Wealthy nations have committed to providing billions of dollars of “climate finance” to developing countries, as part of the global effort to tackle climate change.
At the COP29 climate summit, nations must decide on a new global goal to replace the existing target of $100bn each year.
Delivering this money is widely viewed as important for helping vulnerable nations in the global south and maintaining trust between countries in UN climate talks.
Yet, for decades, climate finance has been plagued by accusations of exaggerated numbers, poor transparency and money going to “questionable” places. Much of this stems from a lack of consensus on what counts as “climate finance”.
Most climate finance comes from the aid budgets of a handful of developed states, including western Europe, the US and Japan. Governments use their own criteria to assess “climate finance”, often prompting criticism from civil society groups and developing countries.
Most climate finance goes towards legitimate causes. However, analysis of the available data reveals examples of countries reporting funds going to, say, fossil fuels and airports. Some donors report finance that may never be spent and others hand out loans that, ultimately, see them making a profit.
These activities are all allowed under the UN climate finance system.
As countries gather to negotiate a new climate-finance target at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, Carbon Brief – in no particular order – explores six of the issues that make climate finance such a “wild west”.
- There is no agreed definition of what counts as ‘climate finance’
- Climate-finance accounting is not consistent or transparent
- Some climate finance is not helping to tackle climate change
- Reliance on loans ‘overstates’ climate finance flows
- Countries are reporting money that may never get spent
- Climate finance is used to boost donors’ economic interests
1. There is no agreed definition of what counts as ‘climate finance’
There is no universal agreement on what should, or should not, count towards the international “climate finance” provided by developed countries to developing countries.
Unofficial definitions, including those of the UN Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), broadly agree that climate finance should support activities that cut emissions or help adapt to climate change.
As for the types of finance that should count, nations decided that the $100bn target would cover “a wide variety of sources”, including public money, support via multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investment spurred by public spending.
However, the kinds of activities and finance streams falling into these broad categories are open to interpretation. In practice, governments of developed countries use their own methodologies and set their own rules when reporting climate finance.
Developed countries also pledged to provide climate finance that is “new and additional” – a term often taken to mean extra funding on top of other aid programmes. However, this framing is contested and, in practice, much of the reported climate finance comes from existing development budgets.
Prof Romain Weikmans, an international climate-finance researcher at the Free University of Brussels, tells Carbon Brief that developed countries have “diverging understandings on what should count as climate finance and on how to count it”. He adds that reporting requirements negotiated at the UN “allow countries to remain vague”.
Many expert analyses have concluded that self-reporting by governments, facing political pressure to act on climate change, contributes to an “overestimation” of total climate finance.
While it was widely reported that, based on OECD data, developed countries met the $100bn target two years late in 2022, Weikmans says the lack of a universal definition “makes it impossible to assess whether the $100bn has been met or not”.
The chart below shows how different assumptions about “climate finance” by key financial organisations lead to divergent estimates of how much has been provided.
Igor Shishlov, head of climate finance at Perspectives Climate Group, tells Carbon Brief that the lack of clarity contributes to an “erosion of trust” in climate negotiations between developed and developing countries.
These tensions have existed since the start of UN climate negotiations in the 1990s. An attempt by COP presidencies in 2015 to “reassure” nations about progress towards the $100bn goal with a special OECD report ended up sparking more disputes.
(A response at the time from the Indian Ministry of Finance – reflected in the chart above – estimated that climate finance was 26 times smaller than the OECD estimate. This was based on money that had been paid out, rather than pledged, from climate funds deemed “new and additional”.)
Efforts since then to agree on a definition have failed. Joe Thwaites, a senior advocate on international climate finance at NRDC, tells Carbon Brief that both developed and developing countries contribute to this deadlock:
“Developed countries oppose a definition that would restrict climate finance to certain financial instruments, while petrostates oppose a definition that would exclude counting funding for fossil-fuel projects as climate finance.”
As countries negotiate the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) for climate finance at COP29, observers say it is unlikely that nations will make significant progress on a comprehensive definition.
2. Climate-finance accounting is not consistent or transparent
The systems for climate-finance accounting have been described as full of “inconsistencies” and “discrepancies”, as well as “prone to huge overestimations”.
Joseph Kraus, senior policy director at the ONE Campaign, which has attempted its own assessment of climate finance based on available data, tells Carbon Brief:
“Climate finance accounting is like the wild west: Every climate finance provider makes its own rules about what to count. Predictably, that makes it virtually impossible to get accurate numbers.”
