Published

2 years ago

May 30, 2024

Alice Rush

As part of the UN climate process, developed countries have been encouraged to donate “international climate finance” to help developing countries cut emissions and prepare for climate disasters.

There has been a significant debate around whether China, as an increasingly wealthy developing country, should also contribute.

China’s stance remains controversial. The country did not make a pledge to the “loss-and-damage fund” established at COP28, but has provided alternative climate funding through its South-South Climate Cooperation Fund and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Ahead of next week’s Bonn conference – where delegates are expected to negotiate climate finance – Carbon Brief has interviewed Li Shuo, head of the China climate hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), on the prospects for China’s climate contribution.

Through talking to various climate experts, including Chinese government officials and consultants, Li examines the motives behind China’s current policy and strategy.

He tells Carbon Brief that focusing on China’s ability to encourage investment that increases use of affordable low-carbon energy solutions worldwide could be one way to encourage the nation to play a greater role in international climate finance.

The wide-ranging discussion with Li covered possible outcomes from this year’s COP29, prospects for US-China alignment, barriers and incentives for China to increase its financial contribution, and more:

On the climate finance debate: “This is indeed one of the most controversial issues…that sees very strong division between the global south and the global north.”
On China’s dominance of low carbon technology: “I actually hope this could be one solution to the…NCQG [new collective quantified goal] question…It could be a solution based on which we can find a path forward.”
On EU and US concerns: “I doubt the NCQG will ever be as explicit as China committing to support developing countries to buy China-made products…The decision will be made in more general terms; general enough to not agitate the US and the EU.”
On improving the BRI as a climate finance mechanism: “The question is what role can China play to facilitate a better environment for its own engagement… That role will increasingly require China to engage…with the policy framework of those recipient countries.”
On ‘inviting’ negotiation strategies: “Messages that are crafted in a more inviting way will probably work better…If your framing is ‘China needs to pay’, or ‘we believe China is ready’ or ‘China is responsible’, then I think politically this will become very difficult.”
On multilateral cooperation: “[Our research has looked at] whether trilateral cooperation would be possible – if not solving all the problems, at least a few demonstration projects that will convey a political signal that we’re all in…There could be areas where China and other traditional donor countries can complement each other.”

On US-China tensions: “[COP29] is probably the best recipe for huge tension between the US and China. Given the agenda set for this COP: it is finance, right? …This one is particularly controversial. If one side or both sides want to weaponise this issue, they can find all the ways to weaponise it and blow up the COP.”

On the new US and Chinese climate envoys’ relationship: “The two envoys are, I think, also committed to learn from what has served this relationship in the past, including by building a personal relationship.”
On future US-China climate cooperation: “This dynamic…also puts the bilateral climate relationship firmly into the pattern of the rest of the bilateral relationship…when they meet, there is normally a set of standard talking points without too many substantive agreements, let alone progress.”
On the need for political courage: “[Climate change] is a time-bound, global, environmental crisis that requires real solutions…We still haven’t seen the political courage to set this issue aside.”

The interview is reproduced in full, below, with some editing for clarification. An abridged version of the transcript has been published in China Briefing, Carbon Brief’s fortnightly email newsletter focusing on climate and energy developments relating to China. (Sign up for free.)

Carbon Brief: At the upcoming COP29 climate talks [in Baku in November], countries will be negotiating a new climate finance target to replace the current $100bn goal for developed countries. As the world’s biggest emitter, China is facing growing calls to start contributing. How is China responding to these calls?

Li Shuo: I think we are expecting a pretty heated debate at COP29. This is indeed one of the most controversial issues…that sees very strong division between the global south and the global north. And, of course, China is in this unique position: it is still firmly in the developing country camp, but, at the same time, it has become one of the largest economies and the largest emitters in the world. So with that, you know, there’s this argument that China should shoulder more responsibility internationally, including by providing future climate finance.

The geopolitical environment is definitely not helping that transition: the tension between China and the west, and also this long-standing deficit on the part of the developed countries to deliver what they have promised. In addition to that, China’s domestic political and economic situation – let’s just say, it’s not at a particularly helpful moment for that transition to happen, [with] the domestic economic slowdown and so on. So we see a lot of risk factors. There is a critical need for other countries and China to work out, to align, ahead of COP29 on this issue. I think the next few months will be very important.

CB: We have seen the US president Joe Biden ramp up tariffs across China’s “new three” types – electric vehicles, solar products and lithium-ion batteries. Some in China might argue that they are contributing to the energy transition by providing affordable, clean energy technology and, therefore, they shouldn’t be pressured to scale up climate finance. Do you think that this could be one of the arguments made by the Chinese negotiators against greater ambition at COP29?

LS: Well, I actually hope this could be one solution to the $100bn – or $1tn – NCQG [new collective quantified goal] question. I actually genuinely see that it could be a solution based on which we can find a path forward for China, but also the rest of the world.

The reason I say this is, indeed, as you outlined, in addition to China’s emission portfolio, the country also happens to be the biggest solution provider when it comes to low-carbon products. Of course, there are increasing political controversies around China’s position in this regard, in particular between the US and China. But, I think, if you were China, what you want to achieve is, of course, to make sure that you can continue to sell those low-carbon solutions to the rest of the world.

So I would argue it actually works in China’s self-interest to make sure that they can facilitate the deployment of renewable energy in the global south. And, that way, I think it helps address the geopolitical problem, the so-called overcapacity [problem]. I mean, they realise that overcapacity always has two sides: oversupply and under-deployment. If you can tackle the same problem from the under-deployment side, that’s helping you geopolitically, but that’s also helping your businesses, that’s helping your companies in real ways. How do you do that? I think a role to provide finance or facilitate investment in developing countries is the way to achieve that. And if China can play a role in this regard, at the bare minimum, it is helping its own companies.

CB: Do you think that that would be politically viable? It would require the EU and the US signing off on saying: “Even though we’re launching investigations and tariffs into Chinese companies domestically, we support China’s global deployment of the ‘new three’ types.”

LS: I doubt it will be. I mean, if you’re talking about the NCQG package, I doubt the NCQG will ever be as explicit as China committing to support developing countries to buy China-made products…The decision will be made in more general terms; general enough to not agitate the US and the EU. In my mind, of course the NCQG discussion is still an ongoing one, but you might be familiar with this “onion” [structure] approach, a kind of multi-layer package. You have a core: public international finance. The controversial issue there is you will have a number, but who will be accountable for that number? That’s one thing. Then the second [layer] might be some sort of investment facilitation, if you will, and that’s where I think China can play a role.

