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Clean-energy technologies contributed more than 10% of China’s economic growth in 2024 for the first time ever, with sales and investments worth 13.6tn yuan ($1.9tn).

Clean-energy sectors drove a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2024 and have overtaken real-estate sales in value.

The new sector-by-sector analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, shows the growing role of clean technology in China’s economy – particularly the so-called “new three” industries, namely, solar, electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries.

For this analysis, a broad definition has been used for “clean-energy” sectors, including renewables, nuclear power, electricity grids, energy storage, EVs and railways. These are technologies and infrastructure needed to decarbonise China’s production and use of energy.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • Clean-energy investment reached 6.8tn yuan ($940bn), with annual growth of 7% cooling markedly – as expected – from the 40% expansion in 2023.
  • China’s investment in clean energy was close to the global total put into fossil fuels in 2024 and was of a similar scale to the overall size of Saudi Arabia’s economy.
  • The “new three” of EVs, batteries and solar continued to dominate the economic contribution of clean energy in China, generating three-quarters of the value added and, overall, attracting more than half of all investment in the sectors.
  • The growth in economic output from clean-energy sectors played a key role in driving their overall contribution to GDP in 2024, whereas investment was the driver in 2023.
  • Including the value of production, clean-energy sectors contributed 13.6tn yuan ($1.9tn) to China’s economy overall – just above 10% of total GDP.
  • These sectors grew three times as fast as the Chinese economy overall, accounting for 26% of all GDP growth in 2024.
  • Significantly, China would have missed its 5% target for GDP growth without the growth from clean technologies, expanding by 3.6% instead of the 5.0% reported.

There is likely to be further growth in clean-energy investment in 2025 as major projects race to finish before the end of the 14th five-year plan, covering 2021-2025.

Beyond this year, development of the clean-energy sectors depends strongly on the new targets and policies in the next five-year plan, which is being finalised this year.

Clean energy reaches GDP milestone

In 2023, clean energy was behind an estimated 40% of economic growth in China, driven by a huge wave of investment in manufacturing capacity in the sector.

As noted in last year’s analysis, it was inevitable that the extraordinary growth rates of investment would cool down in 2024 – and the new data bears this out.

Nevertheless, investment in the clean-energy sectors continued to grow in 2024. Moreover, growth in the production of goods and services in the sectors held up, at over 20%.

As a result, clean-energy sectors made up more than 10% of China’s GDP in 2024 for the first time ever, as shown in the figure below.

Share of China’s GDP contributed by clean-energy sectors
Share of China’s GDP contributed by clean-energy sectors, %. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

The overall economic contribution from clean-energy sectors, at 13.6tn yuan ($1.9tn), is of a similar scale to many major economies, such as Saudi Arabia or Switzerland.

Equally, the sectors now make up a larger share of China’s economy than real-estate sales, at 9.6tn yuan, or agriculture at 9.1tn yuan.

EVs and solar were the top growth drivers

The value of production and investments in clean-energy sectors grew an estimated 13% overall in 2024 – and has increased by 50% since 2022, as shown in the figure below.

Contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s GDP and GDP growth, trillion yuan
Contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s GDP and GDP growth, trillion yuan, 2022-2024. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

Investments in clean-energy sectors reached an estimated 6.8tn yuan ($940bn), up 7% year-on-year, contributing almost half of all growth in fixed asset investments.

The production of goods and services in the sectors grew by 21%, reaching 6.8tn yuan ($950bn).

Electric-vehicle production was the most valuable sector overall, followed by clean-power production, rail transportation, electricity transmission and storage and energy efficiency.

The table below includes a detailed breakdown by sector and activity.

