Delegates at the 61st meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Sofia, Bulgaria have failed to agree on a timeline for the upcoming seventh assessment report.
The week-long meeting saw more than 230 delegates from 195 member governments revisit an unresolved topic from the previous meeting in January – finalising the timeline for the IPCC’s seventh assessment report (AR7) cycle.
AR7 will be the IPCC’s latest round of reports summarising the most recently published climate science.
First published in 1990, the assessment reports typically take 6-7 years to complete. AR6’s concluding “summary for policymakers” was published in March last year.
Many countries said in Sofia that they favoured an accelerated timeline, in which all three “working group” reports would be completed by June 2028. This deadline would allow the findings to inform the UN’s second global stocktake, which will gauge progress towards the Paris Agreement goals.
Ahead of last week’s meeting, a group of 40 IPCC authors from developing countries published an open letter arguing that the AR7 reports “can and must” be produced by this date in order to remain policy-relevant.
However, countries including Kenya, India, China and South Africa opposed the accelerated timeline, warning that “haste leads to shoddy work” and saying that raising concerns that the decision was being rushed through.
Ultimately, the decision was delayed. The issue will be picked up again after the AR7 scoping meeting in December.
Delegates in Sofia had more success in agreeing outlines for the special report on “climate change and cities” and the methodology report on “short-lived climate forcers”, both of which will be published in 2027.
Tricky talks in Turkey
Following the completion of its sixth assessment report (AR6) last year, the IPCC’s attention has now turned to its seventh assessment (AR7).
In a four-day meeting in Istanbul in January, which focused on the IPCC’s “programme of work” for AR7, governments decided against adopting a new structure and instead committed to the traditional set of three “working group” reports and a final synthesis report.
Before the Istanbul meeting, governments had already agreed that the AR7 cycle would include a special report on climate change and cities, as well as a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers.
The meeting then saw the addition of a second methodology report on carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage, plus a revision to the IPCC’s 1994 technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation.
However, while there was agreement between government delegates on the selection of reports, a timeline for their delivery was not agreed.
The majority of countries meeting in Istanbul favoured delivering the working group reports on an “accelerated” timeline, which would see them published by the end of 2028. This would allow the reports to “inform” the UN’s second global stocktake (GST), which will gauge progress towards the Paris Agreement goals.
However, a few countries, including Saudi Arabia, India and China, “strenuously objected” to this timetable, reported the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), which has unique access to the closed talks.
It reported, for example, that Saudi Arabia “opposed the shorter timeline, saying this would lead to compromised working groups reports both in content and inclusivity”. While China “emphasised that AR7 aims to be inclusive and developing country scientists should be given time to make their contributions”.
As opposition to the accelerated timeline “held fast” – despite the meeting overrunning into a fifth day – no decision was made.
The final “decisions adopted” document instead requested that the IPCC bureau – experts with more managerial roles, including vice and co-chairs – prepare a document “outlining the month and year of delivery on the basis of an AR7 strategic plan, taking into account the different views expressed” in the meeting.
The instruction included an “oblique reference” to taking “into account” the GST, noted ENB. The report, it was decided, would be presented at the Sofia meeting “for consideration and decision”.
Decision delayed
A key goal of the meeting in Sofia last week was to nail down a timeline for AR7. Ahead of the meeting, a group of 40 IPCC authors from developing countries sent a letter arguing that the AR7 reports “can and must” be produced by 2028, in time to inform the second GST report.
Delegates convene in a huddle at IPCC-61 on 30 July. Photo by IISD/ENB | Anastasia Rodopoulou
On 31 July, former IPCC vice chair Dr Youba Sokona – a co-author of the letter – published a commentary in Climate Home News summarising its main arguments. He argued that “ensuring the IPCC cycle aligns with GST timelines is crucial for maintaining the integrity of international climate cooperation”, adding that, without input from the IPCC, the stocktake “may lack essential southern perspective”.
He also dismissed concerns that accelerating the timeline would compromise the robustness of the reports, or lead to under-representation of developing countries. The article also outlined ways these concerns could be addressed while implementing an accelerated timeline.
Typically, the three working group reports focus on “the physical science basis”, “impacts, adaptation and vulnerability” and “mitigation of climate change”.
On the morning of 31 July, Dr Jim Skea – the IPCC chair for AR7 – presented a proposed schedule for AR7. The proposal was requested by the IPCC panel at the 60th session in Istanbul in January. It was developed by the co-chairs of the IPCC working groups and the Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI), then reviewed by the IPCC bureau.
