s “final” figures, meaning they are unlikely to change. For 2024-25, only Defra – which was responsible for 17% of nature finance that year – provided “provisional” figures.
The post Analysis: UK foreign aid for nature hits £800m record due to cash for carbon credits appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK foreign aid for nature hits £800m record due to cash for carbon credits
Global warming linked to the world’s biggest oil and gas companies made all “major” 21st century heatwaves more intense and frequent.
This is according to new research, published in Nature, which uses “extreme event attribution” to assess the impact of climate change on all 21st-century heatwaves that were classified as “major disasters”.
The authors find one-quarter of the 213 heatwaves would have been “virtually impossible” without human-caused global warming.
They add that the effect of climate change on heatwave frequency and intensity is becoming more pronounced as the planet warms.
The study estimates the emissions stemming from the operations and production of more than 100 “carbon majors”, such as ExxonMobil, BP, Saudi Aramco and Shell.
The fossil fuels produced by these companies account for 60% of all human-caused CO2 emissions over 1850-2023, the study says.
The authors find that heatwaves recorded over 2000-23 were made, on average, 1.7C hotter due to climate change, with half of this increase due to the emissions originating from carbon majors.
This study “could be used to support future climate lawsuits and aid diplomatic negotiation”, according to a scientist not involved in the research.
Worsening heatwaves
As the planet warms, heatwaves are becoming more intense and frequent, driving economic losses, ecosystem damage and a rise in heath-related deaths.
The EM-DAT database catalogues all “major disasters” that have been reported since the year 1900 – defined as events that cause at least 10 fatalities, affect at least 100 people, or result in the declaration of state of emergency or a call for international assistance.
Between 2000 and 2023, the database lists more than 200 heatwaves. These are shown on the map below, where darker pink indicates a greater number of heatwaves. Countries with no reported heatwaves are shown in grey.
The study authors acknowledge that heatwave reporting is “highly uneven”, with only nine of the heatwaves reported in the database since the year 2000 in Africa, Latin America or the Caribbean. (This is largely because extreme heat events in these regions are not routinely monitored.)
They then carried an attribution analysis on each heatwave to identify whether it was made more likely or intense due to human-caused climate change.
The chart below shows how climate changes increased the intensity and frequency of the 78 heatwaves assessed over 2000-09 (left), 54 heatwaves assessed over 2010-19 (middle) and 81 heatwaves assessed over 2020-23 (right).
The authors find that climate change increased the intensity and probability of all 213 heatwaves in the study. They add that the influence of climate change on heatwaves is strengthening over time.
In each panel, the bars show the percentage of heatwaves in that time period that were made 0.25-1.0C (yellow), 1.0-2.0C (orange) or 2.0-3.0C (red) hotter due to climate change.
The position of bars indicate the change in likelihood of the heatwaves. This ranges from those made 1-10 times more likely due to climate change (left-most bar in each panel) to those made more than 11,000 times more likely (right-most bar in each panel).
Heatwaves recorded over 2000-09 were, on average, 20 times more likely due to climate change, according to the authors. Meanwhile, those recorded over 2010-19 were about 200 times more likely.
Similarly, 2000-09 heatwaves were 1.4C hotter due to human-caused climate change on average, according to the study, while 2010-19 heatwaves were made 1.7C hotter.
The study finds that human-caused climate change made 55 heatwaves at least 10,000 times more likely. According to the authors, this is “equivalent to saying that they would have been virtually impossible” without the influence of human activity.
Carbon majors
To assess the contribution to heatwaves by oil and gas companies’ products, the authors use a database of carbon dioxide and methane emissions from 180 carbon majors over 1854-2023. This includes direct emissions from the companies, as well as the emissions released when the oil and gas they produced is used by others.
The 180 carbon majors in the database represent 60% of all human-caused CO2 emissions, including land use, over 1850-2023, according to the study. The paper adds that 14 companies, including ExxonMobil, BP, Saudi Aramco and Shell, are responsible for almost half of these emissions.