I think it is in that layer that I feel like this is actually the interesting ongoing geopolitical development. You can actually make a stronger argument [now] than before to convince China that they should really play a role in that second layer, because it is helping its trade and investment facilitation, in essence. It is helping them to sell to the rest of the world. So they should be willing to play a role there. As long as that provision is not framed as sensitive to the West, I think there is an area where the two sides can converge. Because at the end of the day, developed countries are also trying to gain more money, so that they can be a little bit less liable on the public international finance side. So there might be a point of convergence.

CB: While often not widely recognised, China has contributed climate funding via both its “South-South Climate Cooperation Fund” and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). How significant is this funding?

LS: I think here, the number is even secondary – to both China and its international counterparts. I think the most important point here is to realise that China can actually contribute internationally to the decarbonisation agenda, and China is already doing so. So the political question then is not whether China will do it or not, but how can we make sure [it plays] a larger role? I think that is the key political point…You have a base to build on, we’re not talking about ‘ground zero’.

But when you look at the details of what China has been doing, I think, number one, there has been real investment and financial support to the global south, primarily through the BRI. The BRI now is going into a second phase which will [have more emphasis on] quality and sustainability. I hope that actually will help China to do more to help developing countries to scale up their renewable energy development. I think the second part that China has been doing is more kind of public finance – south-south cooperation and so on. There, we didn’t do the number crunching, but if you look at [climate thinktank] E3G‘s report, their argument is that there has been a gap – a huge gap – between what China has committed to in the past and what it has actually delivered.

In addition to that, we understand that the existing support and projects are done on a rather ad-hoc basis, lack a coherent strategy and are also constrained by various domestic policies. One example that I can give you – and this is well known as part of China’s south-south climate support – [is the] domestic procurement policies dictate that [what are] essentially development aid projects can only rely on Chinese-made products, which is fine, but a lot of times not services. So it has to be hardware – it has to be hardware – [which is donated] a lot of the time, not know-how. So that’s a problem. You would think that’s a problem that China can easily solve. And that’s also our argument. When we draw attention to the non-monetary actions needed, this is one of them – to reform domestic policies, so that it better facilitates effective action. I can also say, as a result of the domestic procurement policy, you see mostly solar water heaters, roadside solar-powered lights and quite a few satellites – literally satellites – being donated to the global south. These are the result of the rather outdated domestic procurement policies. So that needs to be reformed as well.

CB: Over the course of your research at ASPI on climate finance, you’ve spoken to various Chinese stakeholders – government officials, non-government organisations and industry participants. Do you see an increasing internal alignment to try and unify this kind of domestic policy-making process, in procurement or in other climate financing issues, or is there still a lot of fragmentation?

LS: The answer is no, there’s still a lot of fragmentation. I think the tricky situation that we have now is, if you go back to the early 2010s, the country was on the rise and there was a “go out” spirit, very much accelerated by the BRI. And, as a result of that, you have the “hundred flowers blooming” [bǎi huā qí fàng 百花齐放, which here means various industries growing successfully], right? Different agencies are all handling some sort of overseas project, be they aid-, investment- or trade-related. So you end up with an unavoidable fragmentation. What has happened since a few years ago is that, all of a sudden, there is a declining political appetite – or ability – to go as much out as [there was] a decade ago. But you still have the various channels. So that’s where we are: a shrinking political will or economic ability, but still a very fragmented bureaucratic picture.

So how do we go from here? I think the country – and this is a bit of a side-note – I think the country is in a bit of a “soul-searching” mode. On one hand, dealing with lack of political will or economic capacity. On the other hand, there is still a deeply fragmented bureaucratic landscape. It’s a bit hard to see how the situation will improve in the very near term. Ideally, there needs to be a high-level signal to call for a coherent strategy, but I don’t think that signal will happen anytime soon. I also think – and this is also just a side-note – bureaucratic fragmentation is a long-standing consistent theme in Chinese political culture. It even goes beyond the specific issue that we’re talking about in this area of development aid. If you look at other areas, it’s a similar situation. Fragmentation is the rule, not the exception.

CB: What do you think could be some practical short-term changes to improve the BRI as a vehicle for climate finance?

LS: I think this is increasingly something many organisations are looking at: namely, the Chinese role in helping developing countries. I think primarily – let’s just use southeast Asian countries as an example, looking at how to help southeast Asian countries to scale up their renewable energy deployment. The complicating factor there is it is not a one-party exercise. It’s not as easy as saying China has the equipment, it has the political will to sell the equipment, and the equipment will somehow be installed in the Philippines or Indonesia. The recipient country also plays a very important role providing the policy framework, the political economic environment in which those projects will be developed. There are still many gaps in those environments. It takes two to tango.

The question is what role can China play to facilitate a better environment for its own engagement with those countries. And that role will increasingly require China to engage, not only on the commercial level – providing the hardware, investment or construction – but also engage with the policy framework of those recipient countries. That’s going to take some time, but I think that’s increasingly where China needs to go. The good news is, at a very high level, all these countries have committed to various decarbonisation courses, and we have committed too, also, at COP last year, to the tripling of renewable energy. So how do we operationalise those very high-level visions at the ground level in a country like Indonesia, and what’s China’s role in it?

CB: This question might lean towards over-generalisation, but wouldn’t a counter-argument be that China is an attractive investment partner precisely because it doesn’t [engage with the policy framework of] recipient countries? Is there an incentive from the investment recipient’s side to make China have these higher standards?

LS: Again, it’s a two-way tango. But I think the good news is, number one, on the Chinese side – at least when it comes to the energy sector – China has already committed to not support coal-fired power plants. So, in a way China is going there without principles, without any kind of pre-judgments, but, in a way, China has already made a very strong rule for itself with “no coal”. And this has been largely implemented – with a few exceptions here and there, but we’re certainly not talking about what happened in the 2010s: 10 coal-fired power plants here in Indonesia, [and] on another island in Indonesia five more. That’s not where we are.

So, in a way, that question has really been partly solved, by a self-imposed rule from China and we should give them credit for that. They’re trying to move to the “greener” side. But, indeed, how do we also accelerate the necessary policy framework on the part of developing countries? This is a critical area.

I would just say we’re still quite new in this exercise. China only announced not to support coal [three] years ago. We’ve only made big strides when it comes to the global energy transition and the big visions at COP28 half a year ago. It takes a long time for domestic policy reforms in countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia. There are also physical infrastructure constraints in those countries. So it takes time for the two sides to work things out. But I think the general mission, or the general direction, is there. It’s not a “whether” question, but a “how” question: how can China accelerate its cooperation with Indonesia, and vice versa.

CB: How do you think that requests for China to contribute to climate finance, be they made by Western countries or by potential [recipient] countries, could be more successful? And, then, which countries do you think could be the most effective and the most amenable partners?