Sector Activity Value in 2024, CNY bln Value in 2024, USD bln Year-on-year growth
EVs Investment: manufacturing capacity 1,393 194 11%
EVs Investment: charging infrastructure 122 17 20%
EVs Production of vehicles 3,067 427 36%
Batteries Investment: battery manufacturing 205 29 -35%
Batteries Exports: batteries 494 69 8%
Solar power Investment: power generation capacity 1,031 144 28%
Solar power Investment: manufacturing capacity 779 109 -18%
Solar power Electricity generation 386 54 41%
Solar power Exports of components 607 85 14%
Wind power Investment: power generation capacity, onshore 417 58 5%
Wind power Investment: power generation capacity, offshore 48 7 -44%
Wind power Electricity generation 440 51 14%
Nuclear power Investment: power generation capacity 129 18 49%
Nuclear power Electricity generation 200 28 3%
Hydropower nvestment: power generation capacity 95 13 19%
Hydropower Electricity generation 567 79 11%
Rail transportation Investment 851 118 11%
Rail transportation Transport of passengers and goods 990 138 3%
Electricity transmission Investment: transmission capacity 608 85 15%
Electricity transmission Transmission of clean power 46 6 17%
Energy storage Investment: Pumped hydro 403 56 13%
Energy storage Investment: Grid-connected batteries 134 19 70%
Energy storage Investment: Electrolysers 9 1 94%
Energy efficiency Revenue: Energy service companies 540 75 4%
Total Investments 6,765 942 7%
Total Production of goods and services 6,797 947 21%
Total Total GDP contribution 13,562 1889 13%

Electric vehicles and batteries

EVs and vehicle batteries were the largest contributors to China’s clean-energy economy in 2024, making up an estimated 39% of value overall.

Of this total, the largest share was from the production of battery EVs and plug-in hybrids – which together make up the bulk of what China calls “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) – worth more than 3tn yuan, followed by investment in NEV and battery manufacturing.

Investment in factories for making NEVs grew 11% to 1.4tn yuan, moderating from the high growth rates seen in 2023. The amount of money invested in new battery manufacturing facilities fell year-on-year, making a negative contribution to growth.

China produced 13m NEVs in 2024, rising 34% year-on-year. Some 22% of Chinese-made NEVs were exported, while the rest were sold domestically.

NEVs are the only growth sector for Chinese carmakers, as shown in the figure below. Moreover, NEVs made up 41% of total vehicle sales in 2024, up from 32% in 2023.

Production and sales of all vehicles and “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) in China
Production and sales of all vehicles and “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) in China, from National Bureau of Statistics and China Association of Automobile Manufacturers data via Wind Financial Terminal. NEVs include battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. The right-hand side shows the share of NEVs out of all new vehicles sold, and the cumulative share over the preceding 10 years, as an indicator of the share of NEVs out of vehicles on the road.

Domestic EV sales were supported by local government policies promoting vehicle replacement, but the strong sales also show that EVs have gained broad market acceptance.

New EV models have improved range and significantly shorter charging times – often under an hour – helping to ease consumer concerns. They also offer smart features such as “navigate on autopilot” self-driving, that provide a better driving experience.

Much of the growth in EV production is now in plug-in hybrid vehicles. The extent to which these cut emissions depends on their being driven mostly on electricity.

Real-world data suggests plug-in hybrids are rarely driven in electric mode in Europe. However, the electricity use of EV battery charging and swapping services in China rose by 51% in 2024, to levels consistent with a high level of electric driving from plug-in hybrids.

The growth in EV charging was supported by strong investment in charging infrastructure, with 4.2m charging points added in 2024, up 20% year-on-year. The total number of charging points reached 12.8m.

The average selling price of EVs in 2024 fell by just 8% year-on-year to 240,000 yuan ($33,000), despite intense competition in the sector.

While weaker than growth in domestic sales, EV exports still expanded 6.7% year-on-year, driven primarily by a 190% surge in the export of plug-in hybrids, while battery EV exports declined by 10.4%.

This trend may be linked to EU tariffs targeting battery EVs, but excluding hybrids.

The top growth markets were Brazil, Belgium, Mexico, the UAE and Indonesia, reflecting Chinese automakers’ efforts to expand in markets where they do not face high tariffs or to accelerate exports before tariff increases take effect.

