In the early 2000s, a new field of climate-science research emerged that began to explore the human fingerprint on extreme weather, such as floods, heatwaves, droughts and storms.
Known as “extreme event attribution”, the field has gained momentum, not only in the science world, but also in the media and public imagination. These studies have the power to link the seemingly abstract concept of climate change with personal and tangible experiences of the weather.
Scientists have published more than 400 peer-reviewed studies looking at weather extremes around the world, from wildfires in the US and heatwaves in India and Pakistan to typhoons in Asia and record-breaking rainfall in the UK. The result is mounting evidence that human activity is raising the risk of some types of extreme weather, especially those linked to heat.
To track how the evidence on this fast-moving topic is stacking up, Carbon Brief has mapped – to the best of our knowledge – every extreme-weather attribution study published to date.
Carbon Brief’s analysis reveals:
- 71% of the 504 extreme weather events and trends included in the map were found to be made more likely or more severe by human-caused climate change.
- 9% of events or trends were made less likely or less severe by climate change, meaning 80% of all events experienced some human impact. The remaining 20% of events and trends showed no discernible human influence or were inconclusive.
- Of the 152 extreme heat events that have been assessed by scientists, 93% found that climate change made the event or trend more likely or more severe.
- For the 126 rainfall or flooding events studied, 56% found human activity had made the event more likely or more severe. For the 81 drought events studied, it’s 68%.
First published in July 2017, this article is the fifth annual update (see endnote) to incorporate new studies. The aim is that it serves as a tracker for the evolving field of “extreme event attribution”.
Using the map
The map above shows 504 extreme weather events and trends across the globe for which scientists have carried out attribution studies. The different symbols show the type of extreme weather; for example, a heatwave, flood or drought. The colours indicate whether the attribution study found a link to human-caused climate change (red), no link (blue) or was inconclusive (grey).
Use the plus and minus buttons in the top-left corner, or double click anywhere, to zoom in on any part of the world. Click on a symbol to reveal more information, including a quote from the original paper to summarise the findings and a link to the online version.
The filter on the left allows users to select a specific type of weather event to look at or, for example, only those found to be influenced by climate change.
The filter can also be used to highlight extreme events from a particular year. (Note: earlier versions of this map classified events by the year that the study or analysis was published.) To isolate studies that assess the changing trends of weather extremes, click the “trend” box in the filter.
The software used to make the map currently only works with a Web Mercator projection (as used by virtually all major online map providers). It is worth noting that this – like all map projections – offers a somewhat distorted view of the world.
It is important to note that the weather events scientists have studied so far are not randomly chosen. They can be high-profile events, such as Hurricane Harvey, or simply the events that occurred nearest to scientific research centres. (More on this below.)
The map includes three different types of studies. The circles and hexagons on the map indicate papers published in peer-reviewed journals. The different shapes refer to whether the study considers an individual extreme event (circles), such as a wildfire or storm, or whether it analyses longer-term trends in extreme weather (hexagons), such as the change in frequency of flooding or marine heatwaves over time.
The third shape – triangles – indicate rapid attribution studies. These are quickfire assessments of the climate change contribution to extreme weather events, published online shortly after an event concludes. (More on this below.)
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the icon locations are approximate – particularly for studies that cover large regions. For example, global studies can be found grouped together in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.
Extreme weather types
The events and trends shown on the map are covered by 431 individual scientific papers or rapid studies. Where a single study covers multiple events or locations, these have been separated out into individual entries on the map.
Combining the evidence over the past 20 years, the literature is heavily dominated by studies of extreme heat (30%), rainfall or flooding (25%) and drought (16%). Together, these make up more than two-thirds of all published studies (71%). The full list is available in this Google sheet.
As the chart below shows, the number of extreme events studied has grown substantially over the past 10-15 years. Note that formal studies typically follow a year or so after the event itself as the writing and peer-review process for journal papers can take many months.
The majority of studies included here have been published in the annual “Explaining extreme events” special issues of the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society (BAMS). Each bumper volume typically contains around 15-30 peer-reviewed studies of events from the previous year. Other studies have been found through the Climate Signals database and online searches through journals. This update includes studies published up to the end of May 2022.
