The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 5.7% in 2023 to their lowest level since 1879, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.
The last time UK emissions were this low, Queen Victoria was on the throne, Benjamin Disraeli was prime minister, Mosley Street in Newcastle became the first road in the world with electric lighting and 59 people died in the Tay Bridge disaster in Dundee.
Carbon Brief’s analysis, based on preliminary government energy data, shows emissions fell to just 383m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2023. This is the first time they have dropped below 400MtCO2e since Victorian times.
Other key findings from the analysis include:
The UK’s emissions are now 53% below 1990 levels, while GDP has grown by 82%.
The drop in emissions in 2023 was largely due to an 11% fall in gas demand. This was due to higher electricity imports after the French nuclear fleet recovered, above-average temperatures and weak underlying demand driven by high prices.
Gas demand would have fallen even faster, but for a 15% fall in UK nuclear output.
Coal use fell by 23% in 2023 to its lowest level since the 1730s, as all but one of the UK’s remaining coal-fired power stations closed down.
Transport was the single-largest sector in terms of emissions, followed by buildings industry, agriculture and electricity generation. The electricity sector likely dropped below agriculture for the first time.
While the 23MtCO2e reduction in 2023 was faster than the 14MtCO2e per year average needed to reach net-zero by 2050, it was mostly unrelated to deliberate climate action. The UK will need to address emissions from buildings, transport, industry and agriculture to reach its 2050 target.
The analysis is the latest in a long-running series of annual estimates from Carbon Brief, covering emissions during 2022, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014.
Lowest since 1879
The UK’s territorial greenhouse gas emissions – those that occur within the country’s borders – have now fallen in 25 of the 34 years since 1990.
(Consumption-based emissions, including CO2 embedded in imported goods and services, were increasing until 2007, but have since fallen at a similar rate to territorial emissions.)
Apart from brief rebounds after the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 lockdowns, UK emissions have fallen during every year for the past two decades.
The latest 23MtCO2e (5.7%) reduction in 2023 takes UK emissions down to 383MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief’s new analysis.
This is the lowest since 1879 – outside the 1926 general strike – as shown in the figure below.
UK territorial greenhouse gas emissions, MtCO2e, 1850-2023. Note the impact of general strikes in 1921 and 1926; the miner’s strike of 1984 had a smaller impact. Source: Jones et al. (2023) and Carbon Brief analysis of figures from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).
Having dropped to a then-record low for the modern era of 404MtCO2e during the height of Covid in 2020, UK emissions bounced back in 2021 as the economy reopened.
While emissions declined in 2022, they remained above 2020 levels. In 2023, however, emissions fell below the lows seen during Covid lockdowns, to levels not seen since Victorian times.
Accidental action
The biggest contributor to the drop in UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2023 was an 11% reduction in gas demand, which accounted for around two-thirds of last year’s overall decline. This took the UK’s gas demand to its lowest level since the 1980s.
However, the drop in 2023 was not primarily due to deliberate climate action.
The figure below shows the estimated actual drop in emissions in red, followed by contributions from a series of factors that decreased emissions, in blue, and other factors in grey.
The most significant factor was the UK returning to its long-term position as a net electricity importer in 2023, reducing demand for domestically generated power from gas by more than 20%.
This followed an anomalous year in 2022, when the UK was a net exporter for the first time ever, as a result of widespread outages in the French nuclear fleet.
Lower demand for gas power accounted for more than two-thirds of the fall in gas use overall.
Reflecting both of these factors, there was a 6% drop in domestic demand in 2023, accounting for a fifth of the overall decline in gas consumption. A similar 7% drop in commercial demand for gas accounted for another tenth of the total, with a 5% drop in industrial demand the remainder.
Finally, the figure shows that there was a small reduction in gas demand and associated CO2 emissions as a result of increased wind and solar generation.
Contributions to emissions changes in 2023, MtCO2e. Left to right: Actual emissions reduction in 2023; Reduction due to higher electricity imports; Reduction due to above-average temperatures; Reduction due to lower gas demand; Reduction due to growth in wind and solar; Reduction due to other factors. Source: Carbon Brief analysis.
