The UK government could approve 13 new oil and gas projects in the North Sea, with the fuel produced emitting 350m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) if burned, Carbon Brief analysis shows.
The Labour government, which took power last month, has ruled out issuing new oil and gas licences for the North Sea.
However, it has not ruled out approving projects that already have a licence, but have not yet received consent to begin development.
A former senior official tells Carbon Brief that the government may now be “compelled” to greenlight them due to the risk of legal action from oil and gas companies.
Official documents show that up to 13 such licenced projects are likely to seek development consent from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), led by Ed Miliband, and the North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA). Many of these projects could seek such consent within months.
The projects could collectively produce 858m barrels of oil equivalent. If all of this fuel was burned, it would produce 350MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
This is equivalent to the annual emissions of 111 of the world’s lowest-emitting countries, which have a combined population of 649 million.
A wide range of scientific evidence shows that new fossil-fuel projects globally are “incompatible” with the world’s ambition of limiting global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.
Since the landmark Horse Hill judgment in June, DESNZ will likely need to consider the emissions produced from burning fossil fuels when deciding whether to grant development consent to new projects for the first time.
A spokesperson for DESNZ chose not to comment on the 13 projects, instead reaffirming to Carbon Brief that the department “will not issue new licences to explore new fields”, but will not revoke existing licences.
- What is the government’s stance on North Sea oil and gas?
- How much new oil and gas could be approved under Labour?
- What does this mean for efforts to tackle climate change?
What is the government’s stance on North Sea oil and gas?
The Labour party achieved a landslide victory in last month’s UK general election, with a campaign that promised major changes to the country’s climate and energy policies.
In its manifesto, Labour said it “will not issue new licences” for oil and gas, but that it “will not revoke existing licences”, leaving uncertainty around whether it will grant development consent to new projects that already have a licence.
The process for new North Sea oil and gas projects moving from obtaining a licence to reaching first production is complex, leading to a lot of confused reporting – with journalists often incorrectly describing Labour’s policy to end new licences as a “ban on new drilling”.
Under the previous Conservative government, multiple oil and gas licensing rounds took place.
Licensing rounds are carried out by the North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA), a company owned by DESNZ that acts as the UK’s oil and gas regulator.
(It is often pointed out that the NSTA is in the awkward position of being responsible for both ensuring the oil and gas sector reaches net-zero and maximising the economic recovery of oil from the North Sea.)
The most recent oil and gas licensing round took place from October 2022 to January 2023, leading to 82 licences being awarded to companies.
All of the licences awarded were production licences. This type of licence enables a company to explore for and then drill to extract oil and gas.
However, before they can set up operations and start drilling, they must obtain development consent from the NSTA, DESNZ and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the UK’s national regulator for workplace health and safety.
The “field development roadmap” below gives a sense of the various stages involved for a North Sea oil and gas project looking to obtain development consent.

The role of DESNZ in granting development consent for new oil and gas projects is highlighted in green.
Specifically, DESNZ is responsible for considering the environmental impact of a new oil and gas project.
As part of the environmental impact assessment, companies are asked to prepare an environmental statement, giving information on how the project could negatively affect the environment and what they plan to mitigate this. This could include, for example, how drilling activity could harm whales and dolphins living in the North Sea.
Until recently, when it came to the climate impact of their projects, companies only had to give information on the emissions caused by their operations. For example, from the energy used on oil rigs.
They did not have to provide DESNZ with data on the emissions that would be caused by burning the oil and gas they produce, which account for the vast majority of the emissions from a fossil-fuel project.
However, in June, the Supreme Court issued a landmark judgment ruling that all fossil-fuel projects seeking approval in the UK should provide decisionmakers with information on the emissions caused from burning the oil and gas that they plan to produce.
Delivering the majority judgment, Lord Leggett stated that the end use of any fossil-fuel extraction was always combustion, necessitating decisionmakers to take into account these emissions:
“The combustion emissions are manifestly not outwith the control of the site operators. They are entirely within their control. If no oil is extracted, no combustion emissions will occur.”
