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Clean-energy technologies contributed more than 10% of China’s economic growth in 2024 for the first time ever, with sales and investments worth 13.6tn yuan ($1.9tn).

Clean-energy sectors drove a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2024 and have overtaken real-estate sales in value.

The new sector-by-sector analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, shows the growing role of clean technology in China’s economy – particularly the so-called “new three” industries, namely, solar, electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries.

For this analysis, a broad definition has been used for “clean-energy” sectors, including renewables, nuclear power, electricity grids, energy storage, EVs and railways. These are technologies and infrastructure needed to decarbonise China’s production and use of energy.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • Clean-energy investment reached 6.8tn yuan ($940bn), with annual growth of 7% cooling markedly – as expected – from the 40% expansion in 2023.
  • China’s investment in clean energy was close to the global total put into fossil fuels in 2024 and was of a similar scale to the overall size of Saudi Arabia’s economy.
  • The “new three” of EVs, batteries and solar continued to dominate the economic contribution of clean energy in China, generating three-quarters of the value added and, overall, attracting more than half of all investment in the sectors.
  • The growth in economic output from clean-energy sectors played a key role in driving their overall contribution to GDP in 2024, whereas investment was the driver in 2023.
  • Including the value of production, clean-energy sectors contributed 13.6tn yuan ($1.9tn) to China’s economy overall – just above 10% of total GDP.
  • These sectors grew three times as fast as the Chinese economy overall, accounting for 26% of all GDP growth in 2024.
  • Significantly, China would have missed its 5% target for GDP growth without the growth from clean technologies, expanding by 3.6% instead of the 5.0% reported.

There is likely to be further growth in clean-energy investment in 2025 as major projects race to finish before the end of the 14th five-year plan, covering 2021-2025.

Beyond this year, development of the clean-energy sectors depends strongly on the new targets and policies in the next five-year plan, which is being finalised this year.

Clean energy reaches GDP milestone

In 2023, clean energy was behind an estimated 40% of economic growth in China, driven by a huge wave of investment in manufacturing capacity in the sector.

As noted in last year’s analysis, it was inevitable that the extraordinary growth rates of investment would cool down in 2024 – and the new data bears this out.

Nevertheless, investment in the clean-energy sectors continued to grow in 2024. Moreover, growth in the production of goods and services in the sectors held up, at over 20%.

As a result, clean-energy sectors made up more than 10% of China’s GDP in 2024 for the first time ever, as shown in the figure below.

Share of China’s GDP contributed by clean-energy sectors
Share of China’s GDP contributed by clean-energy sectors, %. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

The overall economic contribution from clean-energy sectors, at 13.6tn yuan ($1.9tn), is of a similar scale to many major economies, such as Saudi Arabia or Switzerland.

Equally, the sectors now make up a larger share of China’s economy than real-estate sales, at 9.6tn yuan, or agriculture at 9.1tn yuan.

EVs and solar were the top growth drivers

The value of production and investments in clean-energy sectors grew an estimated 13% overall in 2024 – and has increased by 50% since 2022, as shown in the figure below.

Contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s GDP and GDP growth, trillion yuan
Contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s GDP and GDP growth, trillion yuan, 2022-2024. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

Investments in clean-energy sectors reached an estimated 6.8tn yuan ($940bn), up 7% year-on-year, contributing almost half of all growth in fixed asset investments.

The production of goods and services in the sectors grew by 21%, reaching 6.8tn yuan ($950bn).

Electric-vehicle production was the most valuable sector overall, followed by clean-power production, rail transportation, electricity transmission and storage and energy efficiency.

The table below includes a detailed breakdown by sector and activity.

Sector Activity Value in 2024, CNY bln Value in 2024, USD bln Year-on-year growth
EVs Investment: manufacturing capacity 1,393 194 11%
EVs Investment: charging infrastructure 122 17 20%
EVs Production of vehicles 3,067 427 36%
Batteries Investment: battery manufacturing 205 29 -35%
Batteries Exports: batteries 494 69 8%
Solar power Investment: power generation capacity 1,031 144 28%
Solar power Investment: manufacturing capacity 779 109 -18%
Solar power Electricity generation 386 54 41%
Solar power Exports of components 607 85 14%
Wind power Investment: power generation capacity, onshore 417 58 5%
Wind power Investment: power generation capacity, offshore 48 7 -44%
Wind power Electricity generation 440 51 14%
Nuclear power Investment: power generation capacity 129 18 49%
Nuclear power Electricity generation 200 28 3%
Hydropower nvestment: power generation capacity 95 13 19%
Hydropower Electricity generation 567 79 11%
Rail transportation Investment 851 118 11%
Rail transportation Transport of passengers and goods 990 138 3%
Electricity transmission Investment: transmission capacity 608 85 15%
Electricity transmission Transmission of clean power 46 6 17%
Energy storage Investment: Pumped hydro 403 56 13%
Energy storage Investment: Grid-connected batteries 134 19 70%
Energy storage Investment: Electrolysers 9 1 94%
Energy efficiency Revenue: Energy service companies 540 75 4%
Total Investments 6,765 942 7%
Total Production of goods and services 6,797 947 21%
Total Total GDP contribution 13,562 1889 13%