The UK’s emissions would have fallen even further in 2023 if not for a 15% decline in the output of the nation’s nuclear fleet. This followed the closure in 2022, of the Hunterston B station in Scotland and the Hinkley Point B plant in Somerset, as well as maintenance outages.
The decline in 2023 means UK nuclear output fell to the lowest level since the early 1980s. Following the site closures in 2022, the UK only has five operational nuclear power plants remaining, all but one of which – Sizewell B in Suffolk – are due to close this decade.
Out of coal
After gas, the next-largest driver of falling UK emissions in 2023 was coal, accounting for around 14% of the overall drop in emissions.
The decline of coal use in the UK – for homes, railways, factories and power stations – is a major part of the long-term reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over the past 30 years.
Factors in this long-term decline include controls on domestic coal burning to limit air pollution, the end of steam railways, the shift from coal-based “town gas” to “natural” gas from the North Sea, the deindustrialisation of the 1970s and the “dash for gas” of the 1990s.
More recently, coal demand has dropped precipitously as the rapid build-out of renewable sources of electricity has combined with falling demand and carbon pricing that favours gas.
The figure below shows how UK coal demand surged during the industrial revolution before levelling off through the 20th century, barring general strikes in 1921 and 1926.
Coal demand has been falling steadily since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1956, in response to London’s “great smog” of 1952. In 2023, UK coal demand fell by another 23% to the lowest level since the 1730s, when George II was on the throne and Robert Walpole was prime minister.
Annual demand for coal in the UK 1560-2022, millions of tonnes. Note the impact of general strikes in 1921 and 1926, as well as the miner’s strike of 1984. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from DESNZ and Paul Warde.
The recent reduction of coal demand is largely down to the demise of coal power, which made up around 40% of the UK’s electricity generation as recently as 2012. Coal power output has fallen by 97% over the past decade, accounting for 87% of the fall in UK coal demand overall.
In 2023, only 1% of the UK’s electricity came from coal, with three coal-fired plants closing down: the coal units at Drax in Yorkshire; Kilroot in Northern Ireland; and West Burton A in Lincolnshire.
As of the start of October 2023, only one coal plant remains – the Ratcliffe-on-Soar site in Nottinghamshire. Operator Uniper plans to close Ratcliffe in September 2024, ahead of the government’s deadline to end coal power by October 2024.
Sectoral shifts
The reductions in gas use for power and building heat, as well as the fall in coal use for power, further cemented the transport sector as the largest contributor to UK emissions in 2023.
This is shown in the figure below, which highlights how transport emissions have barely changed over the past several decades as more efficient cars have been offset by increased traffic.
The power sector was the largest contributor to the UK’s emissions until 2014. In 2023, it was likely only the fifth-largest below transport, buildings, industry and – for the first time – also agriculture.
Estimated UK territorial emissions by sector, MtCO2e, 1990-2023. Only the top five sectors are shown. The remaining sectors, making up a combined 45MtCO2e per year, are fuel production, waste and land use, land use change and forestry. Note that sectoral estimates for 2023 are based on limited information including the use of proxies such as fuel duty receipts. Where no relevant proxy information was available, such as for agriculture, emissions are assumed to remain at 2022 levels. As such, there is greater uncertainty attached to these figures than for the other estimates in this analysis. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from DESNZ and HMRC.
As of 2023, transport emissions were only around 10% below 1990 levels and made up nearly a third of the UK’s overall total. There are now more than a million electric vehicles (EVs) on the UK’s road, which will have avoided around 2MtCO2e of annual emissions.
However, the government has also frozen or cut fuel duty every year since 2010, rather than increasing it in line with inflation, adding up to around 20MtCO2e to the UK’s total.
Emissions from buildings – chiefly for heating and cooling – are the second-largest contributor to the UK’s emissions, accounting for around a fifth of the total.
They were around one-third lower than 1990 levels in 2023, with improved insulation and boiler regulations making the UK’s buildings more efficient to heat.
Efficiency improvements dried up around a decade ago and the fall in building emissions since 2021 has been driven by high prices suppressing demand, rather than deliberate policy choices.