Governments report their climate-finance contributions to three major international bodies: the OECD; the UNFCCC; and, in the case of EU member states, the European Commission.
Most climate finance is drawn from developed countries’ aid budgets and they register their bilateral contributions in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Officials then mark projects as being related to climate mitigation or adaptation.
This “Rio marker system” was implemented in 1998 to assess whether aid projects align with the three “Rio Conventions” on climate change, biodiversity and desertification.
The tags were never meant to define the amount of “climate finance” counted under the UN system. They have effectively filled the gap left by the lack of official guidance.
Most developed countries use the data submitted to the OECD CRS to guide what they report as “official” climate finance in reports to the UNFCCC. Only a handful, including the UK and the US, assess projects on a more case-by-case basis.
Governments use the Rio Markers to calculate climate finance in different ways. Most say they count 100% of the projects where climate has been marked as a “principal” objective towards their UNFCCC totals.
Projects where climate is deemed “significant”, implying a partial focus on climate, vary a lot more. Countries state that they report between 30% and 50% of these projects as climate finance.
Analysts have warned that the blanket application of fixed percentages is arbitrary and can lead to figures being inflated. They also note that, in practice, UNFCCC and OECD figures are difficult to compare and do not always match up in the ways countries report them.
The figures for bilateral climate finance that developed countries report to the UNFCCC are used as the basis for the OECD’s annual reports of progress towards the $100bn goal. They are combined with the OECD’s figures for MDBs, multilateral funds and the private sector.
(These are generally cited as the definitive figures for $100bn tracking, although they are contested. The OECD does not provide a breakdown of contributors to the target and its reports are released two years in arrears, making real-time scrutiny difficult.)
While the OECD screens projects reported in its system, it has no power to amend those that have been marked “incorrectly”. Analysis by Development Initiatives of climate-related aid projects found countries, such as France, Japan and Australia, frequently tagged projects that “deviated” from OECD guidance – those that include fossil fuels, for example.
Independent audits in Denmark, the Netherlands and the EU have all found significant evidence of “climate” projects being mislabelled, or their relevance overstated.
Reflecting on the wider state of climate-finance accounting, Thwaites tells Carbon Brief:
“I think understanding of climate finance is getting better, both through improvements in official reporting and through greater scrutiny from journalists and civil society. But as those third-party audits have shown, there is much room for improvement.”
All of this is further complicated by the lack of transparency from governments, when reporting their official climate-finance contributions to the UNFCCC. The lack of detail in submissions makes it difficult to assess the relevance of each project for tackling climate change.
For example, NGO FragDenStaat has documented its difficulties evaluating the German government’s claim that its climate finance reached a “record level” in 2022.
Poor transparency makes it difficult for those in developing countries as well. Turkish banks have received millions of dollars in climate finance from Germany and France, but there is little information provided either by the banks or the donors on how it is used.
“Citizens have no access to any information about these public funds,” Özgür Gürbüz, campaign director of the Turkish NGO Ekosfer, tells Carbon Brief.
Sehr Raheja, a programme officer specialising in climate finance at the Centre for Science and Environment in India, tells Carbon Brief:
“Implications…include the inability to clearly hold actors accountable, or even first understand the complete reality of the situation of climate finance for developing countries.”
Such scrutiny is important. The UK has traditionally been viewed as one of the more rigorous climate-finance reporters, but the government loosened its accounting system in 2023 to bring it more in line with those of less strict donors.
In doing so, an independent audit found that the UK added an extra £1.7bn ($2.2bn) to its projected climate finance spending without contributing any new funds, as the chart below shows.
3. Some climate finance is not helping to tackle climate change
Climate-finance databases contain details of tens of thousands of projects operating in developing countries around the world.
Most of these projects have clear links to tackling climate change. They might, for example, support solar power projects in Kenya, the construction of a train line in India, or improving the climate resilience of drought-prone farms in Guatemala.
However, among them are aid projects that may bring benefits to the target countries, but have little or no relevance for tackling climate change. Some could even undermine such efforts, by supporting fossil fuels and carbon-intensive sectors.
Stacy-ann Robinson, a climate-adaptation finance researcher at Emory University in the US state of Georgia, tells Carbon Brief that some climate finance “has been going to questionable places to support objectives that are clearly not related to…reducing vulnerability or increasing resilience”.
Some assessments indicate that “inaccurately” categorised climate projects are relatively common among the largest donors, notably Japan and France. NGOs have also identified many “troubling and high-emitting projects” reported as climate finance by MDBs.
