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China’s central and local governments, as well as state-owned enterprises, are busy preparing for the next five-year planning period, spanning 2026-30.

The top-level 15th five-year plan, due to be published in March 2026, will shape greenhouse gas emissions in China – and globally – for the rest of this decade and beyond.

The targets set under the plan will determine whether China is able to get back on track for its 2030 climate commitments, which were made personally by President Xi Jinping in 2021.

This would require energy sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to fall by 2-6% by 2030, much more than implied by the 2035 target of a 7-10% cut from “peak levels”.

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The next five-year plan will set the timing and the level of this emissions peak, as well as whether emissions will be allowed to rebound in the short term.

The plan will also affect the pace of clean-energy growth, which has repeatedly beaten previous targets and has become a key driver of the nation’s economy.

Some 250-350 gigawatts (GW) of new wind and solar would be needed each year to meet China’s 2030 commitments, far above the 200GW being targeted.

Finally, the plans will shape China’s transition away from fossil fuels, with key sectors now openly discussing peak years for coal and oil demand, but with 330GW of new coal capacity in the works and more than 500 new chemical industry projects due in the next five years.

These issues come together in five key questions for climate and energy that Chinese policymakers will need to answer in the final five-year plan documents next year.

Five-year plans and their role in China

1. Will the plan put China back on track for its 2030 Paris pledge?

2. Will the plan upgrade clean-energy targets or pave the way to exceed them?

3. Will the plan set an absolute cap on coal consumption?

4. Will ‘dual control’ of carbon prevent an emission rebound?

5. Will it limit coal-power and chemical-industry growth?

Conclusions

Five-year plans and their role in China

Five-year plans are an essential part of China’s policymaking, guiding decision-making at government bodies, enterprises and banks. The upcoming 15th five-year plan will cover the years 2026-30, set targets for 2030 and use 2025 as its base year.

The top-level five-year plan will be published in March 2026 and is known as the five-year plan on economic and social development. This overarching document will be followed by dozens of sectoral plans, as well as province- and company-level plans.

The sectoral plans are usually published in the second year of the five-year period, meaning they would be expected in 2027.

There will be five-year plans for the energy sector, the electricity sector, for renewable energy, nuclear, coal and many other sub-sectors, as well as plans for major industrial sectors such as steel, construction materials and chemicals.

It is likely that there will also be a plan for carbon emissions or carbon peaking and a five-year plan for the environment.

During the previous five-year period, the plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises for very large-scale solar and wind projects were particularly important, far exceeding the central government’s targets.

The five-year plans create incentives for provincial governments and ministries by setting quantified targets that they are responsible for meeting. These targets influence the performance evaluations of governors, CEOs and party secretaries.

The plans also designate favoured sectors and projects, directing bank lending, easing permitting and providing an implicit government guarantee for the project developers.

Each plan lists numerous things that should be “promoted”, banned or controlled, leaving the precise implementation to different state organs and state-owned enterprises.

Five-year plans can introduce and coordinate national mega-projects, such as the gigantic clean-energy “bases” and associated electricity transmission infrastructure, which were outlined in the previous five-year plan in 2021.

The plans also function as a policy roadmap, assigning the tasks to develop new policies and providing stakeholders with visibility to expected policy developments.

1. Will the plan put China back on track for its 2030 Paris pledge?

Reducing carbon intensity – the energy-sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of GDP – has been the cornerstone of China’s climate commitments since the 2020 target announced at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference.

Consequently, the last three five-year plans have included a carbon-intensity target. The next 15th one is highly likely to set a carbon-intensity target too, given that this is the centerpiece of China’s 2030 climate targets.

Moreover, it was president Xi himself who pledged in 2021 that China would reduce its carbon intensity to 65% below 2005 levels by 2030. This was later formalised in China’s 2030 “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.

Xi also pledged that China would gradually reduce coal consumption during the five-year period up to 2030. However, China is significantly off track to these targets.

China’s CO2 emissions grew more quickly in the early 2020s than they had been before the Coronavirus pandemic, as shown in the figure below. This stems from a surge in energy consumption during and after the “zero-Covid” period, together with a rapid expansion of coal-fired power and the fossil-fuel based chemical industry. as shown in the figure below.

As a result, meeting the 2030 intensity target would require a reduction in CO2 emissions from current levels, with the level of the drop depending on the rate of economic growth.

Chart showing that China would need to cut emissions by 2030 to meet its carbon-intensity target
Energy sector CO2 emissions, billion tonnes. Black: historical. Blue dashes: pre-Covid trend. Red: path to meeting carbon-intensity targets with 5% GDP growth. Pink: path with 4.2% growth. Sources: Year-to-year change in CO2 emissions calculated from reported GDP growth and CO2 intensity reductions since 2017; earlier figures calculated from reported total energy consumption and energy mix, using CO2 emission factors from China’s latest national GHG emission inventory, for 2021. Absolute emission level for 2021 from the emission inventory, with emissions for other years calculated from year-to-year changes. The path to targets is calculated based on carbon-intensity reduction targets for 2015, 2020 and 2025, together with reported GDP growth. There was no carbon-intensity target for 2006-10, but a 21% reduction was achieved, so the path to targets is set equal to actual emissions. For 2025, CREA projection of 0.5% increase in energy sector CO2 emissions and 5% GDP growth is used. For 2030, two different assumptions about average GDP growth rate in 2026-30 are used, with corresponding maximum CO2 emission level to meet the 2030 carbon-intensity reduction commitment calculated. Pre-Covid trend is the linear best-fit to 2012-19 data.

Xi’s personal imprimatur would make missing these 2030 targets awkward for China, particularly given the country’s carefully cultivated reputation for delivery. On the other hand, meeting them would require much stronger action than initially anticipated.

Recent policy documents and statements, in particular the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the next five-year plan, and the government’s work report for 2025, have put the emphasis on China’s target to peak emissions before 2030 and the new 2035 emission target, which would still allow emissions to increase over the next five-year period. The earlier 2030 commitments risk being buried as inconvenient.

Still, the State Council’s plan for controlling carbon emissions, published in 2024, says that carbon intensity will be a “binding indicator” for the next five-year period, meaning that a target will be included in the top-level plan published in March 2026.

China is only set to achieve a reduction of about 12% in carbon intensity from 2020 to 2025 – a marked slowdown relative to previous periods, as shown in the figure below.

(This is based on reductions reported annually by the National Bureau of Statistics until 2024 and a projected small increase in energy-sector CO2 emissions in 2025. Total CO2 emissions could still fall this year, when the fall in process emissions from cement production is factored in.)

