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A record surge of clean energy kept China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions below the previous year’s levels in the last 10 months of 2024.

However, the new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and commercial data, shows the tail end of China’s rebound from zero-Covid in January and February, combined with abnormally high growth in energy demand, stopped CO2 emissions falling in 2024 overall.

While China’s CO2 output in 2024 grew by an estimated 0.8% year-on-year, emissions were lower than in the 12 months to February 2024.

Other key findings of the analysis include:

  • China’s CO2 emissions grew 0.6% year-on-year in the fourth quarter, as hopes of stimulus measures pushed up industrial coal use and oil demand.
  • In addition, wind and solar fell short of expected levels in the final quarter of 2024, likely as a result of being denied grid access in favour of coal power, which was flat year-on-year.
  • Clean-energy capacity growth will accelerate in 2025 as largescale wind, solar and nuclear projects race to finish before the 14th five-year plan period comes to an end.
  • Industrial electricity demand growth has slowed since summer 2024 and total energy demand growth eased in the fourth quarter of the year.
  • These factors would be expected to push China’s coal-power output into decline in 2025, which would have international significance for energy markets and emissions.
  • However, another period of industrial demand growth driven by government stimulus efforts could change this picture, particularly if the real-estate slump turns around.

As ever, the latest analysis shows that policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory in the coming years. In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.

Emissions have plateaued since February 2024

China’s re-opening from zero-Covid began in earnest in March 2023, leading to rapid energy demand growth year-on-year until February 2024.

This resulted in a 3.8% rise in China’s CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2024.

Emissions stabilised in March-December 2024 as clean electricity supply growth covered all of the growth in electricity demand, while emissions from cement and steel production fell due to contracting demand for construction materials. This is shown in the figure below.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

After February 2024, oil consumption growth also stabilised. Coal use in the chemical industry and coal and gas use in other industrial sectors continued to grow, offsetting the fall in emissions from the construction materials industry.

Contributions to the emissions plateau during the final 10 months of 2024 are shown in the figure below, broken down by fuel and by sector, where data is available.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024 when emissions have remained stable, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

The growth in power generation from non-fossil sources set a new record, growing more than 500 terawatt hours (TWh) compared with 2023, which had already been a record year.

This is more than the total power generation of Germany in 2023. Solar power generation was responsible for half of the increase in clean power supply.

Emissions inched up in the fourth quarter

After rising in the first quarter of 2024, China’s CO2 emissions started to decline in March, falling 1% in the second quarter of the year and levelling off in the third quarter.

While power-sector emissions remained stable in the fourth quarter, industrial emissions outside the power sector swung into an increase. There was no reduction in power-sector emissions to offset that growth, resulting in an estimated 0.6% increase in overall emissions.

The largest factor was a rebound in oil and gas demand outside the power sector, indicated by the large bars under “All Sectors” and “Other Sectors” in the figure below.

Preliminary numbers from the National Bureau of Statistics indicate gas and oil demand rose 10% and 3% year-on-year, respectively, in the fourth quarter of 2024.

The supply of refined oil products fell 1.5%, so the increase in oil demand apparently came entirely from crude oil consumption in the chemical industry.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Steel output picked up after stimulus announcements in late September, increasing 2% in October-November and 12% in December after a 4% reduction in the year to September.

The December increase, however, came from the reversal of a sharp 15% drop in production in December 2023, which was a last-minute measure to adhere to a cap set by the government for steel production during the year. As a result, steel production in December 2024 saw a dramatic increase year-on-year, but remained below 2022 levels.

Gas consumption has been rebounding from a drop caused by spiking prices in 2022, but demand growth is expected to moderate this year.

Cement production fell 6% year-on-year in the last quarter, extending a decline that started in 2020 and that has seen China’s cement output fall by almost a quarter from its peak level, as construction volumes have fallen.

Clash between coal and clean energy

As shown in the chart above, emissions from the power sector remained flat during the fourth quarter of 2024, with a small fall from coal and a small rise from gas. However, as electricity demand growth slowed down to 3.5%, emissions would have been expected to fall.

Even as electricity demand growth slowed down in October and November, fossil-fuel generation continued to increase. This was due to a sharp drop in the utilisation of solar and wind capacity, as shown by China Electricity Council data accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.

It is normal for utilisation to vary month-to-month, especially in the case of wind power, as wind conditions vary. The fall in utilisation of solar power was, however, the largest on record and, in the case of both solar and wind, this specific drop is not readily explained by weather conditions.

Lauri Myllyvirta on Bluesky: The weather conditions for solar and wind were a bit worse than last year

If the fall in utilisation was not caused by weather, the other possible cause is an increase in curtailment, or the amount of solar and wind power supply not fed into the power grid.

However, officially reported curtailment rates only increased marginally.

The apparent increase in unreported solar and wind curtailment in November is indicative of issues likely to arise in China’s electricity market as demand for coal-fired power begins to fall.

The government has pushed electricity buyers to enter into long-term contracts with coal-power companies, which involve guaranteed sales volumes. This has been a way to shore up profitability and enable investments in new coal-power capacity.

This now appears to be coming into conflict with clean-power growth and efforts to limit emissions.

When power generation from clean sources grows faster or total power demand grows slower than expected, electricity buyers with these long-term contracts can face penalties, unless they refuse power supply from clean sources and purchase from coal-power generators instead.

This conflict is accentuated when a lot of new coal-power capacity enters into the market. The new units have internal production targets and, at least in some cases, power purchase agreements signed in advance, making them unwilling to reduce output, even if there is no space in the grid.

