Nearly a tenth of global climate finance could be under threat as US president Donald Trump’s aid cuts risk wiping out huge swathes of spending overseas, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Last year, the US announced that it had increased its climate aid for developing countries roughly seven-fold over the course of Joe Biden’s presidency, reaching $11bn per year.
This likely amounts to more than 8% of all international climate finance in 2024.
However, any progress in US climate finance has been thrown into disarray by the new administration.
Trump has halted US foreign aid and threatened to cancel virtually all US Agency for International Development (USAid) projects, with climate funds identified as a prime target.
USAid has provided around a third of US climate finance in recent years, reaching nearly $3bn in 2023, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Another $4bn of US funding for the UN Green Climate Fund (GCF) has also been cancelled by the president’s administration.
One expert tells Carbon Brief that more climate funds will likely end up on the “cutting block”.
Another warns of an “enormous gulf” to meeting the new global $300bn climate-finance goal nations agreed last year, if the US stops reporting – let alone providing – any official climate finance.
Carbon Brief’s analysis draws together available data to explain how the Trump administration’s cuts endanger global efforts to help developing countries tackle climate change.
- How much did climate finance increase under Biden?
- What are the climate impacts of cutting USAid?
- Are other sources of climate finance at risk?
- Methodology
How much did climate finance increase under Biden?
The US is by far the world’s largest economy and biggest historical emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2).
This means that, while it is the fourth-biggest national provider of international climate finance, its overall share is low relative to the nation’s wealth and responsibility for climate change. As a result, the US has long been seen as a laggard in this area.
The US provides 0.24% of its gross national income (GNI) as aid for developing countries, which includes some climate funding. This is the same share as the Czech Republic, a nation with a per-capita GNI three times smaller.
US climate-finance contributions stalled during Trump’s first four-year term as president, when other developed countries were ramping up to meet their target of providing and mobilising $100bn a year for developing countries by 2020.
A shift in focus came when Biden became president in 2021. He established an international climate finance plan to scale up US efforts, in line with US obligations under the Paris Agreement.
Biden also announced that the US would reach $11.4bn in annual climate finance by 2024.
This goal was achieved, according to “preliminary estimates” announced by the US during the COP29 climate summit at the end of 2024. These estimates, which are unlikely to be confirmed by the new administration, are shown in the chart below.
The figures are based predominantly on “bilateral” climate finance reported to the UN. They also include US finance distributed via multilateral climate funds, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the GCF.
Bilateral climate finance largely comes from aid programmes with climate benefits, such as supporting a geothermal project in the Philippines, investing in “climate-smart” agriculture in Bangladesh, or improving water security in Niger.
The US significantly increased its contribution towards climate finance during the Biden administration. Ramping up relevant US aid projects and multilateral funding helped developed countries to hit the $100bn climate-finance target – albeit two years late in 2022.
The $11bn reported by the US in 2024 would be the equivalent of 21% of all bilateral and multilateral climate fund inputs that year – up from around 4% under the previous Trump presidency. These funds are shown by the blue bars in the figure below.
(Estimates for 2023 and 2024 assume a steady rise in climate finance from sources beyond the US, as official figures beyond then have not been released. See Methodology for more information.)
Even when considering other sources of international climate finance – specifically multilateral development banks (MDBs) and “mobilised” private finance shown in grey in the figure below – the US has contributed a sizable share in recent years.
After lingering around 2% during the last Trump administration, the US share of total climate finance roughly quadrupled to more than 8% in 2024, Carbon Brief analysis suggests.
It is also worth noting that the US, as the biggest shareholder at the World Bank and a major shareholder at other MDBs, can be linked to a large portion of their finance. This contribution is not factored into official US reporting, so it has not been included in this analysis.
Even accounting for MDB contributions, US climate finance spending is still far lower than its “fair share”, based on its historical responsibility for climate change and ability to pay. Some analysts have put the US fair share as high as 40-50% of climate finance overall.
What are the climate impacts of cutting USAid?
Upon taking office for the second time in January 2025, Trump immediately took aim at international aid spending and climate action with a flurry of executive orders.
One order announced plans to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement and criticised such treaties for “steer[ing] American taxpayer dollars to countries that do not require, or merit, financial assistance”. It also “revoked and rescinded” Biden’s international climate finance plan.
