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The UK will need to almost double the climate finance it gives for nature conservation annually in order to meet one of its flagship international targets, according to Carbon Brief analysis of data released under freedom of information (FOI) rules.

As part of the UK’s pledge to provide £11.6bn of climate aid between 2021 and 2026, the previous Conservative government promised that £3bn of this money would be used to protect nature and, specifically, £1.5bn of that would be for forests.

A series of FOI requests and additional analysis by Carbon Brief reveal that the UK spent an average of around £450m each year on nature for the first three years of the commitment.

This will need to rise to more than £800m a year for the next two years to hit the target, amounting to nearly £1.7bn by 2026.

The new Labour government has made much of the “fiscal constraints” it is facing in office. Years of cuts to the foreign aid budget under the Conservatives have threatened the UK’s climate finance targets.

Senior Labour ministers, including foreign secretary David Lammy in a speech last week, have said they will stick to the £11.6bn goal. However, so far, they have not committed to the sub-goals set by their predecessors. When asked by Carbon Brief, the government did not confirm if the sub-goals would be honoured.

In the FOI responses, the government said it would “consider all spending plans inherited from the last government” as it undertook its spending review, which is set to conclude in spring next year.

Nature and forests

In 2019, the Conservative government led by Boris Johnson committed to spending £11.6bn on climate finance between 2021-22 and 2025-26. This is the UK share of the annual $100bn that developed countries agreed to give to developing countries from 2020.

At the start of 2021, the same government pledged to spend £3bn of the £11.6bn goal on “climate change solutions that protect and restore nature and biodiversity”. It said the money would support various projects, including marine conservation, tackling the illegal timber trade and conserving mangroves.

Later that year, as the UK hosted the COP26 climate summit, the government announced that £1.5bn of its climate finance – half of the £3bn nature target – would specifically support efforts to “halt and reverse deforestation and land degradation”.

This funding was part of the “global forest finance pledge”, which, in turn, was a significant announcement at COP26, where the UK had centred nature as one of its key themes.

These sub-goals have received less attention than the overarching £11.6bn target, which came under pressure during Rishi Sunak’s leadership. Notably, Sunak’s government changed the rules for calculating climate finance, making it easier for the UK to meet its goals.

Nevertheless, the Conservative government had retained its commitment to nature and forests, telling the Environment Audit Committee earlier this year, while still in power, that it “remained steadfast” in its commitment to the forest target.

Scaling up

Three years into the five years covered by its climate finance pledge, the UK has provided £1.34bn of climate finance for nature, of which £590m has gone to forest projects, according to Carbon Brief’s figures.

This means the UK has met around 45% of each sub-target, with only two years remaining to make up the remainder.

To meet these targets, the UK would, therefore, have to accelerate its spending on nature and forests in order to provide the remaining 55% in two years.

As the chart below shows, nature funding has steadily increased since the target was set in 2021 – a trend that would need to continue over the next two years in order to meet the goal.

This is in line with broader spending to meet UK climate finance targets, which tends to be “backloaded”, with more spending towards the end of each five-year period.

The UK provided, on average, £448m of nature finance each year from 2021, and needs to raise this to £828m, on average, in each of the periods 2024-25 and 2025-26 to reach £3bn.

The UK would have to spend around £1.7bn on nature by 2026 to reach its climate finance target
Annual UK climate finance for nature, 2021-22 to 2023-24, and average amount required in the following two years to reach the government target. Source: Data provided by FOI to Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief analysis.

A large chunk of nature funding given to date is money that the government has paid into large international funds, particularly the UN’s Green Climate Fund (GCF).

Reasoning that the GCF supports nature-related activities, the government has been marking 40% of its GCF contributions as nature finance – accounting for around a quarter of the total nature finance over the past three years.

Other big recipients so far include a project working with forest communities in Colombia, efforts to address water scarcity in the Middle East and international initiatives based on “public-private partnerships” and “market reforms” to avert deforestation.

As for forests specifically, climate finance for them has also increased. The UK has provided, on average, £222m each year, and needs to raise this to £417m, on average, in each of the periods 2024-25 and 2025-26 to hit its £1.5bn pledge.

More than £800m of climate finance must be spent on forests to meet the UK goal
Annual UK climate finance for forests, 2021-22 to 2023-24, and average amount required in the following two years to reach the government target. Source: Data provided by FOI to Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief analysis.