It is notable that the first time that renewable energy curtailment became a major issue in China was around 2015, when demand for power generation from coal was falling.

Statistical analysis also reveals that solar and wind capacity utilisation tends to fall when coal-power capacity utilisation falls as well – the opposite of what should be expected. In a well-functioning market, coal-power utilisation should fall when more clean power is available.

A statistical model predicting solar and wind power utilisation by province, using daily meteorological data, failed to predict the drop in utilisation in October and November, indicating that weather conditions were not the main reason for the reduction.

If power demand growth slows down in 2025 and the expected record clean-energy additions are realised (see below), the conflict between coal and clean power could worsen. Demand for coal-fired power would be likely to fall, even as the coal industry expects rapid growth.

It would only be possible to ease this conflict by relaxing the government’s targets for long-term power contracts and accepting a fall in the utilisation of coal-power capacity.

Did emissions peak in 2024?

A year ago, an earlier iteration of this analysis predicted that China’s emissions would begin to fall in March 2024 and then continue to decline, leading to a 2% reduction in the full year of 2024.

This was based on three assumptions:

  • Clean-energy additions would continue;
  • Hydropower generation would recover to historical average levels;
  • Energy consumption growth would slow down, after abnormally rapid growth in 2020-2023, during and after zero-Covid.

Taking each of those assumptions in turn, clean-energy additions not just continued but accelerated further, with 2024 poised to see a new record for the amount of solar and wind capacity added. Hydropower also recovered, although not all the way to historical averages.

The clean-energy additions, shown by the columns in the figure below, reached a scale where they would be sufficient to cover all energy demand growth at historical pre-Covid levels (grey line).

Indeed, the growth in clean-energy supply in 2024 far exceeded the growth in total energy demand recorded in any year from 2015 to 2020. However, energy demand growth in 2023-2024 was above historical norms, increasing significantly faster than in the years before Covid, even as GDP growth rates slowed down, due to high reliance on energy intensive industries to drive growth.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply. Source: Total energy consumption growth from NBS annual data and recent economic and energy data releases. Non-fossil electricity supply from Ember yearly electricity data, except 2024 data from CREA monthly China snapshot. Electricity generation is converted into primary energy following the “coal power equivalent” methodology used in China.

Specifically, China’s power demand grew at 6.8% in 2024 while GDP expanded 5%. In contrast, last year’s analysis had assumed that power demand and GDP growth rates would converge after the zero-Covid period and its immediate aftermath were over.

This discrepancy was enough to throw off the projection for 2024. With energy demand growth far in excess of what had been assumed, even the massive clean-energy additions seen in 2024 were only enough to stabilise emissions, rather than to reduce them.

This means that while China’s CO2 emissions have been stable since March, it is still likely that they will post a small increase of around 0.8% for the full year, as January-February had rapid growth due to the rebound from zero-Covid.

As a result, the calendar year of 2023 did not become the peak year for China’s CO2 output, because emissions still inched up, according to current estimates.

From one perspective, stabilising emissions despite the rapid growth in energy demand is a major achievement. From another perspective, it is important for China’s emissions to begin to fall in absolute terms, if global climate goals are to remain within reach.

Even larger clean energy additions likely in 2025

After the enormous jump in China’s clean-energy installations in 2023 – particularly solar – even the most optimistic predictions did not expect a further increase in 2024.

Yet solar and wind capacity additions in China increased by 28% and 5% year-on-year in 2024, respectively, with 277GW of solar and 79GW of wind connected to the grid.

This year is likely to set another record, as key largescale solar, wind and nuclear projects race to complete during the 14th five-year plan period ending in 2025. State-owned enterprises, local governments and other actors have set targets that they will be striving to achieve.

Solar-power capacity additions are expected to stay at the record levels seen in 2024, with approximately 265GW added to the grid, according to forecasts from TrendForce New Energy Research Center.

Wind power is poised for a new record of 110-120GW of capacity added in 2025, according to China International Capital Corporation. Of this, 14-17GW is expected to be offshore wind power, up from 7GW in 2024.

After two slow years, China’s nuclear power capacity is expected to see a significant increase, rising to 65GW by the end of 2025, from 61GW today.

Some 3GW was added right at the end of 2024, starting to contribute to non-fossil power supply in 2025. In total, after a record number of new reactor projects was permitted in 2023 and 2024, China currently has 55GW approved or under construction, suggesting an average of more than 10GW of reactor start-ups per year over the next five years.

In addition, China had at least 14GW of conventional hydropower under construction at the end of 2024, based on Global Energy Monitor data on capacity under construction in April 2024 and subtracting capacity that was already commissioned last year.

Taken together, the new solar, wind, hydro and nuclear capacity that is likely to be connected to China’s grid in 2025 can be expected to generate more than 600TWh per year of electricity, up from the 500TWh of new clean electricity generation added in 2024, as shown in the figure below.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025. Source: Calculated based on changes in year-end capacity and average capacity utilisation for each technology from China Electricity Council data accessed through the Wind Financial Terminal.

However, as noted above, new clean-power capacity will only result in lower coal-fired generation and CO2 emissions if its output is integrated into the electricity system without a major increase in curtailment.

Aiming to avoid that outcome, in early January 2025, China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), published a new power system action plan that aims to integrate more than 200GW of new wind and solar onto the grid per year in 2025-27.

While this target is below the record-breaking clean-energy additions seen in recent years, it still indicates that there is central government support for similarly rapid growth in the next few years.