In another executive order, Trump announced a “pause” on US foreign aid “for assessment of programmatic efficiencies and consistency with US foreign policy”.
USAid handles 60% of US foreign aid – more than $43bn in 2023 – while the State Department oversees most of the remainder. Trump says he wants to “close [USAid] down” and his advisor Elon Musk has called it a “criminal organisation”.
Source: Truth Social.
Trump requires the approval of Congress to repurpose USAid funds or, indeed, abolish the agency. His administration’s actions have, therefore, been described as “illegal” and “unconstitutional” by senior Democrats and aid workers.
Yet, despite lawsuits and court orders instructing the administration to lift the pause, it has since stated its intention to eliminate more than 90% of USAid contracts and, more widely, $60bn of US foreign aid.
This would have major implications for US climate finance.
News outlets have reported on the climate-related programmes at risk, sometimes stating that USAid has funded half a billion dollars of climate programmes annually in recent years.
This figure, while based on USAid’s own reporting of its clean energy, climate adaptation and nature projects, is a significant underestimate of its total climate-finance contributions.
Carbon Brief analysis suggests that USAid contributed $2.8bn of climate finance in 2023, the latest year for which data is available. Other US departments with aid contributions in the OECD database contributed smaller sums, bringing total climate spending up to $2.9bn.
This equates to around a third of US climate finance that year. If a similar share from these departments was counted as climate finance in 2024, it would amount to nearly $4bn, Carbon Brief finds.
(These are estimates based on “climate-related” aid data reported to the OECD. See Methodology for more details.)
Climate-finance experts tell Carbon Brief that these higher figures align with the fact that many aid projects targeting other issues, such as agriculture, have climate components.
Dr Ed Carr, a centre director at Stockholm Environment Institute US who has previously worked at USAid, tells Carbon Brief:
“The way that the Biden administration was doing stuff and the way that [former president Barack] Obama before was doing stuff, [was to] start to weave a degree of climate sensitivity into everything…So, basically, a huge percentage of programmes [are] working on some aspect of climate.”
Unlike many forms of climate finance, USAid projects include lots of grant-based funding, which many developing countries view as preferable to loans and better suited to supporting climate adaptation.
Relevant projects backed by USAid in recent years include support for a food-security programme in Ethiopia, upgrading a dam in Pakistan and protecting water supplies in Peru.
The Trump administration has made it clear that “climate” is one of the issues that it is scrutinising as it assesses aid projects for consistency with what it defines as US interests. A survey sent to grant recipients several weeks after the initial executive order asks:
“Can you confirm this is not a climate or ‘environmental justice’ project or include such elements?”
Are other sources of climate finance at risk?
The remaining billions in climate finance are handled by more than a dozen organisations, distributing grants, loans, development finance and export credits.
Around $1.2bn of US climate finance in 2022 was paid into international funds, including the GEF. This amounts to a fifth of the total US climate finance that year.
The Biden administration did not release a breakdown of how much money went to these funds in 2023 and 2024. However, in 2023 the country paid out $1bn for the GCF alone.
Such funding is also at risk as the new administration pulls away from what the White House calls “international agreements and initiatives that do not reflect our country’s values”. Notably, the US has now cancelled $4bn in funds previously committed to the GCF.
(Biden and Obama pledged $3bn each to the fund. However, neither of them ever delivered more than $1bn of their pledge, leaving $4bn outstanding.)
As the chart below shows, this means the US contribution to the GCF is now lower than that of Sweden – a country with an economy 50 times smaller.
The GCF is not the only specific fund that has been targeted. The US formally ended its involvement in the UN loss and damage fund, which it pledged $17.6m towards in 2023. It has also withdrawn from the Just Energy Transition Partnership initiative, which included at least $56m in grants to help South Africa transition away from coal power.
Another Trump executive order announced a review of “international intergovernmental organisation” membership, including MDBs.
There is an assumption that the US will not give up its considerable power in these banks. However, Trump supporters, including those behind the influential Project 2025, have laid out plans for withdrawing the US from the World Bank.