Lawyers tell Carbon Brief that the judgment means that North Sea oil and gas companies seeking development consent will now need to provide DESNZ with data on the emissions from burning the fuel extracted by their projects.
After considering the environmental impact of a project, DESNZ can either grant consent, request further information or refuse consent, if it considers the potential environmental impacts of the new project to be too large.
This decision, ultimately, lies with the secretary of state, Ed Miliband.
As noted above, Labour has not been clear on its position on development consent for new oil and gas projects that already have a licence.
Although DESNZ technically has the power to refuse new oil and gas projects on climate grounds, it might be difficult to do so in practice, says Adam Bell, head of policy at the consultancy group Stonehaven and former head of energy at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (which has now been split into DESNZ and two other departments). He tells Carbon Brief:
“To say no, the secretary of state would need to demonstrate that the relevant project would indeed have significant environmental impacts. What ‘significant’ in this context means is very much up for grabs and the regulations do extend the secretary of state scope to refuse a project on climate impact grounds.
“However, such a contention would be difficult to stand up in court unless the secretary of state could demonstrate that the project would have a greater impact on the climate than an imports counterfactual. This would be challenging.”
Because of this, the government might be forced to greenlight oil and gas projects seeking approval, Bell says:
“My expectation is that unless the government takes the position that any further extraction anywhere globally increases the risk of climate change – with consequent impacts on international relations – they will be compelled to consent the projects.”
Commenting on the chance of the Horse Hill judgment making a difference, he adds:
“My expectation is that how emissions [from burning oil and gas] are considered will be crucial; whether purely on territorial grounds or in the context of global emissions.
“One can make the case for projects on the former, and the framework for doing so is, ironically, [the] Paris [Agreement] and nationally determined contributions. On the latter, it becomes much harder to consent to projects.”
(See: “What does this mean for efforts to tackle climate change?”)
How much new oil and gas could be approved under Labour?
According to a 2024 overview from the NSTA, 13 new oil and gas projects are at a phase where they could soon be seeking development consent.
The NSTA says these projects would collectively produce 858m barrels of oil equivalent. When burned, this would produce around 350MtCO2e, Carbon Brief analysis shows.
The graphic below, which has been adapted from the NSTA’s overview, uses bubbles to indicate the relative size of the 13 projects that are likely to seek development consent, in terms of their oil and gas resources.

A spokesperson for the NSTA would not provide Carbon Brief with any further information on the projects represented in its overview, arguing this information is “commercially sensitive”.
However, Carbon Brief understands that some of the larger projects likely to seek development consent include the controversial Cambo oil project, the UK’s second-largest undeveloped oil and gas discovery in the North Sea, as well as the Buchan oil redevelopment project and the Avalon oilfield project.
Labour has previously publicly ruled out greenlighting the Cambo oil project – despite not ruling out approving other large oil and gas projects. (As noted above, it may be challenging for DESNZ to do this in practice.)
(Labour has also publicly pledged to stop the Rosebank oil and gas project, another large project that was approved for development by the previous Conservative government. The decision to approve Rosebank will face a legal challenge from environmental groups later this year.)
The NSTA spokesperson said that it is possible that not all of the 13 projects will “reach the stage” of seeking development consent. (A project with a licence may encounter economic or viability issues in its early stages.)
They added that “some may apply in the next few months”, while others will seek consent “over a longer time period”.
What does this mean for efforts to tackle climate change?
There is a wide range of evidence to show that new fossil fuel projects globally could blow efforts to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C, the aspiration of the Paris Agreement.
A scientific review of all known feasible routes for keeping to 1.5C published in 2022 concluded that developing new oil and gas fields is “incompatible” with the target.
It followed on from a landmark road map to net-zero released by the International Energy Agency in 2021, which said there are “no new oil and gas fields approved for development in our [1.5C] pathway”.