In December 2024, top economic policymakers called for accelerating the construction of very largescale clean-energy “bases” in western China and introduced a new theme of creating zero-carbon industrial parks. As industrial parks are responsible for 30% of China’s CO2 emissions, this policy could also drive significant investment in clean energy.

Energy demand outlook

Whether China’s emissions remain stable or begin to fall, cementing an emissions peak, remains a race between clean-energy additions and energy demand growth.

The big question is whether the recent trend of exceptionally rapid energy demand growth will continue, or whether it will unwind, resulting in a period of demand growing slower than GDP.

The previous periods of rapid energy and power demand growth in relation to GDP, around 2004 and 2010, were followed by periods of slower demand growth. In particular, around 2015, energy demand growth slowed down markedly and China’ emissions plateaued for several years.

There are signs of a repeat of this pattern in China’s recent energy demand data.

Specifically, industrial power demand rose sharply in 2023 and 2024, but exhibited a clear slowdown in the second half of 2024, as shown in the figure below (top left).

This was masked by a rebound in service and residential sector electricity consumption. Residential demand merely caught up to the pre-Covid trendline and service sector demand remains below it, reflecting the Covid-era distortion to the structure of the economy.

China’s electricity consumption growth by sector, terawatt-hours per month.
China’s electricity consumption growth by sector, terawatt-hours per month. Source: National Energy Administration monthly data releases.

The recent rapid energy demand growth has been driven by an economic strategy that heavily favours energy-intensive manufacturing.

This approach has likely reached its limits as China’s manufacturing expansion has led to a supply glut, falling prices for industrial products and falling profits.

Now, the government is aiming to speed up economic growth by stimulating household consumption, a much less energy-intensive part of the economy than manufacturing, and by “halting the decline and stabilising” the real-estate sector.

However, delivering this outcome is far from trivial. The 2022 economic work conference – where annual departmental priorities are set – had also said that the recovery from zero-Covid should be consumption-led, but this vision failed to materialise.

The 2024 conference reduced the emphasis on “high-quality growth”, a concept that discourages growth driven by “low-quality” construction projects. In Communist party jargon, it said that “the relationship between improving the quality and growing the total output must be well coordinated”. This was a downgrade from 2023 when “high-quality growth” was described as a “hard truth”.

What next for energy and emissions in China?

Clean-energy additions will accelerate even further this year, from the record levels of 2024. At the same time, industrial power demand growth has slowed significantly since the summer.

These two trends suggest there is likely to be a fall in power-sector emissions this year. However, this drop in CO2 could still be outweighed by government stimulus efforts leading to another period of rapid growth in heavy industry, especially if construction volumes rebound.

If construction activity makes a strong comeback, this could drive further increases in emissions. The coal industry is bullish, with the China Coal Transportation and Distribution Association projecting a 1% increase in coal consumption in 2025.

The China Coal Industry Association projects a 4.5% increase in power generation from coal and gas. It believes that the stimulus policies to expand investment and stabilise the real-estate market will lead to increases in output in steel, cement and other major coal-consuming industries.

However, even if policymakers did pursue construction stimulus, a key question is how much of an effect it will have – and how fast.

Regardless of industry association hopes, the government’s stimulus announcements, so far, have not reversed market expectations of falling steel demand.

The local governments that are expected to deliver the stimulus are likely to struggle to fund a major increase in spending – and there is much less need for new infrastructure than during previous stimulus cycles.

If the government is successful in reviving household consumption as a source of growth – which is far less energy intensive – then energy demand growth could normalise to levels where clean energy can easily meet all of the growth. If so, emissions would begin to fall in a sustained way.

Beyond 2025, China’s energy and emissions trends are harder to pin down. For example, the rate of clean-energy additions after this year is more uncertain, despite recent positive signals.

China’s new Paris commitments are due to be published this year, containing targets for 2030 and 2035. In addition, the 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030, will be prepared this year and released in early 2026. As such, policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory not only this year, but for many years into the future.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics for the first quarter, the first half and the first three quarters of the year, as well as for the full year. The effect of the adjustments is less than 0.4% for total annual emissions, with unadjusted numbers showing smaller in emissions in the third quarter.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2023.

For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.

The post Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise

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Cropped 13 August 2025: Fossil-fuelled bird decline; ‘Deadly’ wildfires; Empty nature fund

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We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

‘Deadly’ wildfires

WINE BRAKE: France experienced its “largest wildfire in decades”, which scorched more than 16,000 hectares in the country’s southern Aude region, the Associated Press said. “Gusting winds” fanned the flames, Reuters reported, but local winemakers and mayors also “blam[ed] the loss of vineyards”, which can act as a “natural, moisture-filled brake against wildfires”, for the fire’s rapid spread. It added that thousands of hectares of vineyards were removed in Aude over the past year. Meanwhile, thousands of people were evacuated from “deadly” wildfires in Spain, the Guardian said, with blazes ongoing in other parts of Europe.

MAJOR FIRES: Canada is experiencing its second-worst wildfire season on record, CBC News reported. More than 7.3m hectares burned in 2025, “more than double the 10-year average for this time of year”, the broadcaster said. The past three fire seasons were “among the 10 worst on record”, CBC News added. Dr Mike Flannigan from Thompson Rivers University told the Guardian: “This is our new reality…The warmer it gets, the more fires we see.” Elsewhere, the UK is experiencing a record year for wildfires, with more than 40,000 hectares of land burned so far in 2025, according to Carbon Brief.