Over the years, researchers and journalists have unearthed climate finance being used to, for example, buy uniforms for park rangers, support anti-terrorism programmes and fund luxury hotels.
However, the overall lack of transparency makes it difficult to ascertain exactly how much money from these “questionable” projects is feeding into the official totals reported to the OECD.
An investigation by Reuters in 2023 uncovered $3bn of finance reported to the UNFCCC that had gone towards “programmes that do little or nothing to ease the effects of climate change”. However, Reuters noted that its review only covered around 10% of countries’ submissions.
Carbon Brief has identified at least $6.5bn of finance attributed to projects involving coal, oil and gas that has been tagged as climate-related in the OECD’s climate-related aid database, over the decade from 2012-2021. If countries have followed their own guidelines for reporting climate finance, much of this money will have been reported to the UNFCCC.
Japan is frequently cited for labelling fossil-fuel finance as climate finance, including billions of dollars for coal- and gas-fired power plants in places such as Bangladesh and Indonesia.
However, Carbon Brief’s assessment of the data reveals that some European countries have also been reporting smaller amounts of fossil fuel-related “climate finance”.
For example, Sweden counted around €5m for a gas-fired power plant in Mozambique between 2012 and 2015, while Germany supported a gas power plant in the Ivory Coast in 2022. In both cases, the governments have confirmed to Carbon Brief that projects marked in the OECD registry were also reported to the UNFCCC.
Defenders of fossil-fuel finance argue that developing countries need investment in cleaner or more efficient fossil-fuel infrastructure – and that this does, in fact, reduce emissions. Others argue that these funds simply should not be labelled as climate-related.
Another example of questionable climate finance comes from the French development finance institution Proparco, which provided a €20m loan to Cabo Verde Airports in 2023, a subsidiary of French construction company Vinci Group.
This project was too recent to have been officially reported to the UNFCCC. However, Proparco has reported that 20% of its financing for the project would lead to “climate co-benefits”, such as “renewable energy investments, the installation of LED lighting and the replacement of air-conditioning systems”.
At the same time, Vinci Group says its other goal is to help Cabo Verde boost tourism through increased traffic at its airports. The company has celebrated “record passenger numbers” at its Cabo Verde airports, where traffic increased by 17% year-on-year in August thanks to rising passenger flows from western Europe.
4. Reliance on loans ‘overstates’ climate finance flows
Most climate finance is delivered as loans to developing countries and their institutions. This is one of the most contentious issues in international climate-finance reporting.
More than half of the bilateral finance committed by wealthy countries – and around three-quarters of the investments by MDBs – comes in the form of loans, as shown by the red bars in the figure below.
In fact, the nations that consistently rank among the largest climate-finance providers – Japan, France and the US – all provide the majority of their climate finance as loans.
Loans have to be paid back, leading to climate finance returning to contributor countries as profits, through repayments plus interest. This has led to accusations by civil society groups that developed countries “overstate” their climate finance by leaning heavily on loans.
Public climate-finance institutions generally offer loans at lower-than-market “concessional” rates, or else with longer repayment periods.
However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that at least $18bn of official climate finance reported by developed countries between 2015 and 2020 – roughly 10% of the total – was “non-concessional”, as the chart below shows. (While less desirable than loans officially described as “concessional”, these public institution loans are still generally offered at better-than-market rates.)
The reliance on loans is especially controversial amid the debt crisis facing many developing countries.
The world’s least-developed countries and small-island developing states collectively spent twice as much repaying debts in 2022 as they received in climate finance, according to analysis by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
There has been considerable pressure from civil society, researchers, developing countries and even UN climate chief Simon Stiell to increase the “concessionality” of climate finance.
NGOs, such as Oxfam, argue that climate-related loans should be reported as “grant equivalents”, rather than at face value. This is a measure of how much the developed-country government is subsidising the loan.
Since 2018, development aid reported in the OECD’s database has been expressed in grant equivalents in order to better communicate the “financial effort” being made by donors.
However, when the OECD reports progress towards the $100bn climate-finance goal, drawing from developed countries’ reports to the UNFCCC, it still uses face-value figures for loans. This is one of the key reasons that developing countries have disputed these figures.
Oxfam releases an annual report that drastically downgrades the OECD figures, primarily by using grant equivalent values. Rather than exceeding the $100bn goal in 2022, the NGO argues that developed countries’ true financial effort only amounted to around $28-35bn that year.
