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Every increment of global warming above 1.5C increases the risk of crossing key tipping points in the Earth system – even if the overshoot is only temporary, says new research.

It is well established that if global temperatures exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, there is a higher risk that tipping points will be crossed.

The new study, published in Nature Communications, investigates the risk of crossing four interconnected tipping points under different “policy-relevant” future emissions scenarios.

The authors investigate the risk of tipping where warming temporarily overshoots 1.5C, but global temperatures are then brought back down using negative emissions technologies. They find that the longer the 1.5C threshold is breached, and the higher the peak temperature, the greater the risk of crossing tipping points.

The most pessimistic scenario in the study sees global warming hit 3.3C by the end of the century – in line with the climate policies of 2020 – before dropping back below 1.5C over 2100-2300. Under this pathway, there is a 45% chance of crossing tipping points by 2300, the authors say.

The authors also warn that if global temperatures rise above 2C, the additional risk of tipping for every extra increment of warming “strongly accelerates”.

For temperatures between 1.5C and 2C, the risk increases by 1-1.5% for every 0.1C increase in overshoot temperature. However, for temperatures above 2.5C, tipping risk increases to 3% per 0.1C of overshoot.

The research “underlines the need for urgent emission cuts now that do not assume substantial carbon dioxide removal later”, a scientist not involved in the study tells Carbon Brief.

Overshoot scenarios

Scientists have warned for decades that as the planet warms, there is an increasing risk that Earth systems will cross “tipping points” – critical thresholds that, if exceeded, could push a system into an entirely new state.

For example, if climate change and human-driven deforestation push the Amazon rainforest past a critical threshold, large parts of the forest could experience “dieback”. This would cause entire sections of lush rainforest to eventually shift to dry savannah.

(See Carbon Brief’s explainer on the nine tipping points that could be crossed as a result of climate change.)

The planet has already warmed by 1.3C above pre-industrial levels, and a recent study warned that five tipping elements – including the collapse of the west Antarctic ice sheet – are already within reach.

That study emphasised the importance of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels – in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement. It finds that warming of 1.5C would render four climate tipping elements “likely” and a further six “possible”. Meanwhile, 13 tipping elements will be either “likely” or “possible” if the planet warms by 2.6C, as expected under current climate policies.

Many of the potential pathways to limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C by 2100 see the planet initially “overshoot” the threshold before negative emissions methods are used to bring temperatures back down.

The new paper investigates 10 future warming scenarios which run to the year 2300. The authors use the PROVIDE v1.2 emission pathways, which they describe as “an extended version of the illustrative pathways identified” used in the recent sixth assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

The original scenarios run over 2015-2300, but the authors carried them forward for another 50,000 years by following the temperature trajectory set over 2290-2300. All scenarios stabilise at 1.5C, 1C or pre-industrial temperatures. However, many include overshoots, with peak temperatures ranging from 1.57C to 3.30C.

These scenarios show a range of options for how global temperatures change under these 10 scenarios in the “medium term” – until the year 2300 – as well as in the “long term”, which runs 50,000 years into the future to see how the planet eventually stabilises.

Scenarios that reach net-zero or negative emissions by 2100 and maintain them thereafter are classified as “NZGHG emission scenarios”. The table below gives more detail on each scenario.

Scenario Overshoot peak temperature NZGHG Stabilisation temperature Scenario assumptions
CurPol-OS-1.5C 3.30C Never-NZGHG 1.5C Follows current (2020) policies until 2100, then declines
ModAct-OS-1.5C 2.69C Never-NZGHG 1.5C Follows current (2020) pledges (NDCs) until 2100, then declines
ModAct-OS-1C 2.69C Never-NZGHG 1.0C Follows current (2020) pledges (NDCs) until 2100, then declines
Ref-1p5 not defined 1.5C Reference scenario designed in temperature space
SSP5-3.4-OS 2.35C No-long-term-NZGHG 1.5C Tests system response to rapid emission changes
SSP1-1.9 1.53C No-long-term-NZGHG 1.0C Sustainable development, no long-term compensation of non-CO2 emissions
GS-NZGHG 1.70C NZGHG pre-industrial Gradual strengthening, returns warming to 1.5 °C by 2215
SP-NZGHG 1.57C NZGHG pre-industrial Broad shift towards sustainable development
Neg-NZGHG 1.67C NZGHG pre-industrial Returns warming to 1.5 °C by 2100 with heavy CDR deployment
Neg-OS-OC 1.67C NZGHG pre-industrial Returns warming to 1.5 °C by 2100 with heavy CDR deployment

Table showing the 10 scenarios used in this study. Source: Möller et al (2024).