(In 2023, the IEA updated its wording to say that “no new long lead time conventional oil and gas projects are approved for development” in its 1.5C pathway.)
The latest UN Emissions Gap Report in 2023 said that the coal, oil and gas extracted over the lifetime of producing and under-construction mines and fields as of 2018 “would emit more than 3.5 times the carbon budget available to limit warming to 1.5C with 50% probability, and almost the size of the budget available for 2C with 67% probability”.
While the scientific case against new fossil fuel expansion is clear, North Sea advocates sometimes argue that the extraction of oil and gas in the UK has lower emissions than the global average and, therefore, offers an advantage.
In 2022, the UK’s climate advisers, the Climate Change Committee, published an analysis examining whether there is currently any climate benefit to using oil and gas produced in the UK, rather than that imported from overseas.
It found that the emissions intensity of oil and gas produced in the UK is lower than the global average, suggesting there may be a small “advantage” to domestic production.

But, although the UK has a climate “advantage” in terms of emissions during production when compared to the global average, it is not outperforming Norway, the country from which it currently sources most of its oil and gas imports.
An analysis published in 2022 found that, on average, UK production in the North Sea was nearly three times more emissions intensive than Norwegian production.
Furthermore, potential small climate “gains” from using domestic oil and gas over imports could be undermined because extracting more fossil fuels could impact global demand.
Namely, if the UK produces more oil and gas, it could contribute to falling prices and, thus, rising demand, fuelling more use and higher emissions.
Previous CCC analysis found that, even if every 100 units of new UK gas production only adds 14 units to global gas demand overall, the upstream emissions advantage would be wiped out by higher usage elsewhere.
Similarly, it concluded that the upstream emissions advantage for oil would be wiped out even if every 100 units of new oil production only added three units to global oil demand.
It is also worth noting that oil and gas produced in UK waters is sold to the global market and does not “belong” to the UK.
Around 80% of oil produced in UK waters is currently exported. Similarly, during the global energy crisis, UK gas exports soared.
The 13 projects looking to obtain development consent would produce 858m barrels of oil equivalent, the NSTA says. This is equal to around two years of UK oil and gas production at current levels.
However, the North Sea is already in decline. Oil production peaked in 1999, while gas production in the UK continental shelf peaked in 2000.
The journey to net-zero will see petrol and diesel cars replaced by electric cars, fossil-fuel boilers replaced by heat pumps and gas power stations replaced with low-carbon alternatives, such as renewables, nuclear and storage. All of this will see oil and gas demand plummet over the coming decades.
This means that new oil and gas will not do much to boost UK energy security – something noted by DESNZ. Referring specifically to oil and gas licences, a spokesperson tells Carbon Brief:
“We will not issue new licences to explore new fields because they will not take a penny off bills, cannot make us energy secure and will only accelerate the worsening climate crisis.”
Prime minister Keir Starmer has previously said that restoring the UK’s reputation as a climate leader is a key priority for his government.
Committing to stopping all new oil and gas projects, rather than just ending new licensing rounds, could give a boost to these efforts, says Tessa Khan, an environmental lawyer and executive director of Uplift, the North Sea oil and gas transition campaign group. She tells Carbon Brief:
“Signalling an end to new oil and gas exploration will be a significant step forward in restoring the UK’s reputation as a climate leader. However, to really bring the UK into alignment with climate science, it needs to go even further and reject any new oil and gas developments – not just licences.”
She adds that setting a clear plan for ending new oil and gas projects – rather than leaving uncertainty over new projects – could help the sector prepare for a just transition:
“Clarity about the future of the oil and gas sector will help to plan a responsible transition that protects the workers and communities that have ties to the industry. If the UK takes these steps, it can set a real example of climate leadership.”
