Connect with us

Published

on

China’s energy sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions increased 5.2% in 2023, meaning a record fall of 4-6% is needed by 2025 to meet the government’s “carbon intensity” target.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and commercial data, shows rapid electricity demand growth and weak rains boosted demand for coal power in 2023, while the rebound from zero-Covid boosted demand for oil.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • China’s CO2 emissions have now increased by 12% between 2020 and 2023, after a highly energy- and carbon-intensive response to the Covid-19 pandemic.
  • This means CO2 emissions would need to fall by 4-6% by 2025, in order to meet the target of cutting China’s carbon intensity – its CO2 emissions per unit of economic output – by 18% during the 14th five-year plan period.
  • China is also at risk of missing all of its other key climate targets for 2025, including pledges to “strictly limit” coal demand growth and “strictly control” new coal power capacity, as well as targets for energy intensity, the share of low-carbon energy in overall demand and the share of renewables in energy demand growth.
  • Government pressure to hit the targets, most of which are in China’s updated international climate pledge under the Paris Agreement, makes it more likely that China’s CO2 emissions will peak before 2025 – far earlier than its target of peaking “before 2030”.

The deadline for peaking CO2 emissions has led officials and industries to pursue rapid emissions growth and carbon-intensive projects, while a window to do so remains open.

The government recently recognised and responded to the gap to meeting its targets, by calling for stronger controls on such projects, as well as faster renewables deployment.

Most of China’s climate targets can be met if the acceleration of clean energy deployment during 2023 is maintained – and if energy demand growth returns to pre-Covid levels.

China’s CO2 emissions continued to increase in 2023

According to preliminary official data, China’s total energy consumption increased by 5.7% in 2023, the first time since at least 2005 that energy demand has grown faster than GDP.

With coal consumption growing by 4.4%, our analysis shows CO2 emissions increasing by 5.2% – at the same rate as GDP – highlighting energy-intensive recent growth patterns.

China’s economic growth during and after the Covid-19 pandemic has been highly energy- and carbon-intensive. CO2 emissions grew at an average of 3.8% per year in 2021-23, up from 0.9% a year in 2016-20, while GDP growth slowed from an average of 5.7% to 5.4%.

Another year of rapidly rising emissions in 2023 leaves China way off track against its target of cutting carbon intensity by 18% during the 14th five-year plan (2021-25).

As a result, CO2 emissions would now need to fall by 4-6% by 2025 to hit the goal. This is illustrated in the figure below, showing historical emissions (black line) and the reductions needed by 2025 to hit the carbon intensity target, depending on the rate of GDP growth.

Even if China’s GDP growth is high and averages 6% per year in 2024-25, the intensity target requires CO2 emissions to fall by 4%.

China's CO2 emissions need to fall 4-6% by 2025 to meet its carbon intensity target
China’s CO2 emissions from energy, billion tonnes per year, and the reductions needed by 2025 to hit the carbon intensity target under low (4.5%), medium (5.2%) or high (6.0%) rates of GDP growth in 2024-25. Note the truncated y-axis. Source: Author calculations using official national bureau of statistics data. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The main drivers of the emissions increase in 2023 were coal-fired power and oil consumption, which increased by 6% and 8%, respectively.

A major reason for the growth in power generation from coal was that hydropower operating rates reached the lowest level in more than two decades due to a series of droughts. These operating rates are likely to recover towards average levels in 2024.

The increase in oil consumption represents a rebound from the slow demand growth during zero-Covid and an outright drop in 2022. Gas consumption rebounded as prices came down from 2022 highs, while still remaining elevated.

The clean energy manufacturing boom also has a role in driving emissions, due to energy-intensive processes involved in the production of solar PV and batteries, in particular.

Approximately one percentage-point of CO2 emission growth can be attributed to these sectors, based on output data and emission intensities estimated for solar PV, electric vehicles and batteries.

This means that, without the clean technology manufacturing boom, China’s CO2 emissions would have grown by around 4.2%, instead of the 5.2% estimated in our analysis.

Nevertheless, the increase in manufacturing will result in a significant reduction in emissions in net terms, once the products are in use. About half of this reduction will be realised outside of China, as the products are exported.

Back to top

China is off track to all of its 2025 climate targets

China’s climate pledge under the Paris Agreement (nationally determined contribution, NDC) was updated in 2021, following commitments made by President Xi Jinping earlier that year and incorporating targets set under the 14th five-year plan.

The updated NDC makes commitments to strictly limit coal consumption growth; strictly control new coal power; reduce energy and carbon intensity by 2025; and increase the share of non-fossil energy sources to 25% by 2030.