These figures are based predominantly on FOI responses from the three major departments responsible for the UK’s overseas climate-related development projects: the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO); the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

Earlier this month, Carbon Brief obtained FOI responses with figures for DESNZ and Defra covering all three years from 2021-22 to 2023-24.

Defra noted that its figures for 2023-24 were “provisional as they have not been finalised”. Separately, DESNZ also provided some additional numbers for payments into international funds that were not included in the original FOI response.

The figures for FCDO 2021-22 and 2022-23 come from another FOI response, provided in March of this year, and not including 2023-24 data. Carbon Brief understands that the figures for FCDO in 2023-24 have not yet been finalised within the department.

The 2023-24 FCDO figures are, therefore, estimates, based on Carbon Brief analysis of all UK-backed climate finance projects provided in another FOI request earlier this year. (Carbon Brief calculated the share of climate finance the government deemed relevant for nature and forests in projects that are known to count towards these sub-goals.)

This means the FCDO figure for 2023-24 will not include any new nature projects that started in that year. Also, in some cases, the share of nature funding from each project may change from year to year, which would affect the final numbers. (It is worth noting that project shares for nature tended to remain very stable between 2021-22 and 2022-23.)

‘Difficult choices’

Senior ministers including net-zero secretary Ed Miliband and foreign secretary David Lammy have said the UK remains committed to the £11.6bn goal under Labour.

In a speech delivered last week at Kew Gardens in London, Lammy emphasised the UK’s role in providing climate aid to developing countries and said “we must unlock much, much more climate and nature finance”.

However, he also said that his government was operating during “times of fiscal constraint” and alluded to the difficulty of achieving the UK’s existing climate finance goals:

“The reality is that the British contribution to this [$100bn climate finance] target was a promise which the Tories casually made, but for which they did not have a plan. In contrast, my focus is on how we can actually deliver that promise, given the dire financial inheritance from the last government. Ahead of the spending review, we’re carefully reviewing our plans to do so.”

Lammy appeared to leave some flexibility for the government by emphasising that climate finance commitments were in the hands of the Treasury. In a response to an audience question, he added:

“Meeting the £11.6bn remains our ambition as we undertake the spending review, and we’ll consider all of those spending plans, and it’s important that I and others in government continue to make the case, as [chancellor] Rachel Reeves makes those difficult choices.”

As part of its FOI requests, Carbon Brief specifically asked if the government intended to retain the nature and forests sub-goals within the broader £11.6bn target. The government response stated:

“Meeting the £11.6bn remains our ambition as we undertake the spending review, which will consider all spending plans inherited from the last government.”

Climate and nature campaigners tell Carbon Brief that they were pleased to see Lammy prioritising international climate action. “It is really encouraging to see the new UK government willing to play a leading role on climate and nature globally,” says Clement Metivier, acting head of international advocacy at WWF-UK.

With nations gathering at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, later this year to discuss a new global climate finance target, Harry Camilleri, a climate diplomacy and geopolitics researcher at E3G, tells Carbon Brief the UK would “lose credibility” if the £11.6bn goal slips:

“⁠Global climate agreements are built on trust. There is an expectation that the new goal will be significantly higher than the current $100bn target. Backtracking on existing commitments, which add up to a fraction of the costs faced by vulnerable countries, will not help.”

The UK’s nature and forest climate funding is also an important part of its contribution to biodiversity finance. This will be high on the agenda at the upcoming biodiversity summit, COP16, in Cali, Colombia, in October, as developed countries have pledged to raise at least $30bn in nature finance a year by 2030.

With this in mind, Alice Jay, international director at the Campaign for Nature, tells Carbon Brief:

“Now we need to see [Lammy] follow up on his words by re-committing to the existing international nature finance pledge to developing countries. We know the FCDO understands the urgency. But does the Treasury? This is the key issue that will decide whether this new UK nature leadership will be credible at the upcoming COP16.”

When asked about the government’s nature finance commitments, an FCDO spokesperson tells Carbon Brief:

“As the foreign secretary set out in his speech at Kew Gardens last week, the climate and nature emergency is a central geopolitical challenge of our age. Tackling the scale of the threat is necessary to achieve clean and secure energy, lower bills and drive growth for the UK, and to preserve the natural world around us.

“We have already begun to turn this ambition into action. The climate and nature crisis will be central to all that the Foreign Office does.”