(Note: The map currently only includes studies published in English.)
Specific types of event can be displayed in the chart below by clicking on the category names at the top.
Number of attribution studies by extreme weather event type and year. Note: the total number of events dipped in 2017 because the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society special report for that year was published in early 2018 rather than late 2017. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
Most of the categories of extreme weather are self-explanatory, but “storms” and “oceans” require a bit of explanation.
For ease of presentation, the “storms” category includes both tropical cyclones – such as hurricanes and typhoons – and extratropical storms. The “oceans” category encompasses studies looking at marine heatwaves, storm surges and the strength of El Niño events.
Newer categories include “coral bleaching” and “ecosystem services”, reflecting the ongoing developments in attribution science. For example, a rapid attribution study concluded that climate change had “drastically” increased the likelihood of the conditions leading to bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef in 2016 – by at least 175 times. And a 2022 study found that “extremely early” cherry-tree flowering in Kyoto in March 2021 was made “15 times more likely” by climate change.
For this latest iteration of the map, a new category of “compound” extreme events has also been added. This includes, for example, a 2021 study that found climate change had contributed to the “high likelihood” of combined dry and hot events in recent decades over most of China.
Such studies show that attribution studies are increasingly considering the impacts of extremes, rather than focusing purely on the weather event.
One of the first of these “impact attribution” studies was published in 2016. It estimated that 506 of the 735 fatalities in Paris during the 2003 European heatwave were down to the fact that climate change had made the heat more intense than it would otherwise have been. The same was true for 64 of the 315 fatalities in London, the study said. Health impacts have increasingly become a focus of attribution studies.
Similarly, a 2021 study found that 37% of “warm-season heat-related deaths” across 43 countries between 1991 and 2018 “can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change and that increased mortality is evident on every continent”. Another 2021 study, which the authors unpacked in a Carbon Brief guest post, found that climate change was a “critical driver” of the drought that led to a food crisis in Lesotho in 2007. And a third 2021 study – also the subject of a Carbon Brief guest post – on the rising threat of an “outburst flood” from glacial lakes in the Peruvian Andes found that the retreat of the region’s glaciers was “entirely attributable” to human-caused warming.
This shift towards impacts “is quite significant”, says Prof Peter Stott, who leads the climate monitoring and attribution team at the Met Office Hadley Centre and has been a co-editor of the BAMS reports since they began in 2012. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Impacts are hard to do because you have to establish a significant link between the meteorology and the impact in question. As editors, we’ve been trying to encourage more studies on impacts because it’s the impacts rather than the meteorology per se that tends to motivate these types of study – and if we only have the attribution on the meteorological event then we only have an indirect link to the relevant impact.”
Attribution of climate impacts could even be used in the courts, one 2021 study explained. The authors wrote a Carbon Brief guest post explaining how attribution science can be “translated into legal causality”. They wrote:
“Attribution can bridge the gap identified by judges between a general understanding that human-induced climate change has many negative impacts and providing concrete evidence of the role of climate change at a specific location for a specific extreme event that already has led or will lead to damages.”
Finally, attribution research has also identified the “signal” of human influence in other indicators of climate change, such as increasing average temperature, rising lake temperatures or sea level rise. Recent research has even been able to detect the fingerprint of climate change “from any single day in the observed global record since early 2012, and since 1999 on the basis of a year of data”. These types of studies have not been included in the attribution map as the focus here is on extremes.
Human influence on extreme weather
Of the attribution studies included here, scientists found that human-caused climate change has altered the likelihood or severity of an extreme weather event in 80% of cases studied (71% made more severe or likely and 9% made less so).
In Carbon Brief’s first edition of this analysis in 2017, 68% of events were found to have a human impact (with 63% made more severe or likely and 6% less so).
While these figures are not representative of all extreme weather events – attribution studies have only been conducted on a relatively small number – previous research has taken this broader view. For example, a 2015 study estimated the fraction of all globally occurring heat and heavy rainfall extremes that was attributable to warming. The authors found that around 75% of “moderate daily hot extremes over land” and 18% of “moderate daily precipitation extremes over land” were attributable to the observed temperature increase since pre-industrial times. These fractions are expected to increase with further warming, the authors noted.