From 2024, countries will be able to start reporting loans in grant-equivalent amounts to the UNFCCC in the newly introduced “biennial transparency reports” (BTRs) that all nations must file under the Paris Agreement. However, they are not required to do so, meaning it is unlikely that an “official” total for grant-equivalent loans will be available.
5. Countries are reporting money that may never get spent
Climate finance only has an impact when it is provided – or “disbursed” – to people and institutions who can use the money.
Yet some countries, including France, Germany and Denmark, choose not to report the amount of climate finance they have actually provided to developing countries.
Instead, they record the amount they have “committed”, or else a mix of committed and provided sums. These numbers feed into the totals reported by national governments and they count towards the $100bn target, even if the money has not left the donor country.
The OECD defines a commitment as a “firm written obligation by a government or official agency”. Over time, the amount of money provided should match the amount committed.
But between a nation committing money and handing it out, all sorts of things can change, as Mattias Söderberg, global climate lead at the NGO DanChurchAid, tells Carbon Brief:
“In some situations, projects are interrupted. Changes in the context or in the projects or within partners, for example, when there was a coup in Mali, means that committed funds may not be disbursed as planned.”
Climate projects could also collapse because a new government in the donor country decides to cancel the project for political or financial reasons. Other issues, such as shifting exchange rates, can also lead to divergences between committed and disbursed funds.
The reliance on commitments to meet climate-finance targets has drawn criticism. In its 2015 critique of progress towards the $100bn target, the Indian government said it needed “actual disbursements” rather than “promises, pledges or multi-year commitments about promised sums in the future”.
An analysis by ONE Campaign of climate-related aid reported to the OECD found that, of $616bn committed since 2013, data was missing for $69bn of disbursements and another $228bn had not yet been disbursed. (This data is not a direct reflection of “climate finance” under the UN, but it is a rough proxy.)
Some lag between commitments and payments is to be expected. Countries tend to commit to big climate-finance projects and then gradually pay out the money over time.
However, civil society groups have highlighted “significant differences” between committed and provided sums.
In recent years, EU member states have had to start reporting both commitments and disbursements. The chart below shows the sizable gap between the money Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy pledge and the amount they provide.
(It is worth noting that there is significant variability. Sweden sometimes provides more finance than it commits, whereas, in two years, France did not report disbursements at all.)
Identifying climate-finance projects that have completely failed to pay out is difficult. Governments are not obliged to report to the UNFCCC when they have provided finance and neither do they have to update the record to reflect any cancellations or changes.
Reuters identified three French climate projects between 2016-2018 – collectively worth half a billion dollars – that had been cancelled. This equates to 4% of France’s climate finance over this period.
“Commitments look better, so more effort is put into reporting them than into tracking actual disbursements,” Kraus from ONE Campaign tells Carbon Brief.
Civil society groups argue that all governments should start reporting disbursements to reduce the risk of “over-reporting”.
6. Climate finance is used to boost donors’ economic interests
Developed nations provide climate finance in a variety of different ways.
In projects that involve building infrastructure, such as windfarms and train lines, companies must be enlisted to work on the engineering and construction. Often, donor governments will work with firms based in their own countries to carry out climate projects.
The French Development Agency (AFD) has reported that the majority of its aid is entrusted to projects involving at least one French “economic actor”, resulting in significant economic benefits for the country.
Meanwhile, one-third of Japanese climate loans are given with the condition that Japanese companies are hired to work on the project, according to Reuters analysis of OECD data.
Stacy-ann Robinson of Emory University notes that this is not a “black-and-white” issue, as sometimes a company from the donor nation will be best placed to carry out the project. However, she notes that it has implications for capacity building in developing countries.
France has committed billions of dollars towards rail infrastructure in developing countries. Given France’s global leadership in the sector, a significant share of these projects have been implemented by French companies.
Project-level data about which companies are awarded contracts is not reported to the UNFCCC. However, one climate-finance project identified by Carbon Brief involves €230m worth of loans provided by AFD for an express regional train in the Senegalese capital, Dakar. This was co-funded with an extra €1bn from development banks.
While the project has clear benefits for the decarbonisation of transport in Dakar, it also helped several French companies expand their activities in the region.
These include Eiffage, which built the infrastructure; Systra, which provided engineering consultancy services; Thales and Engie, which together won a €225m project to design and build the electricity infrastructure for the train; and Alstom, which supplied trains.
Reflecting on this issue, Robinson tells Carbon Brief:
“Perhaps we need regulations around the conditionalities associated with [climate] finance that would reduce the possibility of only French companies, for example, being able to work on these climate-finance projects.”
