The UK’s new Labour government must urgently reinstate the net-zero plans shelved by its predecessor in order to “limit the damage” caused by Conservative policy rollbacks, according to official advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC).
In its latest annual progress report, the CCC issues some frank words about the “confusing and inconsistent” behaviour of the previous government.
The Conservatives only brought in “credible” policies to cover one-third of the emissions cuts required to hit the UK’s 2030 climate target, the committee finds.
Despite being “insufficient”, the CCC notes that this is a slight improvement on last year. Since then, a requirement for carmakers to sell electric models and a deal to help decarbonise heavy industry both boosted the credibility of the UK’s climate strategy, it says.
Nevertheless, the committee criticises former prime minister Rishi Sunak’s decision to roll back key net-zero policies, notably delaying bans on the sale of new gas boilers and non-electric cars. It says that, contrary to his claims, there was “no evidence” the delays would save people money.
The committee points to a general need to scale up emissions cuts across the economy. It says almost none of the UK government efforts to scale up low-carbon technologies or invest in nature-based solutions are on track.
With this in mind, the progress report lays out a selection of “priority” actions that the new Labour government should take to “make up lost ground” so the UK can achieve its climate goals.
- New government
- Policy gap
- Road transport
- Buildings
- Industry
- Fossil fuels and hydrogen
- Electricity
- Agriculture and land use
- Aviation and shipping
- CO2 removal
- Waste and F-gases
- Adaptation
New government
A lot has changed in UK climate politics since the CCC’s last annual progress report was published in June 2023.
Earlier this month, Labour won a landslide election victory ending 14 years of Conservative rule. The party triumphed with a manifesto full of climate-related policies, including a pledge to decarbonise the nation’s electricity supplies by 2030.
Under the Conservatives, the CCC had issued a series of progress reports in which it warned, again and again, that the UK was not on track to meet its future climate goals.
Rather than heeding these warnings, the government led by Sunak announced a rollback of net-zero policies last September, citing “unacceptable costs” for British people. This included delaying the phaseout of both gas boilers and petrol and diesel cars.
The CCC’s latest report acknowledges some positive progress made under Sunak’s leadership. However, it is also quite critical of the outgoing Conservative government, which it says “undermined” the government’s own climate efforts with “confusing and inconsistent messaging and actions”. The report states:
“[The previous government] claimed to be acting in the long-term interests of the country, but there was no evidence backing the claim that dialling back ambition would reduce costs to citizens.”
The new report was prepared before the election, but it says the new government must “act fast to hit the country’s commitments”. It highlights the reinstatement of the weakened net-zero policies as a priority, noting that “damage can be limited”, if the government does so “quickly”.
Interim CCC chair Prof Piers Forster told journalists in a briefing that the new Labour government, which has hired former CCC chief executive Chris Stark to lead its clean power by 2030 “Mission Control”, has already made some progress. He said:
“They’ve done some quite good things in their first 10 days…They have concentrated their announcements on decarbonising energy.”
However, to achieve the UK’s broader climate goals, he added that the new government would “have to go much wider than energy”, with efforts to cut emissions “right across the economy”.
In the coming months, the Labour government must produce a new net-zero strategy, following a second successful legal challenge, which concluded that the existing UK plan was not credible.
It is also obliged to produce a new international climate pledge (nationally determined contribution, NDC) under the Paris Agreement, laying out the UK’s ambition for cutting emissions out to 2035.
The government will also have to legislate in 2025 for the seventh carbon budget, covering 2038-2042, following advice from the CCC due early next year. The CCC describes the seventh carbon budget period as a “stepping stone” on the path to net-zero by 2050.
(See Carbon Brief’s “Interactive: Labour government’s in-tray for climate change, energy and nature”.)
Policy gap
UK greenhouse gas emissions have been falling steadily for years, largely driven by the phaseout of coal and the growth of renewable power. Last year was no exception, the CCC says – confirming Carbon Brief analysis published in March.
The nation’s emissions dropped by 5.4% from 415m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2022 to 393MtCO2e in 2023, excluding emissions from international aviation and shipping.
This marked an increase in the rate of emissions cuts, resulting predominantly from a fall in gas demand that “may in part reflect continuing high gas prices”, as well as a return to normal levels of imports of clean electricity from overseas.
