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Only half of China’s provinces have finalised new rules for pricing wind and solar power, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Local governments are required to have published final plans to reform the way wind and solar power is priced in their jurisdiction before the end of this year.

This follows the release of a central government directive in February – known as “Document 136” (136号文) – that calls for developing a more “market-based” approach to pricing newly installed renewable projects.

The new rules will replace the previous pricing mechanism, which gave wind and solar generators guaranteed sales at a fixed price tied to the benchmark electricity price from coal.

The shift towards market-based pricing for wind and solar is seen as a key uncertainty for the sector, with implications for China’s wider energy and emissions targets.

Carbon Brief analysis finds that, as of 15 October 2025, only 18 provinces had issued finalised “Document 136” plans.

Another 10 have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet have yet to indicate what their strategies will be.

Central direction, local rules

In February this year, China’s central government issued a notice on “deepening market-based reform of feed-in tariffs for new energy”, also known as “Document 136”.

The document calls on local governments to develop plans for new pricing mechanisms for wind and solar power, applicable to projects completed on or after 1 June 2025.

Local governments are expected to develop “sustainable new-energy pricing mechanisms” (新能源可持续发展价格结算机制), in which they only offer a fixed price to a set amount of new wind and solar capacity each year.

The amount offered a fixed price is to be linked to each province’s annual clean-energy installation quotas. Moreover, the fixed price is to be determined at auction, through a mechanism resembling the UK’s contract for difference (CfD).

Any additional wind and solar projects, which are unable to secure contracts via the provincial auction mechanism, would need to find buyers for their electricity on the open market. This could be done through a “power purchase agreement” with a grid operator or a large industrial user, for example, or by selling their power in spot markets.

The move is part of wider efforts to shift China’s giant electricity system towards more market-based operation, rather than running on rules set by the government, including prices for coal-fired power plants determined by bureaucrats.

The shift towards market-based pricing for renewables has been attributed to both the falling costs of building new solar and windfarms, as well as to the grid challenges created by record renewable capacity additions.

At the time of the policy’s release earlier this year, analysts expected the rules to have a chilling effect on China’s wind and solar buildout in the short term, as developers adjust to the new rules and to lower – and more uncertain – prices set at auction.

The notice led to a rush of new capacity additions ahead of the June cut-off, with an estimated 100 solar cells being installed every second in the month of May.

However, a subsequent policy requiring cement, polysilicon and iron and steel manufacturers, as well as certain types of data centres, to use renewable power to fulfil a certain proportion of their overall consumption has been seen as a “backstop” that may buoy industry demand for new wind and solar capacity.

Furthermore, analysts believe that “Document 136” may strengthen China’s clean-energy industries in the long term, by forcing companies to become more innovative and competitive.

Below, Carbon Brief lists which provinces have published finalised “Document 136” pricing plans (green), which provinces have published a form of draft plan (yellow) and which provinces have yet not published their plans at all (white).

By default, provinces are listed in order of the size of their energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, based on a dataset for 2022 from the thinktank Institute of Global Decarbonization Progress.

New territory

So far, Carbon Brief finds, only just over half of provinces have issued finalised plans. Collectively, these provinces account for 61% of China’s energy-related emissions.

Another 10, representing 31% of emissions, have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet – the final 8% of CO2 – have yet to publish anything.

A few provinces published finalised rules in early June, including renewable-power heavyweights Shandong and Inner Mongolia.

(Inner Mongolia’s power grid is split into two zones – “Inner Mongolia East” and “Inner Mongolia West” – which are administered separately.)

In a nationwide conference call at the end of August, National Energy Administration officials urged provinces to “promptly promote” concrete plans.

Eleven provinces have published finalised rules since then, including major polluters Heilongjiang, Hebei and Guangdong, with a further eight publishing draft rules, according to Carbon Brief calculations. 

The delay in provinces completing their plans can be attributed to the fact that local policymakers are trying to establish a completely new system of pricing power from scratch, says David Fishman, principal at energy consultancy the Lantau Group.

He tells Carbon Brief that, for some of the provinces that have issued finalised rules, “fairly meaningful differences” can be found between the final version and earlier drafts – indicating a high level of debate on the best path forward.

Shandong province was the first to issue draft rules, setting the tone for other local governments’ documents.

The eastern province is seen as a leader both in renewable energy additions and in undertaking power-market reforms. It is also the largest source of energy-related emissions in China.

Its plan saw notable policy innovations, such as setting an auction subscription threshold of 125% to encourage competition, by ensuring that not all bidders will be successful.

In September, it also became the first province in China to hold auctions for solar and wind power under the new rules, with the winning bidders securing prices of 0.319 yuan per kilowatt-hour (yuan/kWh) for wind and 0.225 yuan/kWh for solar.