A 12% fall would be far less than the 18% reduction targeted under the 14th five-year plan, as well as falling short of what would be needed to stay on track to the 2030 target.

To make up the shortfall and meet the 2030 intensity target, China would need to set a goal of around 23% in the next five-year plan. As such, this target will be a key test of China’s determination to honour its climate commitments.

Chart showing that China's 2023 carbon-intensity target would require a step change in the progress
Energy sector CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity reductions by five-year period. Source: Year-to-year change in CO2 emissions calculated from reported GDP growth and CO2 intensity reductions since 2017; earlier figures calculated from reported total energy consumption and energy mix, using CO2 emission factors from China’s latest national GHG emission inventory, for 2021. For 2025, CREA projection of 0.5% increase in energy sector CO2 emissions and 5% GDP growth is used. For 2026-2030, maximum CO2 emission level to meet the 2030 carbon intensity reduction commitment is calculated based on reductions achieved until 2025.

A carbon-intensity target of 23% is likely to receive pushback from some policymakers, as it is much higher than achieved in previous periods. No government or thinktank documents have yet been published with estimates of what the 2030 intensity target would need to be.

In practice, meeting the 2030 carbon intensity target would require reducing CO2 emissions by 2-6% in absolute terms from 2025, assuming a GDP growth rate of 4.2-5.0%.

China needs 4.2% GDP growth over the next decade to achieve Xi’s target of doubling the country’s GDP per capita from 2020 to 2035, a key part of his vision of achieving “socialist modernisation” by 2035, with the target for the next five years likely to be set higher.

Recent high-level policy documents have avoided even mentioning the 2030 intensity target. It is omitted in recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the next five-year plan, the foundation on which the plan will be formulated.

Instead, the recommendations emphasised “achieving the carbon peak as scheduled” and “promoting the peaking of coal and oil consumption”, which are less demanding.

The environment ministry, in contrast, continues to pledge efforts to meet the carbon intensity target. However, they are not the ones writing the top-level five-year plan.

The failure to meet the 2025 intensity target has been scarcely mentioned in top-level policy discussions. There was no discernible effort to close the gap to the target, even after the midway review of the five-year plan recognised the shortfall.

The State Council published an action plan to get back on track, including a target for reducing carbon intensity in 2024 – albeit one not sufficient to close the shortfall. Yet this plan, in turn, was not followed up with an annual target for 2025.

The government could also devise ways to narrow the gap to the target on paper, through statistical revisions or tweaks to the definition of carbon intensity, as the term has not been defined in China’s NDCs.

Notably, unlike China’s previous NDC, its latest pledge did not include a progress update for carbon intensity. The latest official update sent to the UN only covers the years to 2020.

This leaves some more leeway for revisions, even though China’s domestic “statistical communiques”, published every year, have included official numbers up to 2024.

Coal consumption growth around 2022 was likely over-reported, so statistical revisions could reduce reported emissions and narrow the gap to the target. Including process emissions from cement, which have been falling rapidly in recent years, and changing how emissions from fossil fuels used as raw materials in the chemicals industry are accounted for, so-called non-energy use, which has been growing rapidly, could make the target easier to meet.

2. Will the plan upgrade clean-energy targets or pave the way to exceed them?

The need to accelerate carbon-intensity reductions also has implications for clean-energy targets.

The current goal is for non-fossil fuels to make up 25% of energy supplies in 2030, up from the 21% expected to be reached this year.

This expansion would be sufficient to achieve the reduction in carbon intensity needed in the next five years, but only if energy consumption growth slows down very sharply. Growth would need to slow to around 1% per year, from 4.1% in the past five years 2019-2024 and from 3.7% in the first three quarters of 2025.

The emphasis on manufacturing in the Central Committee’s recommendations for the next five-year plan is hard to reconcile with such a sharp slowdown, even if electrification will help reduce primary energy demand. During the current five-year period, China abolished the system of controlling total energy consumption and energy intensity, removing the incentive for local governments to curtail energy-intensive projects and industries.

Even if the ratio of total energy demand growth to GDP growth returned to pre-Covid levels, implying total energy demand growth of 2.5% per year, then the share of non-fossil energy would need to reach 31% by 2030 to deliver the required reduction in carbon intensity.

However, China recently set the target for non-fossil energy in 2035 at just 30%. This risks cementing a level of ambition that is likely too low to enable the 2030 carbon-intensity target to be met, whereas meeting it would require non-fossil energy to reach 30% by 2030.

There is ample scope for China to beat its targets for non-fossil energy.

However, given that the construction of new nuclear and hydropower plants generally takes five years or more in China, only those that are already underway have the chance to be completed by 2030. This leaves wind and solar as the quick-to-deploy power generation options that can deliver more non-fossil energy during this five-year period.

Reaching a much higher share of non-fossil energy in 2030, in turn, would therefore require much faster growth in solar and wind than currently targeted. Both the NDRC power-sector plan for 2025-27 and China’s new NDC aim for the addition of about 200 gigawatts (GW) per year of solar and wind capacity, much lower than the 360GW achieved in 2024.

If China continued to add capacity at similar rates, going beyond the government’s targets and instead installing 250-350GW of new solar and wind in each of the next five years, then this would be sufficient to meet the 2030 intensity target, assuming energy demand rising by 2.5-3.0% per year.

All previous wind and solar targets have been exceeded by a wide margin, as shown in the figure below, so there is a good chance that the current one will be, too.

Chart showing that China has repeatedly beaten its own targets for wind and solar growth
Solid line: China’s combined capacity of solar and wind power. Dashed lines: Various official targets. Source: Capacity by year from National Energy Administration (NEA). Targets compiled from various policies, including five-year plans, NEA annual energy work guidance and China’s nationally determined contributions. Targets include specific targets for wind and solar separately, for the two technologies combined and for “new energy” capacity, including other non-fossil energy sources. Targets stated as gross capacity additions over a given period were converted to targeted cumulative total capacity by adding the target to the capacity level at the end of the base year, assuming that retirements are negligible.

While the new pricing policy for wind and solar has created a much more uncertain and less supportive policy environment for the development of clean energy, provinces have substantial power to create a more supportive environment.

For example, they can include clean-energy projects and downstream projects using clean electricity and green hydrogen in their five-year plans, as well as developing their local electricity markets in a direction that enables new solar and wind projects.

3. Will the plan set an absolute cap on coal consumption?

In 2020, Xi pledged that China would “gradually reduce coal consumption” during the 2026-30 period. The commitment is somewhat ambiguous.

It could be interpreted as requiring a reduction starting in 2026, or a reduction below 2025 levels by 2030, which in practice would mean coal consumption peaking around the midway point of the five-year period, in other words 2027-28.