Electric vehicles and batteries

EVs and vehicle batteries were the largest contributors to China’s clean-energy economy in 2024, making up an estimated 39% of value overall.

Of this total, the largest share was from the production of battery EVs and plug-in hybrids – which together make up the bulk of what China calls “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) – worth more than 3tn yuan, followed by investment in NEV and battery manufacturing.

Investment in factories for making NEVs grew 11% to 1.4tn yuan, moderating from the high growth rates seen in 2023. The amount of money invested in new battery manufacturing facilities fell year-on-year, making a negative contribution to growth.

China produced 13m NEVs in 2024, rising 34% year-on-year. Some 22% of Chinese-made NEVs were exported, while the rest were sold domestically.

NEVs are the only growth sector for Chinese carmakers, as shown in the figure below. Moreover, NEVs made up 41% of total vehicle sales in 2024, up from 32% in 2023.

Production and sales of all vehicles and “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) in China
Production and sales of all vehicles and “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) in China, from National Bureau of Statistics and China Association of Automobile Manufacturers data via Wind Financial Terminal. NEVs include battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. The right-hand side shows the share of NEVs out of all new vehicles sold, and the cumulative share over the preceding 10 years, as an indicator of the share of NEVs out of vehicles on the road.

Domestic EV sales were supported by local government policies promoting vehicle replacement, but the strong sales also show that EVs have gained broad market acceptance.

New EV models have improved range and significantly shorter charging times – often under an hour – helping to ease consumer concerns. They also offer smart features such as “navigate on autopilot” self-driving, that provide a better driving experience.

Much of the growth in EV production is now in plug-in hybrid vehicles. The extent to which these cut emissions depends on their being driven mostly on electricity.

Real-world data suggests plug-in hybrids are rarely driven in electric mode in Europe. However, the electricity use of EV battery charging and swapping services in China rose by 51% in 2024, to levels consistent with a high level of electric driving from plug-in hybrids.

The growth in EV charging was supported by strong investment in charging infrastructure, with 4.2m charging points added in 2024, up 20% year-on-year. The total number of charging points reached 12.8m.

The average selling price of EVs in 2024 fell by just 8% year-on-year to 240,000 yuan ($33,000), despite intense competition in the sector.

While weaker than growth in domestic sales, EV exports still expanded 6.7% year-on-year, driven primarily by a 190% surge in the export of plug-in hybrids, while battery EV exports declined by 10.4%.

This trend may be linked to EU tariffs targeting battery EVs, but excluding hybrids.

The top growth markets were Brazil, Belgium, Mexico, the UAE and Indonesia, reflecting Chinese automakers’ efforts to expand in markets where they do not face high tariffs or to accelerate exports before tariff increases take effect.

Investment in overseas production capacity is also supporting growth. For example, BYD’s joint factory with BMW in Hungary is set to begin production in late 2025.

Solar

After EVs and batteries, the next-largest clean-tech contribution to China’s GDP in 2024 came from solar power, which completes the “new three” industries.

Solar generated 21% of the total value of the clean-energy industries in 2024, adding 2.8tn yuan ($390bn) to the national economy.

Within this, investment in power generation projects, at 1tn yuan ($140bn), overtook manufacturing investment (0.8tn yuan, $109bn) as the largest contributor to the value of the sector. The value of solar power technology exports (0.6tn yuan, $85bn) was the third-largest, followed by the value of the power generated from solar (0.4tn yuan, $54bn).

The figure below shows the surge of Chinese investments in new solar power capacity – which has grown 10-fold in just five years – alongside spending on new wind, hydro and nuclear capacity (see next section).

Value of investments in new clean power capacity, billion yuan.
Value of investments in new clean power capacity, billion yuan. The value of new capacity additions is calculated at constant 2023 capital cost levels to show the evolution of the real value of investment. Source: Capacity additions compiled from National Energy Administration annual electricity statistics releases and additional releases for solar PV and wind. Capital costs from China Electricity Council annual reports on power engineering costs.

China added some 277 gigawatts (GW) of new solar capacity in 2024, up 28% year-on-year from the previous year’s 216GW, which was also a record. This increase included strong growth from both large-scale and distributed segments.