In addition, the country’s five-year plans set targets of increasing the share of non-fossil energy sources to 20% by 2025 and deriving more than 50% of the increase in energy use from 2020 to 2025 overall from renewable sources.

All of these targets are severely off track after 2023.

The table below lists the various climate- and energy-related targets, the progress seen from 2020-23 and what would be needed during 2024-25 to achieve each of the goals. (See below for further details on each indicator and what is needed by 2025.)

China’s 2025 climate commitments and targets in the energy sector

Indicator Target Progress in 2020-23 Change needed in 2024-25
Carbon intensity -18% -4.6% (-1.5%/year) -7%/year; reduce emissions in absolute terms
Energy intensity -13.5% -2% (-0.6%/year) -6%/year; reduce energy use in absolute terms
Coal consumption growth “strictly limit” Annual growth increased eightfold from 0.5% in 2016-20 to 3.8% Negative growth to limit increase to the same rate as previous five-year period
New coal power projects “strictly control” Permits increased fourfold, from 25GW per year in 2016-20 to 110GW per year Restrict new permits and review permits already granted
Non-fossil share of energy overall Increase by 4.1 percentage points Increased by 1.8 percentage points (0.6 points per year) Rate of increase has to double to 1.2 points per year
Share of energy consumption growth met by renewables Above 50% 30%, down from 42% in 2016-20 Renewable energy growth needs to double and energy consumption growth needs to slow to pre-Covid rate; total consumption of fossil fuels needs to fall.Renewable energy growth needs to double and energy consumption growth needs to slow to pre-Covid rate; total consumption of fossil fuels needs to fall.

The centrepiece of China’s 2020 and 2025 climate commitments has been reducing carbon intensity, or CO2 emissions from energy use per unit of GDP.

The country’s carbon intensity reportedly fell 48% from 2005 to 2020. China committed to an 18% fall from 2020 to 2025 – and to reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels by 2030, which requires a further reduction of at least 17% from 2025 to 2030.

However, as of the end of 2023, China’s carbon intensity has only fallen 5% in the 14th five-year plan period, lagging far behind the target of 18% from 2020 to 2025. If this target is to be met, CO2 emissions will have to come down in absolute terms from 2023 to 2025.

The figure below shows how China overachieved against its carbon intensity target for 2015-2020 but is veering increasingly off track against the goal for 2020-2025.

China beat its previous carbon intensity target but is now off track
Change in carbon intensity since 2005, %, and targets under the 13th and 14th five year plans. Source: Carbon intensity improvements until 2022 compiled from China’s annual Statistical Communiques and aligned with the reduction reported until 2020 in China’s official communication to the UNFCCC. Improvement in 2023 calculated from preliminary official energy data. Chart by Carbon Brief.

China’s energy intensity increased by 0.5% in 2023, the first annual rise since at least 2005. From 2020 to 2023, energy intensity only fell 2%.

The figure below shows that China narrowly missed its energy intensity target during the 13th five-year plan period, spanning 2016 to 2020, as progress halted in 2020. The country is now far off track for its 14th five-year plan target.

Indeed, to meet the target of a 13.5% reduction over 2020-25 – given the lack of progress as of the end of 2023 – energy consumption would have to fall in absolute terms over the next two years, while the rate of GDP growth is maintained or accelerated. This makes the goal all but unachievable.

China’s energy intensity target is now all but unachievable
Change in energy intensity since 2005, %, and targets under the 13th and 14th five year plans. Source: Energy consumption growth until 2022 from national bureau of statistics annual data. Change in 2023 calculated from preliminary official energy data. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The share of China’s energy demand met by non-fossil sources has increased by 1.8 percentage points from 2020 to 2023, against a target of 4.1 points by 2025.

This is shown in the figure below, illustrating the targeted 15% share for non-fossil energy by 2020 and 20% by 2025, as well as progress to date.

Meeting the 2025 target would mean that the rate of increase needs to double for the next two years. Moreover, if energy demand growth continues at the exceptionally high rate of 2020 to 2023, then energy production from non-fossil sources would need to grow at 11.3% per year to meet the target, up from 8.5% in the past three years.

Alternatively, the growth of renewables and nuclear could be maintained – but energy consumption growth would have to slow down to its pre-Covid average.

China is targeting 20% of energy from non-fossil sources by 2025
Share of energy consumption met by non-fossil sources, %, and targets under the 13th and 14th five year plans. Source: National bureau of statistics annual data until 2022 and preliminary data for 2023. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Only 30% of energy consumption growth has been met by renewable energy in 2020 to 2023, against a target of more than 50% during 2020-25.