In either case, if Xi’s pledge were to be cemented in the 15th five-year plan then it would need to include an absolute reduction in coal consumption during 2026-30. An illustration of what this might look like is shown in the figure below.

Chart showing that China has pledged to 'gradually reduce' coal use during 2026-3-
China’s annual coal consumption growth rate by five-year period, 2006-2025. For 2026-2030, the commitment to “gradually reduce coal consumption” is illustrated as a small absolute reduction over the period. Source: Until 2024, calculated from reported total energy consumption and energy mix. For 2025, the CREA projection of a 0.3% increase is used.

However, the commitment to reduce coal consumption was missing from China’s new NDC for 2035 and from the Central Committee’s recommendations for the next five-year plan.

The Central Committee called for “promoting a peak in coal and oil consumption”, which is a looser goal as it could still allow an increase in consumption during the period, if the growth in the first years towards 2030 exceeds the reduction after the peak.

The difference between “peaking” and “reducing” is even larger because China has not defined what “peaking” means, even though peaking carbon emissions is the central goal of China’s climate policy for this decade.

Peaking could be defined as achieving a certain reduction from peak before the deadline, or having policies in place that constrain emissions or coal use. It could be seen as reaching a plateau or as an absolute reduction.

While the commitment to “gradually reduce” coal consumption has seemed to fade from discussion, there have been several publications discussing the peak years for different fossil fuels, which could pave the way for more specific peaking targets.

State news agency Xinhua published an article – only in English – saying that coal consumption would peak around 2027 and oil consumption around 2026, while also mentioning the pledge to reduce coal consumption.

The energy research arm of the National Development and Reform Council had said earlier that coal and oil consumption would peak halfway through the next five-year period, in other words 2027-28, while the China Coal Association advocated a slightly later target of 2028.

Setting a targeted peak year for coal consumption before the half-way point of the five-year period could be a way to implement the coal reduction commitment.

With the fall in oil use in transportation driven by EVs, railways and other low-carbon transportation, oil consumption is expected to peak soon or to have peaked already.

State-owned oil firm CNPC projects that China’s oil consumption will peak in 2025 at 770m tonnes, while Sinopec thinks that continued demand for petrochemical feedstocks will keep oil consumption growing until 2027 and it will then peak at 790-800m tonnes.

4. Will ‘dual control’ of carbon prevent an emission rebound?

With the focus on realising a peak in emissions before 2030, there could be a strong incentive for provincial governments and industries to increase emissions in the early years of the five-year period to lock in a higher level of baseline emissions.

This approach is known as “storming the peak” (碳冲锋) in Chinese and there have been warnings about it ever since Xi announced the current CO2 peaking target in 2020.

Yet, the emphasis on peaking has only increased, with the recent announcement on promoting peaks in coal consumption and oil consumption, as well as the 2035 emission-reduction target being based on “peak levels”.

The policy answer to this is creating a system to control carbon intensity and total CO2 emissions – known as “dual control of carbon” – building on the earlier system for the “dual control of energy” consumption.

Both the State Council and the Central Committee have set the aim of operationalising the “dual control of carbon” system in the 15th five-year plan period.

However, policy documents speak of building the carbon dual-control system during the five-year period rather than it becoming operational at the start of the period.

For example, an authoritative analysis of the Central Committee’s recommendations by China Daily says that “solid progress” is needed in five areas to actually establish the system, including assessment of carbon targets for local governments as well as carbon management for industries and enterprises.

The government set an annual target for reducing carbon intensity for the first time in 2024, but did not set one for 2025, also signaling that there was no preparedness to begin controlling carbon intensity, let alone total carbon emissions, yet.

If the system is not in place at the start of the five-year period, with firm targets, there could be an opportunity for local governments to push for early increases in emissions – and potentially even an incentive for such emission increases, if they expect strict control later.

Another question is how the “dual” element of controlling both carbon intensity and absolute CO2 emissions is realised. While carbon intensity is meant to be the main focus during the next five years, with the priority shifting to reducing absolute emissions after the peak, having the “dual control” in place requires some kind of absolute cap on CO2 emissions.

The State Council has said that China will begin introducing “absolute emissions caps in some industries for the first time” from 2027 under its national carbon market. It is possible that the control of absolute carbon emissions will only apply to these sectors.

The State Council also said that the market would cover all “major emitting sectors” by 2027, but absolute caps would only apply to sectors where emissions have “stabilised”.

5. Will it limit coal-power and chemical-industry growth?

During the current five-year period, China’s leadership went from pledging to “strictly control” new coal-fired power projects to actively promoting them.

If clean-energy growth continues at the rates achieved in recent years, there will be no more space for coal- and gas-fired power generation to expand, even if new capacity is built. Stable or falling demand for power generation from fossil fuels would mean a sharp decline in the number of hours each plant is able to run, eroding its economic viability.

Showing the scale of the planned expansion, researchers from China Energy Investment Corporation, the second-largest coal-power plant operator in China, project that China’s coal-fired power capacity could expand by 300GW from the end of 2024 to 2030 and then plateau at that level for a decade. The projection relies on continued growth of power generation from coal until 2030 and a very slow decline thereafter.

The completion of the 325GW projects already under construction and permitted at the end of 2024, as well as an additional 42GW permitted in the first three quarters of 2025, could in fact lead to a significantly larger increase, if the retirement of existing capacity remains slow.

In effect, China’s policymakers face a choice between slowing down the clean-energy boom, which has been a major driver of economic growth in recent years, upsetting coal project developers, who expect to operate their coal-fired power plants at a high utilisation, or retiring older coal-power plants en masse.

Their response to these choices may not become clear for some time. The top-level five-year plan that will be published in March 2026 will likely provide general guidelines, but the details of capacity development will be relegated to the sectoral plans for energy.

The other sector where fossil fuel-based capacity is rapidly increasing is the chemical industry, both oil and coal-based. In this sector, capacity growth has led directly to increases in output, making the sector the only major driver of emissions increases after early 2024.

The expansion is bound to continue. There are more than 500 petrochemical projects planned by 2030 in China, of which three quarters are already under construction, according to data provider GlobalData.

As such, the emissions growth in the chemical sector is poised to continue in the next few years, whereas meeting China’s 2030 targets and commitments would require either reining it in and bringing emissions back down before 2030, or achieving emission reductions in other sectors that offset the increases.

The expansion of the coal-to-chemicals industry is largely driven by projects producing gas and liquid fuels from coal, which make up 70% of the capacity under construction and in planning, according to a mapping by Anychem Coalchem.

