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LGES

In a major move to reduce dependence on Chinese imports, South Korea’s LG Energy Solution (LGES) has reportedly secured a $4.3 billion deal to supply Tesla with lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries for energy storage systems. As the U.S. ramps up tariffs on Chinese goods, the agreement marks a strategic pivot for Tesla, which has heavily relied on China for its battery needs.

Reuters disclosed that neither company has confirmed the deal publicly, but a source familiar with the matter said that the LFP batteries will be produced at LGES’s Michigan factory, which recently began production.

The contract, among LGES’s largest to date, will run from August 2027 through July 2030, with an option to extend for up to seven additional years and increase volumes based on future discussions.

LG Energy Solution’s (LGES) Power Shift: From EVs to Energy Storage

CNBC reported that LG Energy Solution had earlier disclosed a $4.3 billion contract to supply LFP batteries globally over three years, but did not name Tesla as the customer or clarify whether the batteries would be used for electric vehicles or energy storage systems (ESS). However, growing signals point to Tesla’s booming energy business as the likely focus.

With EV demand slowing, LGES has shifted gears toward energy storage. The company is betting on a surge in demand fueled by the rapid expansion of AI data centers and renewable energy installations.

Liz Lee, Associate Director at Counterpoint Research, confirmed to CNBC that the deal is expected to be closely linked to LGES’s Michigan facility, which now serves as its first North American ESS battery manufacturing hub.

This strategic shift comes as LGES considers repurposing some of its U.S. EV battery lines for ESS production in response to weakening EV market dynamics.

ESS LGES
Source: LGES

Strong Q2 2025

The company recently posted solid second-quarter earnings for 2025, even without North American production incentives. The company reported revenue of KRW 5.6 trillion, down 11.2% from the previous quarter. However, operating profit surged 31.4% to KRW 492.2 billion, with an 8.8% margin. Notably, North American incentives contributed KRW 490.8 billion to the operating profit.

CFO Chang Sil Lee stated,

“In the second quarter, we secured stable EV battery sales and also started production at our new ESS battery facility in North America. However, constrained customer purchase sentiment, coupled with the reflection of metal price decline to our average selling price (ASP), affected our quarterly revenue.”

Moving forward, LGES anticipates a short-term slowdown in EV demand due to new tariffs and cost pressures on automakers. Yet, the company remains optimistic about mid- to long-term growth, driven by advances in autonomous driving and energy storage.

To adapt to this shift, it is focusing on maximizing output at existing production lines, particularly for ESS batteries. It plans to expand its annual production capacity for ESS to 17 GWh by year-end. The company also aims to reduce fixed costs by scaling back investments while securing a competitive supply chain.

Sustainability Goals 

Beyond profits, the company is committed to achieving carbon neutrality across its value chain by 2050. One major step involves converting 100% of its power use across all global sites to renewable energy by 2030.

LGES is also working on creating a closed-loop battery ecosystem. With millions of tons of used EV batteries piling up, the company is actively exploring ways to reuse them for energy storage and recycle production waste. These initiatives aim to minimize environmental harm while securing critical raw materials.

lg energy solution LGES
Source: LGES

Tesla’s Push for U.S.-Made Batteries Gains Momentum

The global battery market is shifting rapidly, driven by policy changes like the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and similar initiatives in Europe and the UK. These regulations are encouraging companies to diversify supply chains and reduce reliance on Chinese suppliers. For LG Energy Solution (LGES), this creates a clear advantage. With operational plants in Michigan and an upcoming facility in Arizona, LGES is well-positioned to meet growing U.S. demand while staying aligned with evolving trade rules.

China has long dominated the lithium iron phosphate (LFP) battery space, but LGES is emerging as one of the few manufacturers building significant LFP production capacity on American soil. Its Michigan plant began operations in May, and the Arizona plant is set to further strengthen its U.S. presence.

CEO Elon Musk reinforced the importance of this shift, noting that energy demand is booming despite ongoing tariff and supply chain pressures.

He said during the company’s latest earnings call,

“Not many people realize just how massive battery demand has become.”

While Tesla plans to open its own LFP cell manufacturing facility in Nevada by the end of the year, it’s expected to cover only a fraction of the company’s overall battery needs. That’s where LGES comes in.

Its new U.S.-based capacity provides Tesla with a critical, non-Chinese alternative. The partnership aligns perfectly with Tesla’s goal to localize its battery supply chain—offering both strategic location and advanced manufacturing capability.

Battery Demand Powers Growth Outlook

Tesla’s energy generation and storage division, which includes its Megapack and Powerwall products, continues to play a growing role in its business. Despite overall revenue falling 12% in Q2 2025 to $22.5 billion, the energy segment generated more than $2.8 billion. However, this was a 7% year-over-year drop due to pricing pressure and supply chain challenges.

Still, the segment stands out as a growth area amid softening EV sales. Tesla has stressed that battery demand is growing at an unprecedented pace, making partnerships like the one with LGES essential to scaling operations.

TESLA

The Rise of Solid-State Batteries

As lithium-ion battery innovation continues, solid-state batteries are emerging as the next frontier in battery technology. These advanced batteries utilize solid ceramic or polymer electrolytes, providing enhanced safety, higher energy density, and longer lifespan.

The global solid-state battery market is expected to grow from $0.26 billion in 2025 to $1.77 billion by 2031, with a projected CAGR of 37.5%, according to MarketsandMarkets.

Solid-State Battery Market Size

Solid state battery market
Source: MarketsandMarkets

Solid-state batteries are ideal for electric vehicles, medical devices, and industrial sensors due to their resistance to leakage and thermal runaway. Primary solid-state batteries, commonly used in smart packaging, RFID tags, and medical patches, will likely dominate the market in the short term.

North America is set to lead in both research and commercialization. U.S. companies like Solid Power, QuantumScape, Sakuu Corporation, and Excellatron are spearheading innovation, with Mercedes-Benz and Factorial Energy collaborating on a technology that could offer EVs over 600 miles of range on a single charge.

solid state battery
Source: MarketsandMarkets

Other major players like ProLogium (Taiwan), Ilika (UK), and Blue Solutions (France) are also advancing the global rollout of solid-state battery technologies, signaling a strong future for energy storage innovation.

The LGES-Tesla deal signals a major shift in the energy market. As EV demand slows and energy storage rises, resilient, tariff-friendly supply chains and advanced battery tech are taking center stage. With new U.S. plants and strong sustainability goals, LGES is emerging as a key player in powering Tesla’s energy growth amid global trade and policy shifts.

The post Is Tesla (TSLA) Securing U.S. Battery Independence with $4.3 B LG Energy Solution Deal? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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