Investment in overseas production capacity is also supporting growth. For example, BYD’s joint factory with BMW in Hungary is set to begin production in late 2025.

Solar

After EVs and batteries, the next-largest clean-tech contribution to China’s GDP in 2024 came from solar power, which completes the “new three” industries.

Solar generated 21% of the total value of the clean-energy industries in 2024, adding 2.8tn yuan ($390bn) to the national economy.

Within this, investment in power generation projects, at 1tn yuan ($140bn), overtook manufacturing investment (0.8tn yuan, $109bn) as the largest contributor to the value of the sector. The value of solar power technology exports (0.6tn yuan, $85bn) was the third-largest, followed by the value of the power generated from solar (0.4tn yuan, $54bn).

The figure below shows the surge of Chinese investments in new solar power capacity – which has grown 10-fold in just five years – alongside spending on new wind, hydro and nuclear capacity (see next section).

Value of investments in new clean power capacity, billion yuan.
Value of investments in new clean power capacity, billion yuan. The value of new capacity additions is calculated at constant 2023 capital cost levels to show the evolution of the real value of investment. Source: Capacity additions compiled from National Energy Administration annual electricity statistics releases and additional releases for solar PV and wind. Capital costs from China Electricity Council annual reports on power engineering costs.

China added some 277 gigawatts (GW) of new solar capacity in 2024, up 28% year-on-year from the previous year’s 216GW, which was also a record. This increase included strong growth from both large-scale and distributed segments.

Centralised solar capacity grew the most in the western provinces of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, home to China’s gigantic “clean energy bases”. The relatively prosperous coastal provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong led the growth of distributed capacity.

As major manufacturing hubs, these coastal provinces have a large potential for distributed solar at industrial sites, where most of the power can be consumed locally.

Rising commercial electricity prices, along with pressure to meet energy-saving and carbon reduction targets, are further driving investment in industrial and commercial distributed solar.

Expansion of distributed solar in some other provinces is being limited by grid constraints. Henan, which topped the list of increases in distributed solar capacity in 2023, saw a slowdown in capacity additions, as residential solar-power producers have faced restrictions on selling power to the grid.

Workers at a photovoltaic panel workshop in Jiangsu province, China.
Workers at a photovoltaic panel workshop in Jiangsu province, China. Credit: Sipa US / Alamy Stock Photo

Solar manufacturing capacity additions slowed down sharply in 2024, reflecting falling product prices and a supply glut. Still, manufacturing capacity at the end of 2024 rose by 29% compared with a year earlier.

The production of solar cells only increased by 16%, showing that manufacturing capacity additions are running ahead of demand and leading to weakened capacity utilisation at solar production lines.

As a result, investments in solar manufacturing capacity are likely to slow down even further in the coming years.

Other clean power generation

Hydropower, wind and nuclear were responsible for 14% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2024, adding some 1.9tn yuan ($264bn) to China’s GDP in 2024.

Nearly two-thirds of this (1.2tn yuan, $168bn) came from the value of power generation from hydropower, wind and nuclear, with investment in new power generation projects – shown in the chart above – contributing the rest.

Power generation grew 14% from wind, 11% from hydropower and 3% from nuclear. The rise in hydropower generation was mainly due to improved operating conditions as installed capacity only grew 1.2%.

Within investment, wind-power generation projects were the largest contributor to value, representing some 465bn yuan ($65bn) of spending in 2025. However, investment in nuclear projects, which increased by nearly half year-on-year, made the largest contribution to clean-energy spending growth. Investment in conventional hydropower declined slightly.

Wind-power investment was dragged down by a large drop in the commissioning of offshore wind capacity, which fell 44% year-on-year to just 4GW in 2024. This is expected to rebound strongly next year to 14-17GW.

Newly added onshore wind power capacity increased 5% year-on-year, reaching 76GW, on top of the blistering 85% increase in 2023.