These prices are equivalent to £33.8 per megawatt hour (MWh), or $44.8/MWh, for wind and £23.8/MWh, or $31.6/MWh, for solar.

While the wind prices are seen as high enough to be relatively acceptable to project developers, the price for solar is below the level thought to be needed to finance such developments. As such, it could “discourage” further solar investment in the province, Reuters reports.

Shortly afterwards, the southwestern province of Yunnan also held its first renewables auction, setting a price of 0.33 yuan/kWh for both wind and solar projects.

Effect on future additions

Analysts disagree about what impact the “Document 136” policy will have on the pace of China’s clean-energy additions.

The country installed a record 360 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar in 2024, followed by an even higher 212GW in the first half of 2025 for solar alone, as developers rushed to complete ahead of the June deadline.

In September, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a target of 3,600GW of wind and solar capacity by 2035 as part of the country’s new “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) to the Paris Agreement.

While hugely ambitious in the context of current global wind and solar capacity, which stood at 1,400GW at the end of 2024, this new goal is equivalent to just 200GW of new wind and solar per year. This would be a significant slowdown compared with China’s recent pace of expansion.

Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief that he does not see the pricing reforms as a “signal of a structural slowdown in clean capacity [additions]”. He adds:

“Adding panels and turbines is the easy part…China is rewiring the world’s largest power sector, with multiple layers of interests and legacy assets to manage. In navigating this complexity, pledge targets act as a floor, providing certainty to clean-energy developers and clean-tech manufacturers. The NDC goal reflects what decision-makers are confident China can deliver given these constraints.”

But Fishman, writing on LinkedIn, notes that the pricing reforms could make it “challenging” for China to hit Xi’s new 2035 target.

Renewables developers are not incentivised to sustain previous years’ high installation figures under the local rules that have been rolled out so far, he notes, adding: “We will be lucky to see 200GW in a single year again for a long time.”

In its Renewables 2025 report, published in October 2025, the International Energy Agency (IEA) shaved 5% off its outlook for wind and solar growth in China out to 2030, a reduction of 129GW. It attributes this downgrade to the country’s renewable pricing reforms “impacting project economics and lowering growth expectations”.

Nevertheless, it adds that China is still projected to add “nearly 2,660GW” of new renewable capacity between 2025 and 2030, meaning that it would reach its 2035 wind and solar target “five years ahead of schedule”.

Bolstering storage demand

Beyond wind and solar capacity, “Document 136” also signalled potentially disruptive changes for China’s energy storage sector. It removed requirements at the central level that wind and solar projects must include a storage component.

This led to concerns at the time that demand for battery energy storage facilities could drop substantially.

In practice, however, different provinces have designed their own approaches to commissioning energy storage under their “Document 136” plans.

Some, such as Shandong, have eliminated energy storage requirements, while others, such as Yunnan and Guizhou have kept them.

A recent analysis by consulting firm Infolink argues that a significant drop in demand for energy storage projects is, therefore, “unlikely”, due to expected ongoing demand for “renewable integration and grid flexibility”.

Pumped storage and gas-fired power capacity make up only 7% of China’s electricity system – compared to 34% in Spain and 50% in the US, according to analysis by NGO Greenpeace. As such, it says there will likely be ongoing demand for battery storage as a major contributor to power flexibility in China.

The Chinese government set a target in a recent action plan for 180GW of new-energy storage by 2027, up from just over 100GW at the end of June 2025.

The target “directly addresses the issue of low short-term economic viability” of the energy storage sector caused by “Document 136”, economic news outlet Jiemian reports, although it notes that “uncertainties” still remain.

However, unnamed industry participants tell financial news outlet Yicai that the pricing reform has removed the storage sector’s “fig leaf”, meaning it is likely to result in the number of energy storage companies falling from the current figure of more than 200,000.

Yang tells Carbon Brief that the reforms will likely lead to “more storage-paired and hybrid projects” that better meet province-specific needs and “prioritise reliability and integration over headline [megawatts]”.

The post Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules

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Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage

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Weather extremes fuel wildfires that have burned through tens of thousands of acres across Georgia, Florida and other states.

Drought and fire are a dangerous duo. The Southeastern United States is witnessing this firsthand as several major blazes burn tens of thousands of acres across the parched region, destroying homes and prompting evacuations in some areas. Florida and Georgia have been particularly hard hit, and strong winds and unusually low humidity have made it difficult to combat the flames.

Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage

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Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate

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When the land no longer answers the stars the way it once did, Indigenous peoples are among the first to notice — and the first to ask why.