This is illustrated in the figure below, showing contributions to annual energy demand growth from fossil fuels (grey bars), nuclear (blue) and renewables (red).

The 50% target is now highly unlikely to be met without a slowdown in energy consumption growth. Without a slowdown, renewables would have to grow by 20% per year to meet the target, up from 8.9% in the past three years.

Only 30% of China’s recent energy demand growth has been met by renewables - short of the 50% target
Share of energy demand growth met by fossil fuels (grey), nuclear (blue) and renewables (red), %, and the target for 2020-2025 (red dashed line). Source: National bureau of statistics annual data until 2022 and preliminary data for 2023. As the headline energy supply statistics only report the total for nuclear and renewables, the contribution of nuclear is disaggregated using electricity generation data in national bureau of statistics industrial output statistics. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Both growth in coal consumption and new coal power projects accelerated sharply in 2021-23, despite Xi’s pledges to “strictly control” them.

This is illustrated in the figure below, with annual coal consumption growth on the left and the amount of new coal capacity added each year on the right.

Indeed, the average growth rate of coal consumption increased 8-fold from 0.5% per year in 2016-20 to 3.8% per year in 2021-23.

Similarly, new coal power approvals increased fourfold in 2022-23, compared with the five years before the “strictly control” pledge, based on analysis of Global Energy Monitor data.

China pledged to 'strictly limit' coal demand growth and 'strictly control' new coal capacity
Left: Coal consumption growth per year, %. Right: Capacity of new coal power plants given permits, gigawatts. Source: Coal consumption from national bureau of statistics annual data until 2022 and preliminary data for 2023. Coal power plant approvals from analysis of Global Energy Monitor data. Charts by Carbon Brief.

Since the beginning of 2022, a total of 218 gigawatts (GW) of new coal power plants have been permitted. By the end of 2023, some 89GW of this capacity had already started construction, while 128GW had yet to break ground.

Furthermore, the government’s official policy has shifted to strongly encouraging new coal power. An assessment of the projects permitted in 2022-23 shows that requirements, set for approving new coal power plants in August 2021, have not been enforced.

Statements from developers and government officials – see below – confirm that the 14th five-year plan period until 2025 is being seen as a “window of opportunity” for new coal power plants, rather than a period when new projects are strictly controlled.

This is causing a rush to secure permits for new projects. China Shenhua called the period until 2025 “an opportune time for thermal power construction”. The provincial state-owned enterprise supervisor boasts of Inner Mongolia Energy Group “achieving a flying start” to 2023 and “seizing the policy window” for coal power projects.

The Zhejiang province energy regulator emphasised the importance of seizing the time window for thermal power construction during the 14th five-year period.

Power China called for joint efforts with local government officials to exploit the coal power development window effectively, citing a plan known as “three times 80GW”. This refers to a proposal promoted by the thermal power construction industry to permit and commission 80GW of coal power plants each year, from 2022 to 2024.

The meaning of the pledges to “strictly control” growth in coal consumption and new coal power projects lacks a precise definition. However, a sharp acceleration of coal consumption growth and coal power plant approvals, along with active government promotion of new projects, is hard to reconcile with the pledge to exert strict control.

By this logic, meeting the pledge on coal consumption growth would require, at the very least, reducing coal use from 2023 to 2025 to bring the growth rate during the 2021 to 2025 period closer to the rate during the preceding five-year period.

Similarly, meeting the commitment to control new coal power projects would require enforcing existing policy to limit new schemes, restricting new permits and reviewing permits already granted, to limit the acceleration compared with the preceding five-year period.

Back to top

Official energy data is over-reporting coal consumption growth

In 2022, government policies seeking to increase coal mine output and push down coal prices led to a sharp deterioration in the quality and calorific value of coal produced.

This fall in quality meant that the weight of coal being consumed increased by far more than the amount of energy supplied or CO2 emitted from that coal.

China’s official statistics failed to capture the change and consequently over-reported the growth in coal consumption and under-reported the improvement in CO2 intensity in 2022. This 2022 data could be expected to be revised once more complete energy statistics are released later.

Unlike in 2022, the officially-reported coal consumption growth rate for 2023 is more closely aligned with growth in coal power generation and output in key heavy industry sectors. The data indicates that coal use grew 4.4% in 2023, while power generation from coal rose 6%.

However, the conclusion that CO2 emissions need to fall from 2023 to 2025 to meet the carbon intensity target holds, even if a correction to 2022 data is made.

Calculating with current official data, CO2 emissions need to fall by 3.8-6.5% in the next two years, depending on the growth rate of GDP.

Based on my previous estimate that the growth in CO2 emissions in 2022 was inflated by 2.3 percentage points, a correction for 2022 would put the required reduction at 1.6-4.3%.

Back to top

Government response

Energy intensity and carbon intensity reduction are among the 20 “main indicators” specified in China’s overarching five-year plan for 2021-25.

The mid-term evaluation of progress, published by China’s top economic planner the national development and reform commission (NDRC) in December 2023, identified these indicators as two of the four that were off track, along with a key air quality target.

(Air pollution concentrations also rose in 2023 due to increased industrial and transportation emissions, along with unfavourable weather conditions.)

In late 2023, the NDRC reprimanded the provinces of Hubei, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangdong and Chongqing for lagging behind on the targets to control energy intensity and total energy consumption.

Zhou Dadi, a member of the national climate change expert advisory committee, pointed to the weak growth in service industries as the reason for the lack of progress on the intensity targets.

Service sectors have relatively low energy demand and carbon emissions relative to economic output, so the decline in their share of economic activity tends to increase the energy and carbon intensity of the economy.

The NDRC’s evaluation report also identified measures to achieve the targets, including improving policies to control energy use and carbon emissions, curbing the initiation of projects with high energy consumption and high emissions, strictly limiting total coal consumption, promoting a shift to cleaner industry and transportation, promoting energy conservation and, importantly, accelerating the deployment of renewable energy.

Back to top

The clean energy boom can allow most targets to be met

While China fell severely behind on its 2025 climate targets for the energy sector, the past two years saw a veritable boom in clean energy installations – particularly solar power.

This boom puts most of the targets still in reach, especially if energy demand growth returns to the pre-Covid rates.

My earlier analysis showed that China’s CO2 emissions could fall this year and then stabilise, if additions of low-carbon power generation continue at 2023 rates and electricity demand returns to trend.

Under this projection, CO2 emissions fall by approximately 1.5% from 2023 to 2025. Therefore, achieving the 4-6% reduction in CO2 emissions needed to meet the CO2 intensity target from 2023 to 2025 would require further acceleration in clean energy deployment, or a sharp slowdown in energy demand growth.

The increase in the share of non-fossil energy should be possible to achieve given the sharp increase in solar and wind installations in 2023. To start with, slow progress was partially caused by the record-low hydropower operating rates in 2023, linked to record droughts.

Even if energy demand continued to grow at the 2020-23 rate, continued low-carbon energy additions at the 2023 level should suffice to raise the share of non-fossil energy to 21%, comfortably ahead of the target.

The target of renewable energy contributing half of the growth in total energy demand is significantly more challenging.

If energy consumption growth rate slows down to its pre-Covid average and clean energy capacity additions continue at the 2023 rate, enabling the growth rate of renewable energy production to almost double to 16%, then the target would likely be reached.

This would also mean a reduction in the total consumption of fossil fuels and a reduction in energy sector CO2 emissions. This scenario would arguably also meet the commitment to “strictly limit the growth in coal consumption”.

Meeting the pledge to “strictly control” new coal power projects would mean thoroughly assessing the justification for permits granted in the past two years and restricting the issuance of new permits.

The large amount of electricity storage being deployed – especially pumped hydro, but increasingly also grid-connected batteries – reduces the need for thermal power plants.

For a significant restriction of new coal power to be possible while ensuring electricity supply security, progress would also be needed on power system reforms that increase flexibility and make more efficient use of existing capacity.

China’s clean energy boom has been happening much faster than official targets for wind and solar installations would require, driven by enthusiasm from local governments, state-owned enterprises and investors.

However, due to the rapid increase in energy consumption, meeting China’s headline climate targets now requires that the momentum of clean energy installations is maintained.

Back to top

About the data

Total energy consumption and energy mix were taken from national bureau of statistics annual data. Improvements in energy intensity and carbon intensity were compiled from the bureau’s annual statistical communiques and changes in carbon emissions were calculated based on reported GDP growth and carbon intensity improvement.

Growth in total energy consumption and changes in the energy mix were taken from preliminary information released by the national bureau of statistics. Growth in CO2 emissions in 2023 was calculated using Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change default emission factors based on changes in the consumption of coal, oil and gas.

Back to top

The post Analysis: Record drop in China’s CO2 emissions needed to meet 2025 target appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Record drop in China’s CO2 emissions needed to meet 2025 target

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Week Two at COP30: What Happens When the World Can’t Agree

Published

on

I’m writing this from Boston, not Belém. I left COP30 a day before it ended—exhausted, frustrated, and strangely hopeful all at once.