Nuclear saw strong growth, with 3.9GW completed in 2024, up from 1.4GW a year earlier. As a result of record approvals of new projects in 2022-2024, China now has more than 50 GW of new nuclear generation capacity permitted or under construction, implying a major uptick in capacity additions in the next five years, the typical construction timeline for new projects in China.

There is likely to be further strong growth in clean power investments in 2025, as large schemes race to complete before the end of the five-year plan period at the end of the year.

Railways

Rail transportation made up 14% of the value of the clean-energy sectors, with revenue from passenger rail transportation the largest source of value.

Growth rates moderated from the forceful post-Covid rebound in 2023, when 39% growth was recorded, to 3%. The number of rail passengers increased 11.9% year-on-year.

The largest source of growth was investment in rail infrastructure, increasing 11% year-on-year. China added 3,000km of new railway line in 2024, with the total length of operating railways reaching 162,000km. This includes the Shanghai-Suzhou-Huzhou high-speed rail line, which opened at the end of the year.

A high-speed train in Shanghai, China.
A high-speed train in Shanghai, China. Credit: Markus Mainka / Alamy Stock Photo

Another 12,000km of high-speed rail will be opened by 2030. The goal is to establish a nationwide “1-2-3-hour travel circle”, where travel between cities within the same metropolitan area takes one hour, travel between adjacent cities takes two hours, and travel between major cities takes three hours.

Realising this vision involves connecting China’s entire coastline through a 350km per hour route by 2028, and to create a grid of eight east-to-west and north-to-south high-speed trunk lines.

Electricity grids and storage

Electricity transmission and storage was responsible for 9% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2024, with real growth of 19%.

The most valuable sub-segment was investment in power grids, followed by investment in energy storage. This includes spending on pumped hydropower, grid-connected battery storage and hydrogen production. The transmission of clean power also increased an estimated 17%, due to rapid growth in clean power generation.

China’s installed electricity storage capacity growth rivaled the increase in coal- and gas-fired power generation capacity, for the first time on record.

A total of approximately 50GW of battery storage, pumped hydro and hydrogen production capacity was added, while fossil fuel-based power generation capacity increased by 54GW.

This is significant, because a key rationale for building coal- and gas-fired power plants has been capacity adequacy, where electricity storage facilities can supplant the need for fossil fuel-based capacity.

Almost 40GW of battery storage was added, increasing 70% year-on-year and reaching 74GW total grid-connected capacity.

The operating capacity of pumped hydropower reached 59GW, with 8GW added during the year and 30GW entering construction. Capacity under construction increased to 189GW, up 13% on year, indicating that capacity additions will accelerate substantially in the next few years.

Investment in hydrogen electrolyser projects doubled year-on-year, from 1.8GW in 2023 to 3-4GW in 2024.

By the end of 2024, China had 42 operational long-distance, ultra-high voltage transmission lines, with a total length of over 40,000km and transmission capacity exceeding 300GW. Another 12 lines are under construction.

One of the headline transmission projects completed during the year is an ultrahigh voltage transmission line connecting regions of Inner Mongolia and northern Hebei with large amounts of renewable and coal power, to demand centers in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong and Jiangsu provinces.

Investment in transmission and storage is bound to continue. China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), published a new power system action plan that aims to integrate more than 200GW of new wind and solar onto the grid per year in 2025-27, requiring significant investments in storage and transmission.

“Developing new forms of energy storage” was included in China’s government work report for the first time in 2024, signaling a stronger policy push for energy storage deployment.

Energy efficiency

Investment in energy efficiency, as measured by the aggregate turnover of large energy service companies (ESCOs) grew 4% year-on-year, the slowest growth rate among the sectors we track.

China’s energy and emissions policies have de-emphasised energy efficiency in recent years. Controlling total energy consumption and energy intensity – so-called energy dual control – was the centerpiece of China’s energy policy and climate commitments until the early 2020s, creating strong incentives for provinces and enterprises to improve energy efficiency.