Using the Earth system model OSCAR, the authors estimate that global average surface temperatures increased by 1.3C between the 1850-1900 average and the year 2023.
They find that 0.7C of this increase was linked to the carbon majors, with 0.3C due to the emissions of the 14 largest.
The chart below, taken from an accompanying Nature “news and views” article, shows the contribution of oil and gas companies’ products to increasing global average surface temperatures over 1950-2023, compared to the 1850-1900 average.
Each colour indicates a carbon major, while grey indicates other sources of temperature increase, such as land-use change.
Heatwaves recorded over 2000-23 were, on average, 1.7C hotter due to climate change, according to the study. The authors find that emissions originating from carbon majors and their products contributed about half of the increase in intensity of heatwaves seen since pre-industrial times.
The authors then break down the contribution of emissions from each carbon major on each heatwave in their analysis.
For example, they find that the emissions linked to Saudi Aramco made 51 heatwaves at least 10,000 times more likely. They add that on average, emissions tied to the company made the 213 heatwaves 0.04C hotter.
Legal action
Attribution studies already play an important role in courts by providing evidence that helps judges to determine liability.
Dr Rupert Stuart-Smith is a research associate in climate science and the law at the University of Oxford’s Sustainable Law Programme. He was not involved in the study, but has published separate work showing that the emissions linked to each of the six largest corporate emitters cause one heat-related death in Zurich alone, every summer.
Stuart-Smith tells Carbon Brief that the new paper is a “high-quality analysis and a meaningful step forward for the field of climate change attribution”. He adds:
“With more and more lawsuits aiming to hold high-emitting companies responsible for their contributions to climate change impacts or compel state and corporate actors to reduce their emissions and prevent rising climate harms, work like this provides the basis for well-informed judicial decision-making.”
Dr Yann Quilcaille is a researcher at ETH Zürich and lead author of the study. He stresses the importance of attribution research for court cases, telling Carbon Brief that he hopes his work “can be used by legal practitioners”.
However, he also says that his role as a scientist is not to assign “responsibility” for climate change, but to “provide information to governments for decision making and to courts for litigation”.
Earlier this year, Dr Christopher Callahan, the principal investigator of the IU Climate & Society Lab, published a study with Prof Justin Makin, an associate professor in the department of geography at the University of Dartmouth, which links trillions of dollars in economic losses to the extreme heat caused by emissions tied to oil and gas companies.
Mankin tells Carbon Brief that the new paper is “very closely” linked to his research.
Callahan says the new paper is “an important contribution to an emerging literature that illustrates how individual emitters can be linked to the change risk of extreme climate conditions and human impacts”.
He explains that “this kind of evidence will be important in courtrooms – holding emitters legally accountable requires demonstrating a causal nexus between that emitter and a particularised harm suffered by a plaintiff”.
Attribution
The cutting-edge field of extreme weather attribution seeks to establish the role that human-caused warming played in these events. Attribution studies have been carried out on hundreds of heatwaves all around the world, as shown in Carbon Brief’s interactive map.
The new paper uses one of the earliest and most commonly used methods of attribution, called “probabilistic attribution”.
Specifically, it uses the method set out by the World Weather Attribution initiative for its “rapid attribution” analyses.
The authors first chose a temperature “threshold” to define their heatwave.
They then used a global climate model to simulate two worlds – one mirroring the world as it was during the heatwave and the other using the climate of 1850-1900. This second scenario is used to represent the climate in a world without human-caused climate change.
The authors run their models thousands of times in each scenario. As the world’s climate is inherently chaotic, each model “run” – individual simulations of how the climate progresses over many years – produces a slightly different progression of temperatures. This means that some runs simulate the heatwave, while others do not.
The authors count how many times the threshold temperature was in each model run. They then compared the likelihood of crossing the threshold temperature in the world with – and a world without – climate change.
For example, they find that the 2021 Pacific north-west heatwave was made 3.1C hotter due to human caused climate change and more than 10,000 times more likely.