The post Analysis: UK must spend £1.7bn more on nature by 2026 to meet climate-finance goal appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK must spend £1.7bn more on nature by 2026 to meet climate-finance goal

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When taps run dry in the Caribbean, it’s not enough to blame El Niño

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Amira Odeh Quiñones is a hydrologist and Caribbean organiser for the 350.org climate campaign group

El Niño, likely to be one of the strongest in modern history, has arrived on Caribbean shores.

Drought is slowly creeping up on our islands. But unlike the fiery wildfires ravaging parts of Europe, there’s no smoke signalling the damage being done, no sirens to warn of the danger. Only announcements from public health officials to stay indoors and remain hydrated — as if outdoor workers and farming communities have the luxury to heed such advice.

During El Niño, strong atmospheric winds alter rain patterns and trap heat across the Caribbean. But while we have experienced El Niño many times before, it has become very visible in recent years how climate change is making this natural phenomenon worse.

Across the Greater Antilles, temperatures are soaring past 38°C (100°F), with real-feel indexes reaching a gruelling 43°C in parts of Puerto Rico where I live. Cuba has it worse. Widespread power outages mean that methods for cooling down are unavailable for most of the day, leaving millions of vulnerable people at risk of heat stroke when temperatures hit 38°C.

Santa Marta coalition tested as co-chair Colombia turns back to fossil fuels

During the last strong drought a decade ago, I had water only two days a week in my home. Today, there are many families whose taps are about to run completely dry. Water authorities have already begun strict rationing in some municipalities, with more on the list scheduled for rationing if conditions don’t change.

Water rationing is far more than an inconvenience; it is an immediate health risk. This means thousands of people need to constantly haul heavy buckets up flights of stairs just so they could bathe, cook, stay hydrated – the basics of survival.

Heat causes health problems

Puerto Rico is home to roughly 300,000 elderly residents. Many live alone, isolated and without support. They risk severe physical injury when carrying heavy water containers, and are wont to suffer from silent heat exhaustion in unventilated rooms.

Furthermore, when water shortages force residents to store water in open household containers, it inadvertently creates breeding grounds for Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. Paired with scorching temperatures that tend to shorten the mosquito breeding cycle, the region is facing explosive outbreaks of dengue fever that endanger our most vulnerable: children and the elderly.

The economic fallout is equally devastating. Dry fields mean millions of dollars in lost crops, forcing small agricultural businesses to collapse, needing urgent government relief to survive. Extreme fuel shortages have already paralyzed Cuba’s agricultural sector, cutting food output by 60% – the El Niño dry spell threatens to decimate it.

At sea, warmer ocean waters fuel massive influxes of sargassum seaweed. Rotting sargassum chokes our beaches, destroying the local tourism industry that so many working families rely on. Tangled seaweed also damages nets and boat engines, slashing fish catches and driving up equipment costs for local fishers.

In the south of Puerto Rico, the coastal town of La Parguera is currently witnessing a historic amount of sargassum on its shores. This has halted most of the boating activity in the area, which is the seaside town’s main tourist draw and economic driver.

All over the Caribbean, from town halls to local group gatherings, the story I hear is always the same: constant headaches, lost work hours, failing health, and a sense that quality of life is silently being stolen. The compounding effects of heatwaves, drought, and marine destruction are exhausting our people, our islands.

Climate change to blame

Climate change makes each El Niño year hotter and more damaging. Higher baseline global temperatures increase the energy and moisture available for extreme weather. Latest projections show that El Niño may push the monthly global average temperature past 2°C of warming for the first time in early 2027. In the Caribbean islands, that will not just be breaking records – it’ll be breaking lives.

Recently, I had the opportunity to share a panel with climate scientists behind what is known as the field of “attribution science” – or the science that compares today’s climate conditions to what the Earth’s climate would be like without human activity, particularly burning fossil fuels. They’re unequivocal: it’s no longer a question of whether extreme weather is caused by climate change, it’s just a question of how much.

    Attribution science recently got a boost from the U.S.’ top scientific advisory body. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recognized that researchers’ methods have advanced considerably in recent years, resulting in better assessments on how much extreme weather can be attributed to human-caused climate change. It noted that attribution findings could be relevant in some types of legal cases, including those seeking damages from oil companies for climate impacts.

    This crisis, which is already taking a heavy toll on our communities’ survival, needs real, urgent, and structural action that goes beyond aid. With similar droughts now gripping parts of Asia and Africa, we’re falling into the familiar narrative of treating the looming humanitarian crisis as if no one was to blame, as if it is being caused solely by a natural phenomenon we can’t control.