Industrial emissions made up an estimated tenth of the UK’s total in 2023, having fallen by two-thirds since 1990 and by a quarter in the past decade.
In common with many other developed economies, the UK shifted from heavy industry towards advanced manufacturing and services from the 1970s onwards. However, industrial energy efficiency improvements and a shift to lower-carbon fuels are also part of the picture.
Agricultural emissions have barely changed for decades, making up just over a tenth of the UK’s total in 2023 and having fallen just 12% since 1990 as livestock herds have shrunk.
There was a small decrease in farm emissions in 2022 as the energy crisis filtered through into surging prices for fertilisers. For the figure above, Carbon Brief assumes the reduced fertiliser use in 2022 continued in 2023, as fertiliser prices only eased in summer 2023.
Decoupling emissions
The drop in UK emissions in 2023 came as the economy flatlined, growing by just 0.4% on 2022 levels. The UK’s emissions are now 53% below 1990 levels while the economy has grown 82%.
This “decoupling” of emissions from economic growth is shown in the figure below. As noted above, this analysis is based on territorial emissions within the UK’s borders.
Consumption-based emissions including imported goods and services were climbing in the early part of this century. However, emissions cuts over the past two decades have been very largely driven by sectors that cannot easily be “outsourced”, particularly power and building heat.
Change since 1990, %, in UK greenhouse gas emissions (red) and GDP adjusted for inflation (blue). Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from DESNZ, the Office for National Statistics and the World Bank.
The UK is now in a mild recession and the economy is only expected to grow by around 1% in 2024. Recent trends in the “emissions intensity” of the UK economy – the emissions per unit of GDP – and weak economic growth suggests that emissions could continue to fall in 2024.
On the other hand, gas and oil prices are easing to pre-crisis levels, while above-average temperatures may not continue for another year. Petrol demand rose by nearly 5% in 2023 as traffic continued to rebound from the pandemic – and jet fuel use similarly climbed by 16%.
Moreover, the one-off impact of the UK returning to net electricity imports has now unwound. As such, further emissions cuts in 2024 are far from guaranteed.
Target practise
While the UK has made rapid progress in cutting its territorial emissions since 1990, it remains only around halfway to reaching its net-zero target for 2050, as the chart figure shows.
Emissions fell by 23MtCO2e in 2023, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis. This is faster than the 14MtCO2e reduction needed every year for the next quarter-century to reach net-zero by 2050.
Annual UK greenhouse gas emissions, MtCO2e, 1990-2050. Historical and estimated emissions are shown by the solid blue line and a steady path to net-zero in 2050 is shown by the red dashed line. Source: DESNZ and Carbon Brief analysis.
However, with only one coal-fired power station remaining and the power sector overall now likely only the fifth-largest contributor to UK emissions, the country will need to start cutting into gas power and looking to other sectors, if it is to continue making progress towards its targets.
This will mean expanding wind and solar capacity to reduce gas use, while retaining gas-fired power stations for periods of low wind and starting to build low-carbon alternatives, such as gas with carbon capture and storage, long-term energy storage or hydrogen-fired turbines.
Emissions from road transport and buildings will be key areas if the UK is to progress, which is why changes to government plans around electric vehicles and heat pumps could be problematic.
Similarly, a government decision to “carry forward” the “surplus” emissions cuts from earlier years – largely due to external events such as Covid – would severely weaken UK targets at a time when continued ambition is needed, to stay on track for medium- and long-term climate goals.
Methodology
The starting point for Carbon Brief’s analysis of UK greenhouse gas emissions is preliminary government estimates of energy use by fuel. These are published quarterly, with the final quarter of each year appearing in figures published at the end of the following February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).
One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which is revised at the end of March each year and often again later on. Emissions data is also subject to revision in light of improvements in data collection and the methodology used, with major revisions in 2021.
The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the comparable energy use and emissions figures, which may differ from those published previously.
Another source of uncertainty is the fact that Carbon Brief’s approach to estimating the annual change in emissions differs from the methodology used for the government’s own provisional estimates. The government has access to more granular data not available for public use.
