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The majority of developed countries are paying less than 50% of their “fair share” towards biodiversity finance, according to new analysis.

These nations contributed less than $11bn in total in 2022, the year that a landmark global nature deal, known as the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), was agreed at COP15.

Taking into account the historical responsibility for biodiversity loss over the past 60 years, the London-based development thinktank ODI has calculated a “fair share” for each country towards a minimum collective target agreed in 2022 aimed at raising $20bn annually by 2025 for biodiversity conservation.

In 2022 – the most recent year for which data is available – only Norway, Sweden and Germany contributed their “fair share”, the analysis shows. The UK, Italy and Canada – host of the COP15 biodiversity summit, where the deal was struck – each contributed less than 40% of their share.

Japan was the “worst performer in absolute terms”, falling short of its fair share by $2.4bn in 2022 and “will need to at least triple its biodiversity finance” by 2025, ODI says.

“These big economies continue to drop the ball on biodiversity finance,” Sarah Colenbrander, co-author and ODI director of climate and sustainability, tells Carbon Brief.

Additionally, pledges to a separate “framework fund” established at COP15 have amounted to less than $250m, with Japan yet to pay a single yen of the ¥650m ($4.47m) it had pledged to the fund.

With COP16 set to start in Cali, Colombia, next week, Carbon Brief looks at the progress towards meeting the GBF’s finance targets, what constitutes a “fair share” and what needs to happen to fund nature conservation over the decade ahead.  

What was agreed on finance at COP15?

At COP15 in 2022, 196 countries agreed to an ambitious global deal to reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, dubbed the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).

The “Paris Agreement for nature” was gavelled through despite objections from developing countries, with parties given little time to examine the fine print on how these targets would be financed.

The GBF has a target to mobilise “at least $200bn per year” for biodiversity conservation by 2030 from “all sources”– domestic, international, public and private.

Of this, developed countries – along with others that “voluntarily assume” their obligations – are expected to “substantially and progressively increase” their international finance flows for nature “to at least $20bn per year by 2025, and to at least $30bn per year by 2030”, the GBF text states.

Target 19 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)
Target 19 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

The $20bn target has attracted criticism from developing countries.

One objection is the amount, given that the biodiversity “finance gap” – the shortfall between current funding for conservation globally and what is needed – is estimated at $700bn per year. The GBF states that countries must close this gap by 2030 through ending harmful subsidies ($500bn per year) and mobilising resources from the global north to south ($200bn per year). 

Clipping from the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, page 9: "Adequate means of implementation, including financial resources, capacity-building, technical and scientific cooperation, and access to and transfer of technology to fully implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework are secured and equitably accessible to all Parties, especially developing country Parties, in particular the least developed countries and small island developing States, as well as countries with economies in transition, progressively closing the biodiversity finance gap of $700 billion per year, and aligning financial flows with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the 2050 Vision for biodiversity."
Goal D of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

According to Dr David Obura, chair of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, insufficient finance was a “primary factor in the failure to achieve” any of the Aichi biodiversity targets, which were agreed by nations in 2010, with rich nations raising less than $4bn a year in funds on average between 2015 and 2020.

In the run-up to COP15, developing countries demanded that developed countries increase their financial contribution to $100bn per year, mirroring the floor of climate-finance commitments up to 2025.

Another criticism is the collective nature of the target, along with little clarity on how it will be met. According to ODI, this approach “often shields wealthy nations from individual responsibility”.

Instead, apportioning individual responsibility can mitigate that risk and increase accountability and transparency, the authors say.

Are developed countries on course to meet nature finance goals?

There is no internationally agreed-upon definition of biodiversity finance. This can lead to confusing – and sometimes inflated – estimates of just how much countries have contributed to protect nature.

There are two main channels of international public finance that developed countries can use to meet their biodiversity finance commitments under the GBF: official development finance (ODF); and the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF).

ODF combines bilateral “official development assistance” (ODA) and other official flows (OOF).

While these flows from developed to biodiversity-rich, developing nations are written into the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to acknowledge historical responsibility for species loss, it was only in 2022 that countries agreed on the specific “$20bn by 2025” and “$30bn by 2030” targets. 

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is one of the main sources of biodiversity finance data on whether countries are meeting their funding targets. (Although it also acknowledges its own limitations and assumptions around what it counts as biodiversity finance.)

There are large differences in how much public finance is intended strictly for biodiversity (“biodiversity-specific”) and how much is intended for other projects where conservation is either a significant goal or a marginal co-benefit (“biodiversity-related”).

According to the OECD, developed countries – including the US – contributed $12.1bn towards biodiversity finance in 2022, an increase of 3% from 2021. However, biodiversity-specific funding – with the principal objective of reducing biodiversity loss – declined from $4.6bn in 2015 to $3.8bn in 2022.

As seen with climate finance, the form that this finance takes matters just as much as the quantity.

For example, the OECD says that some of these large donors have mostly used loans for biodiversity-related development finance, including France (87% of their contributions), Poland (85%), Japan (81%) and Canada (51%). Loans are seen as problematic by developing countries because they add to the debt burden that they are already facing.

The OECD also notes that the largest spike in biodiversity finance over 2015-22 was from development banks, mostly in the form of loans to already debt-distressed, but nature-rich nations. (See: Carbon Brief’s Q&A on debt-for-nature swaps.)

The figure below shows how different donors have contributed to what the OECD describes as an “all-time high” in development finance for nature in 2022. 

With contributions from multilateral institutions alongside the biodiversity-related finance from developed countries, including the US, the total funding for biodiversity crossed $20bn in the year 2022.

The full values of all biodiversity finance flows (biodiversity-related) by donor categories
The full values of all biodiversity finance flows (biodiversity-related) by donor categories: Development Assistant Committee (DAC) countries, including the US (light blue), multilateral institutions, including development banks (green), private philanthropy (teal), private finance mobilised by governments (yellow) and developing countries (brick red). Source: OECD (2024)

How do each country’s contributions compare to their ‘fair share’?

One limitation of biodiversity finance data tracked by the OECD is that developed countries are often represented as a single unit, obscuring progress – or lack thereof – on a national level.