Centralised solar capacity grew the most in the western provinces of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, home to China’s gigantic “clean energy bases”. The relatively prosperous coastal provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong led the growth of distributed capacity.

As major manufacturing hubs, these coastal provinces have a large potential for distributed solar at industrial sites, where most of the power can be consumed locally.

Rising commercial electricity prices, along with pressure to meet energy-saving and carbon reduction targets, are further driving investment in industrial and commercial distributed solar.

Expansion of distributed solar in some other provinces is being limited by grid constraints. Henan, which topped the list of increases in distributed solar capacity in 2023, saw a slowdown in capacity additions, as residential solar-power producers have faced restrictions on selling power to the grid.

Workers at a photovoltaic panel workshop in Jiangsu province, China.
Workers at a photovoltaic panel workshop in Jiangsu province, China. Credit: Sipa US / Alamy Stock Photo

Solar manufacturing capacity additions slowed down sharply in 2024, reflecting falling product prices and a supply glut. Still, manufacturing capacity at the end of 2024 rose by 29% compared with a year earlier.

The production of solar cells only increased by 16%, showing that manufacturing capacity additions are running ahead of demand and leading to weakened capacity utilisation at solar production lines.

As a result, investments in solar manufacturing capacity are likely to slow down even further in the coming years.

Other clean power generation

Hydropower, wind and nuclear were responsible for 14% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2024, adding some 1.9tn yuan ($264bn) to China’s GDP in 2024.

Nearly two-thirds of this (1.2tn yuan, $168bn) came from the value of power generation from hydropower, wind and nuclear, with investment in new power generation projects – shown in the chart above – contributing the rest.

Power generation grew 14% from wind, 11% from hydropower and 3% from nuclear. The rise in hydropower generation was mainly due to improved operating conditions as installed capacity only grew 1.2%.

Within investment, wind-power generation projects were the largest contributor to value, representing some 465bn yuan ($65bn) of spending in 2025. However, investment in nuclear projects, which increased by nearly half year-on-year, made the largest contribution to clean-energy spending growth. Investment in conventional hydropower declined slightly.

Wind-power investment was dragged down by a large drop in the commissioning of offshore wind capacity, which fell 44% year-on-year to just 4GW in 2024. This is expected to rebound strongly next year to 14-17GW.

Newly added onshore wind power capacity increased 5% year-on-year, reaching 76GW, on top of the blistering 85% increase in 2023.

Nuclear saw strong growth, with 3.9GW completed in 2024, up from 1.4GW a year earlier. As a result of record approvals of new projects in 2022-2024, China now has more than 50 GW of new nuclear generation capacity permitted or under construction, implying a major uptick in capacity additions in the next five years, the typical construction timeline for new projects in China.

There is likely to be further strong growth in clean power investments in 2025, as large schemes race to complete before the end of the five-year plan period at the end of the year.

Railways

Rail transportation made up 14% of the value of the clean-energy sectors, with revenue from passenger rail transportation the largest source of value.

Growth rates moderated from the forceful post-Covid rebound in 2023, when 39% growth was recorded, to 3%. The number of rail passengers increased 11.9% year-on-year.

The largest source of growth was investment in rail infrastructure, increasing 11% year-on-year. China added 3,000km of new railway line in 2024, with the total length of operating railways reaching 162,000km. This includes the Shanghai-Suzhou-Huzhou high-speed rail line, which opened at the end of the year.

A high-speed train in Shanghai, China.
A high-speed train in Shanghai, China. Credit: Markus Mainka / Alamy Stock Photo

Another 12,000km of high-speed rail will be opened by 2030. The goal is to establish a nationwide “1-2-3-hour travel circle”, where travel between cities within the same metropolitan area takes one hour, travel between adjacent cities takes two hours, and travel between major cities takes three hours.

Realising this vision involves connecting China’s entire coastline through a 350km per hour route by 2028, and to create a grid of eight east-to-west and north-to-south high-speed trunk lines.

Electricity grids and storage

Electricity transmission and storage was responsible for 9% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2024, with real growth of 19%.

The most valuable sub-segment was investment in power grids, followed by investment in energy storage. This includes spending on pumped hydropower, grid-connected battery storage and hydrogen production. The transmission of clean power also increased an estimated 17%, due to rapid growth in clean power generation.

China’s installed electricity storage capacity growth rivaled the increase in coal- and gas-fired power generation capacity, for the first time on record.

A total of approximately 50GW of battery storage, pumped hydro and hydrogen production capacity was added, while fossil fuel-based power generation capacity increased by 54GW.