These projects are a way of reducing reliance on imported oil and gas. In these areas, electrification and clean energy offer another solution that can replace imports.

Conclusions

The five-year plans being prepared now will largely determine the peak year and level of China’s emissions, with a major impact on China’s subsequent emission trajectory and on the global climate effort.

The targets in the plan will also be a key test of the determination of China’s leadership to respect previous commitments, despite setbacks.

The country has cultivated a reputation for reliably implementing its commitments. For example, senior officials have said that China’s policy targets represent a “bottom line”, which the policymakers are “definitely certain” about meeting, while contrasting this with other countries’ loftier approach to target-setting.

Depending on how the key questions outlined in this article are answered in the plans for the next five years, however, there is the possibility of a rebound in emissions.

There are several factors contributing to such a possibility: solar- and wind-power deployment could slow down under the new pricing policy, weak targets and a deluge of new coal- and gas-power capacity coming onto the market.

In addition, unfettered expansion of the chemical industry could drive up emissions. And climate targets that limit emissions only after a peak is reached could create an incentive to increase emissions in the short term, unless counteracted by effective policies.

On the other hand, there is also the possibility of the clean-energy boom continuing so that the sector beats the targets it has been set. Policymakers could also prioritise carbon-intensity reductions early in the period to meet China’s 2030 commitments.

Given the major role that clean-energy industries have played in driving China’s economic growth and meeting GDP targets, local governments have a strong incentive to keep the expansion going, even if the central government plans for a slowdown.

During the current five-year period, provinces and state-owned enterprises have been more ambitious than the central government. Provinces can and already have found ways to support clean-energy development beyond central government targets.

Such an outcome would continue a well-established pattern, given all previous wind and solar targets have been exceeded by a wide margin.

The difference now is that a significant exceedance of clean-energy targets would make a much bigger difference, due to the much larger absolute size of the industry.

To date, China’s approach to peaking emissions and pursuing carbon neutrality has focused on expanding the supply and driving down the cost of clean technology, emphasising economic expansion rather than restrictions on fossil-fuel use and emissions, with curbing overcapacity an afterthought.

This suggests that if China’s 2030 targets are to be met, it is more likely to be through the over-delivery of clean energy than as a result of determined regulatory effort.

The post Q&A: Five key climate questions for China’s next ‘five-year plan’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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IPCC: ‘Frustrating and disappointing’ meeting leaves AR7 timeline in deadlock

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Governments are still at loggerheads over the timeline for publishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) next three-part report, after countries doubled down on existing positions at a meeting in Bangkok.

Last week, around 330 delegates from more than 100 countries met in Thailand for the 64th session (IPCC-64) of the UN’s climate science body.

The meeting, set against the backdrop of a global energy shock triggered by war in the Middle East, comes more than two-and-a-half years into the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7).

There was disagreement on a range of issues, including the workplan for the cycle’s “working group” reports.

For five consecutive meetings, countries have failed to agree on whether the reports should be completed before, or after, the second “global stocktake” process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), due to culminate in 2028.

IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea tells Carbon Brief the “frustrating and disappointing” meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”.

“We made some formal decisions by consensus, but I would say they were more to postpone the decision making than they were to take decisions,” he says.

AR7 report timeline

As is typical for an IPCC assessment report cycle, AR7 will include three “working group” reports – on the physical science of climate change, impacts and adaptation, and mitigation. These will be summarised in a synthesis report.

Work is already underway on the three headline reports, as well as a special report on cities and climate change and methodology reports on carbon dioxide removal technologies and inventories for short-lived climate forcers.

However, countries are yet to reach an agreement as to when the three headline reports will be published, after deadlocked negotiations at meetings at Lima, Hangzhou, Sofia and Istanbul.

A coalition of developing and developed countries have backed a plan – proposed by the IPCC’s co-chairs – that would see the three reports published in 2028. This would enable their findings to feed into the second global stocktake, due to conclude that year at the COP33 conference.

The global stocktake is a five-yearly appraisal of global progress on tackling climate change that is designed to inform the national climate goals countries must submit to the UN under the Paris Agreement.

A separate group of countries, including China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have argued for a longer timeline on the grounds that developing nations need more time to review and approve the reports, according to reports from inside the meeting. This would mean some of the working group reports would be published after the second global stocktake is completed.

Dr Bill Hare, CEO and senior scientist at Climate Analytics, tells Carbon Brief that “the majority of countries, across geographies and levels of development, including least developed countries and small island developing states” support a timeline where the AR7 reports align with the stocktake.

Speaking during the opening session of IPCC-64, UNFCCC executive secretary Simon Steill said that 194 nations who attended COP30 in Belem last year had “emphasised the critical importance of the IPCC’s work in ensuring that the best available science feeds into the global stocktake”.

The timeline of the AR7 reports was not on a provisional agenda released ahead of the meeting.

However, the contentious issue was belatedly added to the agenda on the meeting’s first day, according to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB) reporting from inside the meeting.

This came after objections about the omission from a raft of countries, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Kenya, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Venezuela.

According to the ENB, Saudi Arabia “insisted” the issue be included on the agenda and warned that deferring it to the next meeting “risked a scenario in which the budget would not be approved and further work would be delayed”.

In response to calls for clarification on why there was no formal agenda item on report timelines, IPCC AR7 chair Prof Jim Skea said the secretariat had “not detected the flexibility” among governments that could lead to its resolution, according to the ENB.

Skea thus proposed that “informal consultations” would be held in order to “identify the basis for any flexibility”. He also suggested the subject be discussed in a session earmarked for “any other business”.

This proposal was rejected by some delegations, who argued the issue required more formal treatment and said informal consultations might not be inclusive, the ENB says.

In the end, the IPCC agreed to add the item to the agenda and establish a contact group, co-chaired by Brazil and Canada, tasked with advising the IPCC on how to make progress.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Skea explains that the secretariat did not put the issue on the agenda because it had “very low expectations about the success of such a discussion” and felt that more preparation was needed “to build the foundations for a decision” at a future meeting.

The last-minute addition of AR7 timelines to the agenda prompted some delegations to question the inclusivity of discussions. They noted that some countries had come without permission from their governments to discuss the issue, the ENB reports, whereas others with “limited resources” had decided to skip the meeting altogether.

This position was articulated at different stages of negotiations by Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands and Singapore in interventions supported by Canada, China, Cuba, Mexico, South Korea and Tanzania.

Climate Analytics’ Hare explains:

“The agenda item ‘progress with the timeline of AR7’ was added at the last minute upon pressure by countries including India and Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to introduce their own timelines into the process, which would push both WG2 and WG3 to 2029.

