Freddie Daley is a research associate with the Centre for Global Political Economy at the University of Sussex. Charlie Lawrie is a postdoctoral associate at the University of Sussex.
In December 2025, Indonesia quietly abandoned plans to close the Cirebon-1 coal power plant. This was no ordinary power plant. Cirebon-1 was supposed to be the centre-piece of a $21.4 billion (£16.5bn) international deal backed by the US, UK, Japan and the EU to help Indonesia end coal use.
Indonesia’s so-called Just Energy Transition Partnership, or JETP, was launched at a G20 summit in Bali in 2022. Similar deals have been struck with South Africa, Vietnam and Senegal. They are widely regarded as the most ambitious attempt at getting international climate finance to end coal use in populous, coal-dependent middle-income countries.
The UK government once touted the JETPs as “a template on how to support just transition around the world”. This refers to efforts to ensure that the phase-out of fossil fuels and phase-in of low-carbon technologies is fair, inclusive and reflects the demands of workers and affected communities.
But if this approach cannot retire a single plant in Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest coal consumer, there is reason to question whether the model itself works. Our research suggests these partnerships are better understood as a cautionary tale.
Investors needed
The idea underpinning the JETPs is elegant in theory: use public money from rich countries to attract private investment for renewable energy projects and closing down coal plants.
Grants from governments and low-cost loans supposedly reduce the risk enough to bring in billions more from banks and asset managers. The public money “unlocks” the private money, and together they fund an energy transition that benefits the public through cleaner air, reliable energy and reduced climate risk. Win, win.
But across all four JETP countries, the private money has yet to materialise at the scale envisioned. In Indonesia, as of early 2025, only around $1.1 billion of public money had been disbursed. But the country’s plan for decarbonising electricity estimates it needs $97 billion in investment by 2030 – a cavernous gap.
More troubling still is the lack of consolidated financial reporting for the JETP funds. Fifty separate funding packages within the Indonesian JETP, all with their own financial instruments and accounting frameworks, make it all but impossible to track how much money has been spent.
As international climate law expert Lukas Bogner has argued, this kind of finance creates complex bureaucratic layers that recipient countries must navigate.
Why investors haven’t shut coal plants
Decommissioning a coal plant is not like building a new one. It means buying out existing contracts, compensating investors for lost future profits, and renegotiating complex legal agreements.
Even then, the electricity the plant provided still needs to be replaced. This requires further investment in generation systems that may not yet exist. Investors have little appetite for any of this, and the costs fall primarily on the state.
In fact, the supposed unlocking of private investment with public money raises a perennial tendency: private capital moves where returns are highest and risks lowest.
Investors in London and New York, for example, demand high returns from middle-income economies like Indonesia, yet baulk at complex regulatory environments, state-owned electricity companies, powerful coal interests and mounting sovereign debt burdens. Public money can make some projects more attractive, but will not remove the supposed political and economic risks investors see in countries like Indonesia.


The JETP also means loading Indonesia with more debt. Of the $21.4 billion now pledged, only 2.6% comes in the form of interest-free grants. Most JETP finance would arrive as commercially-priced loans which Indonesia must eventually repay.
In other words, Indonesia is being asked to borrow more to decommission coal assets that currently generate government revenue and employment. At the same time, it will have to purchase renewable electricity from the privatised companies that would replace them.
In the words of one of our interviewees, the Indonesian state is expected to “pay twice” – once to close the old system, and again to buy power from the new one. Trade unions in Indonesia have been blunt about what this means in practice. Under the JETP model, they warn electricity will no longer be treated as a public good, but as a commodity that ordinary Indonesians will pay more for.
Why rich countries are “reluctant” on additional JETP coal-to-clean deals
The JETP model can also weaken the same state institutions needed to manage the energy transition. Countries that have managed rapid clean-energy booms, from China to Vietnam, have done so through strong state-owned enterprises, clear industrial strategies and the ability to direct investment and discipline business.
The JETPs, by contrast, are designed around a diminished role for the state and a central role for private capital. This happens through regulatory reform, the creation of new private markets, or through investor-friendly technologies.
In the case of Indonesia, this “de-risking” agenda explains the pressure to break up the national electricity company and sell off its assets – a prospect fiercely resisted by trade unions, civil society and even wealthy groups who profit from the existing system.
A broken model?
International climate finance remains important. Rich countries must still fund energy transitions in the Global South. But the Indonesian JETP suggests that relying on private investors to deliver coal phase-outs may be the wrong model.
Alternatives do exist, from proposals for much larger grant-based financing to the Bridgetown Initiative proposed by Barbados’s prime minister, Mia Mottley, which would use International Monetary Fund resources to support climate investment. More radical proposals call for publicly-owned, worker-led transitions. But so far, these ideas have made little progress.