Carbon Brief’s analysis takes figures on the amount of energy sourced from coal, oil and gas reported in Energy Trends 1.2. These figures are combined with conversion factors for the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, published annually by the UK government. Conversion factors are available for each fuel type, for example, petrol, diesel, gas, coal for electricity generation.
For oil, the analysis also draws on Energy Trends 3.13, which further breaks down demand according to the subtype of oil, for example, petrol, jet fuel and so on. Similarly, for coal, the analysis draws on Energy Trends 2.6, which breaks down solid fuel use by subtype.
Emissions from each fuel are then estimated from the energy use multiplied by the conversion factor, weighted by the relative proportions for each fuel subtype.
For example, the UK uses roughly 50m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the form of oil products, around half of which is from road diesel. So half the total energy use from oil is combined with the conversion factor for road diesel, another one-fifth for petrol and so on.
Energy use from each fossil fuel subtype is mapped onto the appropriate emissions conversion factor. In some cases, there is no direct read-across, in which case the nearest appropriate substitute is used. For example, energy use listed as “bitumen” is mapped to “processed fuel oils – residual oil”. Similarly, solid fuel used by “other conversion industries” is mapped to “petroleum coke”, and “other” solid fuel use is mapped to “coal (domestic)”.
The energy use figures are calculated on an inland consumption basis, meaning they include bunkers consumed in the UK for international transport by air and sea. In contrast, national emissions inventories exclude international aviation and shipping.
The analysis, therefore, estimates and removes the part of oil use that is due to the UK’s share of international aviation. It draws on the UK’s final greenhouse gas emissions inventory, which breaks emissions down by sector and reports the total for domestic aviation.
This domestic emissions figure is compared with the estimated emissions due to jet fuel use overall, based on the appropriate conversion factor. The analysis assumes that domestic aviation’s share of emissions is equivalent to its share of jet fuel energy use.
In addition to estimating CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, Carbon Brief assumes that CO2 emissions from non-fuel sources, such as land-use change and forestry, are the same as a year earlier. Remaining greenhouse gas emissions are assumed to change in line with the latest government energy and emissions projections.
These assumptions are based on the UK government’s own methodology for preliminary greenhouse gas emissions estimates, published in 2019.
Note that the figures in this article are for emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has published detailed comparisons between various different approaches to calculating UK emissions, on a territorial, consumption, environmental accounts or international accounting basis.
The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar number of tonnes as emissions within the UK.
Bioenergy is a significant source of renewable energy in the UK and its climate benefits are disputed. Contrary to public perception, however, only around one quarter of bioenergy is imported.
International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector has a target to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.
Coal power generation fell in both China and India in 2025, the first simultaneous drop in half a century, after each nation added record amounts of clean energy.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that electricity generation from coal in India fell by 3.0% year-on-year (57 terawatt hours, TWh) and in China by 1.6% (58TWh).
The last time both countries registered a drop in coal power output was in 1973.
The fall in 2025 is a sign of things to come, as both countries added a record amount of new clean-power generation last year, which was more than sufficient to meet rising demand.
Both countries now have the preconditions in place for peaking coal-fired power, if China is able to sustain clean-energy growth and India meets its renewable energy targets.
These shifts have international implications, as the power sectors of these two countries drove 93% of the rise in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 2015-2024.
While many challenges remain, the decline in their coal-power output marks a historic moment, which could help lead to a peak in global emissions.
Double drop
The new analysis shows that power generation from coal fell by 1.6% in China and by 3.0% in India in 2025, as non-fossil energy sources grew quickly enough in both countries to cover electricity consumption growth. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Growth in coal-fired power generation in China and India by year, %, 1972-2025. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief. Further details below.
China achieved this feat even as electricity demand growth remained rapid at 5% year-on-year. In India, the drop in coal was due to record clean-energy growth combined with slower demand growth, resulting from mild weather and a longer-term slowdown.
The simultaneous drop for coal power in both countries in 2025 is the first since 1973, when much of the world was rocked by the oil crisis. Both China and India saw weak power demand growth that year, combined with increases in power generation from other sources – hydro and nuclear in the case of India and oil in the case of China.