“As the AR7 timeline was not on the provisional agenda, many developing countries with resource and capacity constraints across the continent did not attend the session.”

One observer to the talks tells Carbon Brief that logistical issues prompted by the war in Iran had contributed to some countries’ decision not to attend.

‘Heated and polarised’

Discussions about the AR7 report timeline were focused on how to reach agreement by the IPCC’s next session.

A number of solutions were proposed, including for the IPCC secretariat to hold “informal conversations” between sessions to the creation of an “options paper” based on country submissions that would be presented at IPCC-65. Ultimately, all options ultimately failed to get the consensus required to be officially ratified by the IPCC.

On Thursday, the co-chairs of a contact group tasked with advising on how to progress with the timeline issue reported that “no consensus had been reached” and said there was a need for a “further exchange of views”, according to ENB.

Singapore subsequently suggested a plan for countries to formally submit views on the topic to the IPCC secretariat, which would then summarise submissions and present an “options report” for discussion at IPCC-65, says ENB. This would allow countries that were not prepared or not present at IPCC-64 to contribute, the country delegation said.

On the other hand, the Cook Islands said that “time is of the essence and further submissions from members should not be invited”, reports ENB. The country delegation also said the report timeline presented by co-chairs in Lima provided “sufficient time” for report reviews. This intervention was supported by Australia, Belize, Chile, Dominican Republic, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Samoa and Vanuatu.

Saudi Arabia repeated objections raised at previous meetings and said there was a need to address issues relating to overlaps in report scheduling, back-to-back reviews, inclusivity and capacity, as well as how the IPCC aligns with the UNFCCC processes, reports the ENB.

Instead, Saudi Arabia suggested that a later publication of working group reports in 2028 and 2029 would “provide sufficient intervals between IPCC sessions, time for developing countries to undertake their reviews and inclusive engagement”. This intervention was backed by Bahrain, Belarus, Kenya, Russia and Yemen, according to ENB.

As in previous IPCC sessions, there were diverging opinions around whether the IPCC needed to align report production with the global stocktake.

Some countries – including Bangladesh, Panama and South Korea, emphasised the need for the reports to align with the UNFCCC process.

The Netherlands, backing the plan for countries to submit their views ahead of IPCC-65, said delivery of AR7 reports after the global stocktake would “significantly lower” their policy relevance. The delegation noted that “never before” had the timeline given rise to such “heated and polarised debate”, according to the ENB.

Others – including Saudi Arabia, China and Russia – minimised the role of IPCC reports as an input into the stocktake, reports ENB.

A selection of interventions by country delegations at the IPCC’s Bangkok meeting, as reported in the ENB’s meeting summary. ENB (2026).

A number of countries, including France, Haiti and Panama, stressed that the absence of several delegations from the Bangkok meeting, including many small-island states, made the discussions about the timeline less inclusive, according to ENB.

Skea tells Carbon Brief that none of the talking points raised by countries around AR7 reports were new:

“I didn’t hear any new arguments offered at this meeting.”

Aerial view of the IPCC's plenary session.
Aerial view of the IPCC’s plenary session. Credit: Melissa Walsh | IISD/ENB

No decision

By close of play on Thursday, Skea presented a draft decision text which proposed that governments entrust the IPCC secretariat to develop an “options paper” that would be circulated ahead of IPCC-65, with a view to making a decision at the meeting.

India, Russia and Saudi Arabia said that they would prefer the creation of a “task group” that would produce a “compilation of views and proposals” on options for the timeline, according to the ENB. This would provide the “basis for further discussion” at IPCC-65.

Skea subsequently advised IPCC vice-chair Ladislaus Chang’a to form a huddle to find a middle ground between these two approaches.

On Friday, Chang’a presented a compromise solution where the IPCC chair and secretariat would “facilitate an exchange on the timeline with a view to reaching a decision at IPCC-65”, according to ENB. This would include overseeing a “task group” that would work between now and the next session.

This “draft decision” was backed by Brazil, China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

However, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, the Cook Islands, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Sweden and Switzerland said they could not support it, ENB says.

Antigua and Barbuda, the Cook Islands and a coalition of European nations instead suggested the chair hold “informal conversations” with governments over the coming months, with a view to coming to a timeline agreement at IPCC-65, says the ENB.

Skea subsequently proposed eliminating the reference to the task group in the decision text and to postpone all further deliberations on the timeline to IPCC-65.

This proposal faced opposition from a swathe of developing and emerging-economy countries, including Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Cuba, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Libya, Russia, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.

At this juncture, a growing number of countries supported pressing ahead without a decision text, citing lack of consensus as the meeting clock was running down, notes ENB.

Among these countries was Canada. Its delegation noted there was little time left in the session – and that countries had heard “basically nothing” about the scientific work of the IPCC at the meeting, reports ENB.

Despite some last-hour calls from India and South Africa for previous proposals to be revisited, no agreement was reached and no decision issued.

Review of IPCC principles and procedures

Another issue discussed in Bangkok was a review of the IPCC’s principles and procedures, which inform how the panel goes about putting together its reports.

The principles and procedures came into force in 1998 and are meant to be reviewed every five years. However, the last review was delayed due to the Covid pandemic.

Opening the agenda item on the IPCC’s principles and procedures towards the beginning of the talks on Tuesday, IPCC officials laid out 12 topics that the IPCC bureau had prioritised for review, according to the ENB. These included:

  • Author selection criteria
  • Responsibility for author selection
  • Chapter scientists
  • Scope of literature/Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge. (See Carbon Brief’s recent report on considering Indigenous knowledge within the IPCC.)
  • Selection criteria and responsibilities for review editors
  • Terms of reference for the chair, vice chairs and working group co-chairs
  • Terms of reference for technical support units
  • Developing country engagement and broader finance concerns
  • Carbon footprint and inclusivity
  • Artificial intelligence
  • Copyright
  • Timing and guidance on conflict of interest

Skea told countries that, while the bureau’s input was meant to inform discussions, it was for them to decide if a review of the principles and procedures was needed and what topics should be covered.

In discussions that followed, some countries called for the review to focus on the inclusivity of global south countries, while others said the review should be “targeted”, “focused” and “completed within a set time frame” to allow the IPCC to make swift progress.

Noting countries’ differing views, Skea proposed a huddle to discuss whether a task force on the review should be created.

On Wednesday, countries once again set out their priorities for the review.

According to the ENB, many countries “prioritised copyright, conflict of interest procedures, AI, and ensuring inclusivity by supporting the participation of developing and least developed countries and incorporating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge”.

Many also said the “principles and procedures are working well and supported a limited review that could be completed by IPCC-65, ahead of the report approval sessions starting in 2027”, the ENB says.

