The European Union (EU) is considering a new policy that could allow the use of international carbon credits to help meet its ambitious 2040 climate target. If implemented carefully, the plan could unlock significant climate finance for projects in developing countries, particularly initiatives that expand access to clean cooking technologies.
At a recent clean cooking summit hosted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), France’s climate ambassador Benoît Faraco suggested that the EU could become a major investor in carbon credit projects. These investments could help accelerate efforts to replace polluting wood and biomass stoves with cleaner alternatives across Africa and other regions.
However, the proposal has also revived a long-standing debate in climate policy. Supporters argue that carbon credits can finance climate solutions globally, while critics warn that poorly designed projects can exaggerate emissions reductions and undermine climate integrity.
As global demand for carbon credits grows, the EU’s upcoming rules could shape the future of the voluntary carbon market.
EU’s 2040 Climate Target and the Role of Carbon Credits
The European Union plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 90% from 1990 levels by 2040, making it one of the most ambitious climate targets globally. To support this goal, policymakers are exploring allowing a limited share of emissions reductions to come from high-quality international carbon credits.
Under the emerging framework, these credits could account for up to about 5% of the emissions reductions needed to meet the 2040 goal. The mechanism would likely begin in 2036 and would include strict safeguards designed to ensure environmental integrity.
EU officials believe this approach could ease pressure on domestic industries while still maintaining the bloc’s overall climate ambition. At the same time, it could channel new climate finance into developing countries where emissions reductions can often be achieved at lower costs.
However, the European Commission has not yet finalized the rules governing which projects would qualify or how these credits would be sourced and verified.

Clean Cooking Projects Could Benefit
One area that could receive significant investment is clean cooking technology. During the IEA summit, Benoît Faraco suggested that EU participation in carbon markets could help scale up efforts to replace traditional cooking methods with cleaner alternatives such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
Across many developing countries, households still rely heavily on wood, charcoal, or biomass for cooking. These fuels create severe indoor air pollution and contribute to deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions.
Globally, the challenge remains enormous:
- More than two billion people still lack access to clean cooking
- Indoor air pollution linked to traditional cooking contributes to millions of deaths every year
Most of those without access live in rural areas where energy infrastructure remains limited.
Expanding access to modern cooking technologies requires large investments in equipment, fuel distribution systems, and consumer financing. Carbon credit funding could help close these financial gaps.
SEE MORE: EU Mobilizes €15.5 Billion to Boost Africa’s Clean Energy Boom
Rwanda Cookstove Initiative Shows the Model
Private companies are already experimenting with this approach. TotalEnergies, for example, has invested in LPG infrastructure aimed at expanding clean cooking access across Africa and India.
One notable initiative involves a cookstove project in Rwanda developed with the organization DelAgua. The program aims to distribute 200,000 high-performance cookstoves to rural households.
Within a year, the project is expected to benefit more than 800,000 people living in rural communities. Compared with traditional open fires, the improved cookstoves significantly reduce pollution and fuel consumption.
The new stoves cut harmful smoke emissions by about 81% and reduce wood use by roughly 71%. Over ten years, the initiative could prevent more than 2.5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.
These avoided emissions generate carbon credits that companies can purchase as part of their climate strategies. The program also supports Rwanda’s national goal of providing universal access to clean cooking by 2030.
Global Carbon Markets Are Expanding
Recent developments in international climate policy suggest that clean cooking projects may play a growing role in carbon markets.
In February 2026, a United Nations body approved the first carbon credits to be issued under the global carbon market established by the Paris Agreement. The approved activity focuses on distributing efficient cookstoves in Myanmar.
The project aims to reduce household air pollution and limit pressure on forests by lowering fuelwood consumption. Some of the credits will be used within South Korea’s emissions trading system, while the remaining credits will support Myanmar’s own climate commitments.
UN climate officials highlighted the broader benefits of clean cooking initiatives. These projects not only cut emissions but also improve health, protect forests, and reduce the burden on women and girls who often spend hours collecting firewood.
Meanwhile, data from the voluntary carbon market shows growing activity. A report from SCB Group found that carbon credit issuances increased by 28% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of 2025.
During that period, about 68 million credits were issued globally. Cookstove projects accounted for the largest share of these credits, representing roughly 29% of total issuances. Wind projects followed with about 20%, while forest conservation initiatives made up around 13%.
Most cookstove credits were certified under the Verra and Gold Standard programs.

Concerns About Credit Integrity
Despite their potential benefits, cookstove carbon credits have long been controversial. Some climate experts argue that many projects exaggerate their emissions reductions.
Monitoring real-world stove usage can be difficult. Households may receive improved stoves but continue using traditional cooking methods alongside them. In such cases, the actual emissions reductions may be smaller than estimated.
Environmental organizations have also raised concerns about weak monitoring systems and inconsistent verification standards across carbon markets.
An expert from the Brussels-based NGO Carbon Market Watch warned that relying on credits that have repeatedly failed to meet expectations could pose significant risks for climate policy.
These concerns reflect lessons from earlier offset systems, including the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. Several projects approved under that framework later faced criticism for overstating emissions reductions.
Because of this history, regulators are now under pressure to ensure that any new carbon credit systems deliver real and measurable climate benefits.
Strong Standards Will Be Critical
EU policymakers say the success of their carbon credit strategy will depend on strict oversight and transparency.
Future rules are expected to focus on three key principles:
- strong monitoring and independent verification
- clear safeguards to prevent double-counting of emissions reductions
- proof that projects deliver additional climate benefits beyond the host countries’ own targets
If implemented effectively, these standards could strengthen confidence in international carbon markets.
At the same time, critics argue that carbon credits should only play a limited role in meeting climate targets. They warn that over-reliance on external offsets could delay necessary emissions reductions within Europe itself.
A Major Global Challenge Remains
The clean cooking challenge illustrates why new financing mechanisms are urgently needed. IEA estimates that around 300 million people must gain access to clean cooking solutions every year to achieve universal access by 2030.
Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for roughly half of the population still relying on traditional cooking fuels. Many rural communities lack access to modern energy infrastructure and affordable alternatives.
Replicating the progress achieved in countries such as China, India, and Indonesia will require large investments and coordinated policy efforts. Carbon finance could become an important tool to accelerate this transition.

Overall, the European Union’s potential use of international carbon credits could reshape the global carbon market and unlock new funding for climate solutions in developing countries.
Clean cooking projects represent one of the most visible opportunities. They deliver clear health and environmental benefits while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
However, the debate over carbon credits highlights a deeper challenge. Policymakers must ensure that these credits represent real, measurable emissions reductions rather than accounting shortcuts.
If the EU succeeds in designing a robust framework with strict quality standards, international carbon markets could channel billions of dollars into projects that improve lives and reduce emissions worldwide.
- READ MORE: The Carbon Credit Market in 2025 is A Turning Point: What Comes Next for 2026 and Beyond?
The post EU Eyes International Carbon Credits to Meet 2040 Climate Target and Expand Clean Cooking appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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