This is significant, because a key rationale for building coal- and gas-fired power plants has been capacity adequacy, where electricity storage facilities can supplant the need for fossil fuel-based capacity.

Almost 40GW of battery storage was added, increasing 70% year-on-year and reaching 74GW total grid-connected capacity.

The operating capacity of pumped hydropower reached 59GW, with 8GW added during the year and 30GW entering construction. Capacity under construction increased to 189GW, up 13% on year, indicating that capacity additions will accelerate substantially in the next few years.

Investment in hydrogen electrolyser projects doubled year-on-year, from 1.8GW in 2023 to 3-4GW in 2024.

By the end of 2024, China had 42 operational long-distance, ultra-high voltage transmission lines, with a total length of over 40,000km and transmission capacity exceeding 300GW. Another 12 lines are under construction.

One of the headline transmission projects completed during the year is an ultrahigh voltage transmission line connecting regions of Inner Mongolia and northern Hebei with large amounts of renewable and coal power, to demand centers in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong and Jiangsu provinces.

Investment in transmission and storage is bound to continue. China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), published a new power system action plan that aims to integrate more than 200GW of new wind and solar onto the grid per year in 2025-27, requiring significant investments in storage and transmission.

“Developing new forms of energy storage” was included in China’s government work report for the first time in 2024, signaling a stronger policy push for energy storage deployment.

Energy efficiency

Investment in energy efficiency, as measured by the aggregate turnover of large energy service companies (ESCOs) grew 4% year-on-year, the slowest growth rate among the sectors we track.

China’s energy and emissions policies have de-emphasised energy efficiency in recent years. Controlling total energy consumption and energy intensity – so-called energy dual control – was the centerpiece of China’s energy policy and climate commitments until the early 2020s, creating strong incentives for provinces and enterprises to improve energy efficiency.

The policy was re-jigged in 2023 to target reductions in the fossil fuel intensity of the economy, making clean energy a more attractive way for local governments to pursue the targets. Five-year plan targets for building energy efficiency retrofits were also lowered compared with the previous plan.

Role of cleantech manufacturing in emissions growth

The clean-energy sectors include energy-intensive manufacturing industries, particularly the production of batteries and polysilicon, a key raw material for solar panels.

In addition, electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines need energy-intensive raw materials such as aluminum, steel and glass.

For this reason, and due to the high public profile of these industries, many commentators have suggested that the manufacturing of clean energy technologies is a major driver of China’s energy demand growth and emissions.

In reality, however, their role in driving China’s emissions is limited. The production of the “new three” – EVs, batteries and solar – was responsible for an estimated 3.5% of China’s CO2 emissions and 0.9 percentage points of emissions growth in 2024

In addition, the analysis shows that these sectors contributed just 0.5 percentage points out of the overall 6.8% increase in China’s electricity demand in 2024.

Electric vehicle charging used an additional 0.8% of China’s total electricity consumption, making it responsible for approximately 0.3% of the country’s total CO2 emissions.

For a full accounting, these additional emissions from producing and fuelling clean energy technologies would need to be compared with the CO2 savings from using them instead of fossil-fuelled alternatives, such as coal-fired power stations or combustion-engine cars.

Falling prices boost adoption, but challenge producers

While almost all other economies fret over high inflation, China is struggling with deflation, a product of aggressive expansion of manufacturing and weak domestic demand.

Several key clean-energy industries are facing this issue, with supply gluts leading to weak revenue and profits growth despite growing volumes. Attention on this issue has masked the contribution of the industries to real growth.

In the manufacturing of solar panels, for example, the nominal value of the industry’s production fell by 41%, even as volumes showed strong growth.

Yet, the nominal value of investments in solar-power projects held steady as the volume of the projects increased strongly and the price of solar panels only makes up less than one third of the cost of solar-power generation projects.

The value of electricity generated from solar increased by 40%, pulling the overall contribution of the solar power industry to nominal GDP growth into positive territory.

In total, the value added of the clean energy industries grew an estimated 8.5% in nominal terms, slower than the 15% real growth rate but significantly faster than the growth rate of GDP, contributing 17% of nominal GDP growth.

In December 2024, a key annual economic policy meeting called for the creation of a “healthy environment for the development of green and low-carbon industries” industries. This suggests the government may introduce measures to address excess clean manufacturing supply and address the weak profitability of the sector.

Implications of rapidly growing clean-energy economy

For the second year in a row, clean-energy sectors played an indispensable role in meeting China’s key economic targets.

The combination of iIncreased supply and falling prices is leading to much faster deployment in China than practically anyone expected a few years ago and is also catalysing clean energy deployment in new overseas markets.

This growth is expected to continue into 2025, driven by major projects aiming to finish before the end of the current five-year plan.