A large chunk of the remaining US climate finance in recent years has come from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which committed more than $3.7bn in climate finance in 2024 and a similar amount in 2023. This included loans for a wind power project in Mozambique and a railway to carry critical minerals through Angola.
DFC is a development finance institution that invests in private enterprises and was set up under the first Trump administration. It has so far been insulated from US aid cuts and there has been speculation that it may now play a larger role in US foreign policy.
Leaning more heavily on DFC, as well as the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM), would not be suitable for climate finance, Ritu Bharadwaj, a climate-finance principal researcher at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), tells Carbon Brief:
“If these mechanisms remain intact while grant-based finance is gutted, it signals a shift away from public, needs-based funding toward finance that prioritises US commercial and strategic interests. In other words, what little climate finance remains will likely benefit US corporations first, rather than frontline communities.”
Additionally, even if such organisations are favoured by the new administration, this does not mean their climate projects will be protected. Benjamin Black, Trump’s nominee to lead DFC, wrote a blog post about the corporation in January, stating:
“The Biden administration’s emphasis on virtue-signaling – such as dedicating 40% of [DFC’s] recent commitments to green projects – raises serious concerns.”
Carr tells Carbon Brief that more US climate spending could still end up on the “cutting block”:
“From what we’ve seen so far, it looks to me like they are going to try and root out everything that they see as clearly related to climate.”
He caveats this by noting that some of the money the Biden administration would have counted as climate finance may continue, but not be defined as such.
This highlights the importance of accounting when assessing climate finance. Different governments around the world report different things as climate finance, depending on their priorities and political leanings.
For example, during the last Trump presidency, the US stopped reporting on climate finance to the UN. When calculating progress towards the $100bn goal during this period, the OECD had to estimate US figures based on “provisional data” or averages from previous years.
The Biden administration retrospectively reported the missing data from the Trump years in 2021, resulting in the OECD scaling down a previous estimate.
Clemence Landers, a senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development (CGD) who previously worked at the US Treasury, tells Carbon Brief that a “very educated guess [is] that there will be no reporting from the US” in the coming years.
The US government website tracking aid has not been updated since December.
If climate finance is not recorded, this could hamper its inclusion in the annual $100bn goal, which lasts until 2025, as well as the $300bn goal that countries agreed on last year at COP29 to replace it, as Landers notes:
“That does leave an enormous gulf in terms of the new global climate-finance target.”
Methodology
Climate-finance reporting practices mean that official data can be difficult to analyse in detail.
In this article, annual US climate-finance figures for the period 2015-2022 are based on those reported by the US government to the UN in biennial reports (BRs) and, for the years 2021 and 2022, its first biennial transparency report (BTR).
These can be considered “official” climate-finance figures. They align with the figures that the US federal government has released and are the ones used to inform the OECD’s assessments of developed countries’ progress towards the $100bn annual target.
The figures only include bilateral climate finance and inputs into multilateral climate funds. MDB shares and private finance mobilised are not covered. Again, this aligns with the “climate-finance” totals quoted in progress reports by the Biden administration.
The climate-finance totals for 2023 and 2024 are based on releases from the US Department of State during the Biden administration. These figures are for the US financial year (FY), which runs from 1 October to 30 September. However, the FY figures are the same as the calendar year numbers reported to the UN for 2021 and 2022, so Carbon Brief assumes the same is true for 2023 and 2024.
Due to the significant time lag in official reporting to the UN, the figures underpinning these totals are not due to be released until 2026. (The previous Trump administration did not report them at all and it is unlikely that the current one will either, now that the US has announced its departure from the Paris Agreement.)
Given this time lag, estimates for total international climate finance in 2023 and 2024 are derived from a joint analysis by the thinktanks Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), ODI, Germanwatch and ECCO. This calculated likely totals in 2030, based on existing pledges and planned reforms. Carbon Brief assumes a steady trajectory to the overall $197bn estimated under the thinktanks’ “business-as-usual” scenario, with bilateral finance, specifically, reaching $50bn by 2025.
Climate-finance figures reported to the UN by the US do not include details of the government departments and agencies responsible, making it difficult to determine the share overseen by USAid. The Biden administration also did not report the breakdown between agencies.
This data is reported to the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which contains figures up to 2023. However, the information in the CRS is not “official” climate finance, but rather “climate-related development finance”, identified as such using Rio Markers. Most countries apply simple coefficients to convert the figures they report to the CRS into their climate-finance submissions to the UN, but the US calculates its climate-finance submissions separately.
Nevertheless, to obtain approximate figures, Carbon Brief has assumed that 100% of CRS projects marked as “principal” climate projects and 50% of the projects marked as “significant”, are climate finance. This aligns with a methodology used by other organisations, such as Oxfam, as well as other nations, including Germany, Japan and Denmark.
However, it is only a rough estimate. Experts that Carbon Brief consulted stressed the uncertainties of climate finance reporting and said the numbers could be higher or lower.
The post Analysis: Nearly a tenth of global climate finance threatened by Trump aid cuts appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Nearly a tenth of global climate finance threatened by Trump aid cuts
Climate Change
DeBriefed 12 June 2026: El Niño begins | COP31 hosts eye electrification | Atlantic current monitoring at risk
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
El Niño begins
‘DOMINO WEATHER’: The natural weather phenomenon El Niño, which can raise global heat and “bring domino weather effects across the planet”, is now underway, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) declared on Thursday, reported the Washington Post. The Japanese Meteorological Administration also identified the start of El Niño on Wednesday, said Bloomberg. According to the Japanese weather agency, the event is “expected to intensify in the coming months and become very strong later in the year, persisting into at least December”, reported the outlet.
‘SUPER EVENT’: BBC News reported that “many forecasts suggest this could end up as a so-called ‘super’ El Niño” and be “among the strongest ever recorded”. It added: “Coming on top of decades of human-caused warming, it could bring another record-hot year – most likely in 2027 – with disruption to weather, food supplies and economies running well into that year.”
COP31 hosts eye electrification
‘35 BY 35’: COP31 hosts Turkey and Australia have called for countries to support a target of electrifying 35% of global energy use by 2035, reported Politico. Speaking at climate talks in Bonn, Germany, Turkish minister Murat Kurum said that electrification would be a “flagship priority” at the COP31 summit, noted the publication. Kurum added that “electrifying daily life, from transport to buildings and industry” could “protect families and businesses from volatile energy markets”, said the outlet.
WASTE AND BUILDINGS: Climate Home News reported that electrification was one of three priorities unveiled by the COP31 hosts, with the other two being waste and buildings. On buildings, the COP31 hosts “quietly overhauled [their] goal”, Climate Home News said. It reported: “An initial press statement on Monday set out a target ‘to achieve at least a 25% increase in energy efficiency in buildings by 2035’. But…on Tuesday, that was replaced with a different goal to ‘reduce energy consumption intensity in the building sector by at least 25% by 2035’.”
‘HARDEST’ CHALLENGE: Elsewhere in Bonn, UN climate chief Simon Stiell said “governments must stop revisiting climate commitments and start delivering on them”, South Africa’s Mail and Guardian reported. It quoted Stiell as saying: “Tackling the global climate crisis is the hardest but most important thing humanity has ever tried to do together…We are not yet where we need to be. But we are somewhere we have never been before.”
Around the world
- ETS EXTRA: The EU has agreed “stronger” price controls on “ETS2”, its planned trading system for heating and transport emissions, according to Reuters.
- OCEAN STRESS: The rate of sea level rise has doubled in 10 years amid “severe and accelerating” pressures on oceans, said a UN report covered by Time.
- CLIMATE MIGRANTS: Donald Trump’s “immigration crackdown is largely targeting people from the countries most vulnerable to displacement from climate-driven disasters”, according to Guardian analysis.
- ULTRA-RICH: Investments by the world’s ultra-rich in 2022 are linked to nearly $1tn in climate damages, according to a Greenpeace Africa analysis covered by BusinessGreen.
Two
The number of bidders for Trump’s auction for drilling rights in an Arctic wildlife refuge, with big oil companies “sitting out the sale”, reported Bloomberg.