This, according to ODI, fails to reflect each country’s individual responsibility for biodiversity depletion. In order to better reflect countries’ roles, ODI has assessed each country’s “fair share” of the target of $20bn per year by 2025.

This calculation is based on each developed country’s specific ecological footprint between 1960 and 2021. (This “trade-adjusted footprint” accounts for a country’s consumption, including imports and exports, to give a more accurate picture of how consumption at home impacts biodiversity globally.) It also incorporates each country’s capacity to pay, measured by gross national income, and its population in 2022.

The chart below shows the biodiversity finance contributions of developed countries in 2022 against their “fair share” and the shortfall in meeting the GBF’s targets.

Countries’ shortfalls compared to their “fair share” of biodiversity finance in 2022 based on the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework’s goals
Countries’ shortfalls compared to their “fair share” of biodiversity finance in 2022 based on the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework’s goals: >100% (black), 75-100% (indigo), 50-75% (baby blue), 25-50% (turquoise), 0-25% (powder blue).

While ODI acknowledges that the $20bn is a fraction of the $700bn a year that biodiversity actually needs between now and 2030, it stresses that “this new data should spur a conversation around a delivery plan” for this sum.

Lead author and climate economist Dr Laetitia Pettinotti, who developed ODI’s “fair share” methodology, adds:

“There is an equivalent in climate finance, designed ahead of COP26 [in 2021] to catalyse further contributions, and there’s no reason why the same can’t be applied to this goal. Every year beyond the deadline is another year of deteriorating ecosystem services and declining biodiversity. These aren’t just numbers; this target matters to us all.”

The authors also acknowledge that their “fair-share” calculations do not take into account the “substantial biodiversity loss before 1961”, which “continues to contribute to less resilient ecosystems today”. 

According to thinktank Third World Network (TWN), which was not involved in the report, using a 60-year cumulative ecological footprint “as a proxy for historical responsibility” does not fully reflect the “vast ecological debt” rich countries owe to poorer nations, “beginning since the colonial era”. 

In a statement shared with Carbon Brief, TWN said:

“Calculating rich countries’ fair share of financing cannot be solely benchmarked against $20bn. $20bn per year was committed in the 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. The target is on a cumulative sliding scale – by 2025, the total provision should amount to at least $60bn, and increase thereafter to at least $30bn annually by 2030. This amounts to at least $210bn by 2030.”

The chart below shows how the target would accumulate per year, if “at least $20bn a year” was raised and then increased to $30bn per year until 2030.

Progress towards the Global Biodiversity Framework’s finance target
Progress towards the Global Biodiversity Framework’s finance target 19(a), if developed countries contributed $20bn annually, beginning in 2022 (black line) until 2025, and $30bn annually from 2025 to 2030. Source: Global Biodiversity Framework (2022), Third World Network (2024). Chart: Carbon Brief.

How much is being contributed to the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund?

The Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF) was established at COP15 in 2022 as another channel for countries and companies to contribute to the biodiversity finance target.

It is currently housed under the World Bank’s “green” lending arm – the Global Environment Facility (GEF) – although developing countries continue to call for an entirely new fund governed by the COP. 

Despite an initial flurry of pledges, rich nations have contributed less than $250m to the fund, as of 31 August this year, according to data the GEF has shared with Carbon Brief.

Selected national pledges to the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund, as of the end of August 2024
Selected national pledges to the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund, as of the end of August 2024. Source: Global Environment Facility, shared with Carbon Brief. Chart: Carbon Brief.

Additionally, according to the GEF data, Japan has yet to pay any of the¥650m ($4.4m) it has pledged to the fund, while Luxembourg has so far paid only $1.1m of the $7.7m it has pledged.

In August, COP16 president Susanna Muhamad urged global-north governments to “make a gesture to increase trust in the conference and actually put their money” into the GBFF to demonstrate their commitment.

COP16 president Susana Muhamad has asked developed countries to give more to a global biodiversity fund ahead of COP16.
COP16 president Susana Muhamad has asked developed countries to give more to a global biodiversity fund ahead of COP16. Credit: Lenin Nolly / Sipa USA / Alamy Stock Photo

Unlike development finance flows, which can be hard to track and isolate, the GBFF publicly reports all of its financing to the COP and can clearly identify how countries are contributing to target 19.

Dr Chizuru Aoki, manager of the division of conventions and funds at the GEF, tells Carbon Brief:

“We welcome the commitment of the COP president to a successful outcome, including on resource mobilisation…Biodiversity needs much more funding [and t]he GEF is the heart of global finance for biodiversity and provides parties with an efficient and transparent vehicle to achieve target 19(a).”

While the fund has received no new pledges in recent months, according to Aoki, additional financial pledges are expected to be made during COP16.

Of the $244m received so far, the GBFF has already allocated more than half ($110m), with almost $40m going to four projects in Brazil, Gabon and Mexico. These include creating protected areas and sampling environmental DNA in Brazil’s Caatinga – the world’s largest semi-arid region, once home to the endangered Spix’s macaw. 

The Spix's macaw native to Brazil’s Caatinga region, listed as “extinct in the wild”.
The Spix’s macaw native to Brazil’s Caatinga region, listed as “extinct in the wild”. Credit: Danny Ye / Alamy Stock Photo

The fund has to allocate at least 36% of its resources to least-developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).

It also has set an “aspirational target” of 20% of all its resources to go to Indigenous peoples and local communities.

However, new analysis by Indigenous rights campaign group Survival International points out that the fund is falling “far short” of this “aspiration” and “more than 50%” of all the money allocated so far will go through global-north environmental charities, such as WWF and Conservation International, to execute and implement projects in developing countries.

How has private finance contributed to meeting the nature finance target?

Target 19 also refers to “leveraging private finance” and “innovative schemes”, such as biodiversity offsets and credits, that will see an increased push and pushback at COP16. (See Carbon Brief’s in-depth Q&A on biodiversity offsets). 

According to the OECD, private philanthropic flows for biodiversity grew from $501m in 2017 to $932m in 2021 and then decreased to $700m in 2022.

At the same time, private finance flows that have a direct negative impact on nature amount to $5tn a year, according to the State of Finance for Nature report. 