Brazil’s presidency pushed hard to close the deal, with President Lula returning to witness what they hoped would be a historic finish. Draft texts circulated rapidly. But negotiators were still debating language that over 80 countries wanted included, while others refused. The venue briefly shut down after a fire, then reopened. Civil society held a “funeral for fossil fuels” in the streets while diplomats removed any mention of a fossil fuel phase-out from the draft agreement.

This is what Week Two taught me: global climate policy is messy, imperfect, and maddeningly slow. And yet, something important is still happening.

The Hard Truth About Consensus

Here’s what didn’t make it into the final text: a roadmap for a fossil fuel phase-out. Over 80 countries pushed for it. Small island nations whose existence depends on it advocated for it. Youth activists and Indigenous leaders demanded it. And it was removed.

Some negotiating blocs, including the Arab Group and Like-Minded Developing Countries, opposed any language on fossil fuels in the final agreement. In consensus-based negotiations, that’s all it takes. One bloc says no, and the whole thing stalls.

But here’s what educators and students need to understand: the absence of that language doesn’t mean the conversation isn’t shifting. Three years ago, fossil fuel phase-out wasn’t even on the agenda. Now it’s what over 80 countries are fighting for. That’s movement, even when it doesn’t feel like it.

The Shift No One’s Talking About

Here’s what I’ve learned after attending multiple global forums: the real negotiations aren’t happening where you think they are.

Brazil’s aggressive push to finish on time revealed something important — when host countries center their own priorities (in this case, Indigenous leadership and Amazon protection), it fundamentally changes what’s “negotiable.” The fossil fuel language got removed, yes, but Indigenous participation went from roughly 200 people at previous COPs to over 900 at COP30. That’s a 350% increase.

This is strategic presence in action. When you change who’s in the room, you change what’s possible — even if outcomes aren’t immediate.

After years of working in global meetings and events, I’ve developed what I call the Presence-to-Policy approach. It has four elements: who’s in the room (strategic presence), how they engage (cultural intelligence), what networks form (relationship architecture), and what outcomes emerge (policy influence). COP30 demonstrated this perfectly — increase Indigenous presence from 200 to 900+ participants, and you don’t just add voices. You shift what’s considered legitimate knowledge, what matters as a priority, and which solutions are explored.

For educators: this is the lesson. Representation isn’t symbolic. It’s tactical.

When Money Becomes the Sticking Point

Adaptation finance became one of the headline topics this year — and one of the most contentious. Countries were pushed to triple adaptation finance to $120 billion, but by the end of Week Two, no new concrete commitments emerged. The Adaptation Fund is facing a significant deficit while wealthy nations negotiate how much they’ll actually contribute.

This is where cultural intelligence matters. In many Western diplomatic contexts, finance discussions and moral discussions often operate separately. But many Global South delegations frame climate finance as reparations, as justice, as basic accountability. When you understand that framing, you know why these negotiations feel so urgent, so non-negotiable.

One encouraging shift: finance ministries and environment ministries are finally working together on climate issues. Initiatives like the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action are bringing economic decision-makers into conversations previously dominated by environmental officials. This convergence matters more than most headlines suggest — it’s the structural change that enables everything else.

What Stayed Strong

Despite frustrations, some things held. Indigenous representation remained centered throughout Week Two. Over 900 Indigenous participants continued to lead conversations, present traditional knowledge systems, and refuse to be sidelined. Even when access to decision-making spaces remained imperfect, they fundamentally changed what this COP prioritized.

Civil society showed up relentlessly. The “funeral for fossil fuels” wasn’t just theater — it was thousands refusing to let negotiators ignore what science demands. Health workers added urgent voices, bringing research showing that fossil fuels drive 7 million premature deaths annually from air pollution alone. Yet even as medical professionals demonstrated direct connections between fossil fuels and human suffering, these fuels remained largely absent from official negotiations.

For Climate Generation’s Work

This connects directly to overcoming disinformation. Because one form of disinformation is the narrative that global forums are useless, that diplomacy doesn’t work, that nothing ever changes. The truth is more complex: change happens slowly, unevenly, and through sustained pressure from multiple directions.

And when negotiations fail to produce what’s needed, localized action becomes even more critical. That’s where actual implementation happens — in communities, classrooms, and organizations that refuse to wait for international consensus. This is Climate Generation’s approach to personalizing and localizing climate change action in practice.

Three Classroom Applications

For educators working with Climate Generation’s mission, here are practical ways to use COP30:

1. Teach coalition-building, not just science. Have students map the 80+ country alliance pushing for fossil fuel language. What do Small Island Developing States, European nations, and Latin American countries have in common? This teaches geopolitics through climate.