Beyond 2025, development of China’s clean-energy sectors hinges on new targets and policies in the next five-year plan, covering 2026-2030, which is being finalised this year.

After the lightning capacity expansion of the past few years, clean-energy manufacturing is plagued by weak profitability and oversupply.

Returning the sectors to profitability would require both maintaining strong domestic demand and measures to address overcapacity. Grid constraints, particularly affecting solar power, would need to be resolved to sustain demand.

Early indications of the targets proposed by China’s key ministries for 2030 and 2035 fall short of maintaining the demand for key clean-energy technologies at the 2023–24 level.

Setting targets for the next five-year period that are below the current rate of deployment could turn the clean-energy sectors from a driver of GDP growth into a drag, as well as worsening the oversupply situation they are facing. In contrast, ambitious clean energy targets could maintain the sector’s positive contribution to the economy.

The government’s economic stimulus measures are likely to support investment in the clean-energy sectors, given their significant role in investment growth.

Moreover, the now critical role of clean-energy development in driving China’s economic expansion creates incentives for policymakers to ensure the economic health of the sector.

About the data

Reported investment expenditure and sales revenue has been used where available. When this is not available, estimates are based on physical volumes – gigawatts of capacity installed, number of vehicles sold – and unit costs or prices.

The contribution to real growth is tracked by adjusting for inflation using 2022–2023 prices. For 2024, the contribution to nominal growth – not adjusted for inflation – is estimated by either using nominal values directly, when reported, or adjusting real growth rates by reported year-on-year changes in prices or costs.

All calculations and data sources are given in a worksheet.

Estimates include the contribution of clean energy technologies to the demand for upstream inputs such as metals and chemicals.

This approach shows the contribution of the clean-energy sectors to driving economic activity, also outside the sectors themselves, and is appropriate for estimating how much lower economic growth would have been without growth in these sectors.

Double counting is avoided by only including non-overlapping points in value chains. For example, the value of EV production and investment in battery storage of electricity is included, but not the value of battery production for the domestic market, which is predominantly an input to these activities.

Similarly, the value of solar panels produced for the domestic market is not included, as it makes up a part of the value of solar power generating capacity installed in China. However, the value of solar panel and battery exports is included.

The estimates are likely to be conservative in some key respects. For example, Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates “investment in the energy transition” in China in 2024 at $800bn. This estimate covers a nearly identical list of sectors to ours, but excludes manufacturing – the comparable number from our data is $600bn.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics says that the total value generated by automobile production and sales in 2023 was 11tn yuan. The estimate in this analysis for the value of EV sales in 2023 is 2.3tn yuan, or 20% of the total value of the industry, while EVs already made up 31% of vehicle production, and the average selling prices for EVs are slightly higher than for internal combustion engine vehicles.

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Analysis: Clean energy contributed a record 10% of China’s GDP in 2024

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‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak

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Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals.

Provisional data from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) shows that Antarctic sea ice hit its annual winter peak on 14 September, with an extent of 17.59m square kilometres (km2).

The organisation notes that the data is still preliminary, adding that “large fluctuations in extent are typical of Antarctic sea ice near the seasonal maximum”.

One expert tells Carbon Brief that it is “concerning to see these low values persisting”, but says that scientists need more time to determine whether this represents a “structural shift” in Antarctic sea ice extent.

Meanwhile, at the Earth’s other pole, Arctic sea ice reached its annual minimum on 12 September, ranking as the joint-10th lowest in the satellite record.

The NSIDC notes that the last 20 years have seen the lowest 20 Arctic sea ice extents in the satellite record.

Antarctic peak

Dr Lettie Roach, a polar climate scientist at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, tells Carbon Brief that this year’s Antarctic sea ice maximum was “well below average for the season”. She warns that, “after several decades of stable or increasing winter Antarctic sea ice conditions, it is concerning to see these low values persisting”.

She adds:

“Compared with the Arctic, it’s less clear how recent changes in Antarctic sea ice are attributable to human-caused warming vs natural variability. We need more years of observations to better understand whether this is truly a structural shift.”

Dr Clare Eayrs, a postdoctoral researcher at the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), tells Carbon Brief that, since recording a “near-average February minimum” extent, Antarctic sea ice has “returned to unusually low winter coverage”.

She notes that Antarctic sea ice extent in July and August this year were the fifth and fourth lowest on record, respectively, adding that “all five of the lowest July extents have occurred since 2022 and all four of the lowest August extents since 2023”.

The chart below shows Antarctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2023 (mid blue), the year of the smallest winter sea-ice maximum on record.