LS: When you talk about UNFCCC climate finance, it is an intrinsically more political debate. The core of the question is: how does China see itself in relation to the rest of the world, and in relation to other traditional donor developed countries, right? Does it see itself graduating to shoulder the same, or similar, responsibilities? Or does it see itself as still not there yet? And how will China think about the lack of delivery of the traditional donor countries [of the $100bn climate finance goal]. This is the core of the question.

I think, going forward, messages that are crafted in a more inviting way will probably work better with China. But that’s precisely the challenge. The political environment that we have will almost prevent that conversation from happening. That’s why the NCQG donor base question will be such a difficult one. I think, in an ideal world, a facilitating, inviting political environment, is what you want to create to facilitate higher aspiration on the Chinese part over time.

CB: Could you explain what you mean by “inviting”?

LS: I think there are two examples. One is simply how we talk about this issue, right?…If your framing is ‘China needs to pay’, or ‘we believe China is ready’ or ‘China is responsible’, then I think politically this will become very difficult for China. Because a lot of the framing – even just enlarging the donor base, that phrase – if you think about it, it assumes kind of a moral high ground. Somebody is saying we need to enlarge the donor base: who is that somebody? That is somebody who thinks they occupy a moral high ground. That framing also implies a legal argument – there’s a legal argument to actually formally enlarge the donor base, which I think China will not agree with.

Enlarging the donor base also carries this undertone that “we want more people to pay so that we can pay less”, if you think about it. It’s very – given the current geopolitical environment – it’s very easily perceived as just an extension of the political tension between China and the west, an extension to the climate finance field. So, given all these reasons, we just need to find a different way, a better way, to talk about this issue. We’re not trying to shy away from this issue, but [we need] a better way to talk about it.

The other example that I can give you is not narrative or framing, but concrete project-level action. [Our research has looked at] whether trilateral cooperation would be possible – if not solving all the problems, at least a few demonstration projects that will convey a political signal that we’re all in. This is not about shying away from our responsibility, but it’s all hands on deck: everybody trying to play to their strengths and play a role. What we mean by trilateral cooperation is one side, of course, is the recipient country – climate-vulnerable countries – and China and traditional donor countries. We do believe there could be areas where China and other traditional donor countries can complement each other. They need to work out the specific areas where they share synergy.

From our conversation with practitioners, I think they all realise that this is a very good idea, there is a political will to embrace that model. But when it comes to the practical details, I can give you one example: if you want to play into the strengths of China’s ability to deliver low-carbon products, and it strengths to be able to get those projects deployed very fast, and you want to tap into the financial resources that developed countries have – you could easily imagine that this will not work for developed countries, because they are essentially channelling their taxpayer money to buy China-made products. That’s a political no-go. [Despite] the desire [for cooperation] and everybody seeing the benefit of trilateral cooperation, I also wouldn’t want to underestimate the practical challenges – there are a lot of constraints, a lot of them imposed by the current geopolitical environment.

CB: Something that struck me, whilst I was looking more into US-China moves on climate finance, is that the South-South Climate Cooperation Fund was actually announced by Xi during a press conference at the White House in 2015. How would you say that conditions in the US-China dynamic have changed since then? And is there a possibility we could ever get back to that 2015 cooperation?

LS: I had the same lightbulb moment when I reviewed what happened in 2015. The two countries actually came together on finance and they actually announced [funds worth] the same amount of money to developing countries. What signal does that send? That signal says: “Hey, China believes it is shouldering the same responsibility as the US when it comes to supporting the global south”. That was what happened nearly 10 years ago. That’s striking if you think about it now. We’re in a very different time now.

I think the G2 (the US and China) angle is critical because, if you think about it, for the last couple of COPs, I think this one [COP29] is probably the best recipe for huge tension between the US and China. Given the agenda set for this COP: it is finance, right? I’m not saying for the last couple of COPs there were no controversial issues between the G2, but this one is particularly controversial. If one side or both sides want to weaponise this issue, they can find all the ways to weaponise it and blow up the COP.

This year we are also facing a unique challenge, which is we’re in a US election year, and we also have two [new] climate envoys on both sides. So [this is] different from the last couple of years, when at this point in the year you probably already knew that [former climate envoys] John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua are working on something, trying to resolve their differences before the COP. We don’t have clarity on that at this point in time.

In our view, the two sides will definitely need to find a minimum level of alignment on the NCQG question, on the donor-base question. That’s a necessary condition for the COP to be a smooth-sailing one. Will they be able to do that? I think that’s the real question. I can’t imagine a COP which features the US sitting on one side of the table and the Chinese sitting on the far other side. That will make for a very contentious COP. I hope that they get this message that it’s actually also in their interest to find alignment in advance. We’re also – to add one more thing – dealing with a rather inexperienced COP president. So if you want to make the job easier for them, you’d want some big power alignment ahead of time.

CB: We’ve talked about big changes regarding the negotiation teams, the changes due to the fact the US election is coming up. But we’ve also seen significant changes in China’s economic situation, especially compared to 10 years ago. You interviewed various people on this impact, in particular. What are the barriers in their view to China scaling up current climate financing and future pledges?

LS: I think the economic challenges are high on people’s mind and, politically, it imposes a very strong mental barrier – I think we felt this very strongly in our conversations – mental barriers with our Chinese interlocutors, for an idea that would push them to do more internationally. It’s just very difficult to achieve that now.

That’s the reality that we need to deal with. That is also why our sense is that there are indeed very real and challenging barriers for China to scale up its international climate finance in the near term. I don’t think we can be naive about it. But, that said, we also tried to find ways to ensure that [China] will actually be able to do more and achieve more in practice. That’s why [ASPI] also made the suggestion that we can drive an even stronger emphasis on sustainability in China’s existing international infrastructure initiatives – such as the BRI. I think that’s a pragmatic way to actually ensure more finances go into the low-carbon dimension.

And I also think – one more piece of advice here – is that people who are working at the international level when it comes to climate finance tend to be COP-oriented. People’s timeframes when thinking about their strategy is on a yearly basis. But I think we also need to realise that this is a multi-year exercise. There are certain political conditions that you will need to build over time to convince China or facilitate China to do more.

So what are the multi-year investments? What are the seeds that you can plant now to cultivate over time? That’s the background against which we make recommendations such as…more sharing of knowledge and experience from traditional donor countries to China, on how they have managed their climate aid – what’s the right institutional setup; how they developed their strategy; how were projects selected and developed; and their experience working with recipient countries…You guys are familiar with, for example, the ETS [China’s emissions trading system], right? It’s a huge undertaking to build up the technical capacity in China – there has been a decade of capacity-building support, from the European side primarily. I would say China’s development of international aid is an exercise on a similar scale, if not even larger.

CB: Recently, the two new climate envoys, Liu and Podesta, met in the US. Can you share any signals from their meeting about how US-China interactions might look – not just on climate finance, but across the board?