There are several ways of carrying out an attribution analysis. (A team of attribution scientists wrote a Carbon Brief guest post in 2021 that unpacks their methods.) One of the most common is to take observations and/or climate model simulations of an extreme event in the current climate and compare them with idealised model runs of that event in a world without human-caused global warming. The difference between the “with” and “without” climate change simulations indicates how the likelihood or severity of that extreme event has changed.
Note that events are classified here as having an human impact if climate change is found to have influenced at least one aspect of that event. For example, a study of the 2011 East Africa drought found that climate change contributed to the failure of the “long rains” in early 2011, but that the lack of “short rains” in late 2010 was down to the climate phenomenon La Niña. This event is, thus, designated as having a human impact.
For the majority of events affected by climate change, the balance has shifted in the same direction. That is, rising temperatures made the event in question more severe or more likely to occur. These events are represented by the red in the chart below. Clicking on the red “slice” reveals that heatwaves account for 40% of such events, rainfall or flooding for 20%, and droughts for 15%. Return to the original chart, and do the same with the other slices to see the proportion of different weather types in each category.
Pie chart showing the proportion of extreme events/studies that were found to have been made more likely/severe by climate change (red segment), less likely/severe (orange), had no link identified (blue) and were inconclusive or lacked sufficient data (grey). Clicking on a segment reveals the makeup of different types of extremes within that category. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
In 11% of extreme weather events and trends studied, scientists found no discernible influence from human activity. These are coloured blue in the map and the chart above. For a further 9%, the observational data or modelling techniques used in the study were insufficient to reach a reliable conclusion (shown as grey in the map and pie chart).
In 9% of studied weather events and trends, scientists found climate change had made the event less likely or less severe (pale orange in the chart above).
Unsurprisingly, this category includes blizzards and extreme cold snaps. However, it also features a few studies that suggest climate change has lessened the chances of heavy rainfall, and another that found rising temperatures have made agricultural drought in California less likely.
Drought is complicated (more on this below). Briefly, though, it is worth noting that five other studies looking at different aspects of the California drought over 2011-17 found climate change had played a role. Two found no discernible link (pdf, p7-15), while one was inconclusive (pdf, p3).
Interestingly, a 2020 study analysed the way links between climate change and the California drought were portrayed in US media. It finds that the links were “covered widely in both local and national news”, but notes:
“However, legitimate differences in the methods underpinning the attribution studies performed by different researchers often resulted in a frame of scientific uncertainty or disagreement in the media coverage.”
As the case of California’s drought shows, it is often necessary to dig deeper to understand the full picture. The rest of this article looks at the evidence for the three most-studied types of extreme weather – heatwaves, heavy rain and floods, and droughts – as well as some of the main issues in event attribution, and where the field as a whole is heading.
Heatwaves
The attribution map includes studies of 152 extreme heat events, of which 142 (93%) have been made more likely or more severe because of climate change. No studies have found a heatwave that has been made less severe by climate change, while studies of two events (1%) identified no influence and a further eight (5%) were inconclusive.
In recent years, studies have shown that several heat extremes would have been impossible or virtually impossible without human influence on the climate. These include Siberia’s heatwave of 2020, the Pacific north-west “heat dome” event of 2021 and Europe’s record-breaking summer of 2021.
The studies on extreme heat that did not find a role for climate change were an analysis of the Russian heatwave in 2010 and a rapid attribution study of the all-time high temperatures recorded in Rajasthan, India in May 2016. For the latter, the authors suggested that “the lack of a detectable trend may be due to the masking effect of aerosols on global warming and increased use of irrigation”.
While heatwaves are the most-studied extreme event in attribution literature, they are becoming “less and less interesting for researchers”, notes a Bloomberg article from 2020. Dr Friederike Otto is a senior lecturer at the Grantham Institute for Climate Change and the Environment at Imperial College London and co-leader of World Weather Attribution, a consortium of scientific organisations founded in 2014 to deliver “timely and scientifically reliable information on how extreme weather may be affected by climate change”. She told Bloomberg that the consortium chose not to investigate California’s record-breaking summer 2020 heatwave as “the evidence is so strong already”.