Another way climate finance might benefit donor nations is through projects that involve hiring consultants and other experts based domestically. One paper notes how such projects can result in money “flowing back to developed countries”.
Previous Carbon Brief analysis found that one-tenth of the climate funds disbursed by the UK between 2010 and 2023 had gone to private consultancies, largely based in the UK.
This article was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe. Carbon Brief worked with journalists based in France, Germany, Sweden and Turkey, and they provided input on how different countries have been providing international climate finance.
The post COP29: Six key reasons why international climate finance is a ‘wild west’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
COP29: Six key reasons why international climate finance is a ‘wild west’
Climate Change
Looking Ahead to a Deepening Affordability Crisis, an Election and the Threat of an AI Investment Bubble
Seven experts weigh in on what they expect in 2026.
U.S. energy markets and policy are heading toward the equivalent of a multicar pileup in 2026.
Climate Change
DeBriefed 9 January 2026: US to exit global climate treaty; Venezuelan oil ‘uncertainty’; ‘Hardest truth’ for Africa’s energy transition
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
US to pull out from UNFCC, IPCC
CLIMATE RETREAT: The Trump administration announced its intention to withdraw the US from the world’s climate treaty, CNN reported. The move to leave the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in addition to 65 other international organisations, was announced via a White House memorandum that states these bodies “no longer serve American interests”, the outlet added. The New York Times explained that the UNFCCC “counts all of the other nations of the world as members” and described the move as cementing “US isolation from the rest of the world when it comes to fighting climate change”.
MAJOR IMPACT: The Associated Press listed all the organisations that the US is exiting, including other climate-related bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The exit also means the withdrawal of US funding from these bodies, noted the Washington Post. Bloomberg said these climate actions are likely to “significantly limit the global influence of those entities”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth Q&A on what Trump’s move means for global climate action.
Oil prices fall after Venezuela operation
UNCERTAIN GLUT: Global oil prices fell slightly this week “after the US operation to seize Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro created uncertainty over the future of the world’s largest crude reserves”, reported the Financial Times. The South American country produces less than 1% of global oil output, but it holds about 17% of the world’s proven crude reserves, giving it the potential to significantly increase global supply, the publication added.
TRUMP DEMANDS: Meanwhile, Trump said Venezuela “will be turning over” 30-50m barrels of oil to the US, which will be worth around $2.8bn (£2.1bn), reported BBC News. The broadcaster added that Trump claims this oil will be sold at market price and used to “benefit the people of Venezuela and the US”. The announcement “came with few details”, but “marked a significant step up for the US government as it seeks to extend its economic influence in Venezuela and beyond”, said Bloomberg.
Around the world
- MONSOON RAIN: At least 16 people have been killed in flash floods “triggered by torrential rain” in Indonesia, reported the Associated Press.
- BUSHFIRES: Much of Australia is engulfed in an extreme heatwave, said the Guardian. In Victoria, three people are missing amid “out of control” bushfires, reported Reuters.
- TAXING EMISSIONS: The EU’s landmark carbon border levy, known as “CBAM”, came into force on 1 January, despite “fierce opposition” from trading partners and European industry, according to the Financial Times.
- GREEN CONSUMPTION: China’s Ministry of Commerce and eight other government departments released an action plan to accelerate the country’s “green transition of consumption and support high-quality development”, reported Xinhua.
- ACTIVIST ARRESTED: Prominent Indian climate activist Harjeet Singh was arrested following a raid on his home, reported Newslaundry. Federal forces have accused Singh of “misusing foreign funds to influence government policies”, a suggestion that Singh rejected as “baseless, biased and misleading”, said the outlet.
- YOUR FEEDBACK: Please let us know what you thought of Carbon Brief’s coverage last year by completing our annual reader survey. Ten respondents will be chosen at random to receive a CB laptop sticker.
47%
The share of the UK’s electricity supplied by renewables in 2025, more than any other source, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Latest climate research
- Deforestation due to the mining of “energy transition minerals” is a “major, but overlooked source of emissions in global energy transition” | Nature Climate Change
- Up to three million people living in the Sudd wetland region of South Sudan are currently at risk of being exposed to flooding | Journal of Flood Risk Management
- In China, the emissions intensity of goods purchased online has dropped by one-third since 2000, while the emissions intensity of goods purchased in stores has tripled over that time | One Earth
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
The US, which has announced plans to withdraw from the UNFCCC, is more responsible for climate change than any other country or group in history, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The chart above shows the cumulative historical emissions of countries since the advent of the industrial era in 1850.