Maelle Pelisson, the advocacy director for Business for Nature, tells Carbon Brief:

“Whilst it’s positive to see a growth in private philanthropies contributing to biodiversity finance, private philanthropy alone is not going to be sufficient to address nature loss…Governments should adopt and implement measures to ensure businesses include the value of nature in short- and long-term decisions, including requirements on disclosure and transition plans.”

The GBFF can receive contributions from private companies, with an expert group set up in June to advise the fund on issues that might arise, such as potential conflicts of interest. However, to date, no private companies have pledged contributions to the fund.

What are developing countries expecting to see at COP16?

Discussions on biodiversity finance in the run up to COP16 have been “difficult” and “polarised”, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin has reported.

In meetings on resource mobilisation earlier this year, developing countries “urged” rich countries to fulfil their commitments to close the biodiversity finance gap.

Many country groups continue to demand a separate global fund for biodiversity finance under the COP, distinct from the GBFF. (See: Carbon Brief’s interactive feature on who wants what at COP16.)

Developing countries have also called for a panel of experts to analyse “all financial flows” and “determine the extent to which parties have met their obligations under target 19”.

Both these suggestions remain heavily bracketed ahead of COP16 in Cali.

Nicky Kingunia Ineet, the DRC negotiator who had raised an objection before the gavel went down in Montreal, tells Carbon Brief:

“The creation of a special fund dedicated to biodiversity remains a sine qua non in the search for solutions linked to the mobilisation of resources in favour of biodiversity. This specific fund should be new, predictable and adequate, under the control and guidance of the COP, and accountable to it. The existing mechanism is provisional [and unfortunately] has not mobilised [the] resources as hoped.”

“Developed country parties should provide the necessary financial resources to developing countries to enable them to meet the additional costs of implementing the [CBD] and the GBF. This is wholly insufficient.”

Sarah Colenbrander, co-author of the report and ODI’s director of climate and sustainability, tells Carbon Brief:

“The US, Japan, Spain and Canada pride themselves on their countries’ natural beauty and their fantastic national parks, but these big economies continue to drop the ball on international biodiversity finance.”

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DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Trump vs world

TILTING AT ‘WINDMILLS’: At the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Donald Trump was quoted by Reuters as saying – falsely – that China makes almost all of the world’s “windmills”, but he had not “been able to find any windfarms in China”, calling China’s buyers “stupid”. The newswire added that China “defended its wind power development” at Davos, with spokesperson Guo Jiakun saying the country’s efforts to tackle climate change and promote renewable energy in the world are “obvious to all”.

SPEECH FACTCHECKED: The Guardian factchecked Trump’s speech, noting China has more wind capacity than any other country, with 40% of global wind generation in 2024 in China. See Carbon Brief’s chart on this topic, posted on BlueSky by Dr Simon Evans.

GREENLAND GRAB: Trump “abruptly stepped back” from threats to seize Greenland with the use of force or leveraging tariffs, downplaying the dispute as a “small ask” for a “piece of ice”, reported Reuters. The Washington Post noted that, while Trump calls climate change “a hoax”, Greenland’s described value is partly due to Arctic environmental shifts opening up new sea routes. French president Macron slammed the White House’s “new colonial approach”, emphasising that climate and energy security remain European “top priorities”, according to BusinessGreen.

Around the world

  • EU MILESTONE: For the first time, wind and solar generated more electricity than fossil fuels in the EU last year, reported Reuters. Wind and solar generated 30% of the EU’s electricity in 2025, just above 29% from plants running on coal, gas and oil, according to data from the thinktank Ember covered by the newswire.
  • WARM HOMES: The UK government announced a £15bn plan for rolling out low-carbon technology in homes, such as rooftop solar and heat pumps. Carbon Brief’s newly published analysis has all the details. 
  • BIG THAW: Braving weather delays that nearly “derail[ed] their mission”, scientists finally set up camp on Antarctica’s thawing Thwaites glacier, reported the New York Times. Over the next few weeks, they will deploy equipment to understand “how this gargantuan glacier is being corroded” by warming ocean waters.
  • EVS WELCOME: Germany re-introduced electric vehicle subsidies, open to all manufacturers, including those in China, reported the Financial Times. Tesla and Volvo could be the first to benefit from Canada’s “move to slash import tariffs on made-in-China” EVs, said Bloomberg.
  • SOUTHERN AFRICA FLOODS: The death toll from floods in Mozambique went up to 112, reported the African Press Agency on Thursday. Officials cited the “scale of rainfall” – 250mm in 24 hours – as a key driver, it added. Frontline quoted South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, who linked the crisis to climate change.

$307bn

The amount of drought-related damages worldwide per year – intensified by land degradation, groundwater depletion and climate change – according to a new UN “water bankruptcy” report.


Latest climate research

  • A researcher examined whether the “ultra rich” could and should pay for climate finance | Climatic Change
  • Global deforestation-driven surface warming increased by the “size of Spain” between 1988 and 2016 | One Earth
  • Increasing per-capita meat consumption by just one kilogram a year is “linked” to a nearly 2% increase in embedded deforestation elsewhere | Environmental Research Letters

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Chart showing newspaper editorials criticising renewables overtook those supporting them for the first time in more than a decade

For the first time since monitoring began 15 years ago, there were more UK newspaper editorials published in 2025 opposing climate action than those supporting it, Carbon Brief analysis found. The chart shows the number of editorials arguing for more (blue) and less (red) climate action between 2011-2025. Editorials that took a “balanced” view are not represented in the chart. All 98 editorials opposing climate action were in right-leaning outlets, while nearly all 46 in support were in left-leaning and centrist publications. The trend reveals the scale of the net-zero backlash in the UK’s right-leaning press, highlighting the rapid shift away from a political consensus.

Spotlight

Do the oceans hold hope for international law?

This week, Carbon Brief unpacks what a landmark oceans treaty “entering into force” means and, at a time of backtracking and breach, speaks to experts on the future of international law.

As the world tries to digest the US retreat from international environmental law, historic new protections for the ocean were quietly passed without the US on Saturday.

With little fanfare besides a video message from UN chief Antonio Guterres, a binding UN treaty to protect biodiversity in two-thirds of the Earth’s oceans “entered into force”.