The post Analysis: UK could approve 13 new oil and gas projects despite North Sea pledge appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK could approve 13 new oil and gas projects despite North Sea pledge
Climate Change
Pawa in Palau
This week our powerful Pacific team is in Palau for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. This is a major moment in our campaigns for Pacific climate justice and to stop deep sea mining. So what’s it all about, what can we expect over the coming days, and why is this year’s meeting in particular so important? Read on to find out!
*Pawa is Melanesian word meaning collective power.
Meet Moemoana Schwenke, our Pacific Climate Campaigner
“When you love something deeply, you do everything you can to protect it.”
What is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)?
The Pacific Islands Forum, or ‘PIF’, is our region’s most important political organisation. It is where countries of the Pacific — including Australia and New Zealand — come together to collaborate on shared challenges and to set collective goals.
The PIF Leaders Meeting is an annual weeklong event that includes a dedicated meeting of the Pacific’s small island developing states (PSIDS), many special side events organised by Pacific civil society, the leaders’ meeting itself, and more. At the end of the week, leaders issue a Forum Communiqué, capturing what they have agreed on, their shared priorities and the actions they will take together.
This year’s meeting is being held in the beautiful northern Pacific nation of Palau, the same place our Pacific team gathered back in January to plan for the year.

What’s at stake this year?
Climate change has dominated the PIF for decades. Pacific leaders have been crystal clear it is their number one priority, and the annual gathering is the moment they can exert maximum pressure on Australia over its fossil fuel record.
The voyage to COP31
This year’s meeting comes less than three months before COP31, where Australia will take on the role of President of Negotiations — a role it has committed to undertaking in partnership with the Pacific — and less than a month before the ‘Pacific Pre-COP’, to be held in Fiji and Tuvalu.
Following a fraught round of mid-year negotiations in Bonn, PIF leaders will need to set out a clear vision and priorities for COP31. These include accelerating a just global transition away from fossil fuels, defending science as the foundation of international climate cooperation, and increasing the availability and accessibility of finance for renewable energy and climate adaptation.

Accountability for Australian fossil fuel exports
Since the last PIF Leaders Meeting, Australia has signed the Belém Declaration on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels. The declaration reaffirmed the legally binding commitment to help limit global warming to 1.5°C and recognised that this is incompatible with new fossil fuel production. Yet, Australia has continued to approve new coal and gas projects, including at least five since the last PIF Leaders Meeting.

What is Greenpeace doing?
We’re going big this year, taking six members of our team to Palau to support Pacific leaders to hold the line, hold Australia accountable, and show the world what’s at stake. We’ll lobby leaders, hold press conferences, share our messages with the world, and support our incredible local partners in Palau.

How can you get involved?
PIF is the first in a drumbeat of major moments where we’ll be carrying the voices of the Pacific to the world. Come October we’ll be voyaging to Fiji on our ship Oceania for the Pacific Pre-COP, and in November we’ll be off to Antalya for the world’s climate negotiations (COP31).
Learn more about the Pacific way to a fossil fuel free future by checking out our report and exhibition.
Follow our journey, and check back here for more ways to join the movement for climate justice. Together we have the pawa!
Climate Change
From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority
Gill Einhorn is head of the Forest Future Alliance and Natalie Çilem is community lead of the Global Wildfire Leadership Network.
Wildfires have devastated communities across the world this summer, claiming lives, displacing thousands of people and leaving billions in economic damage in their wake. In Europe alone, wildfires have already caused an estimated €19 billion in losses this year.
They are an economic, financial and public health challenge that is growing faster than many governments and markets are prepared for – and exposing the real costs of poor land management.
A system built for recovery, not resilience
Far more money is currently spent responding to the disastrous effects of wildfires than preventing them in the first place. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that more than half of wildfire-related spending goes towards response, while planning receives only around 0.2 percent. This problem is not limited to wildfires; over 95 percent of disaster aid between 2005 and 2017 was allocated to response, and less than 4 percent was directed towards prevention or preparedness.