The policy was re-jigged in 2023 to target reductions in the fossil fuel intensity of the economy, making clean energy a more attractive way for local governments to pursue the targets. Five-year plan targets for building energy efficiency retrofits were also lowered compared with the previous plan.

Role of cleantech manufacturing in emissions growth

The clean-energy sectors include energy-intensive manufacturing industries, particularly the production of batteries and polysilicon, a key raw material for solar panels.

In addition, electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines need energy-intensive raw materials such as aluminum, steel and glass.

For this reason, and due to the high public profile of these industries, many commentators have suggested that the manufacturing of clean energy technologies is a major driver of China’s energy demand growth and emissions.

In reality, however, their role in driving China’s emissions is limited. The production of the “new three” – EVs, batteries and solar – was responsible for an estimated 3.5% of China’s CO2 emissions and 0.9 percentage points of emissions growth in 2024

In addition, the analysis shows that these sectors contributed just 0.5 percentage points out of the overall 6.8% increase in China’s electricity demand in 2024.

Electric vehicle charging used an additional 0.8% of China’s total electricity consumption, making it responsible for approximately 0.3% of the country’s total CO2 emissions.

For a full accounting, these additional emissions from producing and fuelling clean energy technologies would need to be compared with the CO2 savings from using them instead of fossil-fuelled alternatives, such as coal-fired power stations or combustion-engine cars.

Falling prices boost adoption, but challenge producers

While almost all other economies fret over high inflation, China is struggling with deflation, a product of aggressive expansion of manufacturing and weak domestic demand.

Several key clean-energy industries are facing this issue, with supply gluts leading to weak revenue and profits growth despite growing volumes. Attention on this issue has masked the contribution of the industries to real growth.

In the manufacturing of solar panels, for example, the nominal value of the industry’s production fell by 41%, even as volumes showed strong growth.

Yet, the nominal value of investments in solar-power projects held steady as the volume of the projects increased strongly and the price of solar panels only makes up less than one third of the cost of solar-power generation projects.

The value of electricity generated from solar increased by 40%, pulling the overall contribution of the solar power industry to nominal GDP growth into positive territory.

In total, the value added of the clean energy industries grew an estimated 8.5% in nominal terms, slower than the 15% real growth rate but significantly faster than the growth rate of GDP, contributing 17% of nominal GDP growth.

In December 2024, a key annual economic policy meeting called for the creation of a “healthy environment for the development of green and low-carbon industries” industries. This suggests the government may introduce measures to address excess clean manufacturing supply and address the weak profitability of the sector.

Implications of rapidly growing clean-energy economy

For the second year in a row, clean-energy sectors played an indispensable role in meeting China’s key economic targets.

The combination of iIncreased supply and falling prices is leading to much faster deployment in China than practically anyone expected a few years ago and is also catalysing clean energy deployment in new overseas markets.

This growth is expected to continue into 2025, driven by major projects aiming to finish before the end of the current five-year plan.

Beyond 2025, development of China’s clean-energy sectors hinges on new targets and policies in the next five-year plan, covering 2026-2030, which is being finalised this year.

After the lightning capacity expansion of the past few years, clean-energy manufacturing is plagued by weak profitability and oversupply.

Returning the sectors to profitability would require both maintaining strong domestic demand and measures to address overcapacity. Grid constraints, particularly affecting solar power, would need to be resolved to sustain demand.

Early indications of the targets proposed by China’s key ministries for 2030 and 2035 fall short of maintaining the demand for key clean-energy technologies at the 2023–24 level.

Setting targets for the next five-year period that are below the current rate of deployment could turn the clean-energy sectors from a driver of GDP growth into a drag, as well as worsening the oversupply situation they are facing. In contrast, ambitious clean energy targets could maintain the sector’s positive contribution to the economy.

The government’s economic stimulus measures are likely to support investment in the clean-energy sectors, given their significant role in investment growth.