LS: I think I’ll just say three things. Number one: I think this visit proves that there is still willingness between the two countries to engage with each other, there is still a strong commitment to implement what they agreed last year in the Sunnylands agreement. Liu’s visit in DC, we should note, is the meeting of the bilateral working group that the Sunnylands agreement re-established. So this is a continuation and the implementation section. As you saw in the readout, there was also progress made during his visit in DC. So that’s message number one. I should also add that the two envoys are, I think, also committed to learn from what has served this relationship in the past, including by building a personal relationship with each other. They had a working lunch and then reportedly John Podesta also hosted Liu and part of his team at his house for dinner.

The second message is that, despite all of the shared commitment to implement and to continue their engagement, there are many differences and contentious points. Many of those disagreements are structural – disagreements for which it is very difficult to see any near-term solutions or breakthroughs. The US concerns over China’s energy sector and the continued investment in coal, for example. The gap between the US’s expectations on China’s NDC [nationally determined contributions] and what China is willing to commit to. And, on the Chinese side, their scepticism about the US’s ability to deliver what it has promised, both when it comes to climate emission reduction targets, and also climate finance. And, added on top of that, of course, is the trade issue. So there are still many disagreements.

I think this dynamic, this disagreement, also puts the bilateral climate relationship firmly into the pattern of the rest of the bilateral relationship. What I mean by this is: if you look at ongoing bilateral dialogues on finance, trade and many other issues, the pattern is very clear: the two sides are committed to engage with each other; keep communication channels open; they will meet, either in China, or in the US, or in third countries; and, when they meet, there is normally a set of standard talking points without too many substantive agreements, let alone progress.

I think this is a dangerous pattern, if not for other issues, at least for climate change – because this issue is a time-bound, global, environmental crisis that requires real solutions and real progress between the two countries. And we still haven’t seen the political courage to set this issue aside so that, in an overall competitive relationship, progress can be made on certain issues: issues that are in the shared interests of both countries, but also of the rest of the world. We haven’t seen the political courage to allow that to happen and allow progress in a small number of issues. So that, I think, is very concerning. But, to be honest with you, I think this will be the pattern for the rest of the year, in the run-up to the [US] election.

That brings me to my third point, which is looking ahead. If some of the structural disagreements cannot be addressed between the two countries, there are at least a few issues on the multilateral agenda – in particular, climate finance – that would require the two countries to work together to bridge their differences and to find minimum levels of alignment ahead of the COP. The question is will they be able to do that? I am not entirely sure what signals this trip has sent – this is something that I think will require all of our attention. I think, fundamentally, on climate finance, it works in both countries’ interest if they can find alignment before the COP.

CB: Great, thank you.

LS: No worries, anytime.

The post Interview: China’s position on ‘international climate finance’ ahead of COP29 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Interview: China’s position on ‘international climate finance’ ahead of COP29

Climate Change

Interview: COP31 president says electrification is ‘surest way to protect citizens’

Published

2 days ago

July 10, 2026

Alice Rush

Last month, COP31 president-designate Murat Kurum launched a target for 35% of the world’s final energy to come from electricity by 2035.

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Kurum says that the target was not a political choice, but instead reflects the latest evidence on “what is needed to keep 1.5C within reach”.

The ongoing Hormuz crisis means there is an “urgent” need for renewables and electrification, which are the “surest and cleanest way to protect citizens” from high energy prices.

Kurum says that the Brazilian and Ethiopian presidencies of COP30 and COP32, as well as the EU, UK and Canada, have welcomed the target.

He adds that “all have confirmed it will be central to discussions at COP31”.

In the interview, Kurum – who is also Turkey’s minister of environment, urbanisation and climate change – tells Carbon Brief where the target came from and what he expects to happen next.

Carbon Brief: You recently launched a target for 35% of the world’s final energy to come from electricity by 2035. Where did this idea come from?

Murat Kurum: The “35 by 35” target is grounded in technical data and based on the IEA [International Energy Agency] and IRENA [International Renewable Energy Agency] analysis of what is needed to keep [the 1.5C Paris Agreement target] within reach. The level was not chosen politically. Rather, it reflects what the science and the energy modelling tell us is required.

CB: Why do you think an electrification target is important right now?

MK: The case for the target is urgent right now. The latest war in the Gulf has made energy diversification – and, in particular, renewable energy transition and electrification – a top global priority, because it is the surest and cleanest way to protect citizens around the world from high and volatile energy prices.

At a time of real fragmentation in international relations, a single, shared target is needed to focus global efforts by aligning governments, businesses and investors behind a common benchmark and to send a clear market signal.

CB: Which countries are supporting this target so far?

MK: The reaction so far has been extremely positive and, while we presented our target at the UN June climate meetings in Bonn, our earlier conversations with parties at both the Petersberg and Copenhagen climate dialogues paved the way for this launch.

For example, the EU, UK, and Canada have welcomed the target, as have the Brazilian COP30 and Ethiopian COP32 presidencies. All have confirmed it will be central to discussions at COP31.

This support has been reflected in the business community as well, with polling by the We Mean Business Coalition showing that 90% of businesses expect to have largely electrified their operations by 2035 and that 88% expect electrification will make their business more competitive.

CB: How do you hope and expect to see this taken forward at the COP? Could it be in the formal COP outcomes, or part of the second global stocktake?

MK: We are now taking electrification forward as an “action agenda” initiative to bring actors together and drive progress. The action agenda and the [formal COP] negotiations are separate, but complementary, with different processes and thresholds, and it is too early to say what all countries might be able to agree in the negotiations. That is for parties to determine as the year progresses.

We are focused and determined to use COP31 as a moment to spark a global conversation about electrification.

CB: What are the key priorities for reaching the target?

MK: The critical sectors for reaching the target are buildings, transport and industry, which together account for around 45% of global emissions. Financial support for the developing world and investment in grids and infrastructure is also crucial.

The target also builds on COP28’s target to triple renewable energy capacity and seeks to take advantage of the tumbling cost of renewable power and other technologies critical to the energy transition. This is a journey that Turkey itself is taking ambitious steps on, including our plan to reach 120GW [gigawatts] of renewable capacity by 2035.

This interview was first published in the 10 July 2026 edition of Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed weekly newsletter. Sign up for free.

The post Interview: COP31 president says electrification is ‘surest way to protect citizens’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Interview: COP31 president says electrification is ‘surest way to protect citizens’

Climate Change

DeBriefed 10 July 2026: Deadly Europe heat | EU electrification leak | COP31 president interview

Published

2 days ago

July 10, 2026

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

‘Catastrophic’ climate impacts

RECORD HEAT: Western Europe experienced its hottest June on record – some 3C above average – according to analysis covered by the Guardian. It said the finding came “as the UK enters its third heatwave of the year and wildfires ravage France and Spain”. Le Monde said 10,000 people had been evacuated due to wildfires in southern France.

‘EXCESS DEATHS’: The June heatwave killed more than 2,700 people in France, according to a guest post analysis for Carbon Brief. Similar analysis for Germany said there had been more than 5,000 “excess deaths”, reported Bloomberg. Meanwhile, an ongoing heatwave in the US has killed at least 30 people, said USA Today.

STORM TEST: Floods have killed 39 people in Guangxi province in southern China, said state-run newspaper China Daily. Scientists warned that climate change and the weather phenomenon El Niño are exposing China to “catastrophic storms” that will test its resilience in 2026, reported Reuters. The nation’s latest official climate report found that “extreme weather and climate events…have become more frequent and severe”, said China National Radio.

Around the world

EU ELECTRIFICATION: The European Commission is set to unveil a 2040 target for EU electrification on 17 July, reported Bloomberg. Citing a leaked draft, it said the plan would aim to cut oil use in half and gas use by two-thirds.
PEAKING PLAN: China has published an “action plan” for peaking emissions during the 15th five-year plan period to 2030, reported Xinhua. It lists targets including “new energy vehicles” making up 30% of cars on the road by 2030, said Reuters.
CLIMATE ‘FLAT EARTHER’: The Trump administration has appointed Matthew Wielicki, described by Politico as a “climate critic”, to lead the office in charge of the US national climate assessment. Common Dreams quoted a scientist describing the move as “like putting a flat-earther in charge of NASA”.
UGANDAN SUIT: A group of farmers from Uganda have launched a legal suit in London against the East African oil pipeline, according to Climate Home News.

23%

The share of Irish electricity used by data centres in 2025, reported the Irish Times.

2%

The share of global electricity used by data centres in the same year, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the Energy Institute statistical review.

Latest climate research

Meltwater from the western Himalayan glaciers will peak at around 2C of warming, before declining at higher warming levels | Environmental Research Letters
Current coral restoration efforts may be unsuitable for temperate reefs, including those in the Mediterranean | Nature Ecology & Evolution
People tend to underestimate the level of “broad public support” for climate action | Nature Climate Change

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Average number of days per year with a daily maximum temperature of at least 30C in a selection of major European cities, for each decade since the 1950s

Carbon Brief explained – via eight facts – why air conditioning rates in some parts of Europe are relatively low, as the technology emerges as a new front in the global “culture war” over climate action. Analysis for the article illustrated that, in many parts of the world’s fastest-warming continent, air conditioning simply was not needed in the past.

Spotlight

COP31 president speaks to Carbon Brief on electrification

This week, Carbon Brief interviews Murat Kurum, president-designate of the COP31 UN climate talks in November and Turkey’s minister of environment, urbanisation and climate change, on his target to boost global electrification.

Carbon Brief: You recently launched a target for 35% of the world’s final energy to come from electricity by 2035. Where did this idea come from?

CB: Why do you think an electrification target is important right now?

COP31 president-designate Murat Kurum. Credit: Supplied by COP31 secretariat

CB: Which countries are supporting this target so far?

For example, the EU, UK, and Canada have welcomed the target, as have the Brazilian COP30 and Ethiopian COP32 presidencies. All have confirmed it will be central to discussions at COP31.

CB: How do you hope and expect to see this taken forward at the COP? Could it be in the formal COP outcomes, or part of the second global stocktake?

We are focused and determined to use COP31 as a moment to spark a global conversation about electrification.

CB: What are the key priorities for reaching the target?

Watch, read, listen

HEATED: A Financial Times long read asked if Europe – the world’s fastest-warming continent – is “prepared for a world of extreme heat”.

LITIGATED: The Outrage and Optimism podcast spoke to Prof Joana Setzer and Catherine Higham about the latest trends in climate litigation.

‘SHATTERED’: Confidence in fossil-fuel exports via the strait of Hormuz has been “shattered”, wrote IEA chief Fatih Birol for Foreign Policy.

Coming up

13-17 July: Meeting of open-ended working group on the Montreal Protocol, Bangkok, Thailand
13-24 July: International Seabed Authority Council, Kingston, Jamaica
16 July: International Energy Agency critical minerals outlook 2026, online

Pick of the jobs

Wellcome Trust, head of policy – climate and health | Salary: £84,640-£105,800. Location: London
Financial Times, senior reporter, Sustainable Views | Salary: Unknown. Location: London
North Texas Public Broadcasting, climate, energy and environment reporter | Salary: $70,000-$78,000. Location: Fort Worth, Texas
Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, head of communications and engagement | Salary: £65,000-£70,000. Location: London

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

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The post DeBriefed 10 July 2026: Deadly Europe heat | EU electrification leak | COP31 president interview appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 10 July 2026: Deadly Europe heat | EU electrification leak | COP31 president interview

Climate Change

Eight facts about air conditioning amid an overheated global debate

Published

2 days ago

July 10, 2026

Alice Rush

As successive heatwaves hit Europe, air-conditioning (AC) has emerged as a new front in the international “culture war” over climate action.

France, Germany and the UK have experienced record-breaking heat and thousands of heat-related deaths this summer, with June temperatures in many regions passing 40C.

This has drawn attention to the relatively low rates of AC use in these countries – and in Europe as a whole – especially when compared to its widespread adoption in the US.

Legacy newspapers, bloggers and even Elon Musk have all weighed in on “European hostility” to AC, criticising Europe’s “cultural conservatism” and “overbearing governments”.

Right-wing politicians, including National Rally in France and the UK Conservatives, have styled themselves as champions of AC, while opposing efforts to tackle climate change.

Missing from most of these interventions is the fact that human-caused climate change has made once-rare heat far more common, in what is the world’s fastest warming continent.

Carbon Brief analysis for this article shows that, until the 2020s, it was rare for many European cities to see days above 30C, making AC an unnecessary expense.

Here, Carbon Brief explains – via eight facts – why AC rates in some parts of Europe are relatively low, as well as clarifies and contextualises some of the misleading claims circulating about the technology.

Much of Europe has not needed AC in the past
AC is already widely used in hotter parts of Europe
Some European nations have ‘resisted’ AC – but its popularity is growing
AC emissions are growing, but its climate impact could be limited
Heat from AC can contribute to directly warming cities
More AC could help to reduce heat deaths in Europe
‘Net-zero rules’ are not blocking AC installation in the UK
AC is not the only answer to overheating cities

Much of Europe has not needed AC in the past

AC installation rates in northern parts of Europe are very low. The best available estimates suggest that 6% of households in Germany and just 4% in England use AC.

However, these rates are largely explained by the historical climates in these nations.

Unlike the US, much of the housing stock and infrastructure in Europe was built at a time when AC did not exist and was not necessary.

Moreover, nations such as France, Germany and the UK have only started to regularly experience extreme heat in recent decades.

The chart below shows the average number of days per year, in each decade since the 1950s, when maximum temperatures have exceeded 30C in major European cities. Capitals such as London and Paris have seen a significant jump since around 2000.

Prof Jan Rosenow, an energy and climate researcher at the University of Oxford, tells Carbon Brief:

“For most of the 20th century, northern Europe simply didn’t need cooling. Homes in Britain and Germany were built to keep heat in, not out, because winters were cold and summers rarely hot.”

Much of the commentary about the relatively low rates of European AC use focuses on cultural or “ideological” factors. (See: Some European nations have ‘resisted’ AC – but its popularity is growing.)

However, Rosenow says people’s views on AC in these countries likely stem from their historically colder climates. He adds:

“Attitudes formed around those facts, not the other way round…There is a cultural element, but it is the product of climate, not of some green ideological project.”

In the past, many in Europe relied on traditional methods to keep buildings cool. Richard Black, head of communications at Climate Analytics, made this point in a post on LinkedIn:

“Once, residents of cities such as Paris could cope with summer heatwaves by opening shutters and windows during the night, and closing them again in the morning to trap the cool air inside…We’ve reached a limit to this sort of adaptation.”

Now, with Europe around 2.5C warmer than pre-industrial levels, climate change is routinely driving record-breaking heatwaves, even in the north of the continent.

This is forcing a reappraisal of societies that were “built for a climate that no longer exists”, as the UK’s Climate Change Committee (CCC) put it in a recent report.

Experts broadly agree that much of Europe will indeed need more AC, particularly in spaces housing the most vulnerable populations, such as care homes, schools and hospitals.

At the same time, they also emphasise broader, “passive” efforts to make cities and homes cooler alongside increased AC use. (See: AC is not the only answer to overheating cities.)

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AC is already widely used in hotter parts of Europe

During periods of extreme heat, articles criticising “European hostility” towards the technology frequently note that “only about 20%” of households in Europe have AC.

Often, this is contrasted with the US, where more than 90% of households have AC installed. (In fact, the US is something of a global outlier, matched only by Japan.)

However, the continent-wide figure for Europe obscures the reality. In southern Europe – where temperatures are and have always been higher – AC is relatively common.

The map below, based on official EU data, shows that southern European nations use far more household energy for “space cooling” than those in the north.

Percentage share of household energy consumption used for “space cooling”, including AC, in EU member states and the Balkans. Source: Eurostat.

Government figures show that nearly 60% of Italian households have AC. Household-level data in many countries is patchy, but various analyses have placed that figure at 70-80% in Greece and 41% in Spain – with higher penetration in the hotter, southern part of the country.

The same pattern can be seen within France. International coverage has stressed the country’s “cultural resistance to AC”, citing a nationwide figure from 2020 that suggests “only” 25% of French households have AC.

However, polling data from customers of the Hello Watt energy app suggests that there is a distinct north-south divide in French uptake. At least 60% of households in Mediterranean regions of France are equipped with AC, according to these figures.

This can be seen in the map below, with households across northern regions, including Paris, reporting far lower AC installation rates, often below 5%.

Percentage share of households equipped with AC in departments of mainland France, according to polling data. Source: Hello Watt.

Finally, when making such comparisons to Europe, it is worth noting that high rates of AC use reported for the entire US also obscure significant differences between – and within – US states. This, too, aligns with differences in regional climate.

Hotter states in the US south have near-universal AC access. But in Washington, a north-western state with a climate more comparable to that of western Europe, 66% of people have AC in their homes.

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Some European nations have ‘resisted’ AC – but its popularity is growing

International commentators have written extensively about Europe’s “longstanding resistance to cooling technology”, especially when compared to the US.

Newspaper editorials in the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, alongside numerous op-eds and blog posts, have added fuel to this “culture war”. Elon Musk has even promoted an AI-generated message stating that Europeans “should just install AC”.

Often, European attitudes are attributed to “guilt” about AC’s energy demand, “cultural conservatism” or “overbearing governments”. One commentator ascribed divergent attitudes in Europe and the US to “different ideas about physical suffering and sacrifice”.

Meanwhile, right-leaning commentators and climate-sceptic groups have blamed “climate policies, which view AC as an unnecessary luxury”.

In general, these critiques often fail to consider the most obvious explanation, which is that AC adoption is low in northern Europe because the historical climate made AC unnecessary.

Critical articles have instead drawn attention to restrictions on AC use in some European countries, as well as the lack of support for AC in official heatwave guidance.

For France, in particular, polling has indeed highlighted widespread disapproval of AC, both on environmental grounds and due to alleged health impacts. Such messages have also been voiced regularly in French media and by left-leaning and green politicians.

However, across Europe there are plenty of signs that such attitudes are shifting, following successive spells of extreme heat.

Amid the June heatwave, there were reports from Germany, France and the UK of “skyrocketing” AC sales. This surge was even acknowledged by the foreign ministry in China, due to the nation’s role in supplying many of these products.

The shift is taking place in politics as well. Marine Tondelier, leader of the French Green party – which has traditionally opposed AC – recently stated that “there are places where we just can’t do without AC anymore”.

Overall, AC has been on the rise across Europe, with France, Spain and the Netherlands all using more than twice as much energy for AC and other “space cooling” technologies in 2024 as they did in 2015.

AC production in Germany has also risen by at least 75% in recent years and a growing share of German homes are being built with it installed.

Notably, there is little evidence that “climate policies” are blocking Europeans from installing AC. Polling in Germany shows that, while people are concerned about environmental impacts, the high costs of installing and running it are perceived as greater barriers.

Finally, there is an important distinction between individual AC units in people’s homes and installing them in public spaces, such as hospitals, care homes and schools.

While neither is widespread in France, support for the latter can increasingly be found across the political spectrum, from Greens to the far-right National Rally (RN).

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AC emissions are growing, but its climate impact could be limited

Some people have noted that a wider rollout of AC in Europe could drive up emissions.

As noted in the Financial Times by columnist and chief data reporter John Burn-Murdoch, there is a logic to this argument, “at least superficially”. He writes:

“AC uses a lot of energy; if the proposed defence against emissions-driven global warming means emitting more, then we have an obvious problem.”

The emissions impact of AC depends heavily on the generation mix of a country’s power sector.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “space cooling” – mostly AC, but this does include some fans – used 2,100 terawatt-hours (TWh) of power globally in 2022.

As such, it was responsible for 1bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) from electricity use globally. This equates to around 2.7% of total CO2 emissions globally from fossil fuels and industry.