Forests are critical, but without investment in how land is managed and protected, their value is neither stable nor guaranteed. Protecting forests requires investing not only in conservation, but in the conditions that keep forests standing.
Each dollar invested in wildfire-resistant construction could save around $210 in avoided future economic losses, according to a report by the World Economic Forum and Forest Future Alliance. Despite this evidence that prevention can significantly reduce future costs, wildfire resilience remains chronically underfunded.
This spending discrepancy is creating significant challenges for insurers, asset owners and financial institutions. Global insured losses from natural catastrophes reached $107 billion in 2025, with wildfires, floods and storms accounting for 92 percent of claims.
In this context, insurers are reassessing where and how they are willing to underwrite risk. Around 56 percent of global wildfire losses between 2000 and 2023 were uninsured. In some high-risk areas, insurers are scaling back coverage altogether, leaving homeowners, businesses and governments to shoulder a growing share of the costs – making it increasingly difficult to break even.
Proven solutions are already paying off
In many regions, wildfires are driven not by natural causes but by the deliberate clearing of land for agriculture. Degraded landscapes are becoming drier, more flammable and increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic loss, creating a vicious cycle of deforestation, economic damage and rising emissions.
The answer is not simply stronger firefighting capacity. Governments, investors and businesses must work together to shift capital upstream into prevention, resilience and long-term landscape stewardship of healthy forests. That means planting appropriately, investing in heat-resistant species, exploring approaches that minimise fire footprints through active management, and exploring the AI and technology solutions that are burgeoning.


Solutions to this already exist and are proven to have an impact. Following devastating wildfires year-on-year, Portugal shifted its approach to wildfire management, increasing prevention spending within its national rural fire management system from around 20 percent in 2017 to approximately 60 percent in 2022. While many countries remain locked in a reactive cycle of disaster response, public policy can shift investment upstream and make resilience a priority before fires occur.
Indigenous communities have long used proactive land stewardship to reduce wildfire risk while supporting healthy and productive landscapes. For example, the Cheslatta Carrier Nation in British Columbia traditionally managed fuels through cultural fire practices but now implements mechanised fuel removal methods under commercial agreements. By combining Indigenous stewardship with sustainable forest management, Cheslatta is generating community benefits while also boosting wildfire prevention.
Resilience can also be strengthened through finance and technology. FireSat, a partnership led by Earth Fire Alliance with Google.org, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and Muon, is a satellite constellation designed for rapid wildfire detection. Scanning every 20 minutes, it can detect fires 400 times smaller than current systems and track them through smoke and darkness in almost real time. In California alone, FireSat could prevent up to 350,000 acres from burning each year. It has recently received significant new investments allowing it to expand towards a constellation of more than 50 satellites that will monitor every point on Earth every 20 minutes or less.
In Brazil’s Pantanal, the Embrace the Forest initiative uses AI-powered detection towers across 2.5 million hectares to support earlier intervention and faster response. During the severe 2024 fire season, the initiative contributed to a 40 percent reduction in burned area compared to 2020.


These examples illustrate what is possible when resilience is treated as an investment priority rather than a recovery cost. But we must ensure funding for these measures is scaled before disaster strikes. Initiatives like the Global Wildfire Leadership Network (GWLN) are key, bringing together corporate decision-makers, investors, insurers, governments and Indigenous leaders to direct investment towards prevention and align finance, technology and stewardship to protect nature, safeguard communities and strengthen future economic stability. With a goal of doing more together than the sum of our parts, the network focuses on Forest Future Alliance GWLN Solutions Labs – where partners sign up with the intent to collaborate.
Rewarding prevention
Financial incentives must be created that reward prevention. This can be done by scaling public-private partnerships, supporting long-term landscape stewardship, investing in community capacity including Indigenous wisdom and technology. Ultimately, our terrestrial natural reserves are critical infrastructure that support resilient economies and thriving communities.
One in three people are dependent on forest services, goods and economic opportunities for survival, so it’s in all our interests to protect what we have. Forests support cooling, water and food security – and are a very cost-effective way of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, where done appropriately.