    It’s not. The world was already on fire before its regular visitor, El Niño, came. While we need humanitarian action, we need climate action too, in order to permanently put out the flames.

    The post When taps run dry in the Caribbean, it’s not enough to blame El Niño appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change?

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    China has released a five-year plan dedicated to addressing climate change.

    The 15th five-year plan for a national response to climate change is the latest in a series to outline in-depth climate and energy targets for the 2026-2030 period.

    These include five-year plans for “building a Beautiful China”, developing a “new-type energy system” and developing renewable energy.

    There are also separate “action plans” for the 2026-2030 period, such as for peaking carbon emissions

    China has pledged to peak its emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060.

    The new plan does not include any major new targets, instead consolidating and reaffirming existing policies.

    Nevertheless, it includes significant signals on key policy areas, such as non-carbon dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gases, global climate governance and carbon markets.

    Below, Carbon Brief examines some of the notable elements in the latest five-year plan and what it reveals about China’s policy direction through to 2030.

    What does the climate plan cover?

    The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) released the plan in late July, in unison with 18 other government departments. These include the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration.

    The document covers a range of topics, including CO2 emissions, other greenhouse gases (non-CO2 GHGs), carbon markets, carbon footprints, climate adaptation and international cooperation on climate change.

    For the first time at the five-year plan level, the plan creates a comprehensive target system covering all areas of climate policy, say officials in a MEE Q&A.

    They describe it as “the main policy instrument” for advancing China’s climate action during 2026-2030.

    China rarely issues high-level multi-year policies dedicated to “responding to climate change”. In 2014, the NDRC published a plan on the topic running through to 2020, but this was not linked to a five-year plan period.

    Qin Yan, principal analyst at ClearBlue Markets, tells Carbon Brief that the plan shows that China’s climate governance has reached “an unprecedented strategic level”.

    She adds that the plan creates an “all-encompassing target system” to support China’s Paris Agreement climate pledges for 2030 and 2035.

    In its 2030 pledge, China aimed to peak emissions “before 2030” and reduce carbon intensity – its emissions per unit of GDP – by more than 65% from 2005 levels.

    Last year, president Xi Jinping personally announced China’s 2035 pledge to cut China’s greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035, while “striving to do better”.

    The five-year plan marks a new phase in China’s climate policy, according to researchers at CIB Research, an economic research body affiliated with the Industrial Bank, whose largest shareholder is the Fujian provincial government.

    Their analysis adds that the plan represents a broad effort to strengthen China’s climate-governance system, implementation mechanisms and underlying capacity.

    Nevertheless, several headline targets and policies in the document simply reiterate already established plans.

    These include:

    • Cutting carbon intensity by 17% across the five years
    • Reducing carbon intensity per product in industries under China’s carbon market by 3%
    • Substituting fossil fuels with renewables
    • Strengthening climate adaptation
    • Supporting the “free flow” of cleantech

    What does the plan say about non-CO2 GHGs?

    The plan also goes into detail on China’s approach to non-CO2 GHGs. This includes reaffirming a target of an emissions “reduction capacity” from these gases totalling 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) by 2030, although the baseline is unclear.

    The target previously appeared in the overarching five-year plan, as well as the plan for building a “Beautiful China”.

    The goal refers to emissions reductions, which can be realised through implementing current non-CO2 emissions reduction policies and projects, says Chen Meian, programme director and senior analyst at the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress (iGDP). 

    She adds that it is “relatively achievable”, with sources including increasing the number of coal-mine methane utilisation projects.

    She points to an MEE explanatory note for a draft methodology under the China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme, China’s voluntary carbon-credit market. Chen says the note suggests that projects using ventilation air methane and coal-mine methane with concentrations below 8% alone could deliver around 20MtCO2e of reduction by 2030.

    The note states that, currently, such projects are estimated to be able to “generate annual emission reductions of approximately 4.5MtCO2e”.

    In addition, Chen says, measures targeting industrial nitrous oxide (N2O) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) could help make up the remainder needed to meet the target.

    According to iGDP analysis of biennial reports submitted by China to the UNFCCC, China emitted around 14,000MtCO2e of GHGs in 2021, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).

    Non-CO2 GHGs accounted for around 2,700MtCO2e, or 19%, of the total, the majority of which was methane, as shown in the figure below.