Moreover, the now critical role of clean-energy development in driving China’s economic expansion creates incentives for policymakers to ensure the economic health of the sector.

About the data

Reported investment expenditure and sales revenue has been used where available. When this is not available, estimates are based on physical volumes – gigawatts of capacity installed, number of vehicles sold – and unit costs or prices.

The contribution to real growth is tracked by adjusting for inflation using 2022–2023 prices. For 2024, the contribution to nominal growth – not adjusted for inflation – is estimated by either using nominal values directly, when reported, or adjusting real growth rates by reported year-on-year changes in prices or costs.

All calculations and data sources are given in a worksheet.

Estimates include the contribution of clean energy technologies to the demand for upstream inputs such as metals and chemicals.

This approach shows the contribution of the clean-energy sectors to driving economic activity, also outside the sectors themselves, and is appropriate for estimating how much lower economic growth would have been without growth in these sectors.

Double counting is avoided by only including non-overlapping points in value chains. For example, the value of EV production and investment in battery storage of electricity is included, but not the value of battery production for the domestic market, which is predominantly an input to these activities.

Similarly, the value of solar panels produced for the domestic market is not included, as it makes up a part of the value of solar power generating capacity installed in China. However, the value of solar panel and battery exports is included.

The estimates are likely to be conservative in some key respects. For example, Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates “investment in the energy transition” in China in 2024 at $800bn. This estimate covers a nearly identical list of sectors to ours, but excludes manufacturing – the comparable number from our data is $600bn.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics says that the total value generated by automobile production and sales in 2023 was 11tn yuan. The estimate in this analysis for the value of EV sales in 2023 is 2.3tn yuan, or 20% of the total value of the industry, while EVs already made up 31% of vehicle production, and the average selling prices for EVs are slightly higher than for internal combustion engine vehicles.

The post Analysis: Clean energy contributed a record 10% of China’s GDP in 2024 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Clean energy contributed a record 10% of China’s GDP in 2024

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Climate Change

DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Heating up

NOT FREE FROM HEAT: “Dangerous, record-breaking” heat altered plans for 4 July celebrations across the US this weekend, reported the Associated Press. New York and Boston hit 100F (37.8C) on Thursday, said the newswire. CNBC reported that temperatures of up to 105F (40.5C) are forecast in central and eastern parts of the country, with “daily, monthly and all-time records possible”.

TEMPERATURES SOAR: Heat that hit western Europe last week spread east to “scorch” Germany, Hungary, Romania, Poland and others, said Bloomberg. Red warnings for extreme heat were issued in a number of nations, noted the outlet, adding that the heat “underscores how climate change is transforming summers in the world’s fastest-warming continent”. The Independent said last month was confirmed to be England’s hottest June on record.

HEAT DEATHS: June’s extreme temperatures caused more than 2,000 excess deaths in Spain and France, reported the Guardian. The countries are bracing for further heat that “could bring temperatures of 44C (111F) over the coming days”, said the newspaper. Deaths in France rose almost 30% at the heatwave “peak” on the week of 22 June, according to Le Monde. Last week’s conditions also led to around 480 excess deaths in the Netherlands, reported Reuters.

BOILING: Global ocean temperatures reached record levels for this time of year, reported NBC News, “fuelling fears of more dangerous heatwaves this summer and fanning concerns over the escalating global climate crisis”. Scientists told the Financial Times that this could lead the world towards “uncharted territory”. The newspaper said global average sea surface temperatures reached 20.96C on 21 June, exceeding June records for 2023 and 2024.

