Only half of China’s provinces have finalised new rules for pricing wind and solar power, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Local governments are required to have published final plans to reform the way wind and solar power is priced in their jurisdiction before the end of this year.
This follows the release of a central government directive in February – known as “Document 136” (136号文) – that calls for developing a more “market-based” approach to pricing newly installed renewable projects.
The new rules will replace the previous pricing mechanism, which gave wind and solar generators guaranteed sales at a fixed price tied to the benchmark electricity price from coal.
The shift towards market-based pricing for wind and solar is seen as a key uncertainty for the sector, with implications for China’s wider energy and emissions targets.
Carbon Brief analysis finds that, as of 15 October 2025, only 18 provinces had issued finalised “Document 136” plans.
Another 10 have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet have yet to indicate what their strategies will be.
Central direction, local rules
In February this year, China’s central government issued a notice on “deepening market-based reform of feed-in tariffs for new energy”, also known as “Document 136”.
The document calls on local governments to develop plans for new pricing mechanisms for wind and solar power, applicable to projects completed on or after 1 June 2025.
Local governments are expected to develop “sustainable new-energy pricing mechanisms” (新能源可持续发展价格结算机制), in which they only offer a fixed price to a set amount of new wind and solar capacity each year.
The amount offered a fixed price is to be linked to each province’s annual clean-energy installation quotas. Moreover, the fixed price is to be determined at auction, through a mechanism resembling the UK’s contract for difference (CfD).
Any additional wind and solar projects, which are unable to secure contracts via the provincial auction mechanism, would need to find buyers for their electricity on the open market. This could be done through a “power purchase agreement” with a grid operator or a large industrial user, for example, or by selling their power in spot markets.
The move is part of wider efforts to shift China’s giant electricity system towards more market-based operation, rather than running on rules set by the government, including prices for coal-fired power plants determined by bureaucrats.
The shift towards market-based pricing for renewables has been attributed to both the falling costs of building new solar and windfarms, as well as to the grid challenges created by record renewable capacity additions.
At the time of the policy’s release earlier this year, analysts expected the rules to have a chilling effect on China’s wind and solar buildout in the short term, as developers adjust to the new rules and to lower – and more uncertain – prices set at auction.
The notice led to a rush of new capacity additions ahead of the June cut-off, with an estimated 100 solar cells being installed every second in the month of May.
However, a subsequent policy requiring cement, polysilicon and iron and steel manufacturers, as well as certain types of data centres, to use renewable power to fulfil a certain proportion of their overall consumption has been seen as a “backstop” that may buoy industry demand for new wind and solar capacity.
Furthermore, analysts believe that “Document 136” may strengthen China’s clean-energy industries in the long term, by forcing companies to become more innovative and competitive.
Below, Carbon Brief lists which provinces have published finalised “Document 136” pricing plans (green), which provinces have published a form of draft plan (yellow) and which provinces have yet not published their plans at all (white).
By default, provinces are listed in order of the size of their energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, based on a dataset for 2022 from the thinktank Institute of Global Decarbonization Progress.
New territory
So far, Carbon Brief finds, only just over half of provinces have issued finalised plans. Collectively, these provinces account for 61% of China’s energy-related emissions.
Another 10, representing 31% of emissions, have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet – the final 8% of CO2 – have yet to publish anything.
A few provinces published finalised rules in early June, including renewable-power heavyweights Shandong and Inner Mongolia.
(Inner Mongolia’s power grid is split into two zones – “Inner Mongolia East” and “Inner Mongolia West” – which are administered separately.)
In a nationwide conference call at the end of August, National Energy Administration officials urged provinces to “promptly promote” concrete plans.
Eleven provinces have published finalised rules since then, including major polluters Heilongjiang, Hebei and Guangdong, with a further eight publishing draft rules, according to Carbon Brief calculations.