Under this schedule, the AR7 cycle would last six-and-a-half years – similar to the fifth and sixth assessment cycles.
In the discussion that followed, a long list of countries supported the schedule as proposed, with many underscoring the importance of feeding into the second GST, according to the ENB’s summary of the entire meeting.
Belize, supported by the US, the Netherlands and the UK, said IPCC reports need to be ready for the Bonn Climate Change Conference in June 2028, according to the ENB. Belize added that “an inclusive cycle is only meaningful if it can feed into the GST”.
Saint Kitts and Nevis argued that the absence of “crucial” IPCC input into the GST would mean the IPCC would lose policy relevance. The country also argued that the schedule for AR7 is “neither compressed nor rushed”, because, while it is shorter than the schedule for AR6, it also contains fewer special reports.
The AR6 cycle included three special reports – on 1.5C of global warming in 2018, then, successively in 2019, on climate change and land, and the ocean and cryosphere.
(Discussions about linking IPCC reports with the GST are long-standing. During 2016-18, the IPCC panel “agreed to draft terms of reference for a task group on the organisation of future work of the IPCC in light of the GST under the Paris Agreement”, according to the ENB.)
Finland argued that “if we want science-based policymaking, the faster we have the next report, the faster policymakers are able to take science-based policy action”, according to the ENB. And many small-island developing nations also “underscored the critical importance of timely reports from small island developing states [SIDS] and less-developed countries”.
Several countries, including Brazil, Peru and the UK, “stressed that inclusivity concerns could be addressed in ways other than an extended timeline”.
However, several countries, including India, Algeria, Kenya, the Russian Federation and South Africa, argued that a longer timeline is needed to ensure “robust, rigorous scientific outputs, and to ensure greater inclusivity”.
India called the proposed schedule “unprecedented,” saying that the fourth and fifth assessment cycles had similar timeframes, but did not include special reports. It also argued that “producing the best science needs time, haste leads to shoddy work and retracted publications”, according to the ENB.
Kenya, supported by India and South Africa, warned that there are “major” gaps in literature on adaptation in Africa. It said that the “short time” between AR7 scoping meetings and the first author meetings may not be sufficient to identify and fill “literature gaps” for the continent.
And South Africa and Saudi Arabia opposed expediting the schedule to feed into the stocktake, suggesting this would not make the IPCC more “policy-relevant,” but more “policy-prescriptive.”
Dr David Lapola is a research scientist at the University of Campinas in Brazil and AR6 contributing author. He tells Carbon Brief that, “while inclusiveness is super important to bring more legitimacy to the process, it also slows down decisions when you have to have the agreement of all members”. He says that it is a “great challenge to imprint more agility to the IPCC decision processes without compromising inclusiveness”.
On the evening of 1 August, Skea “noted how difficult it had been to find a solution that satisfied all delegations” and he proposed to postpone a decision on the timeline until after the AR7 scoping meeting in December 2024.
In a press release published after the meeting closed, the IPCC stated that “at its next plenary in early 2025, the panel will agree on their respective scope, outlines and work plans, including schedules and budgets”.
“While some expressed disappointment about the lack of consensus, others were quick to point out that determining the timeline after the scoping meeting for the working groups is consistent with past practice and the IPCC’s principles and procedures”, says the ENB.
Dr Hannah Hughes is a senior lecturer in international politics and climate change at Aberystwyth University, who has written extensively about the IPCC. She tells Carbon Brief that it is “not surprising” that the decision has been further postponed. She explains that the IPCC is “balancing complex and competing dynamics”.
She adds:
“Delaying the finalisation of the timeline until after the scoping of reports offers the advantage of having a clear sense of the advances in science and the level of urgency in communicating these.”
However, Otto tells Carbon Brief that it will be “difficult to scope without a timeline”. She says that “with the decision postponed, it seems that conflicts could not be resolved, but everything is just postponed”.
What additional reports were discussed in Sofia?
Earlier this year, IPCC held scopingmeetings (in Latvia and Australia, respectively) for a special report on climate change and cities and a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers – both of which are due for publication in 2027. The proposals suggested at these meetings were discussed in Sofia.