2. Explore the disinformation narrative. The “COPs don’t work” message serves fossil fuel interests. Help students analyze who benefits from climate action paralysis. This builds critical thinking about the systems that perpetuate the crisis.

3. Examine power through presence. Compare Indigenous participation at previous COPs with that at COP30. What changed when representation increased by 350%? How did this shift priorities? This connects directly to Climate Generation’s work centering anti-racism and systemic equity.

What COP30 Means for Antalya

COPs are often judged immediately and deemed “failures.” But their real impact shows up 2-3 years later when relationships built here materialize into policy shifts.

Watch what happens at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, next year. The over-80-country coalition pushing for fossil fuel language won’t disappear. The health workers making connections between fossil fuels and human suffering won’t stop. The finance and environment ministries learning to work together will keep building bridges.

Climate Generation’s work preparing the next generation matters because these young people will inherit these coalitions, these relationships, these incremental shifts. They need to understand not just the science of climate change, but the mechanics of how power actually moves.

That’s not taught in most classrooms. But it should be.

Coming Home

As I sit in Boston processing these two weeks, I keep thinking about that environmental justice leader from the Gulf Coast, the Indigenous forest guardians who traveled days to make their voices heard, and the youth activists holding a funeral for fossil fuels in the streets.

They’re not waiting for perfect agreements. They’re building movements that outlast individual COPs, that shift power gradually, that create change from multiple directions at once.

That’s what Climate Generation does — it builds sustained capacity to act through centering marginalized communities, working with BIPOC partners on the convergence of racial and climate justice, and engaging educators and students where disinformation is most prevalent.

COP30 didn’t deliver everything it needed to. But it delivered relationships, knowledge, pressure, and possibility. That’s not nothing.

The work continues — in Belém, in Antalya next year, in communities worldwide, and in every classroom — refusing to accept an inadequate status quo.

___

About This Partnership: Climate Generation provided COP30 credentials to Terra40 in exchange for on-the-ground insights and educational content. Learn more at climategen.org. Learn more about Terra40’s global climate engagement work at terra40.com.

The post Week Two at COP30: What Happens When the World Can’t Agree appeared first on Climate Generation.

Week Two at COP30: What Happens When the World Can’t Agree

Continue Reading

Climate Change

COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel shift but triples finance for climate adaptation

Published

on

After all-night talks, governments at COP30 agreed on Saturday to launch limited initiatives to strengthen emissions-cutting plans, as well as tripling finance to help poor countries cope with worsening climate change impacts by 2035. But the Amazon summit’s outcomes fell short on the global transition away from oil, gas and coal.

In an effort to deliver something on fossil fuels, the Brazilian presidency complemented the final Belém package by promising to create roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and protecting forests – as requested by Brazilian President Lula da Silva.  

Brazil tabled its roadmap proposal at the eleventh hour as a compromise solution after some nations – especially European and Latin American states – voiced disappointment that a formal deal was not reached on one after strong pushback from large fossil fuel producers led by Saudi Arabia. 

Brazil’s roadmap process will sit outside the UN climate regime. It will be supported by other countries such as Colombia, which is organising the first global conference on the issue, said COP30 president André Aranha Corrêa do Lago. He added that he will also craft a second roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation and report back to the COP on them both.  

“We know some of you had greater ambition for some of the issues at hand,” Corrêa do Lago told a closing plenary. “I will try not to disappoint you.” 

    After week-long row, COP30 fails to mention fossil fuels

    After more than 80 countries called for a roadmap to phase down oil, coal and gas to be kickstarted at COP30, observers said fossil fuel heavyweights, including Gulf States, Russia and India, had insisted it stay out of the final Global Mutirão decision adopted in Belém, along with any explicit mention of fossil fuels. 

    On Friday, the European Union and the UK had fought hard against that opposition but ultimately had to settle for two new processes that are meant to reinforce ambition and implementation of countries’ national climate plans (NDCs), with reports and a high-level dialogue due next year. 

    Before the final plenary, EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra said it had been “an intense and sometimes difficult week and evening”, adding “we would have liked to have more”. But, he said, “we think we should support [the COP outcome] because at least it is going in the right direction.”

    The Mutirão text encourages countries ”to strengthen their existing nationally determined contribution at any time with a view to enhancing its level of ambition” and calls on them to accelerate their implementation “while striving to do better collectively and cooperatively”.

    In a last-minute push, Colombia – which championed a declaration to transition away from oil, coal and gas – told the closing plenary the country was “left with no other choice” but to object to the outcome of the dedicated mitigation track on emission-cutting efforts unless a mention to fossil fuels was added. After the presidency tried to dismiss concerns, Colombia insisted and the plenary was suspended.