Antarctic sea ice peak in 2026 is third smallest on record. Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026, 2025, and 2023, as well as decadal averages, million km2. Source: NSIDC. Line chart showing 2026 peak in September remaining below 1980s-2010s averages but above Sep 2023's lowest record. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Eayrs tells Carbon Brief that the regional pattern of Antarctic sea ice cover “changed substantially during the growth season”.

For example, she says that “in April, the Bellingshausen Sea remained almost entirely ice-free, while the neighbouring Amundsen Sea had more ice than usual”.

However, by late August, changes in atmospheric pressure and wind meant that “the Bellingshausen deficit had largely recovered, while ice was unusually scarce in the Amundsen Sea and across much of East Antarctica”.

Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic.
Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Arctic minimum

Meanwhile, the Arctic recorded its minimum summer sea ice extent on 12 September. At 4.60m km2, this year ties with 2025, 2010 and 2008 as the 10th-lowest sea ice extent on record.

The chart below shows Arctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2012 (mid blue), the year of the smallest summer sea-ice minimum on record.

Arctic sea ice minimum in 2026 is tied for 10th smallest on record. Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026, 2025 and 2012, as well as decadal averages, million km2. Source: NSIDC. The line graph shows annual ice extent reaching September lows, with 2026 far below 1980s-2000s averages. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Roach tells Carbon Brief that although this minimum is not “record setting”, it is still “lower than any sea ice minimum before 2007”. She adds:

“Human-caused climate change has reduced Arctic sea ice cover and thickness, so the region is fundamentally different compared to a few decades ago.”

Scientists have been tracking Arctic sea ice thickness using a reanalysis produced called the Pan-Arctic Ice Ocean Modeling and Assimilation System (PIOMAS) since 1979.

In March 2026, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) terminated a global dataset of air pressure that scientists relied upon to produce PIOMAS, forcing both datasets to stop publishing updates.

The PIOMAS website says it will take “considerable effort and time” to find alternative data to use in their reanalysis. It adds that “we don’t yet have a good sense if that’s possible with available funds and if so, when we will be able to resume production of a new PIOMAS timeseries”.

Roach also notes that August saw record-breaking heat sweep across much of the world, explaining that high temperatures “extended into Arctic coastal regions, close to regions with substantial sea ice loss – particularly the Barents-Kara and East Siberian seas”.

Dr Zack Labe, a scientist at Climate Central, tells Carbon Brief that the absence of a new record does not mean that ice cover is becoming more “resilient”. He says:

“Local weather patterns across the Arctic play a really important role in year-to-year sea-ice extent, even as the long-term trend is clearly downward.”

Labe tells Carbon Brief that weather in the Arctic this summer was “influenced mainly by lower pressure toward the central Arctic, which brought cloudier and cooler conditions that limited surface melt and delayed the start of the melt season”.

He explains that this “was most obvious across parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where the melt season didn’t really kick off until after early July, which was more than two weeks later than normal”.

In contrast, he says, the Atlantic side of the Arctic “had a much more extreme summer”, with sea ice in the Barents Sea recording its “earliest melt-out on record”.

This was partly due to “unusually warm air and ocean temperatures”, Labe says. He notes, for example, that parts of western Siberia saw unusually persistent temperatures more than 5C above the 1981-2010 average for much of the summer, which extended out over the Kara Sea and contributed to substantial ice melt in this area”.

Map showing main regions of the Arctic.
Map showing main regions of the Arctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Labe tells Carbon Brief that, going forward, scientists need “more data and observations of other sea-ice metrics, like ice thickness, which may give us better insight into the overall condition of the ice pack, especially during years like 2026 when it is very fragmented”.

(In March 2026, Arctic sea ice reached its peak extent for this winter, clocking in as the joint-smallest in a satellite record going back almost half a century.)

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‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak

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COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”

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Participants at COP31 in Antalya will have a “duty” not to interfere in Türkiye’s internal affairs under the country’s hosting deal with the UN, reviving a clause dropped for last year’s climate summit in Brazil that human rights groups warn could put activists at risk.

Türkiye has faced growing criticism from human rights groups over the jailing of opposition figures, journalists and activists and imposed a blanket protest ban around July’s summit of the NATO military alliance in Ankara.

The contested provision is included in the binding agreement between the UN climate secretariat and the Turkish government that sets out responsibilities over logistical arrangements and details participants’ rights and obligations.

The document, signed in June but only made public on Wednesday, gives accredited COP31 attendees immunity from legal action over what they say, write or do in connection with the conference. Climate Home News understands that this safeguard can be applied to what takes place both inside and, in certain circumstances, outside of the UN-controlled COP “Blue Zone”. For the first time, this protection explicitly continues after the summit ends.