Spotlight
How to think about Africa’s just energy transition
African nations are striving to boost their energy security, while also addressing climate change concerns such as flood risks and extreme heat.
This week, Carbon Brief speaks to the deputy Africa director of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, Ibrahima Aidara, on what a just energy transition means for the continent.
Carbon Brief: When African leaders talk about a “just energy transition”, what are they getting right? And what are they still avoiding?
Ibrahima Aidara: African leaders are right to insist that development and climate action must go together. Unlike high-income countries, Africa’s emissions are extremely low – less than 4% of global CO2 emissions – despite housing nearly 18% of the world’s population. Leaders are rightly emphasising universal energy access, industrialisation and job creation as non-negotiable elements of a just transition.
They are also correct to push back against a narrow narrative that treats Africa only as a supplier of raw materials for the global green economy. Initiatives such as the African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy show a growing recognition that value addition, regional integration and industrial policy must sit at the heart of the transition.
However, there are still important blind spots. First, the distributional impacts within countries are often avoided. Communities living near mines, power infrastructure or fossil-fuel assets frequently bear environmental and social costs without sharing in the benefits. For example, cobalt-producing communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or lithium-affected communities in Zimbabwe and Ghana, still face displacement, inadequate compensation, pollution and weak consultation.
Second, governance gaps are sometimes downplayed. A just transition requires strong institutions (policies and regulatory), transparency and accountability. Without these, climate finance, mineral booms or energy investments risk reinforcing corruption and inequality.
Finally, leaders often avoid addressing the issue of who pays for the transition. Domestic budgets are already stretched, yet international climate finance – especially for adaptation, energy access and mineral governance – remains far below commitments. Justice cannot be achieved if African countries are asked to self-finance a global public good.
CB: Do African countries still have a legitimate case for developing new oil and gas projects, or has the energy transition fundamentally changed what ‘development’ looks like?
IA: The energy transition has fundamentally changed what development looks like and, with it, how African countries should approach oil and gas. On the one hand, more than 600 million Africans lack access to electricity and clean cooking remains out of reach for nearly one billion people. In countries such as Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania, gas has been framed to expand power generation, reduce reliance on biomass and support industrial growth. For some contexts, limited and well-governed gas development can play a transitional role, particularly for domestic use.
On the other hand, the energy transition has dramatically altered the risks. Global demand uncertainty means new oil and gas projects risk becoming stranded assets. Financing is shrinking, with many development banks and private lenders exiting fossil fuels. Also, opportunity costs are rising; every dollar locked into long-lived fossil infrastructure is a dollar not invested in renewables, grids, storage or clean industry.
Crucially, development today is no longer just about exporting fuels. It is about building resilient, diversified economies. Countries such as Morocco and Kenya show that renewable energy, green industry and regional power trade can support growth without deepening fossil dependence.
So, the question is no longer whether African countries can develop new oil and gas projects, but whether doing so supports long-term development, domestic energy access and fiscal stability in a transitioning world – or whether it risks locking countries into an extractive model that benefits few and exposes countries to future shocks.
CB: What is the hardest truth about Africa’s energy transition that policymakers and international partners are still unwilling to confront?
IA: For me, the hardest truth is this: Africa cannot deliver a just energy transition on unfair global terms. Despite all the rhetoric, global rules still limit Africa’s policy space. Trade and investment agreements restrict local content, industrial policy and value-addition strategies. Climate finance remains fragmented and insufficient. And mineral supply chains are governed largely by consumer-country priorities, not producer-country development needs.
Another uncomfortable truth is that not every “green” investment is automatically just. Without strong safeguards, renewable energy projects and mineral extraction can repeat the same harms as fossil fuels: displacement, exclusion and environmental damage.
Finally, there is a reluctance to admit that speed alone is not success. A rushed transition that ignores governance, equity and institutions will fail politically and socially, and, ultimately, undermine climate goals.
If Africa’s transition is to succeed, international partners must accept African leadership, African priorities and African definitions of development, even when that challenges existing power dynamics in global energy and mineral markets.
Watch, read, listen
CRISIS INFLAMED: In the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo, columnist Marcelo Leite looked into the climate impact of extracting more oil from Venezuela.
BEYOND TALK: Two Harvard scholars argued in Climate Home News for COP presidencies to focus less on climate policy and more on global politics.
EU LEVIES: A video explainer from the Hindu unpacked what the EU’s carbon border tax means for India and global trade.