There is quite a range between the 10 pathways.

At the high end, the “CurPol-OS-1.5C” scenario sees a continuation of the global climate policies implemented in 2020 until the year 2100, with warming peaking at 3.3C. It then sees a decline in global temperature until reaching a stabilisation of 1.5C by the year 2300.

At the low end, “Neg-OS-0C” scenario initially overshoots 1.5C to 1.67C, but then returns warming to 1.5C by 2100 using “heavy carbon dioxide removal deployment”. It also then sees average global temperatures drop to pre-industrial levels by the year 2300.

In the middle, the Ref-1p5 scenario is the only one that does not include an overshoot, instead stabilising quickly at 1.5C.

The chart below shows greenhouse gas emissions (top) and corresponding global temperature changes (bottom) associated with each scenario, identified by the different-coloured lines. The bottom chart illustrates the range in how quickly the pathways return to 1.5C or below.

Greenhouse gas emissions (top) and corresponding global temperature changes (bottom) associated with each scenario are shown in the graphics below.
Greenhouse gas emissions (top) and corresponding global temperature changes (bottom) associated with each scenario are shown in the graphics below. The table below gives more detail on each scenario. Source: Möller et al (2024).

Dr David McKay is a research impact fellow at the University of Exeter’s Global Systems Institute, who has published extensively on climate tipping points, but was not involved in this study.

He also notes that some of the scenarios shown in this study “may not be possible”, because there is debate about whether or not “the substantial carbon dioxide removal needed for large overshoots is feasible”.

Cascades

Many Earth systems are interlinked, so crossing one tipping point can increase the likelihood of crossing others. This is often described as a “domino effect” or “tipping cascade”.

The study focuses on four interconnected tipping points – collapse of the Greenland ice sheet and west Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation and dieback of the Amazon rainforest.

Annika Högner is a researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and co-lead author on the study. She tells Carbon Brief these four tipping points were chosen because they “play a significant role in the functioning of the Earth system” and “their tipping would have severe global impacts”.

The graphic below shows how the tipping points interact with each other. A “+” symbol indicates that crossing one tipping point can destabilise another. For example, a collapse of the Greenland ice sheet makes the AMOC more likely to shut down, as a result of the sudden influx of freshwater into the north Atlantic Ocean. A “±” symbol indicates that the relationship between two tipping points is uncertain.

A “-” symbol indicates that crossing one tipping point stabilises another. Högner tells Carbon Brief that the interaction between the Greenland ice sheet and AMOC is the only stabilising interaction in this study. She explains that if the AMOC were to cross a tipping point, “we [would] expect to see strong cooling in the northern hemisphere”, which will contribute to stabilising the Greenland ice sheet.

Interactions between the Greenland ice sheet collapse, west Antarctic ice sheet collapse, AMOC shutdown and Amazon dieback.
Interactions between the Greenland ice sheet collapse, west Antarctic ice sheet collapse, AMOC shutdown and Amazon dieback. A “+” indicates that crossing one tipping point destabilises another, “-” indicates that crossing one tipping point stabilises another and “±” indicates that the relationship between two tipping points is uncertain. Source: Möller et al (2024).

Earth system models “often don’t resolve tipping processes very well”, making them less suited to modelling full tipping cascades, Högner tells Carbon Brief.

Instead, she explains that the authors developed a “conceptual model”. This model does not attempt to simulate the entire Earth system, but instead just models the likelihood of tipping at different temperatures, based on existing knowledge about tipping elements from other studies.