Our research suggests just transitions are more likely when governments receive direct grants that help them retain the capacity to shape their own energy systems, and to support domestic industries through green industrialisation.
The failure to decommission Cirebon-1 matters beyond Indonesia. It suggests the world’s flagship model for financing the end of fossil fuels isn’t working. And the longer it takes to admit that, the harder the transition becomes – for Indonesia, and for everyone.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The post Indonesia’s failing Just Energy Transition Partnership is a cautionary tale appeared first on Climate Home News.
Indonesia’s failing Just Energy Transition Partnership is a cautionary tale
Climate Change
Iran War Jeopardizes Global Food Security
Transitioning to sustainable practices could boost resilience to compounding geopolitical and climate threats, experts say.
The worldwide fallout from the U.S. war in Iran isn’t limited to gas prices.
Climate Change
Planned offshore oil and gas expansion threatens key marine ecosystems, report
Ocean and coastal creatures are being put at risk by the spills, noise, dredging and shipping associated with new offshore oil and gas infrastructure, says a new report by a group of environmental NGOs.
The report by a group of twelve environmental groups analysed planned new offshore oil and gas blocks covering 430,000 square kilometres – an area the size of Sweden – in 11 countries.
Blocks in countries such as Kenya, Indonesia and Australia overlap with some of the planet’s hotspots for marine biodiversity, home to mangroves, coral reefs, sea turtles, sharks and whales.
Oil and gas expansion is advancing in spite of the legal protections already in place, the report says, with a third of the area being licensed overlapping with marine and coastal protected areas.
“It is alarming to see the research findings and the sheer scale of fossil fuel expansion trajectories threatening the health and future of our shared ocean,” said Tyson Miller, Executive Director of Earth Insight, one of the environmental NGOs involved in the report.
At the first conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta, around 60 countries floated the idea of creating “fossil-fuel-free zones”, which would seek to place limits on coal, oil and gas in areas where development would lead to severe social and environmental harm.
As part of the landmark Kunming-Montreal biodiversity deal, governments have also pledged to protect 30% of the planet’s land and marine ecosystems by 2030. This could be used as an opportunity to limit oil and gas expansion in sensitive areas, Miller said.
The report says the findings “reinforce the need for governments, financial institutions and companies to stop funding and supporting offshore oil and gas expansion”, and calls for the creation of fossil-fuel-free zones in “high-value marine and coastal areas”.
Oil bidding in biodiversity hotspots
As one of the case studies, Kenya — which is set to host the Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa later this month — has opened 50 offshore oil and gas blocks for bidding in the Lamu Basin, one of East Africa’s marine biodiversity hotspots.
These blocks overlap with all the region’s mangroves and coral reefs, the report says, which provide nursery habitats for fish, sea turtles and the vulnerable dugong.
These ecosystems are already under severe stress from climate change-related ocean heating and increased water acidity and could now face seismic surveys, offshore drilling, dredging, increased shipping traffic, oil spills, chemical discharge and underwater noise pollution.
The government estimates that oil production will start by 2026, aligning with “global best practices”, and has said the Lamu basin has vast “untapped potential”. The country is expected to open bidding for the first 10 blocks by September.

Muturi wa Kamau, network coordinator for the Kenya Oil and Gas Working Group, said in a statement that the country “is preparing to open ecologically sensitive areas for fossil fuel exploration” while positioning itself as a leader in ocean diplomacy.
“The question is: at what cost are we willing to risk these fragile ecosystems and the livelihoods of coastal communities who have depended on them for generations?” Kamau said.
Australia’s Otway Basin
After a four-year pause, Australia — which will act as co-presidency of the COP31 climate summit — resumed offshore exploration in the Otway basin last year, with American energy firm ConocoPhillips among the operators approved for exploratory drilling off the country’s southern coast.
The sites under exploration are as close as one kilometre from a series of marine reserves known as sanctuaries for pygmy blue whales, who travel thousands of kilometres to reproduce in those waters. Orange roughy, a deep-sea fish that can live for over 140 years, may also be harmed.
In total, the report analysed new LNG export projects in Argentina, Alaska, Mexico and Tanzania, as well as expanded offshore oil and gas licensing in Australia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The post Planned offshore oil and gas expansion threatens key marine ecosystems, report appeared first on Climate Home News.
Planned offshore oil and gas expansion threatens key marine ecosystems, report
Climate Change
The scramble to stockpile critical minerals could drive up energy transition costs
As competition for minerals needed to produce clean energy technologies intensifies, a growing number of countries have resorted to an age-old mechanism to cope with the threat of scarcity: stockpiling.
The world’s biggest economies are racing to shore up reserves of cobalt, lithium, graphite and rare earths, which are needed to produce batteries, electric vehicles, wind turbines and electric systems to wean the global economy off fossil fuels. The same minerals are also increasingly sought after to manufacture military hardware and chips for AI, adding further pressure on supplies.
But the cutthroat scramble to build up reserves threatens to drive up the costs of the energy transition by intensifying competition and pushing up prices of key materials needed to produce clean energy technologies, research published today has found.
“If you undermine the financial viability of [clean energy] projects through higher raw material costs, you’re going to delay their roll-out,” co-author Hugh Miller, the critical minerals lead at the Centre for Economic Transition Expertise at the London School of Economics and Political Science, told Climate Home News.
Stockpiling “is happening, whether we like it or not”, said Miller. “But if we’re going to do it, we need to have it in a coordinated manner that means we don’t have massive market volatility and adverse implications from every country trying to go at it alone,” he added.
The rise of stockpiles
A growing number of governments have adopted national stockpiling programmes in response to heightened geopolitical tensions around mineral supply chains.
Earlier this year, US President Donald Trump announced the establishment of a critical mineral reserve known as “Project Vault” to protect American businesses from shortages after China imposed export restrictions on rare earth supplies.

Beijing suspended the measures until November as part of a trade truce with Washington but the episode spooked Western governments and exposed how strategic materials can be weaponised to achieve geopolitical objectives.
Australia, China, the EU and India have also announced measures to create strategic mineral reserves. Japan and South Korea already have long-standing mineral stockpiling programmes.
“Legitimate concerns”
“There are legitimate concerns with regards to potential global shortages of these minerals,” said Miller, citing rapidly rising and concurrent mineral demand for the energy transition, AI, data centres, and military technologies, combined with underinvestment in new supplies for some minerals, such as copper.
While stockpiling can serve as an emergency response mechanism during acute shortages, it does nothing to address the underlying concentration risks in mineral supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo holds around 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves, for example, while China dominates the processing of 19 out of 20 minerals deemed critical by a large number of nations.
Uncoordinated stockpiling programmes risk heightening the price volatility they are designed to hedge against, according to the report.
Researchers found that if Australia, China, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea and the US simultaneously built reserves of minerals to cover six months of imports, the aggregate stockpile demand could represent up to 34% of global annual cobalt supply and over 10% of global lithium, graphite and copper supply. That could cause a shock to the market, triggering the shortages and price spikes they are trying to avoid.
Miller said it was unlikely that every country would stockpile at that rate, but aggregate stockpiling demand of just 5% of global mineral supply would have an impact on prices.
Coordinating stockpiles: a role for the IEA?
Researchers found that avoiding the negative impacts of stockpiling requires global coordination over how mineral stocks are accumulated and released – a mechanism which already exists for other commodities, including oil.
Coordination should include agreed rules for countries to build up their stocks over a slow and staggered timeline and pre-agreed conditions for releasing reserves to provide market predictability and reduce the risk of price spikes.
The International Energy Agency (IEA), which was established after the 1970s oil crisis to coordinate emergency oil stock releases among member countries, is best placed to oversee such a mechanism, they say.
Earlier this year, IEA member countries called on the agency to strengthen its work on critical minerals, including by providing support to countries “that choose to establish and expand critical minerals stockpiling systems”.
But Miller and his co-author Pau Morandi, a policy fellow at the Centre for Economic Transition Expertise, argue that members should go one step further and mandate the IEA to coordinate the security of supplies, rather than only helping individual governments.
The IEA has been contacted for comment.
A call to action for the G7
Miller said he hoped the research could be picked up by the G7 group of wealthy countries, which could lead on mandating the IEA to take on this coordination role.
France, which is presiding over the group this year and is hosting leaders in Evian on the shores of Lake Geneva in mid-June, has made strengthening the resilience of critical minerals value chains a priority.
In a communique last month, finance ministers agreed to “deepen and expand our cooperation among G7 members and with like-minded partners” to strengthen and diversify critical mineral supply chains and to continue discussions “on how to best organise analytical cooperation”.
Sebastien Treyer, executive director of the Paris-based Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI), said he hoped the G7 leaders’ summit can help move the discussion on critical minerals towards greater international cooperation to secure the resources the world needs to build a clean economy.
From inclusive and mutually beneficial partnerships to mine resources to stockpiling minerals, “we need to coordinate more like a trade organisation than something that is about securing supply,” he said.
The post The scramble to stockpile critical minerals could drive up energy transition costs appeared first on Climate Home News.
The scramble to stockpile critical minerals could drive up energy transition costs
-
Climate Change10 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases10 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy7 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Greenhouse Gases11 months ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测