IPCC secretary Abdalah Mokssit and IPCC chair Jim Skea consult with Brittany Croll, US, and Debra Roberts, South Africa, on 27 July. Photo by IISD/ENB | Anastasia Rodopoulou
Special report on climate change and cities
In 2016, the IPCC decided to produce a special report on climate change and cities. A “cities and climate change science conference” was held in Canada in 2018 to “inspire the next frontier of research focused on the science of cities and climate change”. A scoping meeting was held in Latvia over 16-19 April 2024 to develop a proposed outline for the report.
On 27 July in Sofia, Diana Ürge-Vorsatz – IPCC vice-chair and chair of the scientific steering committee (SSC) for the cities report – presented the proposal.
Under the proposal, the report will have five main chapters. The first will provide framing for the report, the second will discuss “trends, challenges and opportunities” in a changing climate and the third will be called “actions and solutions to reduce urban risks and emissions”. The final two chapters will focus on facilitating change and solutions.
Ürge-Vorsatz also suggested a timeline in which authors for the report will be selected by the end of 2024 and the first meetings of lead authors will be held in 2025. The expert review of the first order draft will take place by the end of 2025, and 15-19 March 2027 will see the “approval of the summary for policymakers and acceptance of the special report”.
In Sofia, many countries proposed changes or raised queries, according to ENB. For example, countries including India, South Africa and Malawi questioned how cities are defined. Burundi, Kenya and Mauritius said early warning systems should be given more prominence. And countries including Burundi, Malaysia and Kenya called for a more “balanced consideration of adaptation and mitigation”.
Over the following days, there were multiple more rounds of comments and drafts. For example, India questioned the shift from “loss and damage” to “losses and damages” implemented in one of the drafts, noting IPCC precedents for use of the latter terminology are limited to one document.
Saudi Arabia opposed the use of “net-zero goals” for cities, saying that these are country-level objectives. And Kenya, supported by India and Algeria, “called for improvements in the way adaptation was addressed throughout the outline”, including the removal of a reference to “maladaptation”.
By 31 July, most countries had accepted the proposal. But others – including Saudi Arabia, India and Kenya – were continuing to raise concerns and to call for a chapter-by-chapter discussion of the report outline.
Skea said the situation was “at a crossroads, given the difficulty of opening only a few non-consensual issues without risking an unravelling, and [he] invited the SSC to confer on whether the issues expressed could be somehow incorporated without unacceptable implications”, according to the ENB.
Timor-Leste, supported by the US and the Netherlands, urged countries to reach a compromise in time for the end of the meeting, noting their delegation consists of a single person. But India, Saudi Arabia and Kenya “expressed concern with other delegations’ ‘refusal to engage’ with their concerns”.
A “huddle” was set up to address some of the key concerns and, on 2 August, the delegates approved a draft decision.
Dr Aromar Revi is the founding director of the Indian Institute for Human Settlements and author on multiple IPCC reports. He tells Carbon Brief that the approval of the outline for an IPCC special report on cities is “a historic step that brings the urban and infrastructure transition, up front and centre of the climate action solutions space”.
He adds:
“It has taken almost a decade of preparation by a wide range of urban and climate actors to make this possible, since it was first suggested in 2016 as a special report in the AR6 cycle…
“This report will be especially important to cities and urban areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the SIDS, where 90% of the incremental urban population will live over the next 30-odd years, often in informal settlements with poor services and high vulnerability.”
Revi adds that the proposed timescale, which would see the work completed by March 2027, sets a “high bar” for the authorship team.
Prof Lisa Schipper – a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn and IPCC AR6 author – tells Carbon Brief that the cities report “will be a critical meeting point of adaptation, mitigation and development agendas”.
She adds:
“I was happy to see the level of detail in the cities [report] outline. Normally, the IPCC report outlines are a shopping list of topics without any normative framing. This makes it challenging to write the report with a consistent narrative. I think IPCC member countries will find more relatable and usable content in the cities report.”
The report “will be arriving at a crucial time”, adds Dr Zachary Labe – a scientist at the NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, noting that many cities are “leading examples of how to design and implement evidence-based climate action through adaptation and mitigation practices”.
“The calls for nominations of authors are scheduled for release as early as next week,” according to the IPCC press release.
Short-lived climate forcers methodology report
In 2019, the IPCC decided that the TFI should produce a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) – gases and particulates, such as methane and carbon, that cause global warming, but typically only stay in the atmosphere for less than two decades.
At the 60th session in January 2024, the panel decided to produce the report by 2027. A scoping meeting for the report was held on 26-28 February 2024 in Brisbane, Australia.