The model takes temperature trajectories as an input and gives the state of the tipping elements after a specified time – that is, whether or not the element has tipped – as an output.

Importantly, these models include “hysteresis” – a feature of tipping systems, in which a system that has moved to a different state does not easily move back to the original state even if temperatures are reduced again.

Tipping risk

The authors use their conceptual model to calculate “tipping risk” under the 10 future warming scenarios. Högner tells Carbon Brief that tipping risk “refers to the model of all four interacting tipping elements analysed in the study”. For example, a 50% tipping risk means there is a 50% chance that at least one of the four climate elements will tip.

The top row of the graphic below shows the risk of tipping in the year 2300 (left) and in 50,000 years from now (right). Bars placed higher up indicate a greater likelihood of tipping. The dot shows the average value for each data point, while the bars show the 10-90% range.

The text on the right hand side gives likelihood levels in the calibrated language used by the IPCC: very likely means a likelihood of 90-100%, likely is 66-100%, about as likely as not is 33-66%; unlikely is 0-33%; and very unlikely is 0-10%.

The middle row shows the peak temperature under each scenario (left) and stabilisation temperature (right). The bottom row shows how long temperatures overshoot before stabilising in each scenario.

Risk of tipping in the year 2300 (left) and in 50,000 years from now (right).
Risk of tipping in the year 2300 (left) and in 50,000 years from now (right). Bars placed higher up indicate a greater likelihood of tipping. The middle row shows the peak temperature under each scenario (left) and stabilisation temperature (right). The bottom row shows how long temperatures overshoot before stabilising in each scenario. Source: Möller et al (2024).

The longer the 1.5C threshold is breached for, and the higher the peak temperature is, the greater the risk of crossing tipping points by the year 2300, the study shows.

The authors find the greatest risk of crossing tipping points in the CurPol-OS-1.5C scenario (red), which follows the climate policies of 2020 until the year 2100 and then reaches 1.5C by 2300, as this scenario has the greatest overshoot temperature and duration.

Under this scenario, there is a 45% tipping risk by 2300 and a 76% chance in 50,000 years, according to the paper.

The five pathways that do not return warming to 1.5C by the year 2100 have the greatest medium-term risks, and those with less than 0.1C overshoot have the lowest medium-term risks.

In the long-term – looking to the next 50,000 years – the authors find that stabilisation temperature is “one of the decisive variables for tipping risks”. They find that even in the Ref1p5 scenario – which sees global temperatures stabilise at 1.5C without any overshoot – there is a 50% risk of the system tipping over the next 50,000 years.

The results “illustrate that a global mean temperature increase of 1.5C is not ‘safe’ in terms of planetary stability, but must be seen as an upper limit”, the study warns.

Högner tells Carbon Brief that the paper “underlines the importance of adhering to the Paris Agreement temperature goal”.

Tessa Möller – a researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and co-lead author on the paper – tells Carbon Brief that “we have a wide portfolio of technologies available” to limit warming to 1.5C, and just need to “implement” them.

However, she also highlights the “large credibility gap” between pledges from individual countries and the policies they have actually implemented. She tells Carbon Brief that not only do we need “stronger pledges”, but it is also essential that countries follow through on them.

Long-term climate

The authors also explore the risk of each individual tipping point being crossed in different scenarios.

The plot below shows the tipping risk by 2300 under different scenarios, at different temperatures, on the left. Each colour represents one scenario. Dots positioned further to the right indicate a greater peak temperature and dots positioned higher up indicate a greater tipping risk.

The plot on the right shows the percentage change in tipping risk for every additional 0.1C of overshoot, for different peak global temperatures, for the Amazon (cross), AMOC (plus), West Antarctic ice sheet (black dot) Greenland Ice sheet (square) and overall (yellow dot).

The risk of tipping by 2300 under different scenarios, at different temperatures (left), where each colour represents one scenario.
The risk of tipping by 2300 under different scenarios, at different temperatures (left), where each colour represents one scenario. The percentage change in tipping risk for every additional 0.1C of overshoot (right), for different peak global temperatures, for the Amazon (cross), AMOC (plus), West Antarctic ice sheet (black dot) Greenland Ice sheet (square) and overall (yellow dot). Source: Möller et al (2024).