What does the treaty mean and do?

The High Seas Treaty – formally known as the “biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction”, or “BBNJ” agreement – obliges countries to act in the “common heritage of humankind”, setting aside self-interest to protect biodiversity in international waters. (See Carbon Brief’s in-depth explainer on what the treaty means for climate change).

Agreed in 2023, it requires states to undertake rigorous impact assessments to rein in pollution and share benefits from marine genetic resources with coastal communities and countries. States can also propose marine protected areas to help the ocean – and life within it –  become more resilient to “stressors”, such as climate change and ocean acidification.

“It’s a beacon of hope in a very dark place,” Dr Siva Thambisetty, an intellectual property expert at the London School of Economics and an adviser to developing countries at UN environmental negotiations, told Carbon Brief. 

Who has signed the agreement?

Buoyed by a wave of commitments at last year’s UN Oceans conference in France, the High Seas treaty has been signed by 145 states, with 84 nations ratifying it into domestic law.

“The speed at which [BBNJ] went from treaty adoption to entering into force is remarkable for an agreement of its scope and impact,” said Nichola Clark, from the NGO Pew Trusts, when ratification crossed the 60-country threshold for it to enter into force last September.

For a legally binding treaty, two years to enter into force is quick. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol – which the US rejected in 2001 – took eight years.

While many operative parts of the BBNJ underline respect for “national sovereignty”, experts say it applies to an area outside national borders, giving territorial states a reason to get on board, even if it has implications for the rest of the oceans.

What is US involvement with the treaty?

The US is not a party to the BBNJ’s parent Law of the Sea, or a member of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) overseeing deep-sea mining.

This has meant that it cannot bid for permits to scour the ocean floor for critical minerals. China and Russia still lead the world in the number of deep-sea exploration contracts. (See Carbon Brief’s explainer on deep-sea mining).

In April 2025, the Biden administration issued an executive order to “unleash America’s offshore critical minerals and resources”, drawing a warning from the ISA.

This Tuesday, the Trump administration published a new rule to “fast-track deep-sea mining” outside its territorial waters without “environmental oversight”, reported Agence France-Presse

Prof Lavanya Rajamani, an expert in international environmental law at the University of Oxford, told Carbon Brief that, while dealing with US unilateralism and “self-interest” is not new to the environmental movement, the way “in which they’re pursuing that self-interest – this time on their own, without any legal justification” has changed. She continued:

“We have to see this not as a remaking of international law, but as a flagrant breach of international law.”

While this is a “testing moment”, Rajamani believes that other states contending with a “powerful, idiosyncratic and unpredictable actor” are not “giving up on decades of multilateralism…they just asking how they might address this moment without fundamentally destabilising” the international legal order.

What next for the treaty?

Last Friday, China announced its bid to host the BBNJ treaty’s secretariat in Xiamen – “a coastal hub that sits on the Taiwan Strait”, reported the South China Morning Post.

China and Brussels currently vie as the strongest contenders for the seat of global ocean governance, given that Chile made its hosting offer days before the country elected a far-right president.

To Thambisetty, preparatory BBNJ meetings in March can serve as an important “pocket of sanity” in a turbulent world. She concluded:

“The rest of us have to find a way to navigate the international order. We have to work towards better times.”

Watch, read, listen

OWN GOAL: For Backchannel, Zimbabwean climate campaigner Trust Chikodzo called for Total Energies to end its “image laundering” at the Africa Cup of Nations.

MATERIAL WORLD: In a book review for the Baffler, Thea Riofrancos followed the “unexpected genealogy” of the “energy transition” outlined in Jean-Baptiste Fressoz’s More and More and More: An All-Consuming History.

REALTY BITES: Inside Climate News profiled Californian climate policy expert Neil Matouka, who built a plugin to display climate risk data that real-estate site Zillow removed from home listings.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

  • British Antarctic Survey, boating officer | Salary: £31,183. Location: UK and Antarctica
  • National Centre for Climate Research at the Danish Meteorological Institute, climate science leader | Salary: NA. Location: Copenhagen, with possible travel to  Skrydstrup, Karup and Nuuk
  • Mongabay, journalism fellows | Stipend: $500 per month for 6 months. Location: Remote
  • Climate Change Committee, carbon budgets analyst | Salary: £47,007-£51,642. Location: London 

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Q&A: What UK’s ‘warm homes plan’ means for climate change and energy bills

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The UK government has released its long-awaited “warm homes plan”, detailing support to help people install electric heat pumps, rooftop solar panels and insulation in their homes.

It says up to 5m households could benefit from £15bn of grants and loans earmarked by the government for these upgrades by 2030.

Electrified heating and energy-efficient homes are vital for the UK’s net-zero goals, but the plan also stresses that these measures will cut people’s bills by “hundreds of pounds” a year.

The plan shifts efforts to tackle fuel poverty away from a “fabric-first” approach that starts with insulation, towards the use of electric technologies to lower bills and emissions.

Much of the funding will support people buying heat pumps, but the government has still significantly scaled back its expectations for heat-pump installations in the coming years.

Beyond new funding, there are also new efficiency standards for landlords that could result in nearly 3m rental properties being upgraded over the next four years.

In addition, the government has set out its ambition for scaling up “heat networks”, where many homes and offices are served by communal heating systems.

Carbon Brief has identified the key policies laid out in the warm homes plan, as well as what they mean for the UK’s climate targets and energy bills.

Why do homes matter for UK climate goals?

Buildings are the second-largest source of emissions in the UK, after transport. This is largely due to the gas boilers that keep around 85% of UK homes warm.

Residential buildings produced 52.8m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2024, around 14% of the nation’s total, according to the latest government figures.

Fossil-fuel heating is by far the largest contributor to building emissions. There are roughly 24m gas boilers and 1.4m oil boilers on the island of Great Britain, according to the National Energy System Operator (NESO).

This has left the UK particularly exposed – along with its gas-reliant power system – to the impact of the global energy crisis, which caused gas prices – and energy bills – to soar.

At the same time, the UK’s old housing stock is often described as among the least energy efficient in Europe. A third of UK households live in “poorly insulated homes” and cannot afford to make improvements, according to University College London research.