On the first day of the 61st session, Dr Takeshi Enoki, the co-chair of the TFI, presented an overview of the group’s recommendations. He suggested a title for the report of “2027 supplement to the 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories: short-lived climate forcers (2027 supplement on SLCFs)”, and said the report would be a supplement to the 2006 guidelines.
They added that the report would be made up of an overview chapter and five “volumes” following the format of the 2006 IPCC guidelines. These five volumes will focus on “general guidance”, the energy sector, industrial processes and product use, the agriculture, forestry and other land use sector, and waste, he said.
However, many countries raised concerns. First, there was disagreement about whether or not to include hydrogen and PM2.5 – particulate matter with a diameter of under 2.5 micrometres – in the report.
China, India, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, among others, argued that they should not be included, as the literature supporting their inclusion is not robust enough, the ENB says. However, it adds that many other countries – including the US, Canada and Chile – supported its inclusion.
Second, the title of the report was called into question. India said that linking the report to the 2006 guidelines “creates a whole new set of obligations and commitments through other channels”. It, along with Saudi Arabia, called for the report to be changed back to a standalone document. However, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Morocco expressed support for the current format.
A series of huddles were held to iron out these disagreements. On 2 August, the delegates agreed to change the name of the report to “2027 IPCC methodology report on inventories for short-lived climate forcers”.
IPCC delegates convene in a huddle at the end of the afternoon plenary session on 29 July. Photo by IISD/ENB | Anastasia Rodopoulou
However, in the absence of consensus on the case for including PM2.5 and hydrogen, the panel decided to come back to this discussion in the future.
What else was agreed in Sofia?
Updates on a range of other IPCC activities were also given, including the IPCC scholarship programme, terms of reference for the IPCC publication committee, and progress reports aimed at increasing accountability and transparency in the IPCC process.
Expert meetings
Ahead of the meeting in Sofia, the IPCC had already decided to limit the production of new special reports in line with the reported preferences of IPCC chair Jim Skea, who previously promised that he would strongly resist pressure to produce more reports.
The limited number of special reports was, in part, to allow more time for expert meetings or workshops. On 2 August, working group one co-chair Prof Xiaoye Zhang introduced the options for expert meetings and workshops for AR7, “highlighting the need for cross-working group collaboration”, according to the ENB.
He noted that expert meetings on reconciling land-use emissions and on CO2 removal technologies had been held in July 2024. Another meeting on gender, diversity and inclusivity has already been “tentatively” scheduled for later this year, and a workshop on the IPCC inventory software will be held in late August 2024.
Ahead of the meeting in Sofia, IPCC co-chairs and their working group bureaus had also proposed a range of extra meetings for 2025-26.
IPCC co-chair for working group one – Dr Robert Vautard – outlined the proposal for a meeting on high impacts and tipping points. The proposal suggests that 60 experts meet in April 2025 to “prepare consensus for the working group-specific assessments addressing
this important topic subject to intense research and debates in the community”.
Vautard explained that the meeting would be led by WG1, but include contributions from all working groups. He added that the meeting will receive financial support from the World Climate Research Programme.
Many countries supported this meeting, with Ukraine calling tipping points “the elephant in the room”. However, India opposed the meeting, saying it spans too many topics. And Saudi Arabia said the meeting is not needed as tipping points will be discussed in the WG1 report.
A meeting on “adaptation guidelines, metrics and indicators” was also proposed. Several countries, including Kenya and Saudi Arabia, said adaptation should be a priority in this cycle, according to the ENB
Finally, a meeting on “novel approaches to assessing knowledge on climate change and society’s responses” was suggested. Australia, Chile, France and others expressed support of this meeting, with many highlighting the importance of Indigenous knowledge and collaboration with the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.
Health, overshoot and science communication were also identified among other key areas of interest for AR7.
Improving inclusivity
“The one issue on which all delegates seemed to agree was the need to enhance the inclusivity of the IPCC’s work in both its process and products,” the ENB says.
WG3 co-chair Prof Joy Pereira stressed that the bureau is committed to AR7 products being inclusive in terms of author representation and literature assessment, and pointed to a document on improving inclusivity in AR7.
The document suggests setting the agenda for the expert meeting on gender, diversity and inclusivity – which is planned in late 2024 or early 2025 – and providing training on inclusive practices for lead authors and contributing lead authors during the first lead author meeting.
Efforts will also be taken to sponsor measures such as internet access and access to literature for IPCC scientists, according to the document.
(Carbon Brief’s analysis on the change in diversity of IPCC authors over the past three decades highlights access to literature as a key barrier for IPCC authors from less wealthy institutions.)