A small number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, India and Russia, called for the procedures to dictate that the timing of IPCC reports should be unaffected by “external factors”.

This could be interpreted as a reference to the push for the next IPCC assessment report to coincide with the next global stocktake – something that Saudi Arabia, India and Russia oppose.

Skea proposed the establishment of a contact group to try to take discussions forward, appointing Egypt and Ireland as co-chairs.

On Friday, the contact group co-chairs told the talks that they had found no agreement on whether to complete a review of the principles and procedures at these talks or at a future session.

Skea then presented a draft decision produced by the contact group co-chairs, which stated that the “IPCC’s principles and procedures are robust and have worked well” and expressed thanks to the bureau “for their work in preparing for a review of the principles and procedures”.

In response, Saudi Arabia said the draft “lacked a clear process and could be misleading”, with India adding that the “group had not reached agreement”, according to the ENB.

Colombia suggested “specifying that the review of principles and procedures had ended and would be considered again in 2031”, it continues.

This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia, who said the “review has just begun”.

India, Kenya and Saudi Arabia also opposed language indicating the principles and procedures “have worked well and are robust”.

Norway “observed that lack of consensus could be interpreted to mean that no amendments of the principles and procedures were appropriate and the panel could consider the review complete”, according to the ENB.

Skea presented a slightly revised text for adoption, which was adopted without further discussion.

The text notes the “diversity of views expressed at the session” and “decides to consider the review of the IPCC principles and procedures at future sessions, as appropriate”.

The ENB notes that this outcome left countries confused, saying:

“Some countries saw lack of consensus as an indication that discussions on the issue are now complete, while others believe the review process has just begun.”

Approval of meeting summaries

In what could be viewed as a signifier of the high levels of disagreement between countries, the talks failed to approve the meeting reports from its past three sessions in Peru, China and Bulgaria.

(The approval of the reports from China and Bulgaria had already been shifted to this meeting after countries failed to agree to them at previous sessions.)

During discussions on Wednesday, many European countries, along with Panama, complained about a “lack of transparency” in the reports, according to the ENB.

They suggested that countries making interventions should be named in the reports and that the number of speakers showing their support or opposition to an issue should be included.

This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia.

In response, Skea called for a huddle to convene to discuss the matter further.

On Friday, Skea noted that some countries had suggested that the “quality” of the report from the most recent meeting in Peru was higher than those from China and Bulgaria and suggested that countries adopt it.

Germany opposed this, expressing “openness” to further revisions of the report, in light of “diverging views” and a “lack of consensus in the room”, according to the ENB.

France requested that “past and future reports include everything that has been said by all delegates”, a view that was described as “unacceptable” by Saudi Arabia.
Skea said the lack of consensus from countries meant the issue would be deferred to the next IPCC meeting. This was reflected in a text adopted at the meeting.

Funding crunch

The IPCC receives funding from its parent organisations, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP), in addition to voluntary contributions from its member governments and the UNFCCC. This money is held in a “trust fund”.

According to the IPCC, the trust fund “supports IPCC activities, in particular the participation of developing country experts in the IPCC, the organisation of meetings as well as publication and translation of IPCC reports”.

However, in her opening remarks at last week’s meeting, UNEP executive director Inger Andersen warned that “expenditures from the IPCC trust fund have exceeded contributions over the last few years”, according to the ENB. She added:

“If this continues, the trust fund’s cash balance will be depleted before the end of the seventh cycle, impacting both this cycle and the transition to the next.”

The IPCC secretariat presented nine different IPCC funding scenarios for 2026-29 to the delegates. These scenarios include three different future expenditure levels, ranging from a “business as usual” scenario to a “severe spending cuts” scenario, which would see “fully virtual operations with suspension of multiple activities”.

They combine these expenditure scenarios with three different contribution scenarios, including a scenario in which annual contributions match annual expenditure and another that is equivalent to 2025 expenditure.

These scenarios highlighted that the IPCC trust fund is “likely to be depleted soon without new and larger financial contributions, expenditure cuts, or both,, the ENB says. It continues:

“The message was clear: if contributions do not increase, significant cuts in operations and more efficient meeting formats will need to be implemented. Possible ways forward include reduced activities and the greater use of virtual meetings, which run counter to the needs voiced by many countries for inclusivity, equity and capacity.”

The ENB adds that “the timing of this situation is particularly difficult”, because the IPCC is moving into its “busiest and most difficult part” of the assessment cycle, when the initial draft of reports are being written and reviewed.

According to the ENB, “the pattern of contentious meetings may also increase costs, especially if the panel requires late night sessions or extended days to conclude its work”.

Skea tells Carbon Brief that he is “more confident” about the budget than the “mood music that came out of some of the reporting”. He notes:

“It is really only in the worst-case scenarios where you combine low levels of contributions with high levels of spend that you run into real difficulties during the [AR7] cycle.

“During the first Trump administration, other countries stepped in [with funds] and we are now seeing these signs as well.”

The ENB reports that “Sweden has committed to increasing its contribution by 150% and encouraged all countries to contribute financially or host plenary sessions”.

The IPCC did not publish an updated budget in the documents for the IPCC-64 meeting.

Working group updates

The co-chairs of the three AR7 working group reports (WG1, WG2 and WG3) also presented updates on progress.

All three working group reports highlight the first joint lead author meeting, which was held in Paris in December. The meeting brought together lead authors from all three working groups and saw a total of 650 attendees.

All working groups have also submitted “zero order drafts” – an initial draft text – of their reports to their respective technical support units.

Meanwhile, the World Climate Research Programme and IPCC co-sponsored a workshop on high-impact events and Earth system tipping points in Paris in November 2025.

Separately, the IPCC undertook an expert review of the first order draft of the “special report on climate change and cities” between October and December 2025.

The agenda for the Bangkok meeting also included a range of other items.

IPCC legal officer Jennifer Lew Schneider reported that there are currently 263 organisations with “observer status” to the IPCC, alongside 20 new applications.

IPCC vice-chair Diana Ürge-Vorsatz presented a progress report on an expert meeting on “gender, diversity, equity and Inclusivity”, which was held in September 2025.

The UNFCCC’s Annett Möhner presented a review of collaborations between the IPCC and UNFCCC. In its summary of the meeting, the ENB says:

“She described activities and outcomes from UNFCCC COP30 including decisions on the global mutirão, procedural and logistical elements of the global stocktake process, and the Belém gender action plan, as well as conclusions on research and systematic observation.”

Similarly, Simone Schiele – programme officer at the IPBES secretariat – noted outcomes of the IPBES-12 meeting held in February 2026, as well as ongoing IPBES work.