Latest climate research
- As the Arctic warms, increased iceberg activity could “reshape” deep-sea habitats and “elevate” navigational hazards as maritime traffic expands | Nature
- Around 11% of the population of the world’s “rarest great ape”, the Tapanuli orangutan, is estimated to have perished in an extreme rainfall event in Indonesia in 2025 | Current Biology
- Canada’s forests are shifting from a carbon sink to a carbon source, due to “wildfires disturbances” | Global Change Biology
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
Solar power has overtaken gas in Asia to become the region’s third largest electricity source behind coal and hydropower, according to Carbon Brief analysis of data from the thinktank Ember. Solar became the third largest electricity source for Asia on an annual basis in April 2026, according to the analysis. In the year to April 2026, solar generated 1,727 terawatt hours (TWh), while gas generated 1,711TWh, it added.
Spotlight
Atlantic current monitoring at risk
This week, Carbon Brief reports on how Trump plans could disrupt efforts to track a major ocean current.
The Irminger Sea, a patch of frigid ocean east of Greenland, plays an outsized role in the Earth’s climate.
Here, surface water that has travelled thousands of kilometres from the tropics grows cold and dense enough to sink to the ocean’s depths – a transformation that must occur for the water to begin a long journey back to the southern hemisphere.
This makes the Irminger Sea an “action centre” for the mighty Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), the vast system of ocean currents that keeps temperatures in Europe mild.
Last week, the US government announced plans to dismantle ocean moorings installed in the Irminger Sea which, among other things, collect data on the health of the AMOC.
This came as part of a programme to “descope” the Ocean Observatories Initiative, a $368m network of ocean sensors installed in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
Two of the moorings earmarked for removal in the Irminger Sea form part of an internationally funded, trans-Atlantic AMOC monitoring array, known as OSNAP, that stretches from Canada to Scotland.
Experts told Carbon Brief the move by the Trump administration highlights the vulnerability of AMOC observation systems around the world. These deep-sea moorings – scattered across the Atlantic – collect real-time data on, among other things, ocean current, temperature, pressure and biochemistry.
Prof Penny Holliday, chief scientific officer of the UK National Oceanography Centre, told Carbon Brief that the OSNAP array, as well as the RAPID array at 26N, are “entirely dependent” on research grants that have to be “continually reapplied for”.
“Funding is perilous all the time,” she said.
A report prepared last month by scientists for Nordic ministers exploring the security of funding for AMOC observing systems warned that RAPID and OSNAP were in “critical condition” and faced “material exposure over an 18-month horizon”. Meanwhile, other key basin-wide and global components of the global AMOC observing system were rated as “at risk”.
It is not just US funding that is uncertain. The report notes, for example, that the five-yearly funding the UK provides to RAPID and OSNAP is “at risk from 2027 due to year-on-year budget reductions” at the Natural Environmental Research Council.
(RAPID is funded by the US and UK, whereas OSNAP is backed by five different countries, with the US contributing half of the total financial support.)
Report co-author Dr Femke de Jong from the Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research told Carbon Brief that “continued AMOC observations” are under pressure in “multiple countries”. She said:
“While the risk of a declining AMOC to society is starting to be recognised, there is not yet a system or institution in place to guarantee a way to monitor it.”
AMOC monitoring arrays are still in their infancy – RAPID, the oldest, was launched in 2004. Two decades of data captured so far shows that the AMOC is slowing down. However, scientists will need many more years of data to be able to confidently link the decline to climate change, rather than natural variability in the ocean.
NOC’s Holliday points to the disconnect between scientific and funder timelines:
“The timescale of observations needed in order to be able to detect a climate change signal from the very naturally variable ocean is around 40-60 years…. [And yet], in the Netherlands, they have to apply for a new grant for their ocean moorings every two years. They are going to have to do that for 40 years.
“This is a very inefficient way of getting funding for what should be critical infrastructure.”
This spotlight first appeared in Cited, Carbon Brief’s new fortnightly newsletter focused on climate research. Sign up for free.
Watch, read, listen
‘BEYOND GROWTH’: A group of economists set out a “roadmap for eradicating poverty beyond growth” in the Guardian.
OIL CAMPAIGN: Politico reported on how “oil industry allies” are campaigning against attribution science, including by working to discredit a US National Academies report that “will examine research into the ways corporate climate pollution is intensifying natural disasters”.
‘FIGHT BACK’: For the Apocalyptic Optimist podcast, Dr Dana Fisher spoke to historian and author Dr Naomi Oreskes about how to “fight back” against climate misinformation.