Coal power generation fell in both China and India in 2025, the first simultaneous drop in half a century, after each nation added record amounts of clean energy.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that electricity generation from coal in India fell by 3.0% year-on-year (57 terawatt hours, TWh) and in China by 1.6% (58TWh).
The last time both countries registered a drop in coal power output was in 1973.
The fall in 2025 is a sign of things to come, as both countries added a record amount of new clean-power generation last year, which was more than sufficient to meet rising demand.
Both countries now have the preconditions in place for peaking coal-fired power, if China is able to sustain clean-energy growth and India meets its renewable energy targets.
These shifts have international implications, as the power sectors of these two countries drove 93% of the rise in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 2015-2024.
While many challenges remain, the decline in their coal-power output marks a historic moment, which could help lead to a peak in global emissions.
Double drop
The new analysis shows that power generation from coal fell by 1.6% in China and by 3.0% in India in 2025, as non-fossil energy sources grew quickly enough in both countries to cover electricity consumption growth. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Growth in coal-fired power generation in China and India by year, %, 1972-2025. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief. Further details below.
China achieved this feat even as electricity demand growth remained rapid at 5% year-on-year. In India, the drop in coal was due to record clean-energy growth combined with slower demand growth, resulting from mild weather and a longer-term slowdown.
The simultaneous drop for coal power in both countries in 2025 is the first since 1973, when much of the world was rocked by the oil crisis. Both China and India saw weak power demand growth that year, combined with increases in power generation from other sources – hydro and nuclear in the case of India and oil in the case of China.
China’s recent clean-energy generation growth, if sustained, is already sufficient to secure a peak in coal power. Similarly, India’s clean-energy targets, if they are met, will enable a peak in coal before 2030, even if electricity demand growth accelerates again.
In 2025, China will likely have added more than 300 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 100GW of wind power, both clear new records for China and, therefore, for any country ever.
Power generation from solar and wind increased by 450TWh in the first 11 months of the year and nuclear power delivering another 35TWh. This put the growth of non-fossil power generation, excluding hydropower, squarely above the 460TWh increase in demand.
Growth in clean-power generation has kept ahead of demand growth and, as a result, power-sector coal use and CO2 emissions have been falling since early 2024.
Coal use outside the power sector is falling, too, mostly driven by falling output of steel, cement and other construction materials, the largest coal-consuming sectors after power.
In India’s case, the fall in coal-fired power in 2025 was a result of accelerated clean-energy growth, a longer-term slowdown in power demand growth and milder weather, which resulted in a reduction in power demand for air conditioning.
Faster clean-energy growth contributed 44% of the reduction in coal and gas, compared to the trend in 2019-24, while 36% was contributed by milder weather and 20% by slower underlying demand growth. This is the first time that clean-energy growth has played a significant role in driving down India’s coal-fired power generation, as shown below.
Change in power generation in China and India by source and year, terawatt hours 2000-2025. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief. Further details below.
India added 35GW of solar, 6GW wind and 3.5GW hydropower in the first 11 months of 2025, with renewable energy capacity additions picking up 44% year-on-year.
Power generation from non-fossil sources grew 71TWh, led by solar at 33TWh, while total generation increased 21TWh, similarly pushing down power generation from coal and gas.
The increase in clean power is, however, below the average demand growth recorded from 2019 to 2024, at 85TWh per year, as well as below the projection for 2026-30.
This means that clean-energy growth would need to accelerate in order for coal power to see a structural peak and decline in output, rather than a short-term blip.
Meeting the government’s target for 500GW of non-fossil power capacity by 2030, set by India’s prime minister Narendra Modi in 2021, requires just such an acceleration.
Historic moment
While the accelerated clean-energy growth in China and India has upended the outlook for their coal use, locking in declines would depend on meeting a series of challenges.
First, the power grids would need to be operated much more flexibly to accommodate increasing renewable shares. This would mean updating old power market structures – built to serve coal-fired power plants – both in China and India.
Second, both countries have continued to add new coal-fired power capacity. In the short term, this is leading to a fall in capacity utilisation – the number of hours each coal unit is able to operate – as power generation from coal falls.
(Both China and India have been adding new coal-power capacity in response to increases in peak electricity demand. This includes rising demand for air conditioning, in part resulting from extreme heat driven by the historical emissions that have caused climate change.)
If under-construction and permitted coal-power projects are completed, they would increase coal-power capacity by 28% in China and 23% in India. Without marked growth in power generation from coal, the utilisation of this capacity would fall significantly, causing financial distress for generators and adding costs for power users.
In the longer term, new coal-power capacity additions would have to be slowed down substantially and retirements accelerated, to make space for further expansion of clean energy in the power system.
Despite these challenges ahead, the drop in coal power and record increase in clean energy in China and India marks a historic moment.
Power generation in these two countries drove more than 90% of the increase in global CO2 emissions from all sources between 2015-2024 – with 78% from China and 16% from India – making their power sectors the key to peaking global emissions.
About the data
China’s coal-fired power generation until November 2025 is calculated from monthly data on the capacity and utilisation of coal-fired power plants from China Electricity Council (CEC), accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.
For December, year-on-year growth is based on a weekly survey of power generation at China’s coal plants by CEC, with data up to 25 December. This data closely predicts CEC numbers for the full month.
Other power generation and capacity data is derived from CEC and National Bureau of Statistics data, following the methodology of CREA’s monthly snapshot of energy and emissions trends in China.
For India, the analysis uses daily power generation data and monthly capacity data from the Central Electricity Authority, accessed through a dashboard published by government thinktank Niti Aayog.
The role of coal-fired power in China and India in driving global CO2 emissions is calculated from the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Balances until 2023, applying default CO2 emission factors from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
To extend the calculation to 2024, the year-on-year growth of coal-fired power generation in China and India is taken from the sources above, and the growth of global fossil-fuel CO2 emissions was taken from the Energy Institute’s Statistical Review of World Energy.
The time series of coal-fired power generation since 1971, used to establish the fact that the previous time there was a drop in both countries was 1973, was taken from the IEA World Energy Balances. This dataset uses fiscal years ending in March for India. Calendar-year data was available starting from 2000 from Ember’s yearly electricity data.
After the United States announced last week it would withdraw from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), effectively slashing more than a fifth of its core budget, the organisation’s head said it could “manage” the US exit, as top officials argued the energy transition is “unstoppable”.
Speaking to reporters at IRENA’s 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, Director-General Francesco La Camera said the US had yet to formally notify the agency it would be leaving. IRENA’s statute says withdrawal of a member country takes effect at the end of the year in which it is notified.
Until that point, they remain a member with all its rights, including the right to vote, but also “the duty to pay”, La Camera added.
The decision will make the US the only country to leave the UNFCCC, with the UN climate chief calling it a “colossal own goal” that will harm the US economy
The surge in employment linked to clean energy equipment and installation is slowing as large-scale plants and increasing automation require less labour
Even as it faces international condemnation over the Gaza war, Israel is working to boost natural gas exports and offshore exploration to strengthen its strategic and regional ties
On Sunday, IRENA’s member countries – around 170 in total – adopted a budget for the coming two years, which shows the US is expected to contribute 22% of IRENA’s core funding, with its share amounting to nearly $5.7 million for 2026.
La Camera said IRENA is already talking to governments and the private sector to fill the potential financial hole if the US does not deliver on its financial obligations, as has been the case in previous years with the UN climate secretariat and the Green Climate Fund.
“We know that some of these usual donors are considering to put something in our budget – we are also trying to get some money from the companies that are part of our initiatives… and we will see other ways that we can pursue,” he added. “I know that we can manage one way or another.”
During country statements made on Sunday afternoon, which were closed to the media, there had been expectations that China might step up to close the gap, but that did not happen.
The United Arab Emirates, Germany and other European nations are substantial government donors to IRENA, although the agency’s core budget has barely risen since 2018, documents show. That has limited its ability to expand its activities even as demand rises across developing countries and small island states for greater technical and policy support to boost renewables.
La Camera noted that, following the US decision to pull out under Donald Trump, IRENA’s council may need to propose amendments to its approved budget for 2026-2027 ahead of its next meeting in May.
Melford Nicholas, minister of information technologies, utilities and energy for Antigua and Barbuda, who is also a newly elected vice president of IRENA, told Climate Home News the US move would “not be an insignificant development” but Europeans had indicated they could help make up the shortfall.
Clean energy for “opportunity and necessity”
At the opening session of the two-day assembly, La Camera and other top officials affirmed the importance of renewable energy as the best choice for energy and economic security at a time of rising geopolitical tensions driven by fossil fuel interests.
Selwin Hart,special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Climate Action and Just Transition, said the world is clearly changing its energy system to clean sources “not out of idealism, but out of opportunity and necessity”.
He noted that three out of four people live in countries that are net importers of fossil fuels, exposing them to geopolitical shocks, volatile prices and balance of payment pressures.
Examples of this include the rise in gas prices in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2024 led to sanctions.
“The energy transition is taking place… not only based on climate considerations, but based on costs, based on competitiveness and energy security and energy independence,” Hart added. “These are the driving forces now – hardcore economic, hardcore national security [and] strategic reasons.”
In a video message, Annalena Baerbock, president of the UN General Assembly and former foreign minister of Germany, said “we are living in heavy, challenging times” – but despite setbacks and political headwinds, “the march to a renewable energy future has proven unstoppable”.
She added that global renewable capacity has now reached more than 4,400 gigawatts, almost 30 times that of 2015 when the Paris climate agreement was adopted, while a record $2.4 trillion was invested in the energy transition in 2024. “There is no way back,” she added.
However, she and Hart both noted that more needs to be done to support African countries to unlock finance for clean energy, as it lags far behind other regions and receives only around 2% of investment in the sector.
Challenges for small island states
The substantial needs of small island developing states (SIDS) are also front and centre at the IRENA Assembly, where ministers have discussed the challenges of shifting away from costly diesel and other polluting fuels while being exposed to rising climate shocks such as destructive cyclones.
Antigua and Barbuda’s minister Nicholas pointed to the difficulty of gaining insurance for renewable energy facilities as a key barrier in an era when storms can cause huge damage.
This happened in Barbuda in 2017 when Hurricane Irma wiped out a solar plant that was not insured. Governments including the United Arab Emirates and New Zealand helped to rebuild it.
Antigua and Barbuda’s Minister Melford Nicholas speaks at the IRENA 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on January 11, 2026 (Photo: IRENA)
Antigua and Barbuda’s Minister Melford Nicholas speaks at the IRENA 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on January 11, 2026 (Photo: IRENA)
Nicholas said SIDS are still in need of concessional finance, which could “become increasingly challenging for us” in the current international environment.
“It’s an issue, because that retards the speed at which we’re able to get to renewable energy transition,” he added, noting his country is likely to reach an energy mix of around 60% renewables by 2030 rather than the 100% it had aimed for.
Despite the obstacles, ministers from Caribbean countries like St Kitts and Nevis and Dominica showcased examples of planned geothermal plants that will enable them to phase down fossil fuels dramatically.
IRENA’s La Camera said he was optimistic the world would get very close to realising a global goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade, but was still lagging behind on a twin target of doubling energy efficiency by 2030.
To help catalyse a global transition away from fossil fuels, he added that IRENA would work with COP host nations on a roadmap to that end, which they are due to present at the COP31 UN climate summit in Turkey in November, as well as a potential target for electrification consistent with that plan.
Jobs in renewable energy expanded only slightly in 2024 to reach 16.6 million worldwide, new figures show, suggesting that the industry’s ability to create employment is slowing as it matures.
According to an annual report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the number of renewables jobs rose by just 2.3% between 2023 and 2024. This was partly due to Chinese solar manufacturers already producing more components than they could sell, and laying off workers to cut costs.
Other factors included a shift from rooftop solar installations to utility-scale systems in major markets like India and Germany, as well as increasing automation in the sector – a trend that is expected to accelerate with the use of robots, drones and artificial intelligence.
Employment in the sector has risen steadily from 7.3 million in 2012, when the data series began, along with the increase in solar, wind and geothermal energy, hydropower and biofuels around the world. But far fewer new jobs were created in 2024 – 400,000 – compared with 2023, which saw a jump of 2.5 million.
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In a foreword to the report released on Sunday, IRENA Director-General Francesco La Camera and ILO Director-General Gilbert F. Houngbo wrote that the slowdown in the rate of job creation points to “the emergence of a new phase in the energy transition”.
“Growing automation and economies of scale mean that comparatively less human labour is required for each new unit of capacity – although impacts vary across countries, technologies and segments of the renewable energy value chain,” they said.
IRENA currently projects that, with the right policies in place, the renewable energy workforce could expand to 30 million jobs by 2030. But the latest figures – which do not reflect the impact of Donald Trump’s squashing of US renewables incentives in 2025 – indicate reaching that level could be a stretch.
Michael Renner, IRENA’s head of socioeconomics and policy, told Climate Home News on the sidelines of the agency’s assembly in Abu Dhabi that, in the past 10-20 years, the renewable energy sector has been far more labour-intensive than the fossil fuel industry – which has largely been automated – but the difference is starting to narrow.
“I think renewables are still looking favourable [for job creation], and I don’t think that advantage will be lost – but I think it will be less massive, less dramatic,” he added.
Notes:
a) Includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas.
b) Direct jobs only.
c) “Others” includes geothermal energy, concentrated solar power, heat pumps (ground based), municipal and industrial waste,
and ocean energy.
Source: IRENA / Renewable Energy and Jobs
Annual Review 2025
Notes:
a) Includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas.
b) Direct jobs only.
c) “Others” includes geothermal energy, concentrated solar power, heat pumps (ground based), municipal and industrial waste,
and ocean energy.
Source: IRENA / Renewable Energy and Jobs
Annual Review 2025
Geographical imbalances
The world needs to add a huge amount of solar, wind, hydro and geothermalcapacity to meet a global goal of tripling renewable power capacity to reach 11.2 terawatts (TW) by the end of the decade. That will require installing an average of about 1.1 TW each year from 2025 to 2030, which is about double the power added in 2024, IRENA says.
In a statement on the jobs report, La Camera noted that renewable energy deployment is “booming, but the human side of the story is as important as the technological side”.
He pointed to geographical imbalances in the deployment of clean energy and related job creation. Africa has particularly struggled to attract foreign investment in building out renewables, with much of the growth currently concentrated in Asia.
“Countries that are lagging behind in the energy transition must be supported by the international community,” La Camera said. “This is essential not only to meet the goal of tripling renewable power capacity by 2030, but also to ensure that socioeconomic benefits become lived realities for all, helping to shore up popular support for the transition.”
Some countries like Nigeria are trying to boost their solar equipment manufacturing supply chains, with the government saying it plans to ban solar panel imports, and two large assembly plants announced to support public electrification programmes.
China leads on jobs but solar stumbles
In 2024, China was home to nearly half – 44% – of the world’s renewable energy jobs with an estimated 7.3 million. But in that year, employment in its solar photovoltaics (PV) sector actually contracted slightly, as five leading manufacturers cut their workforce.
This was in response to efforts by the Chinese government to curb what it has dubbed “disorderly” competition by reducing excess capacity across the solar PV supply chain, in a bid to boost prices and product quality.
Renewables jobs stayed flat in the European Union in 2024, meanwhile, at 1.8 million jobs, and India and the US saw small rises, accounting for 1.3 million and 1.1 million respectively. Brazil was also a big employer, with 1.4 million jobs, partly thanks to its biofuels industry based on soy and sugarcane.
On the impact of Trump’s efforts to roll back incentives and subsidies for green energy in the US, Renner said it will likely mean fewer new renewable power installations, with the report documenting examples of solar and wind projects that were cancelled or halted in 2025.
He also noted the dampening effects of US tariff hikes on the production of solar panels in Southeast Asia, which has led to job losses in some countries including Thailand, while others such as India have been able to increase their exports to the US thanks to relatively lower taxes on their exports.
Limited opportunities for women and people with disabilities
The report also highlights a lack of progress on increasing women workers in the renewables industry. While higher than in fossil fuels, it has plateaued at about one job in three.
Those jobs are concentrated in administrative roles, which account for 45% of female employment in renewable energy, as well as in technical positions unrelated to science, technology or engineering, such as legal work.
The report calls for greater efforts by companies, education and skills training bodies to open up more opportunities for women in clean energy, as well as for people with disabilities who face high barriers to participating in labour markets across the board, with only three in 10 being employed worldwide.
There are some positive cases where proactive policies have made a difference, such as in India’s electric vehicle industry, which has a relatively high level of women at the management level.
In Brazil, meanwhile, national legislation requires companies with more than 100 employees to reserve 2-5% of jobs for people with disabilities, including those in renewable energy.
And in Spain, energy utility Endesa and municipalities trained over 300 people with intellectual and psycho-social disabilities in tasks like vegetation management and composting at solar energy sites, with nearly 40% securing jobs after six months.
ILO’s Houngbo called for greater efforts on disability inclusion in the clean energy transition, not just as a matter of justice but also to advance resilient labour markets and sustainable development.
“This requires accessible training systems, inclusive hiring practices, and workplaces that accommodate, welcome and respond to diverse needs and respect every worker’s rights,” he added.
Climate Home News received support from IRENA to travel to Abu Dhabi to covers its 16th Assembly.
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