This situation leads to more energy being wasted, meaning higher bills and more emissions.

Given their contribution to UK emissions, buildings are “expected to be central” in the nation’s near-term climate goals, delivering 20% of the cuts required to achieve the UK’s 2030 target, according to government adviser the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

(Residential buildings account for roughly 70% of the emissions in the buildings sector, with the rest coming from commercial and public-sector buildings.)

Over recent years, Conservative and Labour governments have announced various measures to cut emissions from homes, including schemes to support people buying electric heat pumps and retrofitting their homes.

However, implementation has been slow. While heat-pump installations have increased, they are not on track to meet the target set by the previous government of 600,000 a year by 2028.

Meanwhile, successive schemes to help households install loft and wall insulation have been launched and then abandoned, meaning installation rates have been slow.

At the same time, the main government-backed scheme designed to lift homes out of fuel poverty, the “energy company obligation” (ECO), has been mired in controversy over low standards, botched installations and – according to a parliamentary inquiry – even fraud.

(The government announced at the latest budget that it was scrapping ECO.)

The CCC noted in its most recent progress report to parliament that “falling behind on buildings decarbonisation will have severe implications for longer-term decarbonisation”.

What is the warm homes plan?

The warm homes plan was part of the Labour party’s election-winning manifesto in 2024, sold at the time as a way to “cut bills for families” through insulation, solar and heat pumps, while creating “tens of thousands of good jobs” and lifting “millions out of fuel poverty”.

It replaces ECO, introduces new support for clean technologies and wraps together various other ongoing policies, such as the “boiler upgrade scheme” (BUS) grants for heat pumps.

The warm homes plan was officially announced by the government in November 2024, stating that up to 300,000 households would benefit from home upgrades in the coming year. However, the plan itself was repeatedly delayed.

In the spending review in June 2025, the government confirmed the £13.2bn in funding for the scheme pledged in the Labour manifesto, covering spending between 2025-26 and 2029-30.

The government said this investment would help cut bills by up to £600 per household through efficiency measures and clean technologies such as heat pumps, solar panels and batteries.

After scrapping ECO at the 2025 budget, the treasury earmarked an extra £1.5bn of funding for the warm homes plan over five years. This is less than the £1bn annual budget for ECO, which was funded via energy bills, but is expected to have lower administrative overheads.

In the foreword to the new plan, secretary of state Ed Miliband says that it will deliver the “biggest public investment in home upgrades in British history”. He adds:

“The warm homes plan [will]…cut bills, tackle fuel poverty, create good jobs and get us off the rollercoaster of international fossil fuel markets.”

Miliband argues in his foreword that the plan will “spread the benefits” of technologies such as solar to households that would otherwise be unable to afford them. He writes: “This historic investment will help millions seize the benefits of electrification.” Miliband concludes:

“This is a landmark plan to make the British people better off, secure our energy independence and tackle the climate crisis.”

What is included in the warm homes plan?

The warm homes plan sets out £15bn of investment over the course of the current parliament to drive uptake of low-carbon technologies and upgrade “up to” 5m homes.

A key focus of the plan is energy security and cost savings for UK households.

The government says its plan will “prioritise” investment in electrification measures, such as heat pumps, solar panels and battery storage. This is where most of the funding is targeted.

However, it also includes new energy-efficiency standards to encourage landlords to improve conditions for renters.

Some policies were notable due to their absence, such as the lack of a target to end gas boiler sales. The plan also states that, while it will consult on the use of hydrogen in heating homes, this is “not yet a proven technology” and therefore any future role would be “limited”.

New funding

Technologies such as heat pumps and rooftop solar panels are essential for the UK to achieve its net-zero goals, but they carry significant up-front costs for households. Plans for expanding their uptake therefore rely on government support.

Following the end of ECO in March, the warm homes plan will help fill the gap in funding for energy-efficiency measures that it is expected to leave.

As the chart below shows, a range of new measures under the warm homes plan – including a mix of grants and loans – as well as more funding for existing schemes, leads to an increase in support out to 2030.

Chart showing the warm home plan increases the overall government support for low-carbon heating and energy-efficiency schemes
Annual support for home upgrades, such as heat pumps and insulation, broken down by UK government scheme, £bn. The blue columns indicate new schemes under the warm homes plan. The grey columns include ongoing schemes, such as the boiler upgrade scheme. Figures are adjusted to constant 2025/26 pounds using the latest Treasury GDP deflators. Source: Nesta analysis using UK government data.

One third of the total funding – £5bn in total – is aimed at low-income households, including social housing tenants. This money will be delivered in the form of grants that could cover the full cost of upgrades.

The plan highlights solar panels, batteries and “cost-effective insulation” for the least energy-efficient homes as priority measures for this funding, with a view to lowering bills.

There is also £2.7bn for the existing boiler upgrade scheme, which will see its annual allocation increase gradually from £295m in 2025-26 to £709m in 2029-30.

This is the government’s measure to encourage better-off “able to pay” households to buy heat pumps, with grants of £7,500 towards the cost of replacing a gas or oil-fired boiler. For the first time, there will also be new £2,500 grants from the scheme for air-to-air heat pumps (See: Heat pumps.)

A key new measure in the plan is £2bn for low- and zero-interest consumer loans, to help with the cost of various home upgrades, including solar panels, batteries and heat pumps.

Previous efforts to support home upgrades with loans have not been successful. However, innovation agency Nesta says the government’s new scheme could play a central role, with the potential for households buying heat pumps to save hundreds of pounds a year, compared to purchases made using regular loans.

The remaining funding over the next four years includes money assigned to heat networks and devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which are responsible for their own plans to tackle fuel poverty and household emissions.

Heat pumps

Heat pumps are described in the plan as the “best and cheapest form of electrified heating for the majority of our homes”.

The government’s goal is for heat pumps to “increasingly become the desirable and natural choice” for those replacing old boilers. At the same time, it says that new home standards will ensure that new-build homes have low-carbon heating systems installed by default.

Despite this, the warm homes plan scales back the previous government’s target for heat-pump installations in the coming years, reflecting the relatively slow increase in heat-pump sales. It also does not include a set date to end the sale of gas boilers.