Coming up
- 10-12 January: 16th session of the IRENA Assembly, Abu Dhabi
- 13-15 January: Energy Security and Green Infrastructure Week, London
- 13-15 January: The World Future Energy Summit, Abu Dhabi
- 15 January: Uganda general elections
Pick of the jobs
- WRI Polsky Energy Center, global director | Salary: around £185,000. Location: Washington DC; the Hague, Netherlands; New Delhi, Mumbai, or Bengaluru, India; or London
- UK government Advanced Research and Invention Agency, strategic communications director – future proofing our climate and weather | Salary: £115,000. Location: London
- The Wildlife Trusts, head of climate and international policy | Salary: £50,000. Location: London
- Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, senior manager for climate | Salary: Unknown. Location: London, UK
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 9 January 2026: US to exit global climate treaty; Venezuelan oil ‘uncertainty’; ‘Hardest truth’ for Africa’s energy transition appeared first on Carbon Brief.
When people discuss climate change, most envision melting glaciers, smoke-filled skies from wildfires, or hurricanes ravaging coastlines. However, another crisis is unfolding in Canada’s North, one that is quieter but just as perilous: the melting of permafrost.
Permafrost is ground that has remained frozen for at least two years, though in many places, it has been frozen for thousands of years. It is a mix of soil, rock, and ice, and it covers almost half of Canada’s landmass, particularly in the Arctic. Think of it like the Earth’s natural deep freezer. Inside it are ancient plants, animal remains, and vast amounts of carbon that have been trapped and locked away for millennia.
As long as the permafrost stays frozen, those gases remain contained. But now, as temperatures rise and the Arctic warms nearly four times faster than the global average, that freezer door is swinging wide open.
Why the Arctic Matters to Everyone
It might be tempting to think of the Arctic as far away, remote, untouched, or disconnected from daily life in southern Canada. But the reality is that what happens in the Arctic affects everyone. Permafrost contains almost twice as much carbon as is currently in the Earth’s atmosphere. When it melts, that carbon escapes in the form of carbon dioxide and methane, two of the most potent greenhouse gases.
This creates a dangerous cycle: warmer air melts permafrost, which releases greenhouse gases, and those gases in turn contribute to even greater warming of the Earth. Scientists refer to this as a “feedback loop.” If large amounts of permafrost thaw, the gases released could overwhelm even the strongest climate policies, making it almost impossible to slow global warming.
The ripple effects are already visible. Melting permafrost worsens heatwaves in Ontario, intensifies wildfires in Alberta and British Columbia, and fuels stronger Atlantic storms. Rising global temperatures also bring increased insurance premiums, higher food prices, and strained infrastructure due to new climate extremes. The Arctic may be far north, but it is the beating heart of global climate stability.
Impacts Close to Home in Canada
For northern communities, the impacts of melting permafrost are immediate and deeply personal. Buildings, schools, and homes that were once stable on frozen foundations are cracking and sinking. Road’s twist and buckle, airstrips become unsafe, and pipelines leak as the ground beneath them shifts. This is not just inconvenient; it is life-threatening, as these systems provide access to food, medical care, and basic supplies in places already cut off from southern infrastructure.
The hamlet of Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories, sits on the edge of the Arctic Ocean. As the permafrost beneath it thaws, the coastline is collapsing at an alarming rate of several meters each year. Entire homes have already been moved inland, and Elders warn that parts of the community may disappear into the sea within a generation. For residents, this is not just about losing land but losing ancestral ties to a place that has always been home.
In Inuvik, Northwest Territories, traditional underground ice cellars, once reliable food storage systems for generations, are collapsing into the permafrost. Families now face soaring costs to ship in groceries; undermining food security and cultural practices tied to country food.
Even the transportation routes that connect the North to the South are threatened. In the Yukon, the Dempster Highway, Canada’s only all-season road to the Arctic coast, is buckling as thawing permafrost destabilizes its foundation. Engineers are racing to repair roads that were never designed for melting ground, costing governments tens of millions of dollars each year.
And the South is not spared. The carbon released from permafrost melt contributes to the greenhouse gases driving climate extremes across Canada, including hotter summers in Toronto, devastating wildfires in Kelowna, severe flooding along the St. Lawrence, and worsening droughts on the Prairies. What melts in the North shapes life everywhere else.