Coming up
- 8-18 June: Bonn climate talks, Bonn, Germany
- 16-18 June: 11th Our ocean conference, Mombasa, Kenya
- 18 June: International Energy Agency Global Hydrogen Review 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- S-Curve Economics, head of road transport | Salary: £75,000-£80,000. Location: Remote (UK)
- UK Department for Energy Security and Net-Zero, speechwriter to the secretary of state | Salary: £62,595-£69,765. Location: London (hybrid)
- Basque Centre for Climate Change, postdoctoral researcher for JustBioSolar project | Salary: €27,040-€34,320. Location: Bilbao, Spain
- Boston Globe climate science and environment reporter | Salary: Unknown. Location: Boston, US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 12 June 2026: El Niño begins | COP31 hosts eye electrification | Atlantic current monitoring at risk appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Solar has overtaken gas power in Asia to become the continent’s third-largest source of electricity, according to new analysis by Carbon Brief.
The rapid expansion of solar power in nations such as China, India and Pakistan has seen its annual output increase nearly fourfold since 2020.
Asia accounts for around 60% of the world’s solar-power growth in this period, putting the continent at the heart of the global solar boom.
Coal and hydropower remain Asia’s largest sources of electricity, generating roughly 52% and 12% of the continent’s power each year, respectively.
Yet despite expectations that gas power would undergo “explosive growth” in the region, output has stalled due to supply disruptions, relatively high gas prices and growth in clean alternatives.
In contrast, solar has surged, generating some 1,727 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity in the 12 months to April 2026.
As the chart below shows, this pushes it just ahead of gas, which generated 1,711TWh over the same period and has remained roughly flat for the past several years.
The milestone reflects wider trends in the global electricity mix, with monthly generation from both wind and solar surpassing gas generation globally for the first time in April 2026.
Asia’s solar expansion has been driven largely by China, which accounts for nearly three-quarters of the growth in the region’s output since 2020.
Record installations in 2025 took China’s cumulative installed capacity to 1.2 terawatts (TW) by the end of the year.
China also dominates global solar supply chains, hosting more than 80% of solar manufacturing capacity.
This means it has played an important role in enabling solar deployment in other Asian countries through cheap solar-panel exports. Amid the energy crisis sparked by the Iran war, Chinese solar exports to Asia doubled to reach a record 39 gigawatts (GW) in March 2026.
Meanwhile, Asian countries have faced a number of challenges in expanding gas-power capacity. Most of these nations are reliant on imported liquified natural gas (LNG) to support their gas-power projects.
Around 81GW of planned gas capacity in Asia was cancelled in 2022 and 2023, amid LNG supply disruptions and price spikes following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
LNG import terminals and pipelines have faced delays and cancellations in south Asia and South Korea as a result of rising fuel and construction costs, as well as weak demand for gas power.
Global gas turbine shortages have also delayed plans to build new gas-power plants in Vietnam and the Philippines.
While Asia’s gas-power capacity increased by 22% between 2019 and 2024, gas-fired generation has only increased by a modest 6% over the same period. Existing gas plants are not always operating at high capacities, as gas is outcompeted by other fuels.
These trends are not uniform across the region, with increased generation in some countries – such as China and Taiwan – being offset by declines in others – such as Japan and India.
Although China has nearly doubled its gas -power generation in the past decade, gas supply issues and high prices make it less competitive than coal and renewables.
The expansion of clean energy has also reduced the need for gas-fired generation in many Asian countries. Pakistan’s widely reported “boom” in rooftop solar is one notable example of this trend.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the latest energy crisis has “renewed gas supply reliability and affordability concerns” among gas-importing countries in Asia, many of which are highly dependent on gas flows through the strait of Hormuz.
Methodology
The figures in this article are based on Ember’s monthly and annual electricity data for Asia.
Annual data was used for the year-end data points, as the coverage is more complete compared to the monthly data.
Rolling annual totals based on monthly data were used to interpolate between the annual data points.
The figures in the chart are based on Ember’s definition of Asia, which covers the following countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
This does not include some countries that are part of the continent of Asia and that use relatively large amounts of gas, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia.