Subscribe: Cropped
  • Sign up to Carbon Brief’s free “Cropped” email newsletter. A fortnightly digest of food, land and nature news and views. Sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

WESTERN US: The US state of Colorado has recorded one of its largest wildfires in history in recent days, the Guardian said. The fire “charred” more than 43,300 hectares of land and led to the temporary evacuation of 179 inmates from a prison, the newspaper said. In California, a fire broke out “during a heatwave” and burned more than 2,000 hectares before it was contained, the Los Angeles Times reported. BBC News noted: “Wildfires have become more frequent in California, with experts citing climate change as a key factor. Hotter, drier conditions have made fire seasons longer and more destructive.”

FIRE FUNDING: “Worsening fires” in the Brazilian Amazon threaten new rainforest funding proposals due to be announced at the COP30 climate summit later this year, experts told Climate Home News. The new initiatives include the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, which the outlet said “aims to generate a flow of international investment to pay countries annually in proportion to their preserved tropical forests”. The outlet added: “If fires in the Amazon continue to worsen in the years to come, eligibility for funding could be jeopardised, Brazil’s environment ministry acknowledged.”

Farming impacts

OUT OF ORBIT: US president Donald Trump moved to “shut down” two space missions which monitor carbon dioxide and plant health, the Associated Press reported. Ending these NASA missions would “potentially shu[t] off an important source of data for scientists, policymakers and farmers”, the outlet said. Dr David Crisp, a retired NASA scientist, said the missions can detect the “glow” of plant growth, which the outlet noted “helps monitor drought and predict food shortages that can lead to civil unrest and famine”.

FARM EXTREMES: Elsewhere, Reuters said that some farmers are considering “abandoning” a “drought-hit” agricultural area in Hungary as “climate change cuts crop yields and reduces groundwater levels”. Scientists warned that rising temperatures and low rainfall threaten the region’s “agricultural viability”, the newswire added. Meanwhile, the Premium Times in Nigeria said that some farmers are “harvest[ing] crops prematurely” due to flooding fears. A community in the south-eastern state of Imo “has endured recurrent floods, which wash away crops and incomes alike” over the past decade, the newspaper noted.

SECURITY RISKS: Food supply chains in the UK face “escalating threats from climate impacts and the migration they are triggering”, according to a report covered by Business Green. The outlet said that £3bn worth of UK food imports originated from the 20 countries “with the highest numbers of climate-driven displacements” in 2024, based on analysis from the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit. The analysis highlighted that “climate impacts on food imports pose a threat to UK food security”. Elsewhere, an opinion piece in Dialogue Earth explored how the “role of gender equity in food security remains critically unaddressed”.

Spotlight

Fossil-fuelled bird decline

This week, Carbon Brief covers a new study tracing the impact of fossil-fuelled climate change on tropical birds.

Over the past few years, biologists have recorded sharp declines in bird numbers across tropical rainforests – even in areas untouched by humans – with the cause remaining a mystery.

A new study published this week in Nature Ecology and Evolution could help to shed light on this alarming phenomenon.

The research combined ecological and climate attribution techniques for the first time to trace the fingerprint of fossil-fuelled climate change on declining bird populations.

It found that an increase in heat extremes driven by climate change has caused tropical bird populations to decline by 25-38% in the period 1950-2020, when compared to a world without warming.

In their paper, the authors noted that birds in the tropics could be living close to their “thermal limits”.

Study lead author Dr Maximilian Kotz, a climate scientist at the Barcelona Supercomputing Center in Spain, explained to Carbon Brief:

“High temperature extremes can induce direct mortality in bird populations due to hyperthermia and dehydration. Even when they don’t [kill birds immediately], there’s evidence that this can then affect body condition which, in turn, affects breeding behaviour and success.”

Conservation implications

The findings have “potential ramifications” for commonly proposed conservation strategies, such as increasing the amount of land in the tropics that is protected for nature, the authors said. In their paper, they continued:

“While we do not disagree that these strategies are necessary for abating tropical habitat loss…our research shows there is now an additional urgent need to investigate strategies that can allow for the persistence of tropical species that are vulnerable to heat extremes.”

In some parts of the world, scientists and conservationists are looking into how to protect wildlife from more intense and frequent climate extremes, Kotz said.

He referenced one project in Australia which is working to protect threatened wildlife following periods of extreme heat, drought and bushfires.

Prof Alex Pigot, a biodiversity scientist at University College London (UCL), who was not involved in the research, said the findings reinforced the need to systematically monitor the impact of extreme weather on wildlife. He told Carbon Brief:

“We urgently need to develop early warning systems to be able to anticipate in advance where and when extreme heatwaves and droughts are likely to impact populations – and also rapidly scale up our monitoring of species and ecosystems so that we can reliably detect these effects.”

There is further coverage of this research on Carbon Brief’s website.

News and views

EMPTY CALI FUND: A major voluntary fund for biodiversity remains empty more than five months after its launch, Carbon Brief revealed. The Cali Fund, agreed at the COP16 biodiversity negotiations last year, was set up for companies who rely on nature’s resources to share some of their earnings with the countries where many of these resources originate. Big pharmaceutical companies did not take up on opportunities to commit to contributing to the fund or be involved in its launch in February 2025, emails released to Carbon Brief showed. Just one US biotechnology firm has pledged to contribute to the fund in the future.

LOSING HOPE: Western Australia’s Ningaloo reef – long considered a “hope spot” among the country’s coral reefs for evading major bleaching events – is facing its “worst-ever coral bleaching”, Australia’s ABC News reported. The ocean around Ningaloo has been “abnormally” warm since December, resulting in “unprecedented” bleaching and mortality, a research scientist told the outlet. According to marine ecologist Dr Damian Thomson, “up to 50% of the examined coral was dead in May”, the Sydney Morning Herald said. Thomson told the newspaper: “You realise your children are probably never going to see Ningaloo the way you saw it.”