(A study by the WWA at the time of the heatwave found that the heatwave was made 150 times more likely. The discrepancy is due to differences in the definition of the event, as well as its “very unlikely nature” according to the study authors.)
Dr Frederieke Otto is a professor at Imperial College London and founder of the WWA initiative. She tells Carbon Brief that the new study is “very similar to some other recent studies on impacts, based on the hazard attribution method used by WWA”, but says that “this is the most high profile and wide-reaching one”.
Otto adds:
“I do hope that many more impact attribution studies will follow, based on our or other extreme event attribution studies. We need more research on this.”
The post Study links world’s top oil and gas firms to 200 ‘more intense’ heatwaves appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Study links world’s top oil and gas firms to 200 ‘more intense’ heatwaves
When flooding strikes, it can devastate vast areas, taking lives, homes and possessions with it.
Multiple factors affect the scale of the social and economic damage that flooding causes, such as climate change, land-use change and the flood protection measures in place.
In a new study, published in Science Advances, my colleagues and I attempt to disentangle the factors contributing to more than 1,700 floods in Europe over 1950-2020.
Our findings show that there has been an overall reduction in deaths and economic damage over this 70-year period – even though population and economic growth means the maximum value of possible losses has increased.
This is linked to the extent to which society has adapted to climate change.
Our study finds that – in most regions – flood impacts have been affected primarily by direct human actions, such as land-use change, vulnerability reduction and catchment alteration, rather than long-term changes to river levels or sea levels.
Other factors, including climate change and alterations to river catchments, had an important role in certain places, but were not a factor on a continent-wide scale.
What influences flood losses?
Dozens of floods occur in Europe every year, though the magnitude of the socioeconomic impacts they cause varies considerably from year to year.
Floods can happen in any country, though they are less common in north-eastern Europe, especially since climate change has reduced snow cover and, hence, reduced spring snowmelt. In the hot and mountainous south of Europe, flash floods are a major risk, causing most fatalities in Europe. In north-western Europe the risk of coastal flooding, increased by global sea level rise, is higher than in other parts of the continent.
Our study looks at 1,729 floods that took place across Europe over a 70 year-period, drawn from the Historical Analysis of Natural Hazards in Europe (HANZE) database. We estimate that this list covers the vast majority of all flood impacts in Europe since 1950.
We find that, in absolute terms, direct economic damage from floods in Europe has increased considerably, from an estimated €37bn in the 1950s (at 2020 prices) to €92bn in the 2000s and €71bn in 2010s.
Yet, in relative terms, the annual losses from floods have fallen. Direct economic damage from floods fell to 0.04% of Europe’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the 2010s, down from 0.11% in the 1950s.
Meanwhile, the risk of dying in a flood has also declined more than six-fold since the 1950s.
Six long-term drivers
First, it is worth noting that each of the 1,729 events in our study were the result of a unique combination of natural and socioeconomic factors under various flood management regimes.
However, we can explore how trends in economic and social damages from floods across Europe have been influenced by different drivers. For this, we turn to the evolving science of attribution research.
Extreme weather attribution research covers a diverse set of qualitative and quantitative approaches to estimate the contribution of individual drivers – such as climate change or socioeconomic factors – to observed impacts. Most studies focus on attribution to climate change, but such approaches are often insufficient to explain the magnitude of flood losses.
Our study investigates six long-term drivers that could have explained the trends in flood impacts in Europe over a 70-year period. These are:
- Long-term climate change
- Human interventions in river catchments
- Population and economic growth
- Land-use change
- Flood protection levels
- Flood vulnerability
To do so, we use hydrological and socioeconomic models driven by observations of climate, economic and other trends.
In all cases, we evaluate the drivers against the climate and socioeconomic conditions of the year 1950 to capture how their importance might have changed over time.
The first driver we look at – and the one that is typically of most interest in attribution studies – is long-term changes to the climate. This includes changes in the probability of extreme river discharges, storm surges, wave heights and global sea level rise.
The study looks at both the fingerprint of human-caused climate change – the 1950-2020 period is when most of global warming has occurred – but also incorporates natural variations of the climate.