Why Permafrost is Sacred in Indigenous Worldviews
For Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, permafrost is not just frozen soil; it is a living part of their homeland and identity. Inuit, First Nations, and Métis Peoples have lived in relationship with frozen ground for thousands of years. The permafrost preserves sacred sites, traditional travel routes, and hunting lands. It has long been a source of stability, shaping the balance of ecosystems and making possible the cultural practices that sustain communities.
For Inuit in particular, permafrost has always been a trusted partner in food security. Ice cellars dug into the ground kept caribou, seal, fish, and whale meat fresh throughout the year. This practice is not only efficient and sustainable but also deeply cultural, tying families to cycles of harvest and sharing. As the permafrost melts and these cellars collapse, Inuit food systems are being disrupted. Families must rely more heavily on expensive store-bought food, which undermines both health and cultural sovereignty.
The thaw also threatens sacred spaces. Burial grounds are being disturbed, rivers and lakes are shifting, and the plants and animals that communities depend on are disappearing. In Indigenous worldviews, the land is kin alive and relational. When the permafrost melts, it signals not just an environmental crisis but a breaking of relationships that have been nurtured since time immemorial.
The Human Face of Melting Permafrost
The impacts of permafrost melt cannot be measured solely in terms of carbon emissions or financial costs. They must also be seen in the daily lives of the people who call the North home. In some communities, houses tilt and become uninhabitable, forcing residents to relocate, which disrupts family life, education, and mental health. In others, health centres and schools need constant repair, straining already limited budgets.
Travel across the land, once a predictable and safe experience, is now risky. Snowmobiles break through thinning ice. Trails flood or erode unexpectedly. Hunters face danger simply by trying to continue practices that have sustained their people for millennia.
For many Indigenous families, this is not only about the loss of infrastructure but also the loss of identity. When permafrost thaws, so do the practices tied to it: storing food, travelling safely, caring for burial sites, and teaching youth how to live in balance with the land. These changes erode culture, language, and ways of knowing that are inseparable from place.
Why the World Should Pay Attention
The melting of permafrost is not just a northern problem it is a global alarm bell. Scientists estimate that if even a fraction of the carbon stored in permafrost is released, it could equal the emissions from decades of current human activities. This is enough to derail international climate targets and lock the planet into a state of runaway warming.
This matters for everyone. Rising seas will not stop at Canada’s borders; they will flood coastal cities around the globe. Droughts and crop failures will disrupt food supplies and drive-up prices worldwide. Heatwaves will claim more lives in cities already struggling to keep cool. Economic costs will skyrocket, from insurance payouts to rebuilding disaster-hit communities. If the permafrost continues to thaw unchecked, the climate shocks of the past decade will look mild compared to what lies ahead.
But beyond the science, there is also a moral responsibility. The Arctic has contributed the least to climate change yet is suffering some of its most significant impacts. Indigenous communities, which have lived sustainably for generations, are now bearing the brunt of global emissions. For the world to ignore this crisis is to accept an injustice that will echo through history.
The Arctic is often referred to as the “canary in the coal mine” for climate change, but it is more than a warning system; it is a driver of global stability. If we lose the permafrost, we risk losing the fight against climate change altogether. Paying attention to what is happening in the Arctic is not optional. It is a test of whether humanity can listen, learn, and act before it is too late.
Moving Forward: Responsibility and Action
Addressing permafrost melt means tackling climate change at its root: cutting greenhouse gas emissions and transitioning to renewable energy. Canada must lead in reducing its dependence on oil and gas while investing in clean energy and climate-resilient infrastructure. But technical fixes alone are not enough. Indigenous-led monitoring, adaptation, and governance must be supported and prioritized.
In Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, Indigenous guardians and community researchers are already combining traditional knowledge with Western science to track permafrost thaw, monitor wildlife, and pilot new forms of housing built for unstable ground. These projects demonstrate that solutions are most effective when they originate from the individuals most closely connected to the land.
For families in southern Canada, the issue may seem distant. However, the truth is that every decision matters. The energy we use, the food we waste, and the products we buy all contribute to the warming that melts permafrost. By reducing consumption, supporting Indigenous-led initiatives, and advocating for robust climate policies, households far from the Arctic can still play a role in protecting it.
The permafrost is melting. It is reshaping the Arctic, altering Canada, and posing a threat to global climate stability. However, it also offers us a choice: to continue down a path of denial, or to act guided by science, led by Indigenous knowledge, and rooted in care for the generations to come.
Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock
Image Credit : Alin Gavriliuc, Unsplash
The post Melting Ground: Why Permafrost Matters for Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.
Melting Ground: Why Permafrost Matters for Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples
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