A particularly well-studied region for heatwaves in the literature is Australia, which accounts for 10% of the heat-related events included here. And climate change was found to play a role in all but one of the 15 Australian heat events studied. It is worth noting for that one event, however, that although the study (pdf, p145) was inconclusive for the city of Melbourne in south-east Australia, the authors did detect a human influence on extreme heat up the coast in Adelaide.
This raises a few important points. First, finding that climate change contributed to an event is not the same as saying it “caused” that event. Attribution is about working out if the likelihood or magnitude of a particular event happening now is different from what it would be in a world that was not warming.
A useful analogy – as explained in the first BAMS report in 2012 – is of a baseball player who starts taking steroids. If the player begins hitting 20% more home runs than before, it would not be possible to say for sure whether a particular home run is because of the steroids or the player’s spontaneous skill. But it is possible to say how the steroids have altered the likelihood that the player hits a home run, by comparing their current and historical performances. As the report put it:
“Given that steroids have resulted in a 20% increased chance that any particular swing of the player’s bat results in a home run, you would be able to make an attribution statement that, all other things being equal, steroid use had increased the probability of that particular occurrence by 20%.”
Another important point is that in cases where attribution science finds that climate change is making a given type of extreme weather more likely, it does not necessarily follow that the chance of experiencing that kind of weather gets incrementally higher each year. Natural variability means that there will still be ups and downs in the strength and frequency of extreme events.
Finally, there is usually a level of confidence attached to attribution results. So, while two studies might both find a role for human influence in a given weather event, the signal may be stronger for one than the other. For the purposes of this analysis, the attribution map does not distinguish between high- and low-confidence results, but users can click through to each study for more details.
Heavy rain and flooding
Of the 126 rainfall or flooding events included in the attribution map, 71 (56%) found human activity had made the event more likely or more severe – a far smaller proportion than for heat-related studies. Nineteen studies (15%) found that climate change had made the whole event less likely to occur. Of the remaining heavy rainfall events, studies of 24 (19%) found no evidence of a link to climate change, while 12 (10%) were inconclusive.
That there is a more divided set of results for extreme rainfall than for heatwaves could suggest several things. In some cases, limited data might make it difficult to detect a clear “signal” of climate change above the “noise” of weather considered normal for a particular region. In other cases, an inconclusive result could reflect the fact that rainfall or flooding events are inherently more complex than heatwaves, with many ways for natural variability to play a role. Human factors, such as land use and drainage, also play a part in whether heavy rain leads to flooding.
Take the UK, for example. While one study found climate change had increased the risk of floods in England and Wales in Autumn 2000 by at least 20% (and even up to 90%), another found little influence on summer rainfall in 2012 (pdf, p36).
This raises another important point. When it comes to interpreting the results of event attribution studies, it matters what the question is. For example, a 2013 study asked whether recent wet summers in north-western Europe were a response to retreating Arctic sea ice (pdf, p32). The answer from the study was “no”. But, as a foreword from that year’s BAMs report explains:
“Given the numerous ways climate change could influence precipitation in this region, a ‘no’ result for the role of Arctic sea ice should not be interpreted as an absence of any role at all for climate change.”
This is similar to an argument made by Dr Kevin Trenberth, distinguished senior scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and colleagues in a Nature Climate Change “perspective” article in 2015.
The paper notes that, in a chaotic weather system, the complex dynamics of the atmosphere mean the size and path of a storm or heavy rainfall event has a large element of chance. This can make it tricky to identify where climate change fits in, potentially underestimating its influence.
Therefore, rather than analysing the weather patterns that bring a storm to an area, the authors argue that scientists should be looking at how the impact of that storm has been boosted by temperature changes – known as “thermodynamic” effects. Higher temperatures mean warmer seas, higher sea levels and more moisture evaporating into the atmosphere. These are changes that scientists can be more confident in, the authors wrote, and so should be the focus for attribution studies – rather than looking at changes to circulation patterns in the atmosphere.