(As well as indirect emissions through power use, AC units can also directly release greenhouse gases – used as AC refrigerants – when they leak or are improperly disposed of. Following the 2016 Kigali Amendment, countries are progressively trying to phase down the use of potent greenhouse gases in AC units.)

In a LinkedIn post, Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and regular Carbon Brief contributor, says:

“There is a lot of alarmist messaging about how much electricity AC uses. However, on an annual basis, the demand is not that substantial. Currently, AC uses about 1% of electricity in the EU and catching up to adoption rates in the US would double this.”

According to the IEA estimates from 2018, “if left unchecked, energy demand from AC will more than triple by 2050”, reaching 6,200TWh of power.

By mid-century, households would contribute the most to the increase (70%), with at least two-thirds of the world’s households potentially having AC, according to the Paris-based agency.

Decarbonising electricity grids and energy-efficiency improvements can reduce AC emissions and their impact on climate.

For instance, in countries with a low-carbon electricity mix – such as France, where nuclear energy accounts for 67% of its electricity generation – expanding AC would have a more limited climate impact than in other countries.

In countries such as India, there could be a more significant increase in emissions as AC is adopted, due to the role coal plays in the country’s energy mix, especially during the night. Demand is growing fast – following low access historically – and many AC units are inefficient, with high electricity use.

According to a new working paper from the India Energy and Climate Center (IECC) at the University of California, Berkeley, “room AC” – portable plug-in units, as opposed to those permanently installed in buildings – already accounts for nearly one-quarter of India’s peak electricity demand (60-70GW) – and this is before the majority of Indian households have bought their first AC unit.

Dr Nikit Abhyankar, co-faculty director of the IECC, tells Carbon Brief that, as AC use is expanded across the world, it should be paired with solar and battery storage, where the “economics have completely shifted” in the last few years. This will help to cut both energy bills and emissions.

According to the IEA, accelerating energy efficiency improvements could deliver more than one-third of all CO2 emission reductions between now and 2030.

The global energy demand needed to run ACs alone in 2050 could be reduced by 1,300GW – the equivalent of all of China and India’s coal plants – through energy efficiency measures, it estimates.

Aditya Valiathan Pillai, a climate adaptation researcher at King’s College London, tells Carbon Brief that, as the use of AC expands, there is a conversation to be had about where and “what type of technology [is used] and who gets access” to it.

A final point is that many AC units are air-to-air heat pumps, which can efficiently heat homes, as well as keeping them cool. As such, wider AC adoption could boost the adoption of electrified heat, helping to cut emissions from gas boilers.

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Heat from AC can contribute to directly warming cities

Some critics of AC mention its electricity demands and associated CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, which contribute to raising the temperature of the entire planet. (See: AC emissions are growing, but its climate impact could be limited.)

But AC also has a localised impact. It works by removing heat from indoor air and pushing it outdoors, raising temperatures on the street and exacerbating the “urban heat island” effect.

Left-leaning French politicians are among those citing this as an argument against AC, particularly in cities. Indeed, Emmanuel Grégoire, the Socialist mayor of Paris, appeared to be making this point in an interview with Le Monde, during the June heatwave:

“[AC] can be useful for cooling collective spaces and protecting the most vulnerable populations, but individual AC is a scourge – it makes the problem worse by heating the city even more.”

One study concludes that, in a city such as Phoenix, Arizona, where the technology is widespread, AC use during a heatwave can raise night-time temperatures by 1-1.5C.

Another models a nine-day heatwave in Paris – in a future with “massive” AC use – and finds an increase in external temperature of more than 2C, due to heat emitted by the units.

Given this, some scientists argue that AC can be a form of climate “maladaptation” – referring to actions that backfire and make people more vulnerable to global warming.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has highlighted this issue, concluding:

“AC may constitute a maladaptation because of its high demands on energy and associated heat emissions, especially in high-density cities.”

Compared to the US, more people in Europe live in dense, urban areas. According to Dr Vincent Viguié, a climate change economist at École des Ponts ParisTech, this could leave Europeans more exposed to heat from AC units. He tells Carbon Brief:

“If you live in a neighbourhood that is not dense, like in a suburban neighbourhood or in the countryside, you don’t care about this…So, once again, there is a key difference between US and European cities.”

Viguié is among the experts arguing that other climate-adaptation measures should be considered alongside AC, to keep entire cities cool – not just individual homes. He says:

“It’s not to say that the heat released by AC by itself is a reason to forbid AC…It’s just that not taking that into account may lead to bad decisions.”

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More AC could help to reduce heat deaths in Europe

Heatwaves can be deadly, especially for older or vulnerable members of society.

According to climate scientists at World Weather Attribution, “heatwaves cause more deaths in Europe than all other natural hazards combined”.

The heatwave in June 2026 is estimated to have killed more than 20,000 people in Europe. In France – which has seen some of the hottest temperatures – the heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths, according to analysis published by Carbon Brief.

AC does help to protect people from the effects of extreme heat. A 2021 study found that globally, AC averted an estimated 190,000 heat-related deaths annually during 2019-21.

With its much higher penetration of AC, the US has fewer deaths due to extreme heat than Europe.

Heat kills around 11 people out of every 100,000 in Europe, compared to around two people in the US, according to analysis by data scientist Dr Hannah Ritchie from Our World in Data.

Several publications have pointed out that “Europe’s heatwaves are deadlier than American gun violence”. While this is technically accurate in absolute terms, Ritchie says the comparison is “a bit silly” for a number of reasons, not least because on a per-capita basis, US gun deaths are higher.

Average annual deaths per 100,000 for heat and gun deaths in the US (red) and Europe (blue) to as close to the end of 2024 as possible. Heat deaths are based on excess death methodology, not death certificates. Source: By the Numbers.

However, experts suggest that AC is only one part of a wider effort to protect people from extreme heat.

A 2020 study looking at heat-related mortality in Canada, Japan, Spain and the US, found that excess deaths due to heat decreased between 1972 and 2009.

For example, the proportion of deaths due to extreme heat fell from 1.7% to 0.5% over the period in the US and 3.5% to 2.8% in Spain.

However, an increase in AC only explained 16.7% of the drop in the US and 14.3% in Spain.

The research concludes that “other factors have played an equal or more important role in increasing the resilience of populations”. This is supported by research that shows changes to cities, such as planting more trees, as well as behavioural shifts and public-health measures, can all protect people from dangerous heat.

Additionally, across Europe there is already a range of policies and measures in place to protect the most vulnerable from heatwaves. Many of these were brought in following the unprecedented summer of 2003, when 70,000 died from extreme heat.

These policies were highlighted by French environment minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher, in response to the far-right National Rally (RN) party’s AC proposals:

“The incompetent RN has just found out that nursing homes need air-conditioned rooms. Thank you, but it’s actually been mandatory since 2004.”