UN chief warns climate crisis “in overdrive” as El Niño threatens to fuel the fire
No sector can solve this challenge alone. The benefits of wildfire resilience are shared across communities, governments, insurers, investors, utilities and businesses. A single intervention can protect homes and livelihoods, reduce insurance claims, secure water supplies and lower future public costs. Because the benefits are shared, the solutions must be too. Coalitions of actors can take proven approaches further than any one individual or organisation could alone.
As wildfires continue to burn at an unprecedented scale, the opportunity now is to roll out solutions, shift investment upstream and build a future where resilience, rather than recovery, becomes the foundation of thriving economies.
The post From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority appeared first on Climate Home News.
From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority
Climate Change
Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C
Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas and the second-largest contributor to global warming after carbon dioxide (CO2).
Methane traps heat in the atmosphere more efficiently than CO2, but has a significantly shorter lifespan, fading after just a few decades.
Therefore, reducing emissions of methane – a gas primarily produced by agriculture, fossil fuels and waste management – is a powerful option for limiting global warming in the near-term.
Yet climate strategies and models often only focus on CO2, or combine all greenhouse gases into one metric known as “CO2 equivalent”.
The latter approach makes reducing methane emissions dependent on modelling choices and assumptions about the “equivalence” of methane and CO2.
It hides the opportunities and challenges linked to methane’s high warming and short lifetime.
In a new study, published in Communications Earth & Environment, we offer a different perspective that “decouples” CO2 and methane reduction and takes global warming limits as a starting point for determining the required level of methane cuts.
We show that, even under the most ambitious existing national net-zero targets, an absence of methane reduction leads to peak warming that exceeds 1.85C above pre-industrial levels.
The study highlights that, to limit peak warming to well-below 2C, net-zero CO2 targets must be complemented by stringent methane emissions cuts.
CO2 equivalent
How much methane corresponds to one tonne of CO2?
The question is as difficult to answer as: ‘how much spaghetti equals a chicken?’ You could compare the two meals according to their calories, protein content or cost. Each metric can be convenient, but is only valid for that specific comparison – no amount of spaghetti is the same as a chicken.
The same is true for the conversion of emissions of methane and other gases to CO2-equivalent emissions. It can be convenient, as it allows different gases to be compared or combined into a single number. This is why the metric is used in climate targets or evaluating the effectiveness of different mitigation options.
But, because methane and CO2 have different atmospheric lifetimes and warming properties, any conversion is only valid for a chosen time horizon and a chosen baseline.
Depending on the assumptions baked into calculations, methane mitigation can either appear as an immediate priority or framed as almost unnecessary.
There are a number of metrics that scientists use to convert greenhouse gases – whether methane, hydrofluorocarbons or nitrous oxide – into CO2-equivalent emissions:
- “GWP20” measures how much heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a 20-year period, relative to CO2. It emphasises urgent methane mitigation but has been criticised for its implicit discounting of future damages.
- “GWP100” looks at a 100-year timeline. It gives more weight to long-term warming and is used in “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) used by scientists, national emission reporting to the UN and by the GHG Protocol used by companies.
- “GWP*” considers the rate of emissions, rather than warming over a fixed time horizon. Under GWP*, very limited methane reductions bring CO2-equivalent emissions to zero, meaning remaining methane emissions can be designated as causing “no additional warming”. (This interpretation remains controversial as it assumes the continuation of historical levels of warming.)
IAMs are the tools used to generate future emissions scenarios. Because they combine CO2 and methane emissions, the impact of methane emission cuts alone is difficult to isolate in existing emission scenarios.
IAM-generated scenarios also assume mitigation decisions driven by costs. Combinations of CO2 and methane emission pathways that are not purely cost-effective are, therefore, not represented, even though climate policy is messy and emission pathways are rarely cost-effective in the real world.