Around the world

  • GOAL DROPPED: The World Bank will “abandon” its goal to devote 45% of annual lending resources to climate-related projects, reported Reuters. Carbon Brief explored what it could mean for global climate action.
  • FIVE-YEAR PLAN: China plans to invest more than 20tn yuan ($2.9tn) in “key energy projects and new business models” over the next five years, according to International Energy Net.
  • DRILLING: The Guardian said UK Labour politicians “urged” the likely next prime minister Andy Burnham to ignore “deluded” calls to develop the Rosebank oil field located in the Atlantic north of Scotland.
  • PLASTIC TALKS: Countries and activists feared key issues could be sidelined at “critical” talks on a global treaty to curb plastic pollution in Kenya, said Climate Home News. A treaty could have “important implications” for climate change, reported Carbon Brief in 2024. 
  • CANADA PIPELINE: Canadian prime minister Mark Carney announced plans to build an oil pipeline to supply Asia with up to 1m barrels per day, reported the Financial Times. Earlier this week, Carney called the previous government’s climate plans “expensive” and “divisive”, said CBC News

63

The number of UK newspaper editorials calling for more oil and gas extraction in the North Sea so far in 2026, according to Carbon Brief analysis. 


Latest climate research

  • Including emissions from permafrost thaw raises the likelihood of the Arctic becoming a net-carbon source by more than 50% at 2C of warming | Earth System Dynamics
  • Net-zero scenarios relying less on carbon dioxide removals lead to fewer residual emissions, which offers greater health improvements for “non-white and low-income groups” in particular | Nature Climate Change 
  • Agricultural plots of land in sub-Saharan Africa owned by women face heat impacts 2-2.5 times higher than those owned by men | Nature Sustainability

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Wind and solar were the world’s largest source of new energy in 2025

Wind and solar were the world’s largest source of new energy in 2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the latest Energy Institute statistical review of world energy. Wind and solar also saw the fastest growth, up by 18% in 2025. Nevertheless, every source of energy – including coal, oil, gas, nuclear and hydro – also reached global all-time highs last year.

Spotlight

Vietnam’s EV surge

Carbon Brief explores the reasons behind soaring electric-vehicle sales in Vietnam.

Motorbikes are a constant fixture on streets across Vietnam. They pollute the air in cities and make crossing the road a feat of endurance.

But, increasingly, people are moving away from petrol-powered vehicles to save money and reduce air pollution.

Sales of electric motorbikes, scooters and mopeds more than doubled in Vietnam last year, according to a recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA).

This identified that Vietnam has the largest electric vehicle (EV) market in south-east Asia.

Nearly one-in-five of the two-wheeled vehicles sold last year were electric, it noted, in a nation with 102 million people and 77m motorbikes.

This is “particularly impactful” given they are the main mode of transport in Vietnam, said Lam Pham, Asia energy analyst at thinktank Ember. He told Carbon Brief:

“Electrifying road transport is essential for Vietnam to achieve its net-zero target by 2050. Road transport accounted for around 86% of transport-sector emissions in 2022.”

The nation has just 6.8m cars, but this number is also climbing, partly due to EVs, with nearly 40% of new car sales being electric.

An electric sightseeing bus, motorcycles and cars in central Hanoi, Vietnam.
An electric sightseeing bus, motorcycles and cars in central Hanoi, Vietnam. Credit: Andy Soloman / Alamy Stock Photo

This is “above levels seen in most European countries”, noted the IEA. (The UK’s figure is around 30%.)

EV incentives

Fuel costs surged in south-east Asian countries earlier this year after the energy crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran.

This “accelerated” discussions from “why use EVs” to “why keep paying more for fuel”, said Dr Tham Nguyen, a lecturer at the Ho Chi Minh City campus of Australia’s Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, who has researched Vietnamese public attitudes to EVs.

But the surge is “not driven by fuel prices alone”, noted Pham.

Increased EV sales can also be attributed to a “convergence of affordability, convenience and sustainability”, Nguyen said:

“Vietnamese consumers buy EVs because they see real value with immediate personal benefits, such as cost savings and energy security, alongside long-term environmental gains.”

Government policies have also incentivised sales through registration fee exemptions and tax cuts for EVs.

Another factor is affordable EVs sold by Chinese companies and Vinfast, a Vietnamese manufacturer. The IEA report noted that Vietnam is the only country in south-east Asