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Chinese electric vehicle (EV) giant BYD is accelerating its global expansion, especially in Europe and Canada. In contrast, Tesla is losing ground across key markets. New sales data, policy shifts, and geopolitical deals suggest a major shift in the EV landscape.

This trend matters not just for automakers. It also impacts battery metals, supply chains, carbon markets, and the future of clean mobility.

BYD’s Germany Boom Marks Europe’s EV Shake-Up

BYD recorded a dramatic surge in German sales in January 2026. Bloomberg highlighted data from Germany’s Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA) showing that BYD’s registrations jumped more than 10-fold from January 2025. The company sold only 235 vehicles in Germany last year, but recent data suggests sales likely exceeded 2,500 units.

Meanwhile, Tesla struggled. BYD more than doubled Tesla’s registrations in Germany during the same month.

Overall, car sales in Germany declined 6.6% to 193,981 vehicles in January. However, electric cars still accounted for 22% of new registrations, highlighting strong demand for EVs despite a weak auto market. This surge shows that BYD’s low-cost models and expanding lineup are gaining traction in Europe’s largest automotive market.

Significantly, the German numbers reflect a broader European trend. Throughout 2025, BYD recorded more than 200% year-on-year growth in many months. In December 2025 alone, its European registrations reached 27,678 units—up nearly 230%.

byd europe
Source: ElectricVehicles.com

Breakthrough in Spain

Spain emerged as another key battleground. BYD dominated the Spanish EV and plug-in hybrid market in January 2026.

  • The company registered 1,962 vehicles, a 64.6% year-on-year increase. It captured a 13.6% market share, leading both fully electric and plug-in hybrid segments.
  • Fully electric sales rose nearly 30% to 1,039 units, putting BYD ahead of Kia and Mercedes-Benz. Tesla ranked fourth, with only 458 fully electric vehicles sold.

Spain’s performance highlights BYD’s strategy of combining affordable EVs with hybrids to capture diverse buyers.

Notably, BYD also sold 1,326 battery-electric vehicles in the UK, marking a nearly 21% increase from the previous year.

Tesla’s European Sales Collapse Deepens

Tesla, on the other hand, saw sales decline every month in Europe during 2025. The trend continued into 2026. Its struggles were especially visible in Northern and Western Europe.

In five major European markets, Tesla’s registrations fell 44% year-over-year in January. This marked the third consecutive year of shrinking sales across the region.

  • Norway: Registrations collapsed by 88%, with only 83 vehicles sold.
  • Netherlands: Sales dropped 67%.
  • France: Registrations fell 42% to 661 vehicles, the lowest in over three years.
  • United Kingdom: Sales plunged more than 57% to just 647 vehicles.

Policy changes played a role. Norway reduced EV tax incentives starting January 1, which hurt Tesla demand. However, the scale of the decline surprised analysts.

Even in Sweden and Denmark, where Tesla saw sales rise by 26% and 3%, the total number of cars sold remains low. These minor gains do little to offset the sharp decline compared with two years ago.

TESLA europe

Analysts believe that one key issue is Tesla’s aging lineup. The Model Y, once a top seller, is now over four years old, and buyers are looking for newer options. Although Tesla launched more affordable “Standard” versions of the Model Y and Model 3, these updates have not been enough to reverse the downward trend.

In the current scenario, Tesla is not only losing ground to Chinese brands. European automakers are also regaining market share. Volkswagen overtook Tesla in 2025 to become Europe’s top-selling EV brand. It sold around 274,000 units, compared to Tesla’s 235,000.

This shows Europe’s EV market is becoming more competitive, with local manufacturers and Chinese brands challenging Tesla’s early dominance.

tesla byd europe
Source: CNeV

Canada Opens the Door to Chinese EVs

Europe is not the only region where BYD is gaining ground. Prime Minister Mark Carney signed a landmark trade agreement with China on January 16, 2026. This deal allows Chinese-made EVs to enter the market at low tariffs.

  • So Canada will allow up to 49,000 Chinese EVs annually at a tariff rate of 6.1%. This marks a sharp reversal from the 100% tariff imposed in October 2024.

Also, the quota could rise to about 70,000 vehicles within five years. By 2030, at least half of imported Chinese EVs must be priced below CAD 35,000. In exchange, China agreed to reduce tariffs on Canadian canola seed, improving agricultural trade relations.

PM Carney said,

“At its best, the Canada-China relationship has created massive opportunities for both our peoples. By leveraging our strengths and focusing on trade, energy, agri-food, and areas where we can make huge gains, we are forging a new strategic partnership that builds on the best of our past, reflects the world as it is today, and benefits the people of both our nations.” 

BYD Gains a Regulatory Edge in Canada

BYD holds a unique advantage in Canada. Its manufacturing facilities in Shenzhen and Xi’an are already approved for Canadian imports. This pre-clearance gives BYD a head start over rivals like NIO, XPeng, and Li Auto. However, other Chinese brands must wait for regulatory approvals or rely on slower case-by-case processes.

BYD also operates an electric bus assembly plant in Ontario, strengthening its local presence. Furthermore, affordable models like the Seagull and Dolphin, priced between $20,000 and $30,000, could qualify under Canada’s affordability requirements.

Political Backlash and U.S. Concerns

The Canada-China EV deal triggered political controversy. Ontario Premier Doug Ford initially urged Canadians to boycott Chinese EVs, warning the agreement could hurt domestic manufacturing.

Labor unions and automakers also expressed concern. They fear the deal could weaken North America’s automotive industry and strain U.S.-Canada trade relations.

As per reports, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened tariffs on Canadian goods if the deal moves forward, calling it a “disaster.” However, Canadian officials argue the agreement aligns with USMCA rules and will expand the EV market.

Analysts estimate Chinese EVs could capture around 23% of Canada’s EV sales in the first year, saving consumers about CAD 6,700 per vehicle.

Canada EV
Source: S&P Global

Stock Market Snapshot: BYDDY vs TSLA

BYD’s (BYDDY) stock trades around $11.28 per share, with a market cap of roughly $102 billion. The stock is near the lower end of its 52-week range, reflecting margin pressures and geopolitical risks.

byddy stock
Source: Yahoo Finance

Tesla’s (TSLA) stock trades near $406 per share, with a market cap of about $1.35 trillion. Analysts expect a volatile 2026, with forecasts ranging widely depending on EV demand and margins.

tesla TSLA
Source: Yahoo Finance

Despite Tesla’s valuation premium, BYD’s rapid sales growth is reshaping investor sentiment.

The Bigger Picture: A Global EV Power Shift

BYD’s rapid rise shows how the EV industry is changing. Chinese automakers are using scale, government support, and efficient production to challenge Western rivals. At the same time, Tesla remains strong in technology, software, and brand recognition. Yet, price competition and shifting policies are reshaping the market.

In Europe, declining subsidies, along with Canada’s new trade rules and ongoing geopolitical tensions, are affecting EV adoption and corporate strategies. As BYD gains ground in Germany, Europe, and Canada, it signals a turning point in the global EV race. Tesla’s falling sales highlight the increasing pressure from both Chinese and European competitors.

For investors, policymakers, and climate advocates, these trends matter. They will influence battery supply chains, emissions targets, and the demand for carbon credits. The EV transition is no longer led by a single company—today, it has become a global contest for scale, affordability, and sustainable leadership.

The post How BYD’s European Surge and Canada Deal Are Challenging Tesla’s EV Dominance appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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