Here, we find climate change has mostly worsened flood impacts, especially for levels of economic damage.
However, there is strong variation in Europe. While climate change has led to more substantial flood impacts in north-west Europe, the inverse was true for several countries in southern Europe. This is largely due to an increase in the dryness of the climate.
Human factors
Next we look at human interventions in river catchments, such as reservoir construction and land-use change, which alter the movement and distribution of water across large areas.
Here, we find that these interventions had opposite effects.
Across Europe, land-use change contributed to larger flood impacts over the study period. This was largely due to a rapid increase in “soil sealing” – the covering of soil for housing, roads or other construction work.
However, the construction of large reservoirs – most of which were built after 1950 – has reduced flood volumes, helping to reduce flood impacts, particularly in central Europe.
Population growth has increased flood impacts in almost all countries (with the main exception being Germany because of population decline in the east of the country). In addition, economic growth means the maximum value of possible losses to floods – or “flood exposure” – has increased across the continent.
That said, when considering losses relative to the size of the economy or population, the change in spatial distribution of people becomes more important.
For example, there has been more development in floodplains than outside of them, which – when combined with structural factors, such as the shift from agriculture to industry and from industry to services – has contributed to an overall increase in flood impacts.
However, this did not occur in all countries and did not apply to fatalities, which narrowly reduced across Europe over the study period due to changes in population distribution.
Adaptation
The final two drivers investigated were related to how society has adapted to flood risks.
One method is improving structural flood protection through dykes and reservoirs. (In a 2024 study, we estimated that flood protection has improved in Europe since 1950, even if more for coastal than river floods.)
We also see this effect in this study, though it is not as pronounced. This is because we only look at floods that did occur – meaning that protection measures were not sufficient to prevent them.
Nonetheless, we find that better protection has reduced the extent and, therefore, the impact of floods in most European countries, except some in central and northern Europe.
Our final driver was vulnerability to floods, defined as the relative impact of flooding on population and assets at a given hydrological intensity.
This factor heavily depends on the level of preparedness and adaptation as well as the capacity to respond to a flood. For instance, small adaptations of buildings that prevent water from flowing into it could substantially reduce the share of the building value that is lost in the flood.
In the most recent decade, floods caused an estimated 74-75% fewer fatalities and smaller economic loss than if they happened in 1950 at the same level of exposure – thanks to lower vulnerability. This reduction was found across the continent – indicating that certain universal changes were responsible for this process.
Our study was not able to link this progress to individual measures, but obvious candidates are creation of early warning systems, more capable emergency services, improved disaster response and uptake of private precautionary measures by households and companies after previous experiences of flooding.
The figure below shows the contribution of the six drivers (from left to right) for three types of impacts: fatalities (top), population affected (middle) and economic losses (bottom) to all floods that have occurred in each country between 1950 and 2020.
The shading indicates whether the driver increased (red) or decreased (blue) impacts.
Attribution of contribution to impacts (in rows) of different drivers (A to F), by country, expressed as percent change, relative to the counterfactual scenario of no change in the individual driver since 1950. Source: Paprotny, D et al. (2025)
Solutions reaching their limit?
Our findings indicate the crucial role that adaptation has had on containing growth in flood losses that could have been induced by a larger population and economy.
Still, this positive development should not be taken for granted. Our results show a considerable slowdown in the reduction of losses from better flood protection or lower levels of vulnerability in the most recent two decades. This could indicate that existing solutions are reaching their limits.
However, we find that southern and eastern Europe still has higher vulnerability compared with western Europe – showing potential for further improvements in those regions.
Recent major floods, such as the 2021 event in western Europe, have raised questions about existing levels of preparedness, while highlighting the role of climate change in increasing the impacts of those events.
Our study shows that adaptation works in Europe, but that greater efforts will be needed to ensure it continues to do so.
The post Guest post: How adaptation has cut flood deaths and losses in Europe appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How adaptation has cut flood deaths and losses in Europe
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