Turkish riot police arrested protesters during the anti NATO protest on July 7, 2026 in Ankara, Turkey. (Photo by Sedat Suna/Getty Images)

But participants enjoying these “privileges and immunities” also have a duty to respect Türkiye’s laws and regulations and not to interfere in its internal affairs, the agreement states. Rights groups fear its wide-ranging formulation could be used to discourage criticism of the host government.

Climate Home News understands that whether an action is covered by the immunity or infringes on the host’s internal affairs would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with close coordination between the country’s authorities and the UN climate change body.

A separate provision states that immunity shall be waived where the UN believes it would “impede the course of justice”.

‘Chilling effect’

Those same provisions featured in the host country agreements for COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP29 in Azerbaijan, both regarded as authoritarian regimes, before being dropped for COP30 in Brazil.

Ann Harrison, climate justice policy advisor at Amnesty International, said it is “extremely disappointing” that the COP31 agreement re-introduced clauses that could “hinder the ability of human rights defenders and civil society organisations to conduct their work safely”.

COP31 electrification pledge leaves out clean power commitment

She added the provisions could have a “wider chilling effect” on rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, given concerns over the human rights situation in Türkiye, including laws that “have shrunk civic space” and their “abusive” implementation by authorities.

The UN climate change body declined to comment.

Rights groups have documented blanket protest bans, unlawful use of force by the police and prosecutions of journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers across Türkiye in the last year.

Arrests and protest bans

Last July, environmental activist Esra Işık was sentenced to more than two years for “resisting” a public official over what Amnesty International described as a peaceful protest against an urgent expropriation order linked to the expansion of coal mining in south-western Türkiye. She is appealing the conviction.

Ahead of a summit of the NATO alliance in the capital Ankara in July, authorities put in place a 13-day blanket ban on demonstrations, citing “national security”, and arrested over 200 people. Human Rights Watch said the crackdown showed Türkiye’s “ruthless intolerance of freedom of speech and assembly”.

Earlier this month, Turkish police detained dozens of people as part of what rights groups described as the government’s widening crackdown on LGBTQ+ activists and venues.

Questioned by media as to how he would guarantee the right to protest at COP31, Kurum said earlier in September that his team would “try to meet” any request they receive from civil society and give them “a free space to express themselves”.

“Don’t worry, thinking you will not be able to voice your opinions or really share your thoughts,” he said in an attempt to reassure campaigners, adding that he had put former deputy environment minister Mehmet Birpinar in charge of liaising with civil society.

Civic space needed

Camilla Pollera, human rights and climate change campaigner at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), said meaningful participation at COP31 is fundamental to the legitimacy of climate action.

“At a climate summit, civil society participation necessarily includes being present, speaking out, scrutinising governments’ decisions and climate policies, and advocating for communities most vulnerable to climate change,” she added.

Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025.
Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. (Photo: Mariel Lozada/Climate Home News)

At last year’s COP30 summit, thousands of Indigenous people and climate activists peacefully marched through the Amazonian city of Belém in the first major demonstration outside the UN venue in four years. Smaller-scale demonstrations were largely confined to the “Blue Zone” at COP27 in Egypt, COP28 in the UAE and COP29 in Azerbaijan.

In two other separate incidents in Belém, members of the Munduruku tribe blocked access to the conference centre for hours, demanding an end to development projects in their ancestral land, and protesters stormed through the venue clashing with UN security officials.

The COP31 hosting agreement keeps some of the safeguards previously hailed by civil society groups. The government and the UN secretariat commit to upholding “the fundamental human rights” of all participants in the agreement’s preamble.

Under the deal, Türkiye also needs to ensure that security personnel follow “the highest ethical and professional standards and are expected to behave with integrity and respect”.

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COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”

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Threatened by rising seas, small islands secure right to keep their statehood

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As rising seas submerge growing swathes of land, countries that lose territory should still keep their national boundaries, sovereign rights and UN membership, according to a political declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly in New York on Thursday.

The declaration, which was championed by climate-vulnerable small island states, affirms “the presumption in favour of continued statehood” in the face of sea level rise fuelled by climate change, and urges countries to work together to assist communities affected by encroaching oceans.

Speaking at a high-level UN meeting to address the existential threats posed by sea level rise, Cabo Verde’s Prime Minister Francisco Carvalho, one of the initiative’s co-facilitators along with Australia, said the adoption of the text by consensus sends “a message of hope”.

“This declaration has a very special meaning. For us, sea level rise is neither a distant threat nor a theoretical concern,” he said, adding that rising seas put at risk key infrastructure, water resources and economic growth in small island states.