The authors find that AMOC collapse and Amazon dieback would likely be the first components to tip. This could be in the next 15-300 years and 50-200 years, respectively, depending on the scenario, they find.

Meanwhile, the Greenland and west Antarctic ice sheets have tipping timescales of 1,000-15,000 years and 500-13,000 years, respectively.

However, they note that as temperatures increase, the relative risk of each element tipping changes. The graph shows that while AMOC is the main driver of tipping risk at lower temperatures, the Amazon becomes the main driver once global temperatures exceed 2C.

Finally, they find that as global temperatures rise, the risk of tipping accelerates. Overall, tipping risk increases by 1-1.5% per 0.1C increase in overshoot temperature, for temperatures below 2C, according to the study. However, above 2.5C, tipping risk increases to 3% per 0.1C increase overshoot.

McKay notes that there are some limitations in the study. For example, he notes that the paper “has to rely on tipping threshold and timescale estimates with often wide ranges and sometimes low confidence, while tipping interaction estimates are based on dated expert judgement”.

However, he adds:

“This work makes it clear that every fraction of warming increases the chance of tipping points, even if global temperature subsequently falls, and underlines the need for urgent emission cuts now that do not assume substantial carbon dioxide removal later.”

The post ‘Every 0.1C’ of overshoot above 1.5C increases risk of crossing tipping points appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Landmark deal to share Chile’s lithium windfall fractures Indigenous communities

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Rudecindo Espíndola’s family has been growing corn, figs and other crops for generations in the Soncor Valley in northern Chile, an oasis of green orchards in one of the driest places on Earth the Atacama desert.

Perched nearly 2,500 metres above sea level, his village, Toconao, means “lost corner” in the Kunza language of the Indigenous people who have lived and farmed the land in this remote spot for millennia.

“Our deep connection to this place is based on what we have inherited from our ancestors: our culture, our language,” said Espíndola, a member of a local research team that found evidence that people have inhabited the desert for more than 12,000 years.

This distant outpost is at the heart of the global rush for lithium, a silvery-white metal used to make batteries for electric vehicles (EV) and renewable energy storage that are vital to the world’s clean energy transition. The Atacama salt flat is home to about 25% of the world’s known lithium reserves, turning Chile into the world’s second-largest lithium producer after Australia.

For decades, the Atacama’s Indigenous Lickanantay people have protested against the expansion of the lithium industry, warning that the large evaporation ponds used to extract lithium from the brine beneath the salt flats are depleting scarce and sacred water supplies and destroying fragile desert ecosystems.

Espíndola joined the protests, fearing that competition for water could pose an existential threat to his community.

But last year, he was among dozens of Indigenous representatives who sat across the table from executives representing two Chilean mining giants to hammer out a governance model that gives Indigenous communities living close to lithium sites a bigger say over operations, and a greater share of the economic benefits.

A man wearing a black T-shirt and a hat stands in front of a tree
Rudecindo Espíndola stands in a green oasis near the village of Toconao in the Atacama desert (Photo: Francisco Parra)

A pioneering deal

The agreement is part of a landmark deal between state-owned copper miner Codelco and lithium producer the Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM) to extract lithium from the salt flats until 2060 through a joint venture called NovaAndino Litio.

The governance model that promises people living in Toconao and other villages around the salt flats millions of dollars in benefits and greater environmental oversight is the first of its kind in mineral-rich Chile, and has been hailed by industry experts as the start of a potential model for more responsible mining for energy transition metals.

NovaAndino told Climate Home News the negotiations with local communities represented an “unprecedented process that has allowed us to incorporate the territory’s vision early in the project’s design” and creates “a system of permanent engagement” with local communities.

The company added it will contribute to sustainable development in the area and help “the safeguarding of [the Lickanantay people’s] culture and environmental values”.