The UK also comfortably achieved its third carbon budget, which ran for the period 2018 to 2022, the CCC confirms. It notes that, rather than due to deliberate climate policy, this can partly be attributed to the UK’s “lower-than-expected GDP”, which, in turn, is linked to the economic impact of Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic.
However, for years the CCC has been warning of a looming gap between the government’s net-zero policies and its future emissions targets.
Only one third of the emissions reductions required to achieve the UK’s 2030 NDC goal under the Paris Agreement of cutting emissions 68% by 2030 are covered by plans the CCC deems “credible”.
There is an even larger credibility gap on the sixth carbon budget for 2033-2037, with only a quarter of the cuts needed covered by “credible” policies.
The chart below shows the distance between these credible policies (dark blue) and the “delivery pathway” that the government has set out for achieving its net-zero target (red).
Policies with “some” (light blue) or “significant” risk (purple) close part of the gap to getting on track, but around one fifth of the emissions cuts needed are either covered by plans that are “completely insufficient” or have no plans in place at all.
The CCC notes a “slight improvement” in credible policies, which only covered a quarter of the 2030 emissions cuts last year. This is due primarily to the introduction of the zero-emission vehicle mandate and a deal for the electrification of heavy industry.
This is illustrated in the figure below, which shows the change in expected emissions in 2030 based only on “credible” policies. The dots on the left show what the CCC expected in its 2023 progress report, while those on the right show its latest estimates.
While the committee now expects emissions from road transport and industry to be slightly lower, the outlook for some sectors – notably buildings – has worsened following the Conservatives’ rollback of net-zero policies.
One of the ways in which the committee monitors government progress towards net-zero is with 28 “key indicators”. Of the 22 that have a fixed benchmark or target, only five are currently on track, including a reduction in distances driven by cars and a drop in battery prices.
None of the CCC’s 12 indicators for the uptake of low-carbon technologies and nature-based solutions are classed as “on track”, except for the expansion of public electric vehicle charging stations.
The CCC also set out 27 specific “priority recommendations” in last year’s progress report for the previous government to implement.
It says only two of these recommendations have seen “good progress” over the past year and 12 have seen no progress at all. Nine of the priorities where no progress was seen were the responsibility of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), which oversees most of the policies in question.
Progress was also “too slow” in the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the CCC notes, with limited headway on their priority recommendations.
While there are “almost” enough credible policies in place to achieve the upcoming fourth carbon budget, between 2023 and 2027, the CCC warns that this should not lead to complacency.
Both the fourth and fifth budgets are relatively unambitious because they were set before the UK had a net-zero target, when the goal was an 80% cut in emissions by 2050. Both must be overachieved in order to remain on a “sensible path” to net-zero, it says.
The emissions drop in 2023 of 22.3MtCO2e was much higher than the average annual emissions cut seen in the seven years prior to this, which was 13.8 MtCO2e each year. The CCC notes that “a similar pace of reduction will need to be maintained throughout the rest of the decade” in order to meet future climate targets.
However, while emissions cuts to date have been dominated by the electricity system, other sectors will need to start contributing in the coming years.
As the chart below shows, three quarters of the emissions cuts over the next three carbon budgets are expected to come from transport, buildings and other sectors.
The CCC sets out various “priority actions” across the report in order to “make up lost ground” and get the UK back on track for its climate targets.
These include sector-specific targets, described in the sections below. They also include broader goals, such as making planning policy consistent with net-zero, publishing a just transition plan for workers and improving public engagement on low-carbon choices.
Road transport
Despite an increase in the miles driven on UK roads last year, emissions from cars and other road transport fell by 0.9%, according to the progress report.
The CCC says this marks the “first time that the uptake of electric vehicles has had a meaningful impact on the direction of emissions trends”. At least one million UK cars – 2.8% of the total fleet – are now electric.
In addition, the CCC notes that the number of miles being driven in cars remains roughly 6% below pre-Covid levels, indicating a persistent shift in travel patterns following the pandemic. (This is not the case for vans, which are being driven 11% more miles than before.)