China’s recent clean-energy generation growth, if sustained, is already sufficient to secure a peak in coal power. Similarly, India’s clean-energy targets, if they are met, will enable a peak in coal before 2030, even if electricity demand growth accelerates again.
In 2025, China will likely have added more than 300 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 100GW of wind power, both clear new records for China and, therefore, for any country ever.
Power generation from solar and wind increased by 450TWh in the first 11 months of the year and nuclear power delivering another 35TWh. This put the growth of non-fossil power generation, excluding hydropower, squarely above the 460TWh increase in demand.
Growth in clean-power generation has kept ahead of demand growth and, as a result, power-sector coal use and CO2 emissions have been falling since early 2024.
Coal use outside the power sector is falling, too, mostly driven by falling output of steel, cement and other construction materials, the largest coal-consuming sectors after power.
In India’s case, the fall in coal-fired power in 2025 was a result of accelerated clean-energy growth, a longer-term slowdown in power demand growth and milder weather, which resulted in a reduction in power demand for air conditioning.
Faster clean-energy growth contributed 44% of the reduction in coal and gas, compared to the trend in 2019-24, while 36% was contributed by milder weather and 20% by slower underlying demand growth. This is the first time that clean-energy growth has played a significant role in driving down India’s coal-fired power generation, as shown below.
Change in power generation in China and India by source and year, terawatt hours 2000-2025. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief. Further details below.
India added 35GW of solar, 6GW wind and 3.5GW hydropower in the first 11 months of 2025, with renewable energy capacity additions picking up 44% year-on-year.
Power generation from non-fossil sources grew 71TWh, led by solar at 33TWh, while total generation increased 21TWh, similarly pushing down power generation from coal and gas.
The increase in clean power is, however, below the average demand growth recorded from 2019 to 2024, at 85TWh per year, as well as below the projection for 2026-30.
This means that clean-energy growth would need to accelerate in order for coal power to see a structural peak and decline in output, rather than a short-term blip.
Meeting the government’s target for 500GW of non-fossil power capacity by 2030, set by India’s prime minister Narendra Modi in 2021, requires just such an acceleration.
Historic moment
While the accelerated clean-energy growth in China and India has upended the outlook for their coal use, locking in declines would depend on meeting a series of challenges.
First, the power grids would need to be operated much more flexibly to accommodate increasing renewable shares. This would mean updating old power market structures – built to serve coal-fired power plants – both in China and India.
Second, both countries have continued to add new coal-fired power capacity. In the short term, this is leading to a fall in capacity utilisation – the number of hours each coal unit is able to operate – as power generation from coal falls.
(Both China and India have been adding new coal-power capacity in response to increases in peak electricity demand. This includes rising demand for air conditioning, in part resulting from extreme heat driven by the historical emissions that have caused climate change.)
If under-construction and permitted coal-power projects are completed, they would increase coal-power capacity by 28% in China and 23% in India. Without marked growth in power generation from coal, the utilisation of this capacity would fall significantly, causing financial distress for generators and adding costs for power users.
In the longer term, new coal-power capacity additions would have to be slowed down substantially and retirements accelerated, to make space for further expansion of clean energy in the power system.
Despite these challenges ahead, the drop in coal power and record increase in clean energy in China and India marks a historic moment.
Power generation in these two countries drove more than 90% of the increase in global CO2 emissions from all sources between 2015-2024 – with 78% from China and 16% from India – making their power sectors the key to peaking global emissions.
About the data
China’s coal-fired power generation until November 2025 is calculated from monthly data on the capacity and utilisation of coal-fired power plants from China Electricity Council (CEC), accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.
For December, year-on-year growth is based on a weekly survey of power generation at China’s coal plants by CEC, with data up to 25 December. This data closely predicts CEC numbers for the full month.
Other power generation and capacity data is derived from CEC and National Bureau of Statistics data, following the methodology of CREA’s monthly snapshot of energy and emissions trends in China.
For India, the analysis uses daily power generation data and monthly capacity data from the Central Electricity Authority, accessed through a dashboard published by government thinktank Niti Aayog.