Another study found that measures that have already been rolled out in France would cut the projected death toll of a 2003-like heatwave by more than 75%. This is in part due to the expansion of AC in places such as nursing homes, but also other approaches, such as heat action plans.

For example, France has a multi-tiered action plan, which includes local governments ensuring access to cooled spaces and water, keeping a list of vulnerable individuals for targeted interventions, as well as national information campaigns.

According to the UN’s office for disaster risk reduction, this French plan has led to a “significant reduction in heat-related mortality”.

While action plans have proved successful in a number of nations, less than half of European countries have such a plan in place.

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‘Net-zero rules’ are not blocking AC installation in the UK

In the UK, Conservative politicians and right-leaning media have tried to pit the adoption of AC against net-zero policy.

Writing in the climate-sceptic Daily Telegraph, columnist Matthew Lynn claimed falsely:

“Strict net-zero rules now mean that aircon is effectively banned in the UK.”

(Further down the article, he concedes: “AC is not strictly speaking banned in new-build homes in the UK. But tough environmental rules mean that it is very hard, and expensive, to install in practice.”)

The same narrative has been used in articles by GB News, the Sun and others. A separate article in the Daily Telegraph’s “money” section goes further, claiming that AC had been “torn from homes under net-zero clampdown”.

A blog post from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government rebuts these claims, stating:

“There has been media coverage this week suggesting that AC is banned in homes. This is incorrect.”

For the UK, while it is true that fewer than 5% of homes currently have AC, this is largely due to the fact that it was not hot enough in the past to warrant the expense. Historically, the focus has therefore been on keeping buildings warm, rather than cool.

Extreme heat has previously been rare in the country, so homes were built with insulation and other measures to keep heat in during the “dank winters”. (See: Much of Europe has not needed AC in the past.)

Current regulations do not ban the installation of AC outright. However – as the government’s blog post notes – there is no blanket rule, meaning there are some localised differences.

Certain areas – or certain kinds of properties – may be subject to additional complications for installing AC.

In a 2025 video on Instagram, shadow secretary of state for energy security and net-zero Claire Coutinho referenced the London plan, for example, which is a framework for development in the capital launched in 2021. She said:

“[London mayor] Sadiq Khan says no. The London plan says we shouldn’t have air con because it uses too much energy. But this is mad! This is a poverty mindset that we need to get away from.”

The London Plan does not stop homes from having AC. It simply says that, for new buildings, passive design measures should be prioritised, such as the orientation of the building, the window design and incorporation of measures such as external shading and trees.

A recent response from the mayor added further measures, such as the need to “minimise the necessity for the operation of mechanical measures including AC, which would further add to the heat island effect within urban areas and add operational cost to residents”.

Elsewhere, new-build homes across England must meet the requirements of “part O” of the 2022 building regulation updates. This includes addressing overheating in buildings through energy-efficient design and prioritising passive cooling, with AC as a last resort.

For existing buildings, most AC units fall under “permitted development rights”, meaning no planning application is required to install them.

Additionally, regulations were relaxed in 2025 to make it easier to install an air-to-air heat pump – which can both heat and cool air – without planning permission.

This means that, far from blocking the expansion of AC, net-zero policy has made it easier to install specific cooling systems.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Andrew Sissons, director of sustainable future at Nesta, says the government must now implement its announced £2,500 subsidy for air-to-air heat pumps “as quickly as possible”, to further ensure that the technology can be rolled out efficiently. He adds:

“[The government] should also continue to expand permitted development rights for air-to-air heat pumps, with a particular focus on flats and homes in denser areas. As long as heat pumps meet the MCS [Microgeneration Certification Scheme] noise test, there are few reasons to limit their use via the planning system.”

Some properties, such as large homes, listed buildings or those in conservation areas, may still require planning permission to install an air-to-air heat pump or other AC. Sissons notes that this can add cost and delay to installation.

While it cannot be said that AC has been blocked or banned due to net-zero, neither has it been prioritised.

This may shift as temperatures continue to rise. UK government advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC) suggest that 22% of the UK’s housing stock will likely need active cooling, such as AC, to cope with 2C of global warming.

The CCC’s recent adaptation report also calls for all new homes to be built using low-cost, passive cooling measures, alongside more AC.

Active cooling such as AC is more likely to be needed for retrofitting existing homes, the report adds.

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AC is not the only answer to overheating cities

AC has become increasingly politicised in Europe, as demonstrated by France’s RN party announcing its “grand plan for AC” in all public buildings.

As noted by Dutch MEP Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, this “far-right” embrace of AC is coming from the same people who for years have “delayed emissions reductions”.

In response, left-leaning policymakers in Europe have frequently downplayed the role of AC, prioritising programmes of urban greening and retrofitting older buildings.

Such approaches for dealing with extreme heat have already proved successful. Therefore, many experts argue that these methods, alongside AC, will be essential to prepare for a hotter world.

According to the IPCC’s sixth assessment report, adaptive infrastructure, such as urban forests and green roofs, can reduce energy use because of cooling, with co-benefits for climate, air quality, physical and mental health.

While retrofitting older buildings for heat as well as insulating them from the cold might prove challenging, urban greening and an active shade policy – one that determines how much of every street is exposed to direct sunlight – are simple measures cities can adopt.

Some experts have also warned about the high cost of running AC, expressing concerns that excessive reliance on the technology could increase energy poverty.

In a Carbon Brief guest post published in 2025, researchers at the Basque Centre for Climate Change found that framing AC as the “default solution” can miss the opportunity to design “more inclusive, human-centred responses” to rising temperatures.

William Lewis, a PhD candidate and one of the guest post’s authors, tells Carbon Brief it is not a case of “one or the other”, when considering AC and other options:

“We have this opportunity in European countries to choose a slightly different path [from the US], which isn’t AC in every single home.”

King’s College London’s Pillai says that, by centring the debate on AC, the far-right response to the heatwaves in Europe has “completely neglected the science of how you cool human beings”.

There are many solutions, he adds, that are already widely used across hot developing countries, such as ceiling fans, windows that open and cross-ventilation, as well as strategies to reduce cumulative hours of heat exposure.

Pillai tells Carbon Brief that, while places reaching 42C and higher “definitely need to think about AC very seriously”, places in the “low to mid 30Cs” could rely on these alternatives.

Behavioural change, he adds, is the “least glamorous part” of heat policy, but “pulls most of the weight” of protecting people. These include a wide range of actions and responses – from reducing heat exposure, to wearing lighter clothing and drinking more water and fluids.

There are also workplace protections. Pillai tells Carbon Brief that these could include legislation on mandatory work breaks, cooling and shade requirements at workplaces, as well as health insurance that covers heat stress days that have been lost by heat-exposed workers.

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