    For mining companies, such agreements could help reduce social conflicts and protests, which have delayed and stalled extraction in other parts of South America’s lithium-rich region, known as the lithium triangle.

    “Argentina and Bolivia could learn a lot from what we’re doing [here],” said Rodrigo Guerrero, a researcher at the Santiago-based Espacio Público think-tank, adding that adopting participatory frameworks early on could prevent them from “going through the entire cycle of disputes” that Chile has experienced.

    Justice at last?

    As part of the governance deal, NovaAndino has pledged to adopt technologies that will reduce water use and mitigate the environmental impacts of lithium extraction.

    It has also committed to hold more than 100 annual meetings with community representatives to build a “good faith” relationship, and an Indigenous Advisory Council will meet twice a year with the company’s sustainability committee to discuss its environmental strategy, company sources said. The meetings are due to begin next month.

    To oversee the agreement’s implementation, an assembly – composed of representatives from all 25 signatory communities – will track the project’s progress. In addition, NovaAndino will hold one-on-one meetings with each community to address issues such as the hiring of local people and the protection of Indigenous employees.

    A flamingo at the Chaxa Lagoon in the Atacama salt flat (Photo: REUTERS/Cristian Rudolffi)

    Espíndola said the deal, while far from perfect, was an important step forward.

    “Previously, Indigenous participation was ambiguous. Now we talk about participation at [every] hierarchical level of this process, a very strong empowerment for Indigenous communities,” said Espíndola, adding that it did not give local communities everything they had asked for. For instance, they will not hold veto power over NovaAndino’s decisions or have a formal shareholder role.

    But after years of conflict with mining companies, a form of “participatory justice is being done”, he said.

    Not everyone is convinced that the accord, pushed by Chile’s former leftist government, marks progress, however.

    “Not in our name”

    The negotiations have caused deep divisions among the Lickanantay, some of whom say greater engagement with mining companies will not stop irreparable damage to the salt flats on which their traditional way of life depends. Others fear the promise of more money will further erode community bonds.

    In January 2024, Indigenous communities from five villages closest to the mining operations, including Toconao, blocked the main access roads to the lithium extraction sites. They said the Council of Atacameño Peoples, which represents 18 Lickanantay communities and was leading discussions with the company, no longer spoke for them.

    Official transcripts of consultations on the extension of the lithium contracts and how to share the promised benefits reveal deep divisions. Tensions peaked when communities around the mining operations clashed over how to distribute the multimillion-dollar windfall, with villages closest to the mining sites demanding the largest share.

    Eventually, separate deals establishing a new governance framework over mining activities were reached between Codelco and SQM with 25 local communities, including a specific agreement for the five villages closest to the extraction sites.

    Codelco’s chairman Maximo Pacheco (Photo: REUTERS/Rodrigo Garrido)

    The division caused by the separate deal for the five villages “will cause historic damage” to the unity of the Atacama desert’s Indigenous peoples, said Hugo Flores, president of the Council of Atacameño Associations, a separate group representing farmers, herders and local workers who oppose the mining expansion.

    Sonia Ramos, 83, a renowned Lickanantay healer and well-known anti-mining activist, lamented the fracturing of social bonds over money, and for the sake of meeting government objectives.

    “There is fragmentation among the communities themselves. Everything has transformed into disequilibrium,” said the 83-year-old.

    “[NovaAndino] supposedly has economic significance for the country, but for us, it is the opposite,” she said.

    The company told Climate Home News it has “acted consistently” to promote “transparent, voluntary, and good-faith dialogue with the communities in the territory, recognising their diversity and autonomy, and always respecting their timelines and forms of participation”.

    A one-off deal or a model for others?

    The NovaAndino joint venture is a pillar of Chile’s strategy to double lithium production by 2031 and consolidate the copper-producing nation’s role in the clean energy transition as demand for battery minerals accelerates.

    Chile’s new far-right president, José Antonio Kast, who was sworn in last week, promised to respect the lithium contracts signed by his predecessor’s administration – including the governance model.

    Still, some experts say the splits over the new model highlight the need for legislation that mandates direct engagement and minimum community benefits for all large mining projects.