In the Pacific, sea levels have risen at twice the global rate, dramatically increasing coastal flooding events from two to 20 a year in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and from zero to 102 events per year in American Samoa, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Surangel Whipps Jr., president of the Pacific island of Palau, said the summit in New York represents a “moment of international solidarity”, and highlighted that small island states will remain permanent members of the UN.

    Declaration recognises statehood

    An advisory opinion by the world’s top maritime court, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), first upheld in 2024 that countries do not have to shrink their maritime borders even if they lose land territory due to sea level rise. This was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in last year’s landmark ruling on the climate obligations of states.

    The new declaration endorsed by all governments at the UN General Assembly stresses that sea level rise “is not a distant scenario but a real and lived experience for many”, and notes that international law must be implemented in global responses to rising seas.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the “milestone must now be translated into action”, adding that the declaration should encourage an “ongoing dialogue” at the “highest possible level” leading to practical outcomes. Pacific islands have proposed an international treaty on sea level rise that would provide more legal certainty.

    “Those on the frontlines must be front and centre on every decision. We cannot allow countries and cultures to vanish beneath the waves,” he said. “The SOS has gone out. The world must answer.”

    At regional summit, Pacific islands ask for COP31 support for clean energy and finance

    Goodwin Friday, prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, said measures to protect vulnerable states will require adequate finance. “Investing in resilience now is more cost-effective than paying the far greater price for loss and damage later,” he added.

    Championed by Australia’s COP31 co-presidency, Pacific islands have sought to put adaptation to sea level rise and ocean conservation at the top of the political agenda by inviting world leaders to attend the pre-COP31 summit co-hosted by Fiji and Tuvalu in October.

    Tuvalu will also host the second global fossil fuel phase-out summit in April 2027, after around 60 governments met this year in Santa Marta, Colombia, to discuss ending their dependence on coal, oil and gas.

    “Our coastlines, our reefs and our communities are living with the consequences of fossil fuel dependence every day, and our people have earned the right to help shape the way forward,” Lynda Tabuya, Fiji’s climate minister, said in a statement announcing details of the conference.

    Secretary-General António Guterres attending the meeting on addressing the existential threats posed by sea level rise at UN headquarters in New York.
    Secretary-General António Guterres attending the meeting on addressing the existential threats posed by sea level rise. (Photo: UN Photo/Manuel Elías)

    Ocean monitoring gets a boost in New York

    Amid record-breaking marine heat and seas rising at unprecedented speed, governments in New York announced new commitments to protect the world’s ocean, as efforts to bolster marine ecosystems and coastal communities rise up the political agenda.

    On Wednesday, the EU and Canada announced more funding for a new Europe-led ocean monitoring system called OceanEye, launched in the aftermath of a failed attempt by the Trump administration to dismantle the largest existing network of deep-sea observatories.

    During an event at UN headquarters in New York, EU President Ursula von der Leyen and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced around $163 million in new funding for the initiative, with the EU pledging €92 million ($105m) on top of existing seed funding and Canada pledging C$82 million (US$58m) over five years.

    According to an EU statement, while OceanEye will collaborate with the Global Ocean Observing System, that network “remains vulnerable to financial shortfalls and geopolitical disruptions”. A group of 30 countries from Europe, Africa and the Americas joined an international initiative in support of OceanEye, including large coastal nations like Brazil, Namibia and Mexico.

    Von der Leyen said OceanEye “can make us the leading ocean data provider in a matter of years”, including by launching new satellites and installing new observatories in the deep ocean. “From outer space to the deepest ocean, our funding helps us keep watch beneath the waves,” she added.

    Carney said the initiative would help protect Canada’s Arctic region with real-time monitoring operating year-round. “We can’t protect what we can’t see,” he said, also highlighting that Canada had expanded conservation of its ocean territory from 1% a decade ago to 15% now.

    In New York, a group of 19 countries said they are either developing or implementing plans to sustainably manage all of their ocean territory, with 12 new nations joining the initiative. In a joint communiqué, they called on more countries to sign up ahead of COP31.

    Warnings of El Niño-fuelled extreme heat

    Scientists and world leaders have raised the alarm over this year’s record-breaking marine temperatures, which have persisted above historical peaks for more than 100 days as the naturally occurring El Niño phenomenon intensifies in the Pacific.

    Extreme ocean heat could become a threat to coastal ecosystems and communities, experts fear. Water temperatures 1.5C above normal levels have also rapidly fuelled a strong hurricane in the Pacific in recent days.

    Despite scientific calls for additional ocean conservation efforts, a report launched this week in New York warned that efforts to protect ocean ecosystems are lagging behind, with only 10% of the global ocean covered by conservation areas and just 3.5% designated as “effectively protected”.

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