‘Frustrating and disappointing’

IPCC chair Skea tells Carbon Brief that, overall, the meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”. He says:

“It was a frustrating and disappointing meeting. It was only a business meeting – there was no science involved in it. The lack of progress was a frustration to me, sitting there, chairing it.”

The next meeting – IPCC-65 – will take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during the second week of October 2026.

During this session, delegates hope to finalise the timeline for the AR7 reports and approve the draft reports of the IPCC’s 61st, 62nd and 63rd sessions.

As such, the ENB notes that “intersessional work” will play an important role in preparing panel members for meetings at IPCC-65. This, it says, includes the “submission of proposals on the AR7 timeline and informal consultations with the chair to identify points of convergence and possible flexibility”.

Skea says the secretariat will be working between sessions “to figure out the process that will move [things] in the right direction”. He continues:

“One of the issues that we have to consider is that there has been, in my view, quite a loss of trust between different groups of countries. We do need to address the trust issue, as well as the technicalities of how the timeline is constructed.”

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Funding gap threatens next round of IPCC climate science reports, chair warns

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A lack of money is hampering the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a substantial funding boost is needed to ensure its scientists can complete their next set of flagship reports, the chair of the UN body has warned.

Funding from governments fell in 2024 and 2025 and the organisation could run out of money by 2028 unless it receives fresh funds or implements spending cuts, chair Jim Skea told an official meeting of IPCC scientists in Bangkok last week, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), which provides coverage of UN negotiations.

Skea told the IPCC’s 64th session that without a substantial increase in contributions, the completion of the next set of reports, known as AR7, would be jeopardised.

To deal with this crisis, the IPCC is now considering cutting costs by holding meetings virtually, reducing staff travel, media training, recruitment, pay and website upgrades and cutting down on the editing, translating and printing of its reports, according to scenarios prepared by the IPCC secretariat.

    Nepal’s representative Manjeet Dhakal told Climate Home News he was concerned about the situation, while the ENB report said Japan’s government had called the funding crunch alarming.

    While South Korea and Sweden announced increased funding, the European Union – a major funder – cautioned against assuming past contributors will continue to give the same amounts, ENB reported.

    No end to row over reports’ timing

    The five AR7 reports, which will assess how the climate is changing, how to adapt, how to cut emissions, a synthesis report and a special report on climate change and cities – are further threatened by a long-running disagreement over when they should be completed.

    While some countries want them finished by 2028, so they can feed into the UN climate process’s five-yearly global stocktake, others say this is too rushed and want to stick to the IPCC’s usual seven-year cycle, meaning reports would be finished by 2030.

    Despite not being on the initial agenda, this issue dominated much of the scientists’ time in Bangkok. With time running out as delegates flew home, the meeting was unable to agree even on a plan to reach agreement by the next meeting in October 2026, ENB said.

    Delegates also failed to agree to approve reports of previous meetings, after arguing over transparency, and were divided on how to respond to a scientific conference on climate tipping points.

    Funding cuts

    To fund its work, the IPCC relies on voluntary funding from governments. Most of the money is spent funding the participation of scientists from developing countries, the IPCC says.

    But a report prepared by the IPCC secretariat for the Bangkok meeting said that “in recent years, the IPCC’s financial situation has come under strain, including amid current geopolitical challenges”.

    It did not mention any governments, but reduced US funding has had a major impact, the IPCC’s financial documents show.

    During Joe Biden’s presidency, the US gave the IPCC an average of $1.7 million a year, but President Donald Trump announced he would end US support and the latest data shows the US contributed no money in the first half of 2025.

    The IPCC spent more money than it received in 2024 and the shortfall grew in 2025, prompting the raft of cost-cutting proposals – from switching to online meetings to cutting budgets for translating reports.

    Further cost savings could be achieved, the IPCC said, by suspending IPCC travel to outreach events, freezing non-essential updates to the IPCC’s website, not creating any new staff positions until at least 2029 and no longer providing media training for the IPCC’s scientists.

    Richard Klein, a scientist who has been involved in the IPCC since 1994, told Climate Home News there was “a growing discrepancy between the ambition of the IPCC and what is feasible given the budget”.

    “In the end it means more pressure on authors who are already volunteering their time, and quite possibly less inclusivity of experts from developing countries,” he said.

    Nepal’s Dhakal, who advises the Least Developed Countries group, called on governments to give more money to the IPCC and for the IPCC secretariat to “explore options to reduce costs without compromising inclusivity, particularly for small delegations and those with limited capacity to engage”.

    Bitter divides on timeline

    Since January 2024, delegates to IPCC meetings have been arguing over when the deadline for the AR7 reports should be. Delegations including Saudi Arabia and India have opposed attempts to ensure that the reports are published by 2028, in time to inform the second global stocktake.

    The issue was not included on the Bangkok meeting’s formal draft agenda, with ENB reporting that Skea said this was because he did not think delegations had shown enough flexibility to be able to resolve it.

    After pressure from Saudi Arabia, India and several others, the issue was added to the agenda despite delegations complaining that their governments had not authorised them to discuss it and that many countries were not represented at the meeting.

    But, after four days, delegates were unable to even agree on a plan on how to reach agreement by the next meeting in October. Nepal’s Dhakal said he was “concerned with the lack of agreement on delivering the full AR7 package by 2028 to inform the second global stocktake”.

    Manjeet Dhakal represents Nepal at the IPCC session in Bangkok (Photo: IPCC Secretariat)

    France’s Environment Ministry said in a statement that it had “deep concern at attempts to slow down and arbitrarily delay the publication schedule for the reports”.

    Klein said that, while scientists are continuing their work on these reports, the likelihood of them being finalised before the second global stocktake “diminishes with every delay in making a decision”.

    Transparency and tipping points

    Delegates were also divided on the usually-routine issue of approving the summaries, prepared by the IPCC secretariat, of previous meetings.

    According to ENB, France, Germany and Belgium wanted reports to specify speakers’ names. While France said reports should include everything that has been said by all delegates, Saudi Arabia responded that this would be unacceptable. The issue was deferred to the next meeting in October.

    Saudi Arabia and India also objected to a reference in a report to a workshop that took place at Paris’s Sorbonne University in November on “tipping points and their consequences”. They argued that the concept of tipping points, which are thresholds beyond which the Earth’s climate changes suddenly, was contentious at the IPCC, ENB reported.

    While journalists are not allowed to observe IPCC sessions, staff from ENB – which is an arm of the IISD think tank – are allowed to watch sessions and report on what is said.