    “In the past, this has lent itself to clientelism, communities who negotiate best or arrive first get the better deal,” said Pedro Zapata, a programme officer in Chile for the Natural Resource Governance Institute.

    “This can be to the detriment of other communities with less strength. We cannot have first- and second-class citizens subject to the same industry,” he added.

    The government is already negotiating two more public-private partnerships to extract lithium with mining giant Rio Tinto, which it said would include a framework to engage with Indigenous communities and share some of the revenues. The details will need to be negotiated between local people, the government and the company.

    Sharing the benefits of mining

    Under the deal in the Atacama, NovaAndino will run SQM’s current lithium concessions until they expire in 2030 before seeking new permits to expand mining in the region under a vast project known as “Salar Futuro” – a process which will require further mandatory consultations with communities.

    Besides the participatory mechanism, the new agreement promises more money than ever before for salt flat communities.

    A stone arch welcomes visitors to the village of Peine, one of the closest settlements to lithium mining sites in the Atacama salt flat (Photo: REUTERS/Cristian Rudolffi)

    Depending on the global price of lithium and their proximity to the mining operations, Indigenous communities could collectively receive roughly $30 million annually in funding – about double what SQM currently disburses under existing contracts.

    When taking into account the company’s payments to local and regional authorities, contributions could reach $150 million annually, according to the government.

    To access these resources, each community will need to submit a pipeline of projects they would like funding for under a complex arrangement that includes five separate financial streams:

    • A general investment fund will distribute funding based on each village’s size and proximity to the mining sites
    • A development fund will support projects specifically in the five communities closest to the extraction sites
    • Contributions to farmers and livestock associations
    • Contributions to local governments
    • A groundbreaking “intergenerational fund” held in trust for the Lickanantay until 2060

    For many isolated communities in the Atacama desert, financial contributions from mining firms have funded essential public services, such as healthcare and facilities like football pitches and swimming pools.

    In the past, communities have used some of the benefits they received from mining to build their own environmental monitoring units, hiring teams of hydrogeologists and lawyers to scrutinise miners’ activities.

    Espíndola said the new model could pave the way for more ambitious development projects such as water treatment plants and community solar energy projects.

    A man in a white shirt and glasses stands in front of a stone wall
    Sergio Cubillos, president of the Peine community, was one of the Indigenous representatives in the negotiations with Codelco and SQM (Photo credit: Formando Rutas/ Daniela Carvajal)

    Competition for water

    The depletion of water resources is one of local people’s biggest environmental concerns.

    To extract lithium from the salt flats, miners pump lithium-rich brine accumulated over millions of years in underground reservoirs into gigantic pools, where the water is left to evaporate under the sun and leaves behind lithium carbonate.

    One study has shown that the practice is causing the salt flat to sink by up to two centimetres a year. SQM recently said its current operations consume approximately 11,500 to 12,500 litres of industrial freshwater for every metric ton of lithium produced.

    NovaAndino has committed to significantly reduce the company’s water use by returning at least 30% of the water it extracts from the brine and eliminating the use of all freshwater in its operations within five years of obtaining an environmental permit.

      Cristina Dorador, a microbiologist at the University of Antofagasta, told Climate Home News that reinjecting the water underground is untested at a large scale and could impact the chemical composition of the salt flats.

      Continuing to extract lithium from the flats until 2060 could be the “final blow” for this fragile ecosystem, she said.

      Asked to comment on such concerns, NovaAndino said any new technology will be “subject to the highest regulatory standards”, and pledged to ensure transparency through “an updated monitoring system with the participation of Indigenous communities”.

      High price for hard-won gains

      For the five communities living on the doorstep of the lithium pools, one of the biggest gains is being granted physical access to the mining sites to monitor the lithium extraction and its impact on the salt flats.

      That is a first and will strengthen communities’ ability to call out environmental harms, said Sergio Cubillos, the community president of Peine, the village closest to the evaporation ponds. It could also give them the means to seek remediation through the courts if necessary, Espíndola said.