    The Colombian delegate calls for the inclusion of fossil fuels in the final decision. Photo: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth

    The Colombian delegate calls for the inclusion of fossil fuels in the final decision. Photo: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth

    Developed countries – especially the EU – had felt isolated in their push for stronger language on emission-cutting measures after failing to win vocal support from traditional allies such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 

    That was mainly because of Europe’s inability to make a compelling offer on finance for adaptation, negotiators and observers said.

    “Adaptation COP” triples finance for climate resilience

    A demand from the world’s poorest nations to triple adaptation finance was agreed, but only by a deadline of 2035 rather than 2030, and without a clear number.

    However, the main Mutirão decision urges developed countries to increase their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to the Global South. It also sets up a two-year process on climate finance as well as a high-level ministerial roundtable to discuss progress towards meeting the new climate finance goal agreed last year at COP29.

    That COP29 goal sets a target for rich nations to provide $300 billion a year for climate action by 2035 – and the tripling of adaptation finance decided in Belem will be part of this, as the EU had insisted.

    “It is very clear that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with the poorest nations,” the EU’s climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said before the final conference session began.

    Some African ministers gave the outcome on adaptation finance a cautious welcome. But many countries – including the EU, some Latin American states, Switzerland and Canada – were angry about a text that adopted indicators to measure progress on adaptation efforts.

    They made interventions rejecting the decision on a new Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) –  expected to be a flagship outcome at this COP – which included a rewritten and shortened list of metrics to measure progress on climate resilience originally developed by technical experts.

    Jiwoh Abdulai, environment minister of Sierra Leone, said they had worked tirelessly to craft a set of indicators that would reflect “lived realities” on the ground, but are now left with “unclear, unmeasurable and – in many cases – unusable” ones. 

    “For us, this is not technical, this is about our survival,” he added before the plenary was suspended.

    COP30 President Andre Correa do Lago in consultations after the closing plenary was suspended. Photo: Ueslei Marcelino/COP30

    COP30 President Andre Correa do Lago in consultations after the closing plenary was suspended. Photo: Ueslei Marcelino/COP30

    Trade and just transition land wins in Belém deal

    As the Belem political package was adopted to muted applause from countries, campaigners at the back of the room whooped with joy as the conference approved a decision on just transition.

    They and developing countries had swung behind a new “Belém Action Mechanism”, intended to serve as a hub to support countries in taking concrete steps to ensure their shift from dirty to clean energy systems is fair and equitable.  

    The Mutirão decision also includes trade, another key issue that was not on the official negotiating agenda, along with long-term climate finance and the gap in emissions-cutting ambition.

    Annual dialogues will take place at the next three mid-year Bonn sessions on boosting international cooperation on trade – an emerging economy priority in the context of a carbon levy on imports proposed by the EU.

    Experts said the inclusion of trade in a COP decision was a big win for China. “For the first time, trade is elevated alongside mitigation and finance as a critical third pillar for climate progress,” said Kate Logan, director of China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, adding that this “is likely to remain a key arena for China’s influence” in the climate regime.

    The decision reaffirms that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.

    The post COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel shift but triples finance for climate adaptation appeared first on Climate Home News.

    https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/11/22/cop30-brazil-deal-fossil-fuel-transition-fails-triples-finance-climate-adaptation/

    Continue Reading

    Climate Change

    COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation

    Published

    on

    After all-night talks, governments at COP30 agreed on Saturday to launch limited initiatives to strengthen emissions-cutting plans, as well as tripling finance to help poor countries cope with worsening climate change impacts by 2035. But the Amazon summit’s outcomes fell short on the global transition away from oil, gas and coal.

    In an effort to deliver something on fossil fuels, the Brazilian presidency complemented the final Belém package by promising to create roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and protecting forests – as requested by Brazilian President Lula da Silva.

    Brazil tabled its roadmap proposal at the eleventh hour as a compromise solution after some nations – especially European and Latin American states – voiced disappointment that a formal deal was not reached on one after strong pushback from large fossil fuel producers led by Saudi Arabia. 

    Brazil’s roadmap process will sit outside the UN climate regime. It will be supported by other countries such as Colombia, which is organising the first global conference on the issue, said COP30 president André Aranha Corrêa do Lago. He added that he will also craft a second roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation and report back to the COP on them both.

    “We know some of you had greater ambition for some of the issues at hand,” Corrêa do Lago told a closing plenary. “I will try not to disappoint you.”