The plan’s central target is for 450,000 heat pumps to be installed annually by 2030, including 200,000 in new-build homes and 250,000 in existing homes.

This is significantly lower than the previous target – originally set in 2021 under Boris Johnson’s Conservative government – to install 600,000 heat pumps annually by 2028.

Meeting that target would have meant installations increasing seven-fold in just four years, between 2024 and 2028. Now, installations only need to increase five-fold in six years.

As the chart below shows, the new target is also considerably lower than the heat-pump installation rate set out in the CCC’s central net-zero pathway. That involved 450,000 installations in existing homes alone by 2030 – excluding new-build properties.

Chart showing the government's new target for heat-pump sales is less ambitious than the previous target and the CCC's net-zero pathway
Annual heat-pump installation targets, including the previous UK government goal, the number set out in the CCC’s “balanced” net-zero pathway and the new target set out in the warm homes plan. Source: UK government, CCC.

Some experts and campaigners questioned how the UK would remain on track for its legally binding climate goals given this scaled-back rate of heat-pump installations.

Additionally, Adam Bell, policy director at the thinktank Stonehaven, writes on LinkedIn that the “headline numbers for heat pump installs do not stack up”.

Heat pumps in existing homes are set to be supported primarily via the boiler upgrade scheme and – according to Bell – there is not enough funding for the 250,000 installations that are planned, despite an increased budget.

The government’s plan relies in part on the up-front costs of heat pump installation “fall[ing] significantly”. According to Bell, it may be that the government will reduce the size of boiler upgrade scheme grants in the future, hoping that costs will fall sufficiently.

Alternatively, the government may rely on driving uptake through its planned low-cost loans and the clean heat market mechanism, which requires heating-system suppliers to sell a growing share of heat pumps.

Rooftop solar

Rooftop solar panels are highlighted in the plan as “central to cutting energy bills”, by allowing households to generate their own electricity to power their homes and sell it back to the grid.

At the same time, rooftop solar is expected to make a “significant contribution” to the government’s target of hitting 45-47 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity by 2030.

As it stands, there is roughly 5.2GW of solar capacity on residential rooftops.

Taken together, the government says the grants and loans set out in the warm homes plan could triple the number of homes with rooftop solar from 1.6m to 4.6m by 2030.

It says that this is “in addition” to homes that decide to install rooftop solar independently.

Efficiency standards

The warm homes plan says that the government will publish its “future homes standard” for new-build properties, alongside necessary regulations, in the first quarter of 2026.

On the same day, the government also published its intention to reform “energy performance certificates” (EPCs), the ratings that are supposed to inform prospective buyers and renters about how much their new homes will cost to keep warm.

The current approach to measuring performance for EPCs is “unreliable” and thought to inadvertently discourage heat pumps. It has faced long-standing calls for reform.

As well as funding low-carbon technologies, the warm homes plan says it is “standing up for renters” with new energy-efficiency standards for privately and socially rented homes.

Currently, private renters – who rely on landlords to invest in home improvements – are the most likely to experience fuel poverty and to live in cold, damp homes.

Landlords will now need to upgrade their properties to meet EPC ratings B and C across two new-style EPC metrics by October 2030. There are “reasonable exemptions” to this rule that will limit the amount landlords have to spend per property to £10,000.

In total, the government expects “up to” 1.6m homes in the private-rental sector to benefit from these improvements and “up to” 1.3m social-rent homes.

These new efficiency standards therefore cover three-fifths of the “up to” 5m homes helped by the plan.

The government also published a separate fuel poverty strategy for England.

Heat networks

The warm homes plan sets out a new target to more than double the amount of heating provided using low-carbon heat networks – up to 7% of England’s heating demand by 2035 and a fifth by 2050.

This involves an injection of £1.1bn for heat networks, including £195m per year out to 2030 via the green heat network fund, as well as “mobilising” the National Wealth Fund.

The plan explains that this will primarily benefit urban centres, noting that heat networks are “well suited” to serving large, multi-occupancy buildings and those with limited space.
Alongside the plan, the government published a series of technical standards for heat networks, including for consumer protection.

What does the warm homes plan mean for energy bills?

The warm homes plan could save households “hundreds on energy bills” for those whose homes are upgraded, according to the UK government.

This is in addition to two changes announced in the budget in 2025, which are expected to cut energy bills for all homes by an average of £150 a year.

This included the decisions to bring ECO to an end when the current programme of work wraps up at the end of the financial year and for the treasury to cover three-quarters of the cost of the “renewables obligation” (RO) for three years from April 2026.

Beyond this, households that take advantage of the measures outlined in the plan can expect their energy bills to fall by varying amounts, the government says.

The warm homes plan includes a number of case studies that detail how upgrades could impact energy bills for a range of households. For example, it notes that a social-rented two-bedroom semi-detached home that got insulation and solar panels could save £350 annually.

An owner-occupier three-bedroom home could save £450 annually if it gets solar panels and a battery through consumer loans offered under the warm homes plan, it adds.

Similar analysis published by Nesta says that a typical household that invests in home upgrades under the plan could save £1,000 a year on its energy bill.

It finds that a household with a heat pump, solar panels and a battery, which uses a solar and “time of use tariff”, could see its annual energy bill fall by as much as £1,000 compared with continuing to use a gas boiler, from around £1,670 per year to £670, as shown in the chart below.

Chart showing that clean electric tech could save households £1,000 a year, compared to gas boilers
Annual energy bill savings (£) for a typical household from April 2026, by using different clean-energy technologies in comparison with a gas boiler. Source: Nesta analysis, using data from Ofgem, the Centre for Net Zero and an Octopus Energy tariff.

Ahead of the plan being published, there were rumours of further “rebalancing” energy bills to bring down the cost of electricity relative to gas. However, this idea failed to come to fruition in the warm homes plan.

This would have involved reducing or removing some or all of the policy costs currently funded via electricity bills, by shifting them onto gas bills or into general taxation.

This would have made it relatively cheaper to use electric technologies such as heat pumps, acting as a further incentive to adopt them.