The delay in provinces completing their plans can be attributed to the fact that local policymakers are trying to establish a completely new system of pricing power from scratch, says David Fishman, principal at energy consultancy the Lantau Group.
He tells Carbon Brief that, for some of the provinces that have issued finalised rules, “fairly meaningful differences” can be found between the final version and earlier drafts – indicating a high level of debate on the best path forward.
Shandong province was the first to issue draft rules, setting the tone for other local governments’ documents.
The eastern province is seen as a leader both in renewable energy additions and in undertaking power-market reforms. It is also the largest source of energy-related emissions in China.
Its plan saw notable policy innovations, such as setting an auction subscription threshold of 125% to encourage competition, by ensuring that not all bidders will be successful.
In September, it also became the first province in China to hold auctions for solar and wind power under the new rules, with the winning bidders securing prices of 0.319 yuan per kilowatt-hour (yuan/kWh) for wind and 0.225 yuan/kWh for solar.
These prices are equivalent to £33.8 per megawatt hour (MWh), or $44.8/MWh, for wind and £23.8/MWh, or $31.6/MWh, for solar.
While the wind prices are seen as high enough to be relatively acceptable to project developers, the price for solar is below the level thought to be needed to finance such developments. As such, it could “discourage” further solar investment in the province, Reuters reports.
Shortly afterwards, the southwestern province of Yunnan also held its first renewables auction, setting a price of 0.33 yuan/kWh for both wind and solar projects.
Effect on future additions
Analysts disagree about what impact the “Document 136” policy will have on the pace of China’s clean-energy additions.
The country installed a record 360 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar in 2024, followed by an even higher 212GW in the first half of 2025 for solar alone, as developers rushed to complete ahead of the June deadline.
In September, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a target of 3,600GW of wind and solar capacity by 2035 as part of the country’s new “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) to the Paris Agreement.
While hugely ambitious in the context of current global wind and solar capacity, which stood at 1,400GW at the end of 2024, this new goal is equivalent to just 200GW of new wind and solar per year. This would be a significant slowdown compared with China’s recent pace of expansion.
Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief that he does not see the pricing reforms as a “signal of a structural slowdown in clean capacity [additions]”. He adds:
“Adding panels and turbines is the easy part…China is rewiring the world’s largest power sector, with multiple layers of interests and legacy assets to manage. In navigating this complexity, pledge targets act as a floor, providing certainty to clean-energy developers and clean-tech manufacturers. The NDC goal reflects what decision-makers are confident China can deliver given these constraints.”
But Fishman, writing on LinkedIn, notes that the pricing reforms could make it “challenging” for China to hit Xi’s new 2035 target.
Renewables developers are not incentivised to sustain previous years’ high installation figures under the local rules that have been rolled out so far, he notes, adding: “We will be lucky to see 200GW in a single year again for a long time.”
In its Renewables 2025 report, published in October 2025, the International Energy Agency (IEA) shaved 5% off its outlook for wind and solar growth in China out to 2030, a reduction of 129GW. It attributes this downgrade to the country’s renewable pricing reforms “impacting project economics and lowering growth expectations”.
Nevertheless, it adds that China is still projected to add “nearly 2,660GW” of new renewable capacity between 2025 and 2030, meaning that it would reach its 2035 wind and solar target “five years ahead of schedule”.
Bolstering storage demand
Beyond wind and solar capacity, “Document 136” also signalled potentially disruptive changes for China’s energy storage sector. It removed requirements at the central level that wind and solar projects must include a storage component.
This led to concerns at the time that demand for battery energy storage facilities could drop substantially.
In practice, however, different provinces have designed their own approaches to commissioning energy storage under their “Document 136” plans.
Some, such as Shandong, have eliminated energy storage requirements, while others, such as Yunnan and Guizhou have kept them.
A recent analysis by consulting firm Infolink argues that a significant drop in demand for energy storage projects is, therefore, “unlikely”, due to expected ongoing demand for “renewable integration and grid flexibility”.