    Methane is China’s main source of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions by gas, MtCO2e. Stacked bar chart from 2005 to 2021 showing total emissions rising to over 2,700 MtCO2e. Methane consistently accounts for the largest share, followed by Nitrous Oxide and F-gases. Source: iGDP analysis of China’s first Biennial Transparency Report and fourth Biennial Update Report - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
    iGDP analysis of China’s first Biennial Transparency Report and fourth Biennial Update Report.

    China’s plans to curb these super-pollutants in the five-year period include coal-mine methane utilisation projects, end-of-pipe destruction technologies for HFCs and guidance on the use of catalysts to reduce N2O emissions.

    The plan also calls for the recovery and replacement of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in power equipment.

    For Chen, the plan’s focus on SF6 control is particularly noteworthy. She says the gas is “finally receiving policy attention” and that proactive action is “timely and will help avoid future emissions growth” as China’s power system expands.

    What does the plan say about global climate governance?

    One of the plan’s clearest objectives for international cooperation is for China to play a more active role in global climate governance.

    By 2030, it says China should markedly increase its “influence, guiding power, shaping power and moral appeal” in this area.

    It says China’s climate action could also feed into the Global Governance Initiative, a policy initiative aimed at reforming the global governance system.

    China will also aim to “build a new narrative on climate governance”, it adds.

    Prof Thomas Hale, a professor in public policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, writes on LinkedIn that the plan “marks a major rhetorical shift” towards China being increasingly willing to “lead and shape” global climate action.

    Another clear focal point for international cooperation is in carbon markets.

    The plan calls for China to expand the global influence of its carbon market, such as through international rule-setting, cooperation on standards and by hosting the China Carbon Market Conference.

    Qin says China’s more active role in global carbon pricing is already evident in the launch of the open coalition on compliance carbon markets with the EU and Brazil. This coalition is expected to adopt a work plan at the China Carbon Market Conference in September.

    Qin also notes that China “could become the world’s largest [carbon] offset buyer” as its energy transition progresses.

    The country would, therefore, “benefit from helping shape global rules under the Article 6 framework [for carbon trading under the Paris Agreement]”, she adds.

    The post Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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    Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline

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    About a quarter of the countries signed up to the Paris Agreement are still breaching its rules by failing to submit a new national climate plan, 18 months after the February 2025 deadline.

    Forty-five nations had not submitted a plan known as a nationally determined contribution (NDC), according to the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee’s (PAICC) newly-published report of its 7-10 July 2026 meeting. One, Oman, has published it since the meeting.

    Twelve countries ignored the committee’s repeated attempts to find out why they had not yet produced a climate plan, the report said. They will be invited to the committee’s next meeting, from September 1-4, so it can identify the challenges and constraints they face.

    Members of the committee are divided, as they were at their last meeting, on whether to name those countries publicly and will debate the question again in September.

    The PAICC does not have any power to punish governments, as building these powers into the Paris Agreement was thought to be so controversial that it could have stopped some governments from joining, experts have previously told Climate Home News.

    A key requirement of the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement is that governments publish a more ambitious NDC every five years, setting targets to reduce their planet-heating emissions and outlining their policies to adapt to climate change, in order to meet the accord’s goals on limiting global warming and protecting people from its effects.

    The latest set – the third round of plans, with new targets for 2035 – was due in 2025.

    Some medium-sized emitters

    Countries without an updated NDC include Egypt, Vietnam, Argentina and the Phillippines, all of which rank among the world’s 40 largest greenhouse gas emitters. The rest of the countries are smaller, poorer nations, with many in Africa or the Caribbean.

    Some nations have argued that they cannot put together an NDC – which requires a significant amount of work in tracking emissions and consulting on how to curb them across the economy – because of exceptional circumstances. For example, a letter from a Sudanese official to the PAICC committee, seen by Climate Home News, says that the country’s civil war has led to the suspension of its NDC preparation.

      The US and Iran are not signed up to the Paris Agreement, although the US submitted a 2035 NDC under the Biden administration before Donald Trump pulled the US out of the UN climate accords.

      The committee also expressed concern that the UN’s NDC registry continued to label the climate plans of countries that are no longer party to the Paris Agreement as “active”, according to its report. The US submission has since been archived.

      Since the last PAICC meeting in March, ten countries have published NDCs. The committee did not name them but they include India, Algeria, Cameroon and Guyana.

      The post Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline appeared first on Climate Home News.

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