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    Nigerians bet on solar as global oil shock hits wallets and power supplies

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    Business has never been as brisk for Nigerian solar panel retailer Samuel Okechukwu and his team of installation technicians, who are struggling to keep up with orders since the Iran war caused local fuel prices to double.

    “There’s too much work, I’m even having to outsource some services to keep up with the work rate,” Okechukwu told Climate Home News, as he installed solar panels on the roof of an apartment building in the southern city of Port Harcourt.

    Before the war, he had installations once or twice a week, but is now busy almost every day.

    Okechukwu’s surge in orders in recent weeks suggests that more Nigerians are buying solar systems due to soaring fuel prices caused by the conflict in the Middle East, which has effectively blocked the Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas previously flowed.

      Plagued by frequent failures on Nigeria’s national grid, many homes and businesses buy diesel and petrol to supply generators to keep the lights on and equipment operating.

      Even before the latest fuel price shock, solar installations had been increasing in Nigeria in recent years as an alternative to generators among those able to afford the initial outlay.

      It costs about 600,000 naira ($450) to buy just one inverter battery and two 300-watt solar panels to charge it – roughly 10 times the minimum monthly wage – and eyebrows were raised when the government announced last year that the presidential villa was being kitted out with a $6 million solar mini-grid.

      Power plants hit by gas shortages

      Nigeria’s erratic power supplies have become even more unreliable in recent weeks as gas shortages constrain already fragile power generation. Most of Nigeria’s electricity supply comes from gas-fired plants.

      A delivery of solar panels to Onuchukwu’s shop in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, March 25, 2026. (Photo: Vivian Chime)

      A delivery of solar panels to Onuchukwu’s shop in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, March 25, 2026. (Photo: Vivian Chime)

      Last month, the Nigerian Independent System Operator said several of the oil- and gas-producing nation’s thermal power plants were being affected by “persistent gas supply constraints” that were causing a decline in electricity generation.

      While Nigeria has abundant gas reserves, the shortages are largely driven by structural issues, including mounting government debts owed to gas suppliers and pipeline constraints. Power Minister Adebayo Adelabu said last week that gas suppliers are prioritising export markets which have become more attractive and offer better returns over domestic markets.

      This week, the Nigerian government increased gas prices for power generation companies, a move likely to deepen cost pressures in the electricity sector already struggling with debt and supply shortages.

      At the same time, Okechukwu said rising temperatures in recent years were also increasing demand for an affordable source of electricity to power air conditioners.

      Global oil shock makes case for renewables

      Installations of solar power in Africa jumped 54% in 2025, according to a report by the Global Solar Council (GSC), marking the fastest annual growth on record.

      The continent’s solar power capacity still represents only about 1% of the world’s total, though industry experts say the continent may have significantly more than official data reflects, with many rooftop installations going uncounted.

      Precarious power supplies are already a key driver of solar adoption in many African nations, propelling fast growth rates in countries including Nigeria, which was Africa’s second-largest solar installer last year, installing more than 800 MW of capacity, according to the GSC, a nonprofit trade body.

      PEG Africa agents prepare to install a solar-powered fridge panel in Lahou-Kpanda, Ivory Coast, February 25, 2021. Photo taken on February 25, 2021. REUTERS / Luc Gnago

      PEG Africa agents prepare to install a solar-powered fridge panel in Lahou-Kpanda, Ivory Coast, February 25, 2021. Photo taken on February 25, 2021. REUTERS / Luc Gnago

      Surging energy costs due to the Iran war could give further momentum to growth, the GSC’s CEO Sonia Dunlop told Climate Home News.

      “It’s clear the people of Nigeria saw the writing on the wall … and have gone all in on rooftop solar as a result,” Dunlop said.

      The increase in energy prices since the conflict began have cost consumers and businesses around the world more than $100 billion, according to a March 2026 analysis by 350.org, a non-profit organisation.

      It said that would be enough to build sufficient solar capacity to supply about 150 million people in lower-consumption countries, for example in Africa, adding that investing in renewables was the best way to stabilise prices and strengthen energy security.

      Anne Jellema, 350.org’s CEO, urged governments meeting in Colombia next month to discuss the transition away from oil and gas to “seize this moment to adopt binding targets to phase out fossil fuels and ramp up investment in a clean, safe energy future”.

      Africa records fastest-ever solar growth, as installations jump in 2025

      The global energy shock unleashed by the U.S.-Israeli war “definitely supports the case for longer-term mitigation, not being reliant on imported oil”, said Karl Boyce, CEO of ARC Power, a mini-grid developer operating in Africa, adding that securing sufficient investment would be crucial to realising Africa’s renewables potential.

      “It’s so reliant on really heavy investment,” Boyce said. “So globally, there should be a focus on seeing how more investment can go into that sector just to give more stability in the longer term.”

      Onuchukwu in front of his solar panels retail shop in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, March 25, 2026. (Photo: Vivian Chime)

      Onuchukwu in front of his solar panels retail shop in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, March 25, 2026. (Photo: Vivian Chime)

      “Forget about buying petrol”

      In Port Harcourt, another solar trader, Sunday Onuchukwu, said his business has been “moving faster than before” as people get tired of power cuts and rising fuel costs that make investing in panels seem a better bet.

      Located in a solar panels retail market, Onuchukwu’s shop was busy with customers, but the market itself was unusually quiet – without the usual whirr of generators thanks to the solar panels on the roof.

      “Most of my customers complain that the fuel issue is one reason why they have decided to go solar. I have clients who transition both their offices and homes at the same time and move away from the bad power supply,” Onuchukwu told Climate Home News.

      He said many businesses spend more than 20,000 naira ($15) per day on petrol to power generators.

      Green Climate Fund picks locations for five developing country hubs

      “With that money, calculated over a one-year period, you can install solar and forget about ever buying petrol,” he said, adding that some lower-cost solar products were now becoming available such as a 50,000-naira ($36) kit that provides enough power to light a single bulb and charge a mobile phone.

      Mr Amadi lifts twp wrapped solar panels onto his head at Onuchukwu’s shop in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, March 25, 2026. (Photo: Vivian Chime)

      Mr Amadi lifts twp wrapped solar panels onto his head at Onuchukwu’s shop in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, March 25, 2026. (Photo: Vivian Chime)

      Lifting two heavy panels onto his head in Onuchukwu’s shop, one customer said ensuring a steady supply of power – after months without mains supplies – was vital for his barber shop and would also help his wife’s small business.

      “This is what I am using to run my business and ensure electricity,” the man said, giving his family name as Amadi.

      “With these two panels, I can also power my wife’s inverter freezer for her to be selling frozen foods.”

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