      After week-long row, COP30 fails to mention fossil fuels

      After more than 80 countries called for a roadmap to phase down oil, coal and gas to be kickstarted at COP30, observers said fossil fuel heavyweights, including Gulf States, Russia and India, had insisted it stay out of the final Global Mutirão decision adopted in Belém, along with any explicit mention of fossil fuels.

      On Friday, the European Union and the UK had fought hard against that opposition but ultimately had to settle for two new processes that are meant to reinforce ambition and implementation of countries’ national climate plans (NDCs), with reports and a high-level dialogue due next year.

      Before the final plenary, EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra said it had been “an intense and sometimes difficult week and evening”, adding “we would have liked to have more”. But, he said, “we think we should support [the COP outcome] because at least it is going in the right direction.”

      The Mutirão text encourages countries ”to strengthen their existing nationally determined contribution at any time with a view to enhancing its level of ambition” and calls on them to accelerate their implementation “while striving to do better collectively and cooperatively”.

      In a last-minute push, Colombia – which championed a declaration to transition away from oil, coal and gas – told the closing plenary the country was “left with no other choice” but to object to the outcome of the dedicated mitigation track on emission-cutting efforts unless a mention to fossil fuels was added. After the presidency tried to dismiss concerns, Colombia insisted and the plenary was suspended.

      The Colombian delegate calls for the inclusion of fossil fuels in the final decision. Photo: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth

      The Colombian delegate calls for the inclusion of fossil fuels in the final decision. Photo: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth

      Developed countries – especially the EU – had felt isolated in their push for stronger language on emission-cutting measures after failing to win vocal support from traditional allies such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

      That was mainly because of Europe’s inability to make a compelling offer on finance for adaptation, negotiators and observers said.

      “Adaptation COP” triples finance for climate resilience

      A demand from the world’s poorest nations to triple adaptation finance was agreed, but only by a deadline of 2035 rather than 2030, and without a clear number.

      However, the main Mutirão decision urges developed countries to increase their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to the Global South. It also sets up a two-year process on climate finance as well as a high-level ministerial roundtable to discuss progress towards meeting the new climate finance goal agreed last year at COP29.

      That COP29 goal sets a target for rich nations to provide $300 billion a year for climate action by 2035 – and the tripling of adaptation finance decided in Belem will be part of this, as the EU had insisted.

      “It is very clear that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with the poorest nations,” the EU’s climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said before the final conference session began.

      Poorest countries appeal for more adaptation finance at COP30

      Some African ministers gave the outcome on adaptation finance a cautious welcome. But many countries – including the EU, some Latin American states, Switzerland and Canada – were angry about a text that adopted indicators to measure progress on adaptation efforts.

      They made interventions rejecting the decision on a new Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) – expected to be a flagship outcome at this COP – which included a rewritten and shortened list of metrics to measure progress on climate resilience originally developed by technical experts.

      Jiwoh Abdulai, environment minister of Sierra Leone, said they had worked tirelessly to craft a set of indicators that would reflect “lived realities” on the ground, but are now left with “unclear, unmeasurable and – in many cases – unusable” ones.

      “For us, this is not technical, this is about our survival,” he added before the plenary was suspended.

      COP30 President Andre Correa do Lago in consultations after the closing plenary was suspended. Photo: Ueslei Marcelino/COP30

      COP30 President Andre Correa do Lago in consultations after the closing plenary was suspended. Photo: Ueslei Marcelino/COP30

      Trade and just transition land wins in Belém deal

      As the Belem political package was adopted to muted applause from countries, campaigners at the back of the room whooped with joy as the conference approved a decision on just transition.

      They and developing countries had swung behind a new “Belém Action Mechanism”, intended to serve as a hub to support countries in taking concrete steps to ensure their shift from dirty to clean energy systems is fair and equitable.

      The Mutirão decision also includes trade, another key issue that was not on the official negotiating agenda, along with long-term climate finance and the gap in emissions-cutting ambition.

      Annual dialogues will take place at the next three mid-year Bonn sessions on boosting international cooperation on trade – an emerging economy priority in the context of a carbon levy on imports proposed by the EU.

      COP31 will be hosted by Türkiye but run by Australia

      Experts said the inclusion of trade in a COP decision was a big win for China. “For the first time, trade is elevated alongside mitigation and finance as a critical third pillar for climate progress,” said Kate Logan, director of China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, adding that this “is likely to remain a key arena for China’s influence” in the climate regime.

      The decision reaffirms that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.

      The post COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation appeared first on Climate Home News.

      COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation

      Continue Reading

      Trending

      Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com