A Sky Full of Knowledge

Look up on a clear night on Turtle Island and you’re seeing a sky that has guided human life for thousands of years. Across Indigenous nations in Canada, detailed systems of celestial knowledge developed not as abstract science but as living, practical guides —telling people when to plant, when to harvest, when herds would move, and when ice would come. This astronomical knowledge was woven into language, ceremony, and everyday life, passed down through generations with remarkable precision.

The Mi’kmaq and the Celestial Bear

Among the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada, star stories are ecological calendars, precise and functional. The story of Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters connects the annual movement of what Western astronomy calls Ursa Major to the seasonal cycle of hunting and harvest: the bear rises in spring, is hunted through summer, and falls to earth in autumn. This knowledge was brought to broader public attention in 2009 during the International Year of Astronomy, when Mi’kmaq Elders Lillian Marshall of Potlotek First Nation and Murdena Marshall of Eskasoni First Nation shared the story through an animated film produced at Cape Breton University narrated in English, French, and Mi’kmaq.¹ The story encodes specific observations about when and where to hunt, and which species to expect at which time of year. It is science in narrative form.

The Anishinaabe and the Seasonal Star Map

Among the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes and northern Ontario, celestial knowledge forms part of a comprehensive seasonal understanding. Knowledge keepers like Michael Wassegijig Price of Wikwemikong First Nation have described how Anishinaabe constellations  quite different from those of Western astronomy connect the movement of the heavens to naming ceremonies, seasonal gatherings, and land practices.² The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada now offers planispheres featuring Indigenous constellations from Cree, Ojibwe, and Dakota sky traditions, recognizing their value as both cultural heritage and ecological knowledge systems.³

When the Stars and the Land Fall Out of Rhythm

Here’s the challenge that climate change has introduced: the stars still move on their ancient, reliable schedule. But the land no longer always responds as expected. Migratory birds that once arrived when certain constellations appeared are now showing up earlier or later. Ice that once formed in predictable windows is forming weeks late, or not at all. Berry harvests, fish runs, animal migrations, all once timed by celestial cues accumulated over millennia are shifting. Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada describe this as a kind of dissonance: the sky remains faithful, but the land has changed.⁴

Long-Baseline Ecological Records

Far from being historical curiosity, Indigenous celestial knowledge systems are now being recognized by researchers as long-baseline ecological calendars —records of how nature behaved over centuries, encoded in story and ceremony. When an Elder observes that a particular star rising no longer predicts the arrival of certain geese, that observation represents a departure from a pattern that may have held true for hundreds of years. The Climate Atlas of Canada integrates Indigenous knowledge observations alongside western climate data, recognizing that both contribute meaningfully to understanding ecological change.⁵

Keeping the Knowledge Alive

Language revitalization and land-based education programs are helping ensure this knowledge reaches the future. From youth astronomy nights on-reserve to the integration of Indigenous sky stories in school curricula, there is growing recognition that these knowledge systems belong to what comes next, not only what came before. As Canada grapples with accelerating ecological change, the quiet precision of thousands of years of skyward observation offers something no satellite can fully replicate: a continuous record of the relationship between the cosmos and a living land.

Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock

Image Credit: Dustin Bowdige, Unsplash

References 

[1] Marshall, L., Marshall, M., Harris, P., & Bartlett, C. (2010). Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters: A Mi’kmaw Night Sky Story. Cape Breton University Press. See also: Integrative Science, CBU. (2009). Background on the Making of the Muin Video for IYA2009. http://www.integrativescience.ca/uploads/activities/BACKGROUND-making-video-Muin-Seven-Bird-Hunters-IYA-binder.pdf

[2] Price, M.W. (Various). Anishinaabe celestial knowledge. Wikwemikong First Nation. Referenced in: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada Indigenous Astronomy resources.

[3] Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. (2020). Indigenous Skies planisphere series. RASC. https://www.rasc.ca/indigenous-skies

[4] Neilson, H. (2022, December 11). The night sky over Mi’kmaki: A Q&A with astronomer Hilding Neilson. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/hilding-neilson-indigenizing-astronomy-1.6679072

[5] Climate Atlas of Canada. (2024). Prairie Climate Centre, University of Winnipeg. https://climateatlas.ca/

The post Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.

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World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis

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A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.

The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.

Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.

While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.

In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.

Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.

‘Return to coal’

The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.

A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.

(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)

With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.

These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.

Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.

This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia. 

In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.

Gas to coal

So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.

Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.

However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.

To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.

For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.

It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.

Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.

(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)

Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.

Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.

Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:

“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”

Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:

“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”

‘Structural decline’

Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.

Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.

Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:

“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”

In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power. 

Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.

Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:

“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”

With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia

Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:

“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”

Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:

“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”

The post World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.

World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis

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