Nesta highlights that in the absence of further action with regard to policy costs, the electricity-to-gas price ratio is likely to stay at around 4.1 from April 2026.

What has been the reaction to the plan?

Many of the commitments in the warm homes plan were welcomed by a broad range of energy industry experts, union representatives and thinktanks.

Greg Jackson, the founder of Octopus Energy, described it as a “really important step forward”, adding:

“Electrifying homes is the best way to cut bills for good and escape the yoyo of fossil fuel costs.”

Dhara Vyas, chief executive of the trade body Energy UK, said the government’s commitment to spend £15bn on upgrading home heating was “substantial” and would “provide certainty to investors and businesses in the energy market”.

On LinkedIn, Camilla Born, head of the campaign group Electrify Britain, said the plan was a “good step towards backing electrification as the future of Britain, but it must go hand in hand with bringing down the costs of electricity”.

However, right-leaning publications and politicians were critical of the plan, focusing on how a proportion of solar panels sold in the UK are manufactured in China.

According to BBC News, two-thirds (68%) of the solar panels imported to the UK came from China in 2024.

In an analysis of the plan, the Guardian’s environment editor Fiona Harvey and energy correspondent Jillian Ambrose argued that the strategy is “all carrot and no stick”, given that the “longstanding proposal” to ban the installation of gas boilers beyond 2035 has been “quietly dropped”.

Christopher Hammond, chief executive of UK100, a cross-party network of more than 120 local authorities, welcomed the plan, but urged the government to extend it to include public buildings.

The government’s £3.5bn public sector decarbonisation scheme, which aimed to electrify schools, hospitals and council buildings, ended in June 2025 and no replacement has been announced, according to the network.

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China Briefing 22 January 2026: 2026 priorities; EV agreement; How China uses gas

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Tasks for 2026

‘GREEN RESOLVE’: The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) said at its annual national conference that it is “essential” to “maintain strategic resolve” on building a “beautiful China”, reported energy news outlet BJX News. Officials called for “accelerating green transformation” and “strengthening driving forces” for the low-carbon transition in 2026, it added. The meeting also underscored the need for “continued reduction in total emissions of major pollutants”, it said, as well as for “advancing source control through carbon peaking and a low-carbon transition”. The MEE listed seven key tasks for 2026 at the meeting, said business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald, including promoting development of “green productive forces”, focusing on “regional strategies” to build “green development hubs” and “actively responding” to climate change.

CARBON ‘PRESSURE’: China’s carbon emissions reduction strategy will move from the “preparatory stages” into a phase of “substantive” efforts in 2026, reported Shanghai-based news outlet the Paper, with local governments beginning to “feel the pressure” due to facing “formal carbon assessments for the first time” this year. Business news outlet 36Kr said that an “increasing number of industry participants” will have to begin finalising decarbonisation plans this year. The entry into force of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism means China’s steelmakers will face a “critical test of cost, data and compliance”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. Carbon Brief asked several experts, including the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Li Shuo, what energy and climate developments they will be watching in 2026.   

COAL DECLINE: New data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed China’s “mostly coal-based thermal power generation fell in 2025” for the first time in a decade, reported Reuters, to 6,290 terawatt-hours (TWh). The data confirmed earlier analysis for Carbon Brief that “coal power generation fell in both China and India in 2025”, marking the first simultaneous drop in 50 years. Energy news outlet International Energy Net noted that wind generation rose 10% to 1,053TWh and solar by 24% to 1,573TWh. 

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EV agreement reached

‘NORMALISED COMPETITION’?: The EU will remove tariffs on imports of electric vehicles (EV) made in China if the manufacturers follow “guidelines on minimum pricing” issued by the bloc, reported the Associated Press. China’s commerce ministry stated that the new guidelines will “enable Chinese exporters to address the EU’s anti-subsidy case concerning Chinese EVs in a way that is more practical, targeted and consistent with [World Trade Organization] rules”, according to the state-run China Daily. An editorial by the state-supporting Global Times argued that the agreement symbolised a “new phase” in China-EU economic and trade relations in which “normalised competition” is stabilised by a “solid cooperative foundation”. 

SOLAR REBATES: China will “eliminate” export rebates for solar products from April 2026 and phase rebates for batteries out by 2027, said Caixin. Solar news outlet Solar Headlines said that the removal of rebates would “directly test” solar companies’ profitability and “fundamentally reshape the entire industry’s growth logic”. Meanwhile, China imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of “solar-grade polysilicon” from the US and Korea, said state news agency Xinhua

OVERCAPACITY MEETINGS: The Chinese government “warned several producers of polysilicon…about monopoly risks” and cautioned them not to “coordinate on production capacity, sales volume and prices”, said Bloomberg. Reuters and China Daily covered similar government meetings on “mitigat[ing] risks of overcapacity” with the battery and EV industries, respectively. A widely republished article in the state-run Economic Daily said that to counter overcapacity, companies would need to reverse their “misaligned development logic” and shift from competing on “price and scale” to competing on “technology”.

High prices undermined home coal-to-gas heating policy

SWITCHING SHOCK: A video commentary by Xinhua reporter Liu Chang covered “reports of soaring [home] heating costs following coal-to-gas switching [policies] in some rural areas of north China”. Liu added that switching from coal to gas “must lead not only to blue skies, but also to warmth”. Bloomberg said that the “issue isn’t a lack of gas”, but the “result of a complex series of factors including price regulations, global energy shocks and strained local finances”.

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HEATED DEBATE: Discussions of the story in China became a “domestically resonant – and politically awkward – debate”, noted the current affairs newsletter Pekingnology. It translated a report by Chinese outlet Economic Observer that many villagers in Hebei struggled with no access to affordable heating, with some turning back to coal. “Local authorities are steadily advancing energy supply,” People’s Daily said of the issue, noting that gas is “increasingly becoming a vital heating energy source” as part of China’s energy transition. Another People’s Daily article quoted one villager saying: “Coal-to-gas conversion is a beneficial initiative for both the nation and its people…Yet the heating costs are simply too high.”

DEJA-VU: This is not the first time coal-to-gas switching has encountered challenges, according to research by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, with nearby Shanxi province experiencing a similar situation. In Shanxi, a “lack of planning, poor coordination and hasty implementation” led to demand outstripping supply, while some households had their coal-based heating systems removed with no replacement secured. Others were “deterred” from using gas-based systems due to higher prices, it said.

