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France Shocks Energy Sector and Rewrites Energy Future: New Law Boosts Nuclear, Cuts Renewables

France has approved a major new energy law that cuts back renewable energy targets and strengthens support for nuclear power. The law was passed by decree on 13 February 2026 after nearly three years of political debate.

The law is part of France’s Multiannual Energy Programming (PPE), a 10-year framework that guides energy policy through 2035. It sets long-term goals for how power is produced, with revised targets for wind, solar, and nuclear energy.

French Finance Minister Roland Lescure said the changes reflect slower electricity demand growth than expected and the government’s desire for a stable energy mix. He also said nuclear power remains the “backbone” of France’s electricity system, while adding:

“We need to stop ​our internal family ‌squabbling. We need both nuclear and renewables.”

The new law marks a significant shift in French energy policy. It alters renewable goals that were set to help cut emissions and diversify power sources.

Wind and Solar Ambitions Dialed Down

France gets almost 97% of its electricity from low-carbon sources in 2025. Nuclear power provides the largest share, supplying nearly 70% of total generation. This reflects the country’s long-standing reliance on nuclear energy for stable power.

Hydropower contributes about 11%, while wind provides around 9% and solar about 6%. Together, these sources create a diversified clean energy mix. Fossil fuels play a small role, making up just over 3%, mainly from gas and biofuels.

power generation in France 2025
Source: lowcarbonpower.org

France is also a major net exporter of electricity. As transport, heating, and industry electrify, demand will rise. More low-carbon capacity will be needed.

However, the new regulation lowers France’s wind and solar capacity goals for 2035. Previously, draft plans set higher targets for renewable capacity, but under the new law, the goals dropped.

  • Wind and solar combined (draft): 133–163 GW by 2035.
  • Wind and solar (new law): 105–135 GW installed capacity by 2035.

The law also adjusts specific sub-targets:

  • Offshore wind: reduced to 15 GW by 2035 (from 18 GW).

The reduction aims to show slower growth in electricity demand. It also addresses challenges in permitting and grid integration in France and the wider EU.

France’s wind and solar power deployment has been slower than in some neighbouring countries. Recent energy plans show that renewables made up about 14.6% of France’s electricity mix. Wind and solar still lag behind nuclear and hydro power.

Critics say that while renewable energy is growing, the new targets might slow down carbon cuts. They worry it could also make investors less confident in wind and solar projects.

Nuclear Reasserted as the Backbone

France’s low-carbon electricity history centers on nuclear power. In the 1980s, nuclear output grew quickly as new reactors came online. Growth slowed in the 1990s and early 2000s and after 2009, production declined.

Output later recovered, with gains of more than 25 TWh in 2021 and over 40 TWh in 2023 and 2024. Nuclear remains central to France’s low-carbon power system, again.

Electricity generation in France by source
Source: lowcarbonpower.org

The new energy law lets state-run utility Électricité de France (EDF) keep 14 nuclear reactors open. This requirement was part of earlier commitments and had been controversial.

Instead, the framework reinforces nuclear’s role in the energy mix. It also sets a goal for net production of 650–693 terawatt-hours (TWh) of decarbonized electricity by 2035, compared with about 540 TWh today.

EDF currently operates a fleet of 57 nuclear reactors, which supply roughly 65% of France’s electricity — one of the highest nuclear shares in the world. The law also foresees the construction of at least six new nuclear reactors, with the first expected to be inaugurated around 2038.

EDF welcomed the revision and said the law would help the company focus on its output goals and long-term planning.

Support for nuclear power reflects a broader policy shift. France has long relied on nuclear energy for low-carbon generation, and policymakers view it as vital for energy security and independence.

Rebalancing the Power Mix for 2035

The new law reshapes France’s energy mix. It places greater emphasis on nuclear while easing pressure on the rollout of renewables.

The revised framework aims to balance supply security, carbon goals, and economic considerations. Slower electricity demand growth is one reason officials cited for the policy shift.

France is also planning to increase the share of electricity in overall energy consumption to 60% by 2030, up from around 30% today. This goal reflects efforts to electrify transport, buildings, and industry as part of broader decarbonization strategies.

However, renewable energy growth has not kept pace with previous plans. France has reduced its wind and solar capacity targets. Some projects are also facing delays due to regulations and grid issues.

Hydroelectric power is a key renewable source in France, but wind and solar are becoming more important. The country aims to cut fossil fuel use and meet EU renewable goals.

A Divisive Shift in the Energy Transition

The energy law triggered a heated debate among legislators. Some lawmakers criticised the reduction in renewables targets as a step backward for the energy transition.

Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, urged lawmakers to submit a no-confidence motion in response to the law. She argued that lowered targets could harm French industry and agriculture.

Environmental groups also voiced concern. Greenpeace France stated:

“If this PPE is ​more than two years late on paper, it’s at least a decade behind in its vision of an energy transition.”

Industry groups, including wind and solar developers, had mixed reactions. Some welcomed the clarity provided by the law after years of uncertainty, while others cautioned that investment could slow without stronger renewable goals.

The debate reflects broader tensions in France between emissions reduction goals and economic and security considerations. The law tries to balance these priorities in the face of fiscal pressures and geopolitical uncertainties.

EDF at the Center of France’s Power Strategy

EDF plays a central role in France’s electricity system. The utility’s large nuclear fleet is critical for providing low-carbon base power. The company is also expanding its renewable business. It runs hydroelectric plants and is involved in wind and solar projects domestically and abroad.

However, abundant wind and solar power across Europe has pressured wholesale power prices, reducing revenue for nuclear plants that operate best at higher price levels. The new law seeks to ease some of this pressure by rebalancing targets and supporting nuclear output.

EDF is also working on modernising its fleet. In recent years, it secured financing to extend the life of its older reactors and to pursue small modular reactor (SMR) technologies for future deployment.

The utility’s path forward will involve managing a complex energy mix that includes nuclear, renewables, hydroelectric, and other clean sources. Meeting climate goals while ensuring reliable, affordable power remains a key challenge.

The Road to 2035: Implementation and Impact

France’s new energy law sets the course for the next decade. It guides energy planning through 2035 under the PPE framework.

The law aligns nuclear and renewable policy with expected demand and economic conditions. It seeks to stabilise the power market and support key utilities like EDF.

Energy markets, investors, and grid operators will be watching how capacity targets unfold and how demand patterns evolve. France’s approach may influence broader EU energy policy debates, especially around balancing nuclear with renewable goals in the transition to net zero.

The post France Shocks Energy Sector and Rewrites Energy Future: New Law Boosts Nuclear, Cuts Renewables appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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