Yet transport remains the largest source of emissions in the UK economy. The CCC stresses that emissions from cars, vans and trucks will have to drop four times faster than the 2023 rate each year this decade, in order to meet the country’s climate targets.
The report recommends various policies to achieve this. It welcomes the zero-emission vehicle mandate – which sets targets for car manufacturers to sell a certain share of electric models – as one of the few recent successes of the previous government.
However, it says that electric cars’ market share did not grow in 2023, after years of having exceeded the CCC’s expectations. It also notes that electric van sales have been stalling.
With this in mind, the CCC’s “priorities” for the Labour government includes a reinstatement of the 2030 phaseout date for petrol and diesel cars, after Sunak’s government delayed this to 2035. (Labour pledged to do so in its election manifesto.)
It also says ministers should remove planning barriers for electric vehicle chargers and develop new policies to promote electric van uptake.
The report welcomes the rapid drop in electric-vehicle battery prices, which have fallen far ahead of the CCC’s expectations, as the chart below shows. Their continued decline will play a “key role” in making these vehicles “more cost-effective”, it says.
Finally, the CCC recommends that the UK and devolved governments should publish various plans to guide local authorities in setting out local transport strategies, promote charging infrastructure and reduce the use of cars.
Buildings
In 2023, emissions from buildings fell by 7.2% due to reduced demand for gas. This continued a trend seen in 2022, which was driven in part by mild winter months and high fuel prices leading to behavioural change, such as people using their heating less.
However between 2015 and 2022, the average reduction in emissions in the buildings sector was below the pace needed for the rest of the decade to reach 2030 targets, the CCC says.
The reductions over the last two years were also not driven by sustained programmes to scale up low-carbon technologies, such as heat pumps, which the CCC says will be needed for “deeper decarbonisation of the economy”.
As such, progress must now be sped up, enabled by programmes of support to roll-out key technologies over the next seven years, the CCC says.
In 2023, the number of heat pumps installed only increased by 4% compared to the previous year, up from 58,000 to 60,000.
This indicator is “significantly off track” from the rate the CCC says is required. Installation rates in residential buildings will need to increase tenfold from 2023 levels by 2028 to meet the government’s 600,000 a year target.
However, the committee says there have been some “promising signs” in the first few months of 2024.
Applications under the Boiler Upgrade Scheme – which provides financial support for switching from a gas boiler to a heat pump – rose 62% in the first four months of the year compared to the same period in 2023. This follows a decision by the Conservative government to increase the grants available under the scheme from £5,000 to £7,500.
Meanwhile, measures to improve the energy efficiency of buildings are “moving in the wrong direction”. Rates of home insulation fell in 2023, having already been “significantly off track” in 2022, the CCC states.
Overall, the CCC’s assessment of policies to decarbonise buildings for the 2030 NDC has worsened over the last year. It points to the Conservative government’s decision to delay the phaseout of fossil-fuelled boilers, abandon plans to enforce energy efficiency improvements in rental properties and push back the introduction of the “clean heat market mechanism”.
The committee recommends reversing recent policy rollbacks as a priority. It also says the government should introduce a comprehensive programme to decarbonise public sector buildings, remove planning barriers for heat pumps and make electricity cheaper to support the electrification of home heating. (See: Electricity.)
Broadly, one of the priorities set out by the CCC is rolling out heat pumps faster, supported by strong and credible signals that policies such as the Boiler Upgrade Scheme will continue to be fully funded.
Additionally, the committee says the government should “narrow the scope” of the strategic decision on hydrogen for heat, ahead of its current deadline in 2026. The government has been set to make a decision on what the role of hydrogen will be within the heating system in Britain, however, multiple pilot schemes have now closed bringing the role of the technology into question. Ahead of this decision, the CCC suggests “prohibiting connections to the gas grid for new buildings from 2025”.
Industry
Emissions from industry fell by 8.1% in 2023. These reductions were largely the result of site closures in the chemicals sector, with high gas prices potentially a contributing factor, the CCC says. There was also a reduction in emissions in the iron and steel sector.
As with buildings, the sector’s annual emissions reductions over the previous seven years were not at a sufficient pace to achieve the UK’s 2030 climate target, the report says.
Moreover, last year’s fall was not the result of sustained decarbonisation action. The CCC says emissions cuts will need to speed up, supported not by factory closures but by the rollout of low-carbon technologies.
Between 2008 and 2022, direct industrial and fuel supply emissions fell from 140.8MtCO2e to 87.1MtCO2e, as shown in the chart below. This was “considerably faster” than the CCC expected in its 2008 advice.
This was mostly due to a fall in emissions-intensive industries’ outputs, in particular for steel and chemicals. The overall demand for steel saw a “big drop” from 2008 to 2009, and the sector has shrunk due to a lack of competitiveness internationally.
Additionally the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) contributed significantly to abatement by encouraging further emissions reductions, the CCC notes.
The share of industrial energy use that comes from electricity has stayed relatively consistent, at 26%, since 2020. However, the CCC expects this to increase, as various industries electrify their processes to reduce emissions. As an indicator therefore, industrial electrification is off track, the report adds.
Risks to the decarbonisation of industry include British Steel’s plan to replace its blast furnace in Scunthorpe with two electric arc furnaces (EAF), which is dependent on as-yet unapproved government support.
The CCC notes that the previous government’s £500m deal with Tata Steel to shift production at its Port Talbot site to EAFs has lowered the risk of industry missing its decarbonisation targets.
However, this transition will mean up to 2,800 job losses. The CCC notes that it has “long been clear that the site would need to adapt to remain competitive, for economic reasons largely unrelated to decarbonisation, yet successive governments have failed to develop a long-term economic strategy to develop alternative high-quality employment in the area”.
It further advises that the government should be more proactive and ambitious when it comes to engaging with communities affected by the transition to net-zero. Not doing so risks long-term harm to communities, which could undermine support for net-zero.
The CCC says there has been progress with tightening the cap under the UK’s emissions trading system (UK ETS), which includes industry. However, it notes that the cap is still far looser than in the “central” trajectory in the government’s net-zero strategy. This means that other parts of the economy will need to cut emissions more quickly in order to keep the UK on track overall.
The new UK ETS cap is expected to lead to higher production costs, the CCC notes. While some industries will be protected if the government introduces a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) in 2027 as planned, this “could lead to offshoring in the absence of further supporting policy to develop alternative low-carbon options”, the report notes..
It says priorities for the new Labour government to tackle industry emissions therefore include strengthening the UK ETS to ensure that its price is sufficient to drive decarbonisation and implementing a CBAM effectively to protect against offshoring.
It also says the government should act to make electricity cheaper, develop policies to address barriers to industrial electrification and implement resource efficiency plans.
Fossil fuels and hydrogen
The CCC also weighs in on the question of whether the UK should continue to exploit its domestic fossil fuel resources, including those in the North Sea.
Specifically, it says that UK policy should be aligned with the COP28 deal on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, as well as the guiding principle for international climate action of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. It says:
“As a developed country with a binding commitment to transition to net-zero, the UK should reassess whether further exploration for new sources of fossil fuels is aligned to the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibility and the global stocktake.”
The outgoing Conservative government had argued that domestic fossil fuels bolstered energy security, attempting to make this into a “wedge issue” with the now-ruling Labour Party, which ran on a pledge to end new licensing for North Sea oil and gas extraction.
To drive this point home, the Conservatives had introduced an offshore petroleum licensing bill that would have required the North Sea Transition Authority to run annual licensing rounds for new exploration. (The Conservatives failed to pass the bill before the election.)
In contrast, the CCC report notes that one of the key reasons why UK energy bills have remained so high during and after the global energy crisis is due to the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. This dependence will be reduced in the shift to net-zero, it notes.
The shift to domestic renewables will also bolster energy security, the CCC says:
“British-based renewable energy is the cheapest and fastest way to reduce vulnerability to volatile global fossil fuel markets. The faster we get off fossil fuels, the more secure we become.”
One “welcome” point of progress has been that in February 2024, the UK formally withdrew from the controversial Energy Charter Treaty, which provides protection to companies investing in fossil fuel developments, the CCC notes.
Beyond fossil fuels, the UK government has continued to target a strategic role for hydrogen. It published a hydrogen production delivery roadmap, a transport and storage networks pathway, and a business model for the first hydrogen allocation round in December 2023.