More China news

  • LOFTY WORDS: At Davos, vice-premier He Lifeng reaffirmed commitments to China’s “dual-carbon” goals and called for greater “global cooperation on climate change”, reported Caixin
  • NOT LOOKING: US president Donald Trump, also at Davos, said he was not “able to find any windfarms in China”, adding China sells them to “stupid” consumers, reported Euronews. China installed wind capacity has ranked first globally “for 15 years consecutively”, said a government official, according to CGTN
  • ‘GREEN’ FACTORIES: China issued “new guidelines to promote green [industrial] microgrids” including targets for on-site renewable use, said Xinhua. The country “pledged to advance zero-carbon factory development” from 2026, said another Xinhua report.
  • JET-FUEL MERGER: A merger of oil giant Sinopec with the country’s main jet-fuel producer could “aid the aviation industry’s carbon reduction goals”, reported Yicai Global. However, Caixin noted that the move could “stifl[e] innovation” in the sustainable air fuel sector.
  • NEW TARGETS: Chinese government investment funds will now be evaluated on the “annual carbon reduction rates” achieved by the enterprises or projects they support, reported BJX News.
  • HOLIDAY CATCH-UP: Since the previous edition of China Briefing in December, Beijing released policies on provincial greenhouse gas inventories, the “two new” programme, clean coal benchmarks, corporate climate reporting, “green consumption” and hydrogen carbon credits. The National Energy Administration also held its annual work conference

Spotlight 

Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy

While gas is seen in some countries as an important “bridging” fuel to move away from coal use, rapid electrification, uncompetitiveness and supply concerns have suppressed its share in China’s energy mix.

Carbon Brief explores the current role of gas in China and how this could change in the future. The full article is available on Carbon Brief’s website.

The current share of gas in China’s primary energy demand is small, at around 8-9%

It also comprises 7% of China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fuel combustion, adding 755m tonnes of CO2 in 2023 – twice the total CO2 emissions of the UK. 

Gas consumption is continuing to grow in line with an overall uptick in total energy demand, but has slowed slightly from the 9% average annual rise in gas demand over the past decade – during which time consumption more than doubled.

The state-run oil and gas company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) forecast in 2025 that demand growth for the year may slow further to just over 6%. 

Chinese government officials frequently note that China is “rich in coal” and “short of gas”. Concerns of import dependence underpin China’s focus on coal for energy security.

However, Beijing sees electrification as a “clear energy security strategy” to both decarbonise and “reduce exposure to global fossil fuel markets”, said Michal Meidan, China energy research programme head at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

A dim future?

Beijing initially aimed for gas to displace coal as part of a broader policy to tackle air pollution

Its “blue-sky campaign” helped to accelerate gas use in the industrial and residential sectors. Several cities were mandated to curtail coal usage and switch to gas. 

(January 2026 saw widespread reports of households choosing not to use gas heating installed during this campaign despite freezing temperatures, due to high prices.)

Industry remains the largest gas user in China, with “city gas” second. Power generation is a distant third.

The share of gas in power generation remains at 4%, while wind and solar’s share has soared to 22%, Yu Aiqun, research analyst at the thinktank Global Energy Monitor, told Carbon Brief. She added: 

“With the rapid expansion of renewables and ongoing geopolitical uncertainties, I don’t foresee a bright future for gas power.”

However, gas capacity may still rise from 150 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 to 200GW by 2030. A government report noted that gas will continue to play a “critical role” in “peak shaving”. 

But China’s current gas storage capacity is “insufficient”, according to CNPC, limiting its ability to meet peak-shaving demand. 

Transport and industry

Gas instead may play a bigger role in the displacement of diesel in the transport sector, due to the higher cost competitiveness of LNG – particularly for trucking. 

CNPC forecast that LNG displaced around 28-30m tonnes of diesel in the trucking sector in 2025, accounting for 15% of total diesel demand in China. 

However, gas is not necessarily a better option for heavy-duty, long-haul transportation, due to poorer fuel efficiency compared with electric vehicles. 

In fact, “new-energy vehicles” are displacing both LNG-fueled trucks and diesel heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs). 

Meanwhile, gas could play a “more significant” role in industrial decarbonisation, Meidan told Carbon Brief, if prices fall substantially.

Growth in gas demand has been decelerating in some industries, but China may adopt policies more favourable to gas, she added.

An energy transition roadmap developed by a Chinese government thinktank found gas will only begin to play a greater role than coal in China by 2050 at the earliest.

Both will be significantly less important than clean-energy sources at that point.

This spotlight was written by freelance climate journalist Karen Teo for Carbon Brief.

Watch, read, listen

EV OUTLOOK: Tu Le, managing director of consultancy Sino Auto Insights, spoke on the High Capacity podcast about his outlook for China’s EV industry in 2026.

‘RUNAWAY TRAIN’: John Hopkins professor Jeremy Wallace argued in Wired that China’s strength in cleantech is due to a “runaway train of competition” that “no one – least of all [a monolithic ‘China’] – knows how to deal with”.

‘DIRTIEST AND GREENEST’: China’s energy engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative was simultaneously the “dirtiest and greenest” it has ever been in 2025, according to a new report by the Green Finance & Development Center.

INDUSTRY VOICE: Zhong Baoshen, chairman of solar manufacturer LONGi, spoke with Xinhua about how innovation, “supporting the strongest performers”, standards-setting and self-regulation could alleviate overcapacity in the industry.


$574bn

The amount of money State Grid, China’s main grid operator, plans to invest between 2026-30, according to Jiemian. The outlet adds that much of this investment will “support the development and transmission of clean energy” from large-scale clean-energy bases and hydropower plants.


New science 

  • The combination of long-term climate change and extremes in rainfall and heat have contributed to an increase in winter wheat yield of 1% in Xinjiang province between 1989-2023 | Climate Dynamics
  • More than 70% of the “observed changes” in temperature extremes in China over 1901-2020 are “attributed to greenhouse gas forcing” | Environmental Research Letters

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

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