      Gaining such rights represents long-overdue progress, Cubillos said, but it has come at a high price for the Lickanantay people.

      “Communities receiving money today is what has ultimately led to this division, because we haven’t been able to figure out what we want, how we want it, and how we envision our future as a people,” he said.

      Main image: A truck loads concentrated brine at SQM’s lithium mine at the Atacama salt flat in Chile (Photo: REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado)

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      Roadmap launched to restart deadlocked UN plastics treaty talks

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      Diplomats will hold a series of informal meetings this year in a bid to revive stalled talks over a global treaty to curb plastic pollution, before aiming to reconvene for the next round of official negotiations at the end of 2026 or early 2027.

      Hoping to find a long-awaited breakthrough in the deeply divided UN process, the chair of the talks, Chilean ambassador Julio Cordano, released a roadmap on Monday to inject momentum into the discussions after negotiations collapsed at a chaotic session in Geneva last August.

      Cordano wrote in a letter that countries would meet in Nairobi from June 30 to July 3 for informal discussions to review all the components of the negotiations, including thorny issues such as efforts to limit soaring plastic production.

        The gathering should result in the drafting of a new document laying the foundations of a future treaty text with options on elements with divergent views, but “no surprises” such as new ideas or compromise proposals. This plan aims to address the fact that countries left Geneva without a draft text to work on – something Cordano called a “significant limitation” in his letter.

        “Predictable pathway”

        The meeting in the Kenyan capital will follow a series of virtual consultations every four to six weeks, where heads of country delegations will exchange views on specific topics. A second in-person meeting aimed at finding solutions might take place in early October, depending on the availability of funding.

        Cordano said the roadmap should offer “a predictable pathway” in the lead-up to the next formal negotiating session, which is expected to take place over 10 days at the end of 2026 or early 2027. A host country has yet to be selected, but Climate Home News understands that Brazil, Azerbaijan or Kenya – the home of the UN Environment Programme – have been put forward as options.

        Countries have twice failed to agree on a global plastics treaty at what were meant to be final rounds of negotiations in December 2024 and August 2025.

        Divisions on plastic production

        One of the most divisive elements of the discussions remains what the pact should do about plastic production, which, according to the UN, is set to triple by 2060 without intervention.

        A majority, which includes most European, Latin American, African and Pacific island nations, wants to limit the manufacturing of plastic to “sustainable levels”. But large fossil fuel and petrochemical producers, led by Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia and India, say the treaty should only focus on managing plastic waste.

        As nearly all plastic is made from planet-heating oil, gas and coal, the sector’s trajectory will have a significant impact on global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

        Countries still far apart

        After an eight-month hiatus, informal discussions restarted in early March at an informal meeting of about 20 countries hosted by Japan.

        A participant told Climate Home News that, while the gathering had been helpful to test ideas, progress remained “challenging”, with national stances largely unchanged.

        The source added that countries would need to achieve a significant shift in positions in the coming months to make reconvening formal negotiations worthwhile.

        Deep divisions persist as plastics treaty talks restart at informal meeting

        Jacob Kean-Hammerson, global plastics policy lead at Greenpeace USA, said the new roadmap offers an opportunity for countries to “defend and protect the most critical provisions on the table”.

        He said that the document expected after the Nairobi meeting “must include and revisit proposals backed by a large number of countries, especially on plastic production, that have previously been disregarded”.

        “These measures are essential to addressing the crisis at its source and must be reinstated as a key part of the negotiations,” he added.

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        Roadmap launched to restart deadlocked UN plastics treaty talks

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        Iran War Shows That Doubling Down on Fossil Fuels Is ‘Delusional,’ UN Climate Chief Says

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        Price spikes from the war highlight the necessity of the renewable energy transition for stability and national security, the U.N. official says.

        The Iran war’s disruption to the global energy market should be a wake-up call for countries that continue to rely on fossil fuels, said United Nations climate chief Simon Stiell in a speech on Monday.

        Iran War Shows That Doubling Down on Fossil Fuels Is ‘Delusional,’ UN Climate Chief Says

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