For example, the paper reexamines an earlier study (pdf, p15) that suggested climate change had reduced the chances of the five-day heavy rainfall event that hit north-east Colorado in September 2013. Trenberth and colleagues argue that while climate change might not have made the specific weather system that brought the rain more likely, it will have contributed to the sheer volume of moisture in the atmosphere.
Chart shows the number of studies for each type of extreme event that fall within each category of human influence: More severe/likely (red), less severe/likely (yellow), no influence (blue) and inconclusive (grey). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
While attribution studies of heatwaves are generally more straightforward than storms – as they focus on thermodynamic influences – the type of question they are asking is still important. The Russian heatwave in 2010 is a good example of this. One study looking at the severity of the event did not find a role for climate change. Yet another one, which did find an influence, looked at the likelihood of the event.
This apparent contradiction is tackled by a third study that reconciles the other two. It explains that “the same event can be both mostly internally-generated [i.e. by natural variability] in terms of magnitude and mostly externally-driven [i.e. by human-caused climate change] in terms of occurrence probability”.
Otto, who is lead author of the third study, tells Carbon Brief:
“The studies, thus, only appear to be contradictory, but are, in fact, complementary.”
It is also important to stress that the absence of evidence for a link to climate change is not the same as evidence of absence. In other words, it does not necessarily mean there was no human influence, just that a particular analysis did not find one. This is why a single study should never be considered the final word on how climate change influences a given type of extreme weather.
Drought
Of the 81 drought events and trends considered here, climate change was found to have increased the severity or likelihood of 55 (68%). Of the remainder, the likelihood or severity was reduced for one event (1%), while no discernible link with human activity was found for 15 (19%) and 10 (12%) were inconclusive.
Capetonians queue for water at natural springs around the city during the water crisis, January 2018. Credit: tim wege / Alamy Stock Photo
This mixed bag of results reflects the inherent complexity of droughts. And, again, the specific question matters. Conclusions about the role of climate change in a specific drought could depend on whether a study looks at temperature, rainfall or soil moisture, for example.
As the 2015 BAMS report explains:
“Drought continues to be an event type where the results require significant context, and easy answers often remain elusive because of the many meteorological, hydrological, and societal drivers that combine to cause drought.”
(For more on the different ways that droughts can be categorised, see this Carbon Brief guest post from 2018.)
Geographical reach
While much has been achieved in the field of extreme event attribution in a short space of time, scientists are constantly looking for ways to tailor their work to suit the people who might use it.
One major goal since the early days of the field has been to expand extreme event attribution to cover a larger and more diverse geographical area.
Where in the world scientists can carry out attribution studies – and for what kind of events – will always be limited by the quality and availability of observed data and appropriate models. The attribution map highlights, for example, that there are relatively few studies of extreme weather in Africa and South America.
In another example, scientists hoping to analyse Super Typhoon Mangkhut – which hit the Philippines in September 2018 – were unable to in part because of “very poor quality” observed data in publicly available datasets and a lack of models.
At the moment, there is also a heavy leaning towards weather events that are local to the modelling groups, or that have a particular scientific interest. Otto explains:
“For example, scientists often do attribution studies because an event occurs on their doorstep. The UK, California and Boulder [in Colorado] are, therefore, studied much more than other parts of the world, but that does not necessarily make them places particularly impacted by climate change.”
This means that while the studies carried out so far are indicative of the role climate change is playing in extreme weather around the world, they should not be considered representative of all types of extreme weather everywhere, says Otto. She tells Carbon Brief:
“[The studies so far] are part of a picture, but we don’t know what’s on the missing puzzle pieces. And, crucially, we don’t know how many pieces are missing.”
For example, Otto recently penned a Carbon Brief guest post on how the lack of monitoring of heatwaves in Africa means they are a “forgotten impact” of climate change.
Real-time extreme weather attribution
As well as expanding the science to cover different types of weather and more of the world, scientists are getting faster at turning the handle on extreme event attribution studies – sometimes crunching the numbers just days after an event has occurred.