The role of coal-fired power in China and India in driving global CO2 emissions is calculated from the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Balances until 2023, applying default CO2 emission factors from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
To extend the calculation to 2024, the year-on-year growth of coal-fired power generation in China and India is taken from the sources above, and the growth of global fossil-fuel CO2 emissions was taken from the Energy Institute’s Statistical Review of World Energy.
The time series of coal-fired power generation since 1971, used to establish the fact that the previous time there was a drop in both countries was 1973, was taken from the IEA World Energy Balances. This dataset uses fiscal years ending in March for India. Calendar-year data was available starting from 2000 from Ember’s yearly electricity data.
After the United States announced last week it would withdraw from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), effectively slashing more than a fifth of its core budget, the organisation’s head said it could “manage” the US exit, as top officials argued the energy transition is “unstoppable”.
Speaking to reporters at IRENA’s 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, Director-General Francesco La Camera said the US had yet to formally notify the agency it would be leaving. IRENA’s statute says withdrawal of a member country takes effect at the end of the year in which it is notified.
Until that point, they remain a member with all its rights, including the right to vote, but also “the duty to pay”, La Camera added.
The decision will make the US the only country to leave the UNFCCC, with the UN climate chief calling it a “colossal own goal” that will harm the US economy
The surge in employment linked to clean energy equipment and installation is slowing as large-scale plants and increasing automation require less labour
Even as it faces international condemnation over the Gaza war, Israel is working to boost natural gas exports and offshore exploration to strengthen its strategic and regional ties
On Sunday, IRENA’s member countries – around 170 in total – adopted a budget for the coming two years, which shows the US is expected to contribute 22% of IRENA’s core funding, with its share amounting to nearly $5.7 million for 2026.
La Camera said IRENA is already talking to governments and the private sector to fill the potential financial hole if the US does not deliver on its financial obligations, as has been the case in previous years with the UN climate secretariat and the Green Climate Fund.
“We know that some of these usual donors are considering to put something in our budget – we are also trying to get some money from the companies that are part of our initiatives… and we will see other ways that we can pursue,” he added. “I know that we can manage one way or another.”
During country statements made on Sunday afternoon, which were closed to the media, there had been expectations that China might step up to close the gap, but that did not happen.
The United Arab Emirates, Germany and other European nations are substantial government donors to IRENA, although the agency’s core budget has barely risen since 2018, documents show. That has limited its ability to expand its activities even as demand rises across developing countries and small island states for greater technical and policy support to boost renewables.
La Camera noted that, following the US decision to pull out under Donald Trump, IRENA’s council may need to propose amendments to its approved budget for 2026-2027 ahead of its next meeting in May.
Melford Nicholas, minister of information technologies, utilities and energy for Antigua and Barbuda, who is also a newly elected vice president of IRENA, told Climate Home News the US move would “not be an insignificant development” but Europeans had indicated they could help make up the shortfall.
Clean energy for “opportunity and necessity”
At the opening session of the two-day assembly, La Camera and other top officials affirmed the importance of renewable energy as the best choice for energy and economic security at a time of rising geopolitical tensions driven by fossil fuel interests.
Selwin Hart,special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Climate Action and Just Transition, said the world is clearly changing its energy system to clean sources “not out of idealism, but out of opportunity and necessity”.
He noted that three out of four people live in countries that are net importers of fossil fuels, exposing them to geopolitical shocks, volatile prices and balance of payment pressures.
Examples of this include the rise in gas prices in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2024 led to sanctions.
“The energy transition is taking place… not only based on climate considerations, but based on costs, based on competitiveness and energy security and energy independence,” Hart added. “These are the driving forces now – hardcore economic, hardcore national security [and] strategic reasons.”
In a video message, Annalena Baerbock, president of the UN General Assembly and former foreign minister of Germany, said “we are living in heavy, challenging times” – but despite setbacks and political headwinds, “the march to a renewable energy future has proven unstoppable”.
She added that global renewable capacity has now reached more than 4,400 gigawatts, almost 30 times that of 2015 when the Paris climate agreement was adopted, while a record $2.4 trillion was invested in the energy transition in 2024. “There is no way back,” she added.