‘DEVASTATION BILL’: Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, signed a “contentious” environmental bill into law, but “partially vetoed” some of the widely criticised elements, the Financial Times reported. Critics, who dubbed it the “devastation bill”, said it “risked fuelling deforestation and would harm Brazil’s ecological credentials” just months before hosting the COP30 climate summit. The newspaper said: “The leftist leader struck down or altered 63 of 400 provisions in the legislation, which was designed to speed up and modernise environmental licensing for new business and infrastructure developments.” The vetoes need to be approved by congress, “where Lula lacks a majority”, the newspaper noted.

RAINFOREST DRILLING: The EU has advised the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against allowing oil drilling in a vast stretch of rainforest and peatland that was jointly designated a “green corridor” earlier this year, Climate Home News reported. In May, the DRC announced that it planned to open the conservation area for drilling, the publication said. A spokesperson for the European Commission told Climate Home News that the bloc “fully acknowledges and respects the DRC’s sovereign right to utilise its diverse resources for economic development”, but that it “highlights the fact that green alternatives have facilitated the protection of certain areas”.

NEW PLAN FOR WETLANDS: During the 15th meeting of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, held in Zimbabwe from 23 to 31 July, countries agreed on the adoption of a new 10-year strategic plan for conserving and sustainably using the world’s wetlands. Down to Earth reported that 13 resolutions were adopted, including “enhancing monitoring and reporting, capacity building and mobilisation of resources”. During the talks, Zimbabwe’s environment minister announced plans to restore 250,000 hectares of degraded wetlands by 2030 and Saudi Arabia entered the Convention on Wetlands. Panamá will host the next COP on wetlands in July 2028.

MEAT MADNESS: DeSmog covered the details of a 2021 public relations document that revealed how the meat industry is trying to “make beef seem climate-friendly”. The industry “may have enlisted environmental groups to persuade people to ‘feel better’ about eating beef”, the outlet said, based on this document. The strategy was created by a communications agency, MHP Group, and addressed to the Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef. One of the key messages of the plan was to communicate the “growing momentum in the beef industry to protect and nurture the Earth’s natural resources”. MHP Group did not respond to a request for comment, according to DeSmog.

Watch, read, listen

MAKING WAVES: A livestream of deep-sea “crustaceans, sponges and sea cucumbers” has “captivated” people in Argentina, the New York Times outlined.

BAFFLING BIRDS: The Times explored the backstory to the tens of thousands of “exotic-looking” parakeets found in parks across Britain.

PLANT-BASED POWER: In the Conversation, Prof Paul Behrens outlined how switching to a plant-based diet could help the UK meet its climate and health targets.

MARINE DISCRIMINATION: Nature spoke to a US-based graduate student who co-founded Minorities in Shark Science about her experiences of racism and sexism in the research field.

New science

  • Applying biochar – a type of charcoal – to soils each year over a long period of time can have “sustained benefits for crop yield and greenhouse gas mitigation”, according to a Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences study. 
  • New research, published in PLOS Climate, found that nearly one-third of highly migratory fish species in the US waters of the Atlantic Ocean have “high” or “very high” vulnerability to climate change, but the majority of species have “some level of resilience and adaptability”.
  • A study in Communications Earth & Environment found a “notable greening trend” in China’s wetlands over 2000-23, with an increasing amount of carbon being stored in the plants growing there.

In the diary

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 13 August 2025: Fossil-fuelled bird decline; ‘Deadly’ wildfires; Empty nature fund appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Cropped 13 August 2025: Fossil-fuelled bird decline; ‘Deadly’ wildfires; Empty nature fund

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Holding the line on climate: EPA

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CCL submits a formal comment on EPA’s proposed endangerment finding rollback

By Dana Nuccitelli, CCL Research Manager

On July 29, the EPA proposed to rescind its 2009 endangerment finding that forms the basis of all federal climate pollution regulations. 

Without the endangerment finding, the EPA may not be allowed or able to regulate greenhouse gas pollution from sources like power plants or vehicle tailpipes, as they have done for years. News coverage has framed this as a “radical transformation” and a “bid to scrap almost all pollution regulations,” so it has appropriately alarmed many folks in the climate and environment space.

At CCL, we focus our efforts on working with Congress to implement durable climate policies, and so we don’t normally take actions on issues like this that relate to federal agencies or the courts. Other organizations focus their efforts on those branches of the government and are better equipped to spearhead this type of moment, and we appreciate those allies. 

But in this case, we did see an opportunity for CCL’s voice — and our focus on Congress — to play a role here. We decided to submit a formal comment on this EPA action for two reasons.

First, this decision could have an immense impact by eliminating every federal regulation of climate pollutants in a worst case scenario. Second, this move relates to our work because the EPA is misinterpreting the text and intent of laws passed by Congress. Our representatives have done their jobs by passing legislation over the past many decades that supports and further codifies the EPA’s mandate to regulate climate pollution. That includes the Clean Air Act, and more recently, the Inflation Reduction Act. We at CCL wanted to support our members of Congress by making these points in a formal comment.

There has been a tremendous public response to this action. In just over one week, the EPA already received over 44,000 public comments on its decision, and the public comment period will remain open for another five weeks, until September 15. 