The rapid studies included here are all produced by the World Weather Attribution (WWA) initiative, described earlier, or the UK Met Office.
An example of analysis performed by the latter includes their review of the UK’s weather in 2020, which was published by Carbon Brief. This showed that climate change increased the likelihood of the UK’s warm year by approximately a factor of 50.
While the WWA individual rapid assessments are not individually peer-reviewed, they are conducted using methods that have been through the peer-review process. As the 2014 BAMS report explains:
“Much like other routine analysis, such as an operational seasonal forecast, statements made about heat events using these methods do not necessarily need to go through the peer-reviewed literature to be considered credible.”
By conducting the analysis in the immediate aftermath of a weather event, these rapid studies provide almost-real-time information on the influence of climate change, rather than having to wait many months for a formal study.
(In some cases, these rapid assessments are later published in peer-reviewed journals. In these instances, the formal study is included in the attribution map, rather than the initial analysis. In some cases, this means earlier rapid assessments are removed from the Carbon Brief map in order to add in the relevant peer-reviewed paper once it is published.)
The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) has been working on a pilot “operational attribution service” through the Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S).
This collaboration between the UK Met Office, German weather service (DWD), Meteo France, Dutch weather service (KNMI) and the University of Oxford will “demonstrate how attribution of extreme weather events can be carried out operationally by national meteorological services”, Prof Stott tells Carbon Brief:
“In this project we are developing and testing the protocols we will need to enable rapid and reliable assessments of the extent to which recent extreme weather events have been made more or less intense or more or less likely by climate change. We started at the beginning of the year and so far we have tested our procedures on an analysis of the 2018 heatwave in Europe.”
The progress to date has “demonstrated the importance of international collaboration for developing new techniques and processes”, says Stott. But “national meteorological services across Europe will continue to have a particular remit to deliver advice on weather and climate in their own countries”, he adds:
“At the Met Office in the UK we are developing our operational attribution capability to help inform the public, policymakers and journalists about the extent to which damaging extreme weather events like the floods in Yorkshire [in 2019] have been affected by climate change.”
An evolving science
As the science of extreme event attribution has matured and become more nuanced, so has the choice of terminology around extreme weather and climate change.
While some attest that all extreme weather must be affected by a world that is warming, this warrants some caution. As the first BAMS report in 2012 noted:
“While it has been argued that in the Anthropocene, all extreme weather or climate events that occur are altered by human influence on climate…this does not mean that climate change can be blamed for every extreme weather or climate event. After all, there has always been extreme weather.”
But while it would be premature to suggest that any single study is the last word, it is clear that – in many cases – the science can do better than that. Similarly, scientific thinking has clearly moved on from the unsatisfactory statement that it is not possible to attribute any individual weather event to climate change. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, there have been some studies that have concluded that an event – or aspect of an event – would have been impossible without climate change.
Ultimately, there are no blanket rules in attribution. Scientists need to examine the circumstances of each individual weather event – or a longer pattern of events for trend studies. It is only by combining evidence from all around the world that they can begin to draw broader conclusions.
Attribution studies, therefore, rely heavily on the quality and availability of observational data and climate model simulations. In a short paper for the journal Weather, Dr Otto says that “the models used for attribution need to be able to reliably estimate the likelihoods of the types of events being attributed”.
As discussed earlier, attribution studies of heatwaves tend to be more straightforward because of their focus on thermodynamic effects, rather than atmospheric circulation. Yet, Otto tells Carbon Brief that recent studies suggest models overestimate the year-to-year variability of heat extremes in some parts of the world, and thus underestimate the trend and the role of climate change.
In a rapid attribution study of the western Europe summer heatwave in 2019, for example, Otto and her colleagues found that, for the month of June, the models “show about 50% smaller trends than observations in this part of Europe and much higher year-to-year variability than the observations”. Similarly, a study of the 2019-20 Australian bushfires noted that “models underestimate the observed trend in heat” and so the “real increase could be much higher”.