Pumped storage and gas-fired power capacity make up only 7% of China’s electricity system – compared to 34% in Spain and 50% in the US, according to analysis by NGO Greenpeace. As such, it says there will likely be ongoing demand for battery storage as a major contributor to power flexibility in China.
The Chinese government set a target in a recent action plan for 180GW of new-energy storage by 2027, up from just over 100GW at the end of June 2025.
The target “directly addresses the issue of low short-term economic viability” of the energy storage sector caused by “Document 136”, economic news outlet Jiemian reports, although it notes that “uncertainties” still remain.
However, unnamed industry participants tell financial news outlet Yicai that the pricing reform has removed the storage sector’s “fig leaf”, meaning it is likely to result in the number of energy storage companies falling from the current figure of more than 200,000.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that the reforms will likely lead to “more storage-paired and hybrid projects” that better meet province-specific needs and “prioritise reliability and integration over headline [megawatts]”.
The post Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules
The launch of the Africa Energy Bank (AEB) has been put back yet again, raising doubts about the institution’s future ability to finance fossil fuel projects – its main objective – as global lenders retreat from such investments over climate concerns, experts told Climate Home News.
The bank, which had been billed to launch in September after a series of delays, is now scheduled to begin operations in November, according to the head of the African Energy Chamber, an advocacy body for the continent’s oil and gas sector.
Even as the world aims to transition away from fossil fuels, many African leaders have made clear they want to continue exploring and extracting the continent’s large oil and gas deposits – estimated at around 125 billion barrels of crude and over 600 trillion cubic feet of gas – to boost economic development.
As a group, Africa sided with a number of powerful oil-and-gas producing nations in blocking progress on negotiations to craft a global roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels at last year’s UN COP30 climate talks, although some countries did individually support the proposal.
-
Campaigners oppose Dangote’s planned Kenya refinery over climate and ecological risks
Plans to build Africa’s second largest oil refinery in ecologically sensitive region criticised as “environmental recklessness” -
Tanzania pushed African nations to oppose fossil fuel transition at COP30
While chairing the African group at the summit, the gas-dependent nation advised the continent’s ministers to block language on transitioning away from fossil fuels
Meanwhile, major projects under development across the continent – including the 1,443-km East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) and Dangote’s 700,000-barrel-per-day Kenyan refinery – show that African governments see oil and gas as playing a significant role in meeting their energy and economic needs for many years to come.
In 2022, at a gathering of the African Petroleum Producers’ Organization (APPO) in oil-rich Angola, ministers from its member states adopted a resolution to create the Africa Energy Bank to finance projects for the production, use and trade of oil, gas and broader energy sources.
African control over energy resources
An article on the APPO website explains that the bank was conceived as a way to overcome “disenchantment” with fossil fuels among “the international community” which it said had crystallised around the “energy transition” concept.
“If Western countries, after having long taken advantage of the energy sources they now revile to develop, can afford the luxury of abandoning them, this is not the case in Africa,” it adds, noting that many of the continent’s economies are still largely dependent on oil and gas revenues.
A separate web page about the bank, also hosted on APPO’s website, says its objectives include financing the exploration, production and refining of oil and gas, as well as supporting member states in transitioning from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources “while ensuring energy security”.
Said Addi, a former executive with Shell and energy commodities trading house Gunvor, said the new bank was judged necessary because financing for hydrocarbons from many traditional international lenders has become constrained.
In trying to fill this financing gap, Africa is not simply setting up another fund to support oil and gas, he added. “It is also an attempt to give African countries greater control over how their energy resources and infrastructure are financed,” he explained.
Nigeria to host the AEB
The energy bank – a joint initiative of APPO and the African Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank) – has so far suffered several delays and is almost two years behind schedule. The initial plan was to start operations in January 2025, with Nigeria as the host country, but the bank’s opening was delayed to June of that year to allow Nigeria time to finalise the construction of the bank’s headquarters in Abuja.