The post Analysis: Solar overtakes gas power in Asia for first time ever appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Solar overtakes gas power in Asia for first time ever
Climate Change
Nearly 100 civil society groups from Türkiye and Australia urge COP31 Presidency to take bold steps to transition away from fossil fuels
Bonn, Germany, Friday 12 June 2026 — A diverse coalition of almost 100 civil society organisations representing Türkiye and Australia have released a joint statement at the Bonn climate conference urging the COP31 Presidency put the transition away from fossil fuels at the centre of the COP31 agenda.
The statement, signed by 94 organisations and addressed to Minister Murat Kurum (Türkiye) and Minister Chris Bowen (Australia), both attending the Bonn Climate Change Conference this week, emphasises that close cooperation between Türkiye and Australia brings a historic opportunity to make international progress in the transition away from fossil fuels, while walking the talk domestically and paving the way to a clean future within their respective borders.
By combining the diplomatic reach of both host nations with the long-standing climate leadership of the Pacific, COP31 should champion the action required to limit warming to 1.5°C.
The statement calls on the COP31 Presidency to:
- Commit to own and advance the just, orderly and equitable transition away from fossil fuels.
- Turn the Just Transition Mechanism – agreed upon at COP30 to enhance international cooperation as well as support and enable equitable and inclusive just transitions – into concrete actions through defined funding, clear timelines, and practical operational details that protect workers and vulnerable communities.
- Enable meaningful progress in international climate finance to advance all pillars of climate action on mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, ensuring that “big polluters pay”.
- Rebuild trust in the multilateral process by having a Presidency team that acts as an ‘honest broker.’ This includes protecting the integrity of negotiations from fossil fuel industry influence, which has had a worrying record presence in the last few COPs, and ensuring the full participation of civil society, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, local communities, and upholding human rights.
The letter also urges Türkiye and Australia to inspire strong global outcomes in negotiations in Antalya in November, by leading by example, developing national roadmaps to transition away from fossil fuels and taking bold decisions domestically.
Shiva Gounden, Head of Pacific, Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “The Pacific is at the forefront of global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels. From the beginning, we have worked to advance multilateral cooperation and strengthen the global climate regime — writing the 1.5°C redline into the Paris Agreement, establishing funding for loss and damage, and taking the world’s biggest problem to the world’s highest court. To the COP31 partnership, we bring the experience of 30 years of frontline leadership, the values of reciprocity and collective responsibility, and the warm hearts and unending resolve of our communities. We will continue to be the voice of science, justice and ambition. For us, phasing out fossil fuels and holding the line on 1.5°C is about survival. Together, we can ensure a safer, thriving future for the peoples of the Pacific and for communities worldwide.”
Tanyeli Behiç Sabuncu, WWF-Türkiye Climate and Energy Practice Manager, said: “As the President of COP31, Türkiye should not postpone leaving coal. One-third of the electricity mix in the country comes from it and new coal-fired power plant units are still being planned, despite losing both its economic and social licence. Phasing out fossil fuels is not merely an emission reduction goal. It is also a pathway toward a liveable world for people and nature as well as energy security for consumers and businesses. COP31 presents Türkiye a defining choice: stick to the choices of the past or lead a transformative shift toward a just and clean energy future. Announcing a coal phase-out date would send the clearest initial signal that the country takes its leadership role at COP seriously.
Denise Cauchi, CEO Climate Action Network Australia, said: “The fossil fuel era is ending. The escalating energy crisis is exposing the true costs of fossil fuel dependence—not only through worsening climate impacts, but also through global insecurity, energy price shocks and rising living costs. As the incoming President and President of Negotiations, Türkiye and Australia must put the 1.5°C temperature goal at the heart of COP31, which requires a managed, equitable transition away from coal, oil and gas, backed by finance and supported by a just transition. Australia must lead with credibility. As the world’s third-largest fossil fuel exporter, it needs a clear plan to phase out fossil fuels, including exports, and contribute its fair share of international climate finance.”
ENDS
Photos from the press conference will be added here after the event. The press conference will be live streamed and archived here
Media contact:
Kate O’Callaghan, Greenpeace on +61 406 231 892 (Whatsapp/Signal) or kate.ocallaghan@greenpeace.org
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