However, she and Hart both noted that more needs to be done to support African countries to unlock finance for clean energy, as it lags far behind other regions and receives only around 2% of investment in the sector.
Challenges for small island states
The substantial needs of small island developing states (SIDS) are also front and centre at the IRENA Assembly, where ministers have discussed the challenges of shifting away from costly diesel and other polluting fuels while being exposed to rising climate shocks such as destructive cyclones.
Antigua and Barbuda’s minister Nicholas pointed to the difficulty of gaining insurance for renewable energy facilities as a key barrier in an era when storms can cause huge damage.
This happened in Barbuda in 2017 when Hurricane Irma wiped out a solar plant that was not insured. Governments including the United Arab Emirates and New Zealand helped to rebuild it.
Antigua and Barbuda’s Minister Melford Nicholas speaks at the IRENA 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on January 11, 2026 (Photo: IRENA)
Antigua and Barbuda’s Minister Melford Nicholas speaks at the IRENA 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on January 11, 2026 (Photo: IRENA)
Nicholas said SIDS are still in need of concessional finance, which could “become increasingly challenging for us” in the current international environment.
“It’s an issue, because that retards the speed at which we’re able to get to renewable energy transition,” he added, noting his country is likely to reach an energy mix of around 60% renewables by 2030 rather than the 100% it had aimed for.
Despite the obstacles, ministers from Caribbean countries like St Kitts and Nevis and Dominica showcased examples of planned geothermal plants that will enable them to phase down fossil fuels dramatically.
IRENA’s La Camera said he was optimistic the world would get very close to realising a global goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade, but was still lagging behind on a twin target of doubling energy efficiency by 2030.
To help catalyse a global transition away from fossil fuels, he added that IRENA would work with COP host nations on a roadmap to that end, which they are due to present at the COP31 UN climate summit in Turkey in November, as well as a potential target for electrification consistent with that plan.
Jobs in renewable energy expanded only slightly in 2024 to reach 16.6 million worldwide, new figures show, suggesting that the industry’s ability to create employment is slowing as it matures.
According to an annual report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the number of renewables jobs rose by just 2.3% between 2023 and 2024. This was partly due to Chinese solar manufacturers already producing more components than they could sell, and laying off workers to cut costs.
Other factors included a shift from rooftop solar installations to utility-scale systems in major markets like India and Germany, as well as increasing automation in the sector – a trend that is expected to accelerate with the use of robots, drones and artificial intelligence.
Employment in the sector has risen steadily from 7.3 million in 2012, when the data series began, along with the increase in solar, wind and geothermal energy, hydropower and biofuels around the world. But far fewer new jobs were created in 2024 – 400,000 – compared with 2023, which saw a jump of 2.5 million.
Even as it faces international condemnation over the Gaza war, Israel is working to boost natural gas exports and offshore exploration to strengthen its strategic and regional ties
While Trump’s aim of boosting oil production in Venezuela could worsen climate change, high costs and an oversupplied market might make investors think twice
In a foreword to the report released on Sunday, IRENA Director-General Francesco La Camera and ILO Director-General Gilbert F. Houngbo wrote that the slowdown in the rate of job creation points to “the emergence of a new phase in the energy transition”.
“Growing automation and economies of scale mean that comparatively less human labour is required for each new unit of capacity – although impacts vary across countries, technologies and segments of the renewable energy value chain,” they said.
IRENA currently projects that, with the right policies in place, the renewable energy workforce could expand to 30 million jobs by 2030. But the latest figures – which do not reflect the impact of Donald Trump’s squashing of US renewables incentives in 2025 – indicate reaching that level could be a stretch.
Michael Renner, IRENA’s head of socioeconomics and policy, told Climate Home News on the sidelines of the agency’s assembly in Abu Dhabi that, in the past 10-20 years, the renewable energy sector has been far more labour-intensive than the fossil fuel industry – which has largely been automated – but the difference is starting to narrow.
“I think renewables are still looking favourable [for job creation], and I don’t think that advantage will be lost – but I think it will be less massive, less dramatic,” he added.
Notes:
a) Includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas.
b) Direct jobs only.
c) “Others” includes geothermal energy, concentrated solar power, heat pumps (ground based), municipal and industrial waste,
and ocean energy.