Only a few countries – including Japan, Mexico and South Korea – specify methane mitigation targets.
A different approach
In our study, we separate CO2 and methane emissions and treat them as independent.
Instead of choosing a conversion method, we suggest that states and organisations set a limit on peak global warming first, then, based on their existing net-zero targets, determine the minimum compatible methane reduction target.
Companies and countries around the world have set net-zero targets focused on CO2, as well as those that include all greenhouse gases. As a result, our research looks at the necessary methane reductions for both types of goal. We consider scenarios where companies or countries deliver linear – in other words, steady – emissions reductions to reach net-zero.
Using a simple climate model, we systematically combined methane and CO2 (or greenhouse gas) mitigation pathways starting in 2025 and calculated peak warming.
The figure below shows how peak warming depends on both the year of reaching net-zero CO2 and the level of methane cuts.
The blue arrows in the figure show that to limit warming to 1.7C under a 2050 net-zero CO2 scenario, methane emissions would need to fall by at least 69% by 2050, relative to 2020.
Our research also finds that, if an organisation or country’s 2050 net zero-target covers all greenhouse gases, its methane emissions would need to fall by 63% instead.
However, under current policies, methane emissions are expected to increase by around 20% by 2050, relative to 2020. We find that this pathway would result in peak warming above 2C by 2050 – even if global CO2 emissions were to reach net-zero by that date (see purple bar on the right-hand side of the figure above).
The figure also shows how, if methane emissions remained at 2020 levels and net-zero CO2 was delivered by 2040 or later, warming would exceed 1.85C. This level of warming is above what has been argued as consistent with the Paris Agreement’s “well-below” 2C limit.
Conversely, cutting methane emissions by around one-third – in line with the Global Methane Pledge target for 2030 – could reduce peak warming by 0.15C, of which 0.05C could be delivered by interventions that come at no net cost. These are shown by the orange and red bars, respectively, on the figure above.
The table below highlights the minimum compatible methane cuts for three different peak warming levels and net-zero CO2 or greenhouse-gas emission targets.
| Peak warming | Year of net-zero CO2 emissions | Year of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions | ||||
| 2050 | 2060 | 2100 | 2050 | 2060 | 2100 | |
| 1.7C | -69% | – | – | -63% | – | – |
| 1.8C | -32% | -56% | – | -11% | -47% | – |
| 2C | +8% | -8% | -83% | >50% | +33% | -78% |
Minimum methane emission reductions between 2020 and the year of net-zero emissions, consistent with peak warming of 1.7C, 1.8C, and 2.0C at 50% likelihood, assuming linear emission trajectories. For some net-zero targets and peak warming levels, there are no compatible methane mitigation targets (indicated by “–”).
Remaining carbon budget
The global carbon budget refers to the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions allowable while still meeting a particular global warming threshold.
The 2021 climate science report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a 2023 Nature study estimated that, by 2025, the remaining carbon budget for holding warming to 2C would be around 1,000-1,150bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2).
We find that these estimates are founded on the assumption of methane reductions of 27-35% by 2050, relative to a 2020 baseline. (A 2024 Communications Earth & Environment study reached similar conclusions.)
Under the GWP* metric, where methane emissions are only cut to maintain “no additional warming”, the remaining carbon budget would be constrained. The best estimate of a 2C budget shrinks by around 30% to approximately 750GtCO2.
Finally, if methane emissions are not cut at all in the future, our findings suggest that the remaining carbon budget for 1.7C of global warming has, in effect, already been exhausted.
Our analysis shows how peak warming depends on both CO2 and methane reduction – and how methane-specific targets can help refine existing net-zero targets.
Crucially, we show that complementing net-zero CO2 targets with stringent methane cuts is necessary to limit peak warming to well-below 2C.
Weber, K. et al. (2026) Limiting warming by CO2 and methane mitigation in an expanded scenario space, Communications Earth & Environment, doi:10.1038/s43247-026-03832-1
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The post Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C
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