To understand more about the details and potential outcomes of the EPA’s actions, read my article on the subject at Yale Climate Connections, our discussion on CCL Community, and CCL’s formal comment, which represents our entire organization. As our comment concludes,

“In its justifications for rescinding the 2009 endangerment finding, the Reconsideration has misinterpreted the text of the Clean Air Act, Congress’ decadeslong support for the EPA’s mandate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and other major sources, and the vast body of peer-reviewed climate science research that documents the increasingly dangerous threats that those emissions pose to Americans’ health and welfare. Because the bases of these justifications are fundamentally flawed, CCL urges the EPA to withdraw its ill-conceived Reconsideration of the 2009 endangerment finding. The EPA has both the authority and the responsibility to act. Americans cannot afford a retreat from science, law, and common sense in the face of a rapidly accelerating climate crisis.”

After the EPA responds to the public comment record and finalizes its decision, this issue will ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court several years from now. 

In the meantime, CCL will continue to focus our efforts on areas where we can make the biggest difference in preserving a livable climate. Right now, that involves contacting our members of Congress to urge them to fully fund key climate and energy programs and protect critical work at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and Department of Energy. We’ve set an ambitious goal of sending 10,000 messages to our members of Congress, so let’s all do what CCL does best and make our voices heard on this critical issue.

This action by the EPA also reminds us that federal regulations are fragile. They tend to change with each new administration coming into the White House. Legislation passed by Congress – especially when done on a bipartisan basis – is much more durable. That’s why CCL’s work, as one of very few organizations engaging in nonpartisan advocacy for long-lasting climate legislation, is so critical. 

That’s especially true right now when we’re seeing the Trump administration slam shut every executive branch door to addressing climate change. We need Congress to step up now more than ever to implement durable solutions like funding key climate and energy programs, negotiating a new bipartisan comprehensive permitting reform bill, implementing healthy forest solutions like the Fix Our Forests Act, and advancing conversations about policies to put a price on carbon pollution. Those are the kinds of effective, durable, bipartisan climate solutions that CCL is uniquely poised to help become law and make a real difference in preserving a livable climate.

For other examples of how CCL is using our grassroots power to help ensure that Congress stays effective on climate in this political landscape, see our full “Holding the Line on Climate” blog series.

The post Holding the line on climate: EPA appeared first on Citizens' Climate Lobby.

Holding the line on climate: EPA

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Analysis: England’s most ethnically diverse areas are 15 times more likely to face extreme heat

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Neighbourhoods in England that are home to the most minority-ethnic people are 15 times more likely to face extreme heat than the least diverse areas, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

People with the lowest carbon footprints – who therefore contribute less to climate change – are also more likely to live in areas that experience high temperatures.

This is based on Carbon Brief analysis that combines satellite data on heat exposure with data on per-capita emissions, ethnicity and levels of deprivation across England.

Thousands of deaths in the UK have been attributed to heat in recent years and the threat is expected to grow as climate change worsens.

But heat is also felt differently across the country, with certain groups both more exposed and more vulnerable to dangerous temperatures.

Broadly, the analysis shows how those subject to the “urban heat island” effect in English cities, often in low-quality housing and with little access to green space, are more likely to experience extreme heat.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that policymaking should reflect the reality of climate change “amplifying” inequalities across society and provide help to those most in need, such as more heat-resilient social housing.

Heat threat

As greenhouse gas emissions and global temperatures rise, more people in the UK are likely to become ill or even die due to extreme heat.

Heat has killed around 6,000 people in England over the past three years, according to government figures. This is roughly double the number killed over the same period between 2016 and 2018.

Scientists have repeatedly linked extreme heat – and the resulting deaths – to climate change.

In June 2025 alone, more than 260 people died in London due to a heatwave, according to a recent attribution study that linked the event to climate change.

Government advisor the Climate Change Committee (CCC) estimates that the number of heat-related fatalities in the UK each year is set to triple by 2050, without adaptation measures.

Around half of homes in the country are already at risk of overheating and the CCC expects this to reach 90%, if global temperatures rise by 2C above pre-industrial levels.

However, these risks will not fall equally across society, with children, the elderly and disabled people more vulnerable to heat-related illness. There is also evidence that poorer communities and people of colour are more vulnerable to extreme heat.

Such communities also tend to have lower carbon footprints than those that are whiter and wealthier.

This fits with the broader concept of climate justice, which describes how people who are least responsible for climate change often end up bearing the brunt of its effects.

Carbon footprints

To investigate these issues, Carbon Brief combined detailed satellite data on heat exposure across England, provided by 4 Earth Intelligence, with neighbourhood-level carbon footprints compiled by the Centre for Research in Energy Demand Solutions (CREDS).

The CREDS dataset provides estimates of per-person carbon footprints, indicating how much the average person in each neighbourhood is contributing to climate change.

Due to data availability, this analysis focuses exclusively on England, the nation that experiences the most extreme heat in the UK.

Every neighbourhood is scored based on its “heat hazard”, meaning the likelihood that it will experience higher relative temperatures during hot weather, compared to surrounding areas.

The analysis then zooms in on the 10% worst-affected neighbourhoods in England. These neighbourhoods have a heat hazard score of 4 or 5, meaning that they face higher exposure to heat than 90% of areas around the country. (For a full explanation, see Methodology.)

The figure below shows that neighbourhoods with lower carbon footprints are twice as likely to face high heat hazard scores than areas with higher carbon footprints.

Specifically, it shows that 13.4% of neighbourhoods with the lowest carbon footprints are among the English areas most exposed to heat hazards. In contrast, only 7.0% of neighbourhoods with the highest carbon footprint are among the most heat-exposed areas.

Chart showing that people living in English neighbourhoods with lower carbon footprints are more likely to be exposed to extreme heat
Proportion of neighbourhoods in England with the highest heat hazard scores in each carbon footprint bracket. Each bar represents a group of English neighbourhoods, ranked by their per-capita emissions from 10% with the lowest carbon footprints (top bar) to the 10% with the highest (bottom bar). The bars in between each represent 20% of neighbourhoods. The “highest heat hazard scores” equate to the top 10% of total English neighbourhoods that are most likely to experience high temperatures during hot weather. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, 4 Earth Intelligence, CREDS.

Neighbourhoods in England with lower carbon footprints are often in dense, urban areas, where people tend to be less reliant on cars and more likely to live in energy-efficient flats.

Areas with higher carbon footprints are commonly found in rural areas, where travelling by car can be a necessity due to limited public transport.

Also, particularly in south-east England, people in these rural neighbourhoods are often wealthier, meaning they spend more money on flights and other high-emitting luxuries.

Ethnicity and deprivation

Carbon Brief also analysed the heat threat facing deprived neighbourhoods in England and those that are home to more people of colour.

Information about how many people identify as black, Asian and other minority ethnicities in each neighbourhood is based on 2021 census data, via the Office for National Statistics.

As the chart below shows, there is a clear correlation between the number of people of colour living in a neighbourhood and the likelihood of it facing extreme heat during periods of hot weather.

The most ethnically diverse neighbourhoods – where roughly half or more of the population are people of colour – are 15 times more likely to have high heat hazard scores than the least ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, where almost everyone is white.

Chart showing neighbourhoods in England that are home to more minority-ethnic people are far more likely to face extreme heat
Proportion of neighbourhoods in England with the highest heat hazard scores in each decile of minority-ethnic population. Each bar represents 10% of English neighbourhoods, ranked by their proportion of minority-ethnic inhabitants, from the highest (top bar) to the lowest (bottom bar). The “highest heat hazard scores” equate to the top 10% of total English neighbourhoods that are most likely to experience high temperatures during hot weather. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, 4 Earth Intelligence, Office for National Statistics.

Among the most diverse areas are parts of Newham in east London, Saltley in Birmingham and Spinney Hills in Leicester, all of which are inner-city areas.

The least diverse neighbourhoods range from coastal parts of Redcar and Cleveland in North Yorkshire to the rural villages of south Somerset. None of England’s hottest 1% of neighbourhoods are in this bracket.

Additionally, Carbon Brief assessed the relationship between levels of poverty and heat risk, based on England’s indices of deprivation dataset. This covers several measures of deprivation, including income, employment and health.

People living in the most deprived English neighbourhoods are more than three times as likely to face high levels of heat hazard as those in the least deprived neighbourhoods, as shown in the figure below.

Chart show more deprived areas in England are also more likely to experience extreme heat
Proportion of neighbourhoods in England with the highest heat hazard scores in each decile of deprivation. Each bar represents 10% of English neighbourhoods, ranked by their level of deprivation, from the highest (top bar) to the lowest (bottom bar). The “highest heat hazard scores” equate to the top 10% of total English neighbourhoods that are most likely to experience high temperatures during hot weather. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, 4 Earth Intelligence, UK government indices of deprivation for England.

The correlation between poverty and extreme heat is less extreme than the one between heat exposure and ethnicity.

While many of England’s most deprived areas are in cities, they are also clustered in some rural and coastal areas – such as parts of Cornwall and Lincolnshire – which tend to be cooler.

Urban heat island

The key phenomenon captured by this analysis is the urban heat island effect. This describes how cities – and particularly areas with dense buildings, roads and stretches of concrete that absorb heat – tend to be hotter than the surrounding countryside.

Cities such as London, Manchester and Birmingham have reached temperatures up to 5C hotter than the surrounding areas in recent decades, due to this effect.

The diagram below shows how air flows circulate between rural and urban areas, forming “heat domes” over cities.

Infographic diagram showing higher temperatures in cities lead to the formation of an urban heat dome
Illustration of air flow in and around a heat dome, based on Yang et al (2024). Graphic: Ada Carpenter, Carbon Brief.

Inner-city areas in England are also home to many people facing high levels of deprivation, as well as large black and Asian communities. Many of these communities are therefore exposed to more dangerous temperatures due to the urban heat island effect.

Access to green spaces, even within cities, also influences exposure to the urban heat island effect. Research has shown how people in deprived areas and people of colour – particularly black people – are more likely to live in areas with less access to green spaces.

There is already extensive scientific literature that uses satellite data to demonstrate the urban heat island effect in cities and other locations.

A number of studies have also used this data to show how people of colour and those living in poverty are more exposed to extreme heat. Much of this research has come from the US, where historic housing inequalities have created stark patterns of segregation in many cities.

A project led by environmental policy researcher Dr Angel Hsu of the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill shows how, globally, “cities are burdening lower-income populations with higher heat exposure”, as she tells Carbon Brief.

Given this, Hsu adds that “it’s not surprising to us to see similar disproportionate exposure patterns among UK neighbourhoods”.

Other researchers tell Carbon Brief that it is important to be wary of satellite data, as it does not precisely capture the air temperatures experienced in these neighbourhoods.

Dr Charles Simpson, who researches the health and economic impacts of climate change at University College London (UCL), notes:

“Satellite-measured surface temperature does not always correlate with the air temperature – what you are measuring includes a lot of road surfaces and rooftops. The air temperature is thought to be more directly relevant to people’s health and their cooling needs.”

Previous research has found that satellite data can therefore overestimate the urban heat island effect compared to data from weather stations.

These stations, however, are not widespread enough to allow comparisons with detailed neighbourhood data. They are particularly lacking in more deprived areas in England, potentially making measurements there less reliable.

Other scientists tell Carbon Brief that, in the absence of a comprehensive ground monitoring network, satellite measurements can serve as a stand-in to estimate heat exposure. Dr Chloe Brimicombe, an extreme-heat researcher based at the University of Graz, explains:

“Although it’s not a good indicator of perceived [temperature], it is a good indicator of what regions are most built up and have the environments that are most vulnerable to heat.”

‘Amplifying’ inequalities

There is a growing body of evidence gathered by activists, scientists and local governments around the UK revealing the unequal burden of climate change.

Dr Charles Ogunbode, an assistant professor of applied psychology at the University of Nottingham who specialises in how people experience climate change, tells Carbon Brief that this kind of data helps to clarify the links between climate change and inequalities:

“We can’t avoid dealing with the issue of social inequalities and climate change is just basically amplifying those things. It’s highlighting them, it’s revealing them. So whatever policies we put in place – be it in the health sector, be it in the climate sector – addressing those inequalities has to be an essential part of whatever those responses are.”

There are many factors influencing how people experience heat that are not captured in Carbon Brief’s analysis.

Previous work by researchers at the University of Manchester and Friends of the Earth has explored this issue, including an analysis of more than 40 indicators that could make neighbourhoods more “socially vulnerable” to heat.

This reveals similar outcomes, with people of colour and those contributing the least to climate change generally more vulnerable to its impacts.

One of the biggest factors that contributes to people’s exposure to heat extremes in the UK is the country’s housing stock, which is “not fit for the future”, according to the CCC.

UK homes have generally not been built for hotter conditions and poorer people are more likely to live in badly adapted housing. Those living in small homes, flats and social housing in England all “suffer significantly more overheating” during heatwaves, according to one study.

Dr Giorgos Petrou, a researcher in building physics modelling at UCL, tells Carbon Brief that it is also vital to consider whether households have the ability to adapt to climate change. “Amongst other factors, their capability will depend on their financial means and whether they own or rent their home,” he says.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that the government should act across its policy agenda to not only address extreme heat, but also support those who are most affected by it. This could involve expanding tree cover and renovating old social housing stock in at-risk communities.

Emma Howard Boyd, a former chair of the Environment Agency who also chaired the London Climate Resilience Review, tells Carbon Brief:

“I do think that with [the Labour] government focusing on house building and retrofit, this is a fantastic opportunity to get this right…For those communities that have had the least impact on the environment and climate change themselves.”

Methodology

This analysis collates several datasets that cover England at a neighbourhood level, with “neighbourhoods” defined as lower-layer super output areas (LSOAs). These are small statistical areas used by the UK government, covering populations of about 1,500-3,000 people. There are 33,755 LSOAs in England.

Data on vulnerability to heat comes from 4 Earth Intelligence (4EI), which analyses land surface temperature to generate “heat hazard” information at a 30m resolution. This detailed information has been converted into LSOAs by 4EI.

Heat hazard scores are calculated by 4EI, based on the likelihood that a given neighbourhood will experience high temperatures during hot weather, relative to the surrounding area.

Each score corresponds to a different percentile of English neighbourhoods. The bar below shows the percentage breakdown across all LSOAs in England.

The two hottest scores – those coloured in red – correspond to the 10% of English neighbourhoods that have higher heat hazard scores than the remaining 90%.

Chart: Carbon Brief analysed the 10% of English neighbourhoods with the highest heat hazard scores
Distribution of heat hazard scores across English neighbourhoods, as calculated by 4EI. The top two heat hazard scores are 5 – representing the 1% of neighbourhoods that are more prone to extreme heat than the remaining 99% – and 4, representing the 90th-99th percentile that are hotter than the remaining 90%. Source: 4 Earth Intelligence.

For simplicity, Carbon Brief’s analysis focuses on the red bars above, meaning neighbourhoods in either the top 90th-99th percentile or 99th percentile of heat hazard. (Neighbourhoods in the 90th-99th percentile have higher heat hazard scores than 90% of areas in England. Neighbourhoods in the 99th percentile have higher heat hazard scores than 99% of areas.)

It shows how these two scores are overrepresented in LSOAs that have lower carbon footprints, more diverse communities and higher levels of deprivation.

Carbon-footprint data is from the CREDS “place-based carbon calculator”, which estimates the average per-person carbon footprint for every LSOA in England. It accounts for emissions-producing activities ranging from electricity use to “consumption of goods and services”.

CREDS assigns the grades “A” to “F” (low carbon footprint to high carbon footprint) to neighbourhoods. Carbon Brief has based its carbon-footprint analysis on these grades.

LSOA-level data on black, Asian and other minority-ethnic populations comes from 2021 census data. English LSOAs were broken down into deciles, based on the percentage of the population that identified as non-white ethnicities.

The lowest decile covered the tenth of LSOAs with between 0 and 2% non-white minority-ethnic populations and the highest covered the tenth with more than 51%.

England’s indices of multiple deprivation dataset also includes LSOA-level information. It provides relative measures of deprivation for LSOAs in England, based on income, employment, education, health, crime, living environment and barriers to housing and services. Carbon Brief broke the LSOAs down into deciles based on the total deprivation scores, from the most deprived to the least deprived.

The post Analysis: England’s most ethnically diverse areas are 15 times more likely to face extreme heat appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: England’s most ethnically diverse areas are 15 times more likely to face extreme heat

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