As a priority, the government should also publish a “strategic spatial energy plan” and identify low-regret infrastructure investments, including for hydrogen infrastructure that can proceed now, the committee says.
Electricity
Emissions from the electricity system fell by 22.2% in 2023. This large drop reflects falling gas generation as part of the longer-term rise of renewables, combined with a return to the UK’s normal status as a net electricity importer.
Electricity generation is the only sector to have sustained emissions cuts in line with the 2030 target over multiple years, the CCC notes.
With electrification of the economy a key enabler for wider emissions cuts, one of the CCC’s priority actions for the remainder of 2024 is for the government to make electricity cheaper, by removing policy costs from electricity bills.
This would support industrial electrification, the uptake of electric cars and ensure lower running costs of heat pumps compared to fossil fuel boilers, it says.
Electricity decarbonisation to date has been aided by massive cost reductions for technologies including wind and solar power, the CCC says. It adds that lower costs lay the groundwork for continued rapid uptake of low-carbon technologies.
Indeed, it says that renewable energy will need to be built even faster than it has been to date. Annual installation of offshore wind will need to more than treble, onshore wind more than double and solar increase five-fold between 2023 and 2035.
For example, the UK had 15 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind at the end of 2023 and will need to add more than 5GW every year to reach 50GW by 2030. This is more than three times the rate added over the past three years.
The technology hit a stalling point in 2023, when no offshore wind was contracted in the contracts for difference (CfD) scheme due to failure to respond to supply chain cost increases.
The CCC says it has “some confidence” that contracts coming through under the CfD scheme will lead to capacity increases, “but these are not enough and significant additional capacity beyond this will be required”.
The CCC “welcomes” updates to the next CfD auction, including the 66% increase in the maximum price for offshore wind and an increase in the notional “budget” that includes £800m for the technology
Onshore wind capacity in 2023 was 15GW, however only 0.5GW of new capacity was installed last year. This was considerably below the peak of 1.8GW in 2017.
Total solar capacity was 16GW in 2023. For the UK to achieve the previous government’s ambition of hitting 70GW of capacity by 2035, more than 4GW would need to be installed each year, the CCC notes – more than five times the average amount added over the past three years.
Within its first week, the new Labour government has moved to make the development of renewables easier, including removing the de facto ban on onshore wind in England and approving three major solar farms.
Other key areas of development have been “positive steps” made by the previous government around whole-system strategic planning of the future energy system, the report says.
The CCC calls for rapid decisions to be made following the second consultation on the “review of electricity market arrangements”, which was published in March,.
The government should publish a strategy for the full decarbonisation of electricity by 2035 at the latest, the CCC recommends. (The report was prepared prior to the election. The new Labour government is targeting clean power by 2030.)
This strategy should cover the strategic and policy requirements, milestones and timeline for delivery, as well as contingencies addressing key risks, the CCC suggests.
Additionally, the government should ensure electricity network capacity is growing to meet requirements. This should include fully implementing the “connections action plan” and “transmission acceleration action plan” at pace.
Agriculture and land use
Agriculture and land use are the source of some major gaps in the previous government’s net-zero plans, the CCC states.
Emissions from agriculture have remained virtually unchanged for nearly two decades. Planting trees and restoring peatland could absorb some of the emissions from high-emitting sectors, but efforts to expand these activities have faltered.
The UK has committed to cut its methane emissions 30% from 2020 levels by 2030. In order to do this, the pace of reductions compared to recent years would need to double over this decade.
Cattle and sheep produce around half of the UK’s methane emissions. Given the slow rate of change over recent years, the rate of methane cuts from agriculture would need to increase roughly eightfold in order to meet the UK’s methane target by 2030.
The CCC notes that livestock numbers fell between 2017 and 2020, but since then the trend has remained flat. It notes that there has been a small amount of progress in the promotion of methane-suppressing feed products for livestock.
The committee also points out that the Welsh government has paused its plans to reduce emissions from farming “following substantial resistance”. It warns that any delay to its sustainable farming scheme “could have significant impacts”.
The report says both the UK government and devolved governments should prioritise funding and support to ensure the UK-wide tree planting target of 30,000 hectares per year by the 2024-25 period is met.