These findings emphasise how important it is to analyse models and observations together, Otto says:
“This made me realise just how important attribution is for the scientific community – and everyone using climate science – at bringing observations and models together in a very concrete real-world test case.
Attribution can, therefore, be used to help scientists “identify where the models are doing well and for what they are not in a much more direct way than the classical skill assessment of climate projections does”, adds Otto.
Forecasted attribution
One attempt to move attribution science forward was the very first “advance forecasted” attribution analysis, which quantified the impact of climate change on the size, rainfall, and intensity of Hurricane Florence before it made landfall in North Carolina in September 2018.
The analysis ran two sets of short-term forecasts for the hurricane: one as the climate is today and the other in a simulated world without human-caused climate change. The researchers concluded at the time:
“We find that rainfall will be significantly increased by over 50% in the heaviest precipitating parts of the storm. This increase is substantially larger than expected from thermodynamic considerations alone. We further find that the storm will remain at a high category on the Saffir-Simpson scale for a longer duration and that the storm is approximately 80km in diameter larger at landfall because of the human interference in the climate system.”
The analysis received a mixed reaction. Prof Stott told Carbon Brief that it was “quite a cool idea”, but would be dependent on being able to forecast such events reliably. Dr Kevin Trenberth, distinguished senior scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, described it as “a bit of a disaster”. He told Carbon Brief that the quality of the forecast was questionable for the assessment:
“The forecasts made were not good: the intensity of the forecast storm at landfall was category 4 or 5 as I recall, instead of category 2. And so the statements made were based on quite flawed assumptions: namely, that they had a good forecast.”
A key requirement for a reliable attribution study is for models to accurately replicate the extreme event, Trenberth added, but “obviously one can not assess the goodness of the forecast if one does this in advance”.
The authors subsequently published a paper in Science Advances that “reviews the forecasted attribution with the benefit of hindsight”. The findings show that climate change increased rainfall amounts “associated with the forecasted storm’s core” by around 5%, and contributed to Hurricane Florence being “about 9km larger in mean maximum diameter (or a 1.6% increase in storm area) due to climate change”.
The authors acknowledged that the “quantitative aspects of our forecasted attribution statements fall outside broad confidence intervals of our hindcasted statements and are quite different from the hindcasted best estimates”. In short, the results are quite a way off what they forecasted.
However, the authors also said they have identified what went wrong with their forecasted analysis. Problems with the way their “without climate change” model runs were set up created a larger contrast against their real-world simulations. The results thus suggested that climate change would have a bigger impact than it actually did.
Nonetheless, the study did identify a quantifiable impact of climate change on Hurricane Florence, adding to the evidence from studies by other author groups, the researchers concluded:
“As the climate continues to warm, it is expected that extreme tropical cyclone precipitation events and resulting inland flooding will become yet more frequent.”
In addition, a 2021 study of the record Australian heat event of October 2015 noted the potential of their methods “to provide attribution statements for forecast events within an outlook period”. This will “allow for informed messaging to be available as required when an extreme event occurs, which is of particular use to weather and climate services”, the authors wrote.
On the topic of forecasts, a 2021 study showed how it was possible to use a weather forecast model for attribution. The researchers, who penned a Carbon Brief guest post about their work, tested their methods using the European heatwave of February 2019 – an event their model successfully predicted:
“We find that the direct impact of the extra carbon dioxide (CO2) that humans have pumped into the atmosphere made the event 42% more likely for the British Isles and at least 100% (two times) more likely for France.”
Their work “so far represents just the first few steps towards an operational forecast-based attribution system”, they noted.
Finally, as well as casting forwards, attribution can also look back in time. A 2020 study on the US “Dust Bowl” heat and drought events of the 1930s takes an unconventional approach of looking at how the past event “would behave” with present-day levels of greenhouse gases.
The researchers find that “the return period of a 1-in-100-year heatwave summer (as observed in 1936) would be reduced to about 1-in-40 years” in today’s climate.
Carbon Brief will continue to add new extreme event attribution studies to the map and update the accompanying analysis every year. Please get in touch with any suggestions of attribution studies that could be included.
The post Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world appeared first on Carbon Brief.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-weather-around-the-world/
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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