After the government announced the completion of the offices in late November 2025, a new launch date was set for January 2026, which was moved back to April, June and then September. Now it has shifted again to November, raising concerns that the institution may be losing momentum.
Former Shell executive Addi said that if the capital is eventually paid in, the bank becomes operational and its first projects are commercially credible, then the delays will be regarded as normal teething troubles in setting up a multilateral institution. But, he added, scepticism will be justified if it continues to stall.
Uganda may see lower oil revenues than expected as costs rise and demand falls
Baron Lamarré, an oil and gas expert and former Petronas oil trader, said that missing “three deadlines in a row is not normal”, and warned that if the timeline slips again, “the story flips from ‘ambitious institution finding its footing’ to ‘good idea that lost momentum before it found any’.”
The Nigerian government, APPO and Afreximbank did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication.
The funding challenge
The Africa Energy Bank is targeting base capital of $5 billion, with plans to scale up to $120 billion within five years by mobilising private-sector funds. However, it is expected to start operations with initial seed capital of $500 million.
The funding plan is to have the 18 member countries of the APPO contribute $83 million each to the bank as equity for a combined $1.5 billion. Afreximbank, other non-APPO African countries and investors outside the continent are expected to provide the remaining $3.5 billion.
But even the initial $500 million has not been easy to mobilise. In May, APPO Secretary-General Farid Ghezali called on members to deliver on their pledges towards the startup goal before the end of June. But the delays suggest this may not have been met, with experts saying Africa may be finding it difficult to self-fund its oil and gas projects in the absence of international capital.
Lamarré said every extension of the deadline points to the fact that “raising fossil fuel capital in Africa without the majors and their financing networks is brutally hard”.
Why the global electrification agenda misses the point on Africa’s energy crisis
Since 2020, Western lenders, export credit agencies and insurers have been in steady retreat from African hydrocarbons, he said, while oil majors are divesting their African assets, handing over fields to smaller local operators whose credit ratings are not high enough to borrow cheaply.
Even capital from China and the Gulf, which has partially filled the gap, cannot match the volume, tenor or pricing that Western investors once offered, Lamarré argued.
“If mobilising the first $500 million of seed capital [for the AEB] has taken this long, that’s the clearest signal yet of how steep the climb to $120 billion looks,” he said, noting that the continent’s energy financing gap is as large as $30 billion-$45 billion per year.
Africa’s investment landscape, meanwhile, has been shifting. While foreign direct investment dropped from a 2024 peak, inflows remained roughly one-third above the continent’s long-term average in 2025, according to the 2026 World Investment Report from UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). They are concentrated in a few sectors including critical minerals needed for renewable energy technologies, battery manufacturing and advanced industrial production.
At the same time, data on global energy investment from the International Energy Agency (IEA) shows that fossil fuel investment in Africa has declined over the last decade.
“Trojan horse” for fossil fuels
While the Africa Energy Bank struggles to get off the ground, climate campaigners have criticised its primary aim of financing oil and gas on the continent at a time when the world is starting to move away from high-carbon fuels to cleaner alternatives.
Bhekumuzi Dean Bhebhe, founder of Africa Change Lab, described the bank as a “Trojan horse”, arguing that its focus on fossil fuel financing runs counter to the global energy transition and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 goals of sustainable development and inclusive growth.
The energy bank, he warned, “risks locking Africa into a new cycle of debt, dependency and fossil fuel entrenchment”, adding that its financing blueprint does not pave the way for a climate-resilient future. “In truth, it is to deepen the same extractive, carbon-heavy pathways that the continent should be moving away from,” he added.
Ugandan farmers use British court to try to stop East Africa oil pipeline
Kenya-based climate and energy expert Joab Okanda said the AEB’s plan to finance oil and gas is “a misplaced priority” and it should instead back clean energy in line with the policies of some of Africa’s major export markets like Europe.