Source: IRENA / Renewable Energy and Jobs
Annual Review 2025
Notes:
a) Includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas.
b) Direct jobs only.
c) “Others” includes geothermal energy, concentrated solar power, heat pumps (ground based), municipal and industrial waste,
and ocean energy.
Source: IRENA / Renewable Energy and Jobs
Annual Review 2025
Geographical imbalances
The world needs to add a huge amount of solar, wind, hydro and geothermalcapacity to meet a global goal of tripling renewable power capacity to reach 11.2 terawatts (TW) by the end of the decade. That will require installing an average of about 1.1 TW each year from 2025 to 2030, which is about double the power added in 2024, IRENA says.
In a statement on the jobs report, La Camera noted that renewable energy deployment is “booming, but the human side of the story is as important as the technological side”.
He pointed to geographical imbalances in the deployment of clean energy and related job creation. Africa has particularly struggled to attract foreign investment in building out renewables, with much of the growth currently concentrated in Asia.
“Countries that are lagging behind in the energy transition must be supported by the international community,” La Camera said. “This is essential not only to meet the goal of tripling renewable power capacity by 2030, but also to ensure that socioeconomic benefits become lived realities for all, helping to shore up popular support for the transition.”
Some countries like Nigeria are trying to boost their solar equipment manufacturing supply chains, with the government saying it plans to ban solar panel imports, and two large assembly plants announced to support public electrification programmes.
China leads on jobs but solar stumbles
In 2024, China was home to nearly half – 44% – of the world’s renewable energy jobs with an estimated 7.3 million. But in that year, employment in its solar photovoltaics (PV) sector actually contracted slightly, as five leading manufacturers cut their workforce.
This was in response to efforts by the Chinese government to curb what it has dubbed “disorderly” competition by reducing excess capacity across the solar PV supply chain, in a bid to boost prices and product quality.
Renewables jobs stayed flat in the European Union in 2024, meanwhile, at 1.8 million jobs, and India and the US saw small rises, accounting for 1.3 million and 1.1 million respectively. Brazil was also a big employer, with 1.4 million jobs, partly thanks to its biofuels industry based on soy and sugarcane.
On the impact of Trump’s efforts to roll back incentives and subsidies for green energy in the US, Renner said it will likely mean fewer new renewable power installations, with the report documenting examples of solar and wind projects that were cancelled or halted in 2025.
He also noted the dampening effects of US tariff hikes on the production of solar panels in Southeast Asia, which has led to job losses in some countries including Thailand, while others such as India have been able to increase their exports to the US thanks to relatively lower taxes on their exports.
Limited opportunities for women and people with disabilities
The report also highlights a lack of progress on increasing women workers in the renewables industry. While higher than in fossil fuels, it has plateaued at about one job in three.
Those jobs are concentrated in administrative roles, which account for 45% of female employment in renewable energy, as well as in technical positions unrelated to science, technology or engineering, such as legal work.
The report calls for greater efforts by companies, education and skills training bodies to open up more opportunities for women in clean energy, as well as for people with disabilities who face high barriers to participating in labour markets across the board, with only three in 10 being employed worldwide.
There are some positive cases where proactive policies have made a difference, such as in India’s electric vehicle industry, which has a relatively high level of women at the management level.
In Brazil, meanwhile, national legislation requires companies with more than 100 employees to reserve 2-5% of jobs for people with disabilities, including those in renewable energy.
And in Spain, energy utility Endesa and municipalities trained over 300 people with intellectual and psycho-social disabilities in tasks like vegetation management and composting at solar energy sites, with nearly 40% securing jobs after six months.
ILO’s Houngbo called for greater efforts on disability inclusion in the clean energy transition, not just as a matter of justice but also to advance resilient labour markets and sustainable development.
“This requires accessible training systems, inclusive hiring practices, and workplaces that accommodate, welcome and respond to diverse needs and respect every worker’s rights,” he added.
Climate Home News received support from IRENA to travel to Abu Dhabi to covers its 16th Assembly.
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago
Climate Change2 years ago
Carbon Footprint2 years ago