It also says there should be a “delivery mechanism” for peatland restoration, which is supposed to reach 32,000 hectares per year by 2026, but is not on track to do so. (The CCC notes that even this target is “significantly less ambitious” than its own recommendation.)
The final priority highlighted for the sector by the CCC is the publication of the long-awaited land-use framework. This plan has been repeatedly delayed, and could help to align the sector with other issues such as using land to build energy infrastructure or adapt to climate change.
Aviation and shipping
Aviation was the only sector that saw a substantial leap in emissions in 2023. They rose by 15.5% as demand “continued to rebound from the pandemic”, and the CCC says there is “a risk” that demand for flights may rise higher than pre-Covid levels next year.
The government’s pathway to net-zero allows for some growth in both aviation and shipping emissions out to 2030. (While domestic journeys are included, international aviation and shipping are not part of the 2030 NDC target. However, they will feature in the UK’s carbon budgets from the sixth period onwards.)
The CCC says more detail of policies for curbing aviation emissions was provided last year – specifically the sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) mandate. However, it says “delivery concerns” mean this sector continues to “attract some risks”.
It notes that the SAF targets the previous government set were “ambitious”, but cautions that the volume of SAFs available to meet this target is “highly uncertain”.
The CCC has frequently highlighted the need to manage demand for flights as well as implementing technological solutions to decarbonise travel. As recent Carbon Brief analysis demonstrates, any emissions cuts from the SAF mandate in the coming years will be entirely wiped out by the expected rise in demand for flights.
In the new report, the committee says a priority for the Labour government should be pausing any new airport expansions until there is a UK-wide “capacity management framework” in place.
This would assess aviation emissions and ensure there is no overall expansion “unless the carbon intensity of aviation is outperforming the government’s emissions reduction pathway”.
Shipping, which accounts for one of the smallest shares of annual emissions, is not highlighted as a priority area for the new government.
CO2 removal
The CCC says the previous Conservative government’s plans to develop technologies that remove CO2 from the atmosphere are “behind schedule”.
This makes the ambition to remove at least 5MtCO2 per year by 2030 – which is required to meet the UK’s NDC target under current plans – “increasingly challenging”, according to the committee.
Moreover, despite the publication of some business models for the sector, all of the government’s plans carry “significant risk”, the CCC warns. This is notable, as the removals sector is expected to contribute 11% of emissions cuts by the end of the sixth carbon budget in 2037.
The key priority the report highlights for the new Labour government is finalising business models for engineered CO2 removals and “opening these to the market to enable projects to get underway”.
A related piece of advice highlighted by the CCC is that the government should publish guidance for businesses on how to use carbon offsets. It says firms should only use them to claim “net-zero” once nearly all their emissions are cut, and “the remaining emissions are neutralised by high-quality permanent removals”.
Waste and F-gases
The CCC says there has been “very little progress” in cutting waste emissions. It highlights insufficient progress in capturing methane from landfills, recycling and composting.
Waste is largely a devolved issue and the CCC makes recommendations to the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland accordingly.
The key priority that the report highlights for the new Labour government for this sector is the need to address rising emissions from waste-to-energy facilities, which have “substantially increased”. It calls for a “moratorium” on new plants until there is a government review of capacity needs and how these facilities align with climate plans.
Fluorinated gases (F-gases), which make up a tiny fraction of UK emission, are subject to steadily declining quotas for importers and producers of the devices that emit them. They are not targeted as a priority in the new report.
Adaptation
The previous Conservative government published its third National Adaptation Plan (NAP3) in 2023, covering the period out to 2028. This is the nation’s statutory plan to ensure the UK is prepared for a warmer world.
It has faced intense criticism from the CCC, and campaigners have taken the government to court, citing the plan’s failure to adequately protect people from climate change.
In its new report, the CCC says NAP3 “lacks the pace and ambition to address growing climate risks which we are already experiencing”. It says the plan needs “clear objectives and targets”, and this should include stronger links with the next spending review.
The report also says the government should reorganise so that adaptation “becomes a fundamental aspect and is embedded in other national policy objectives” across departments. This includes prioritising it in other national priorities, including nature restoration, infrastructure development, economic growth and health.
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CCC: Labour must ‘make up lost ground’ to hit UK climate goals
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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