In addition, the new bank could struggle to mobilise enough resources to advance large-scale oil and gas projects, he added, noting that its proposed $5-billion initial capital is equivalent to the cost of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline alone.
The AEB’s aim of backing more fossil fuels should be flipped “to support countries that are oil-dependent to start working on their transition plans”, Okanda said.
The post Launch of Africa Energy Bank delayed again in blow to oil and gas hopes appeared first on Climate Home News.
Launch of Africa Energy Bank delayed again in blow to oil and gas hopes
A booklet published by the UK’s opposition Conservative party includes a “cost of net-zero” that appears to have been doubled by a spreadsheet error.
The “common sense” policy document argues that “what people ultimately want is a government competent enough to solve the problems for which it takes responsibility”.
In a section that says “sophisticat[ed]…modelling” should not be a substitute for “political judgement”, the “Right Way” document disparages various estimates of the cost of net-zero.
The Conservative document then claims – incorrectly – that the government’s official adviser, the Climate Change Committee (CCC), had put the cost of net-zero at close to £1tn. It says:
“In 2020, the CCC estimated that its route to net-zero would cost £957bn.”
In fact, the CCC’s 2020 estimate was exactly half this amount – £478bn – and last year it published a revised figure of £108bn, largely as a result of the falling cost of electric vehicles (EVs).
Spreadsheet error
The Conservative party’s erroneous claim appears to stem from another report that had accidentally added up numbers twice, using a spreadsheet published by the CCC in 2020.
The 2020 spreadsheet contains a table listing the additional investments that would be needed to build a net-zero economy, from low-carbon electricity generation through to heat pumps and EVs.
These extra capital expenditures, listed as “CAPEX”, add up to a total of £1.38tn over the 30 years of 2020-50. They are set against operational savings, listed as “OPEX”, of £0.90tn.
Added up over 2020-50, the combined CAPEX and OPEX figures come to a total of £478bn.
In addition to the annual sectoral CAPEX and OPEX figures, the CCC’s 2020 spreadsheet also has a line giving combined totals for each year. It appears that someone has added all of these numbers together, resulting in the savings and costs being counted twice.
This double-counted total for the cost of net-zero amounts to £957bn – as shown in the image below – and it appears to be the source of the claim in the Conservative booklet.
At the time of publication in 2020, the CCC said that the £478bn net cost of net-zero amounted to less than 1% of GDP over 30 years – and that the large investment needed would not only result in savings due to lower fossil-fuel imports, but that it would boost GDP overall, by around 2%.
In 2025, the CCC revised its estimates for investment costs and operating savings to £670bn and £562bn respectively, giving a net total of £108bn over 2025-50, or less than 0.2% of GDP.
Earlier this year, the committee said that cutting emissions to net-zero would cost less than a single fossil-fuel price shock and that doing so would have benefits worth £110bn per year.
Paper trail
The erroneous claim in the Conservative document is referenced to the CCC’s 2020 advice on the UK’s sixth “carbon budget”, which, as explained, does not contain the £957bn figure.
The earliest online use of the £957bn figure found by Carbon Brief is a 12 January 2026 article in the Spectator, by retired engineer and self-described “accidental energy analyst” David Turver.
A day later, Turver repeated the mistaken number in a report for the free-market Institute of Economic Affairs. His report cites figure 5.3 of the CCC’s 2020 advice.
However, as set out above, the CCC spreadsheet containing the data for figure 5.3 only adds up to £478bn, half the figure claimed by Turver.
It appears that Turver accidentally added up all of the numbers in the CCC spreadsheet, without noting that it already included a line for the annual total. This results in double-counting the cost.
(Turver’s report also triggered a slew of inaccurate headlines stating that net-zero would cost £7.6tn – or even £9tn. These figures, which came from Turver’s report, were based, among other things, on the implicit assumption that fossil fuels and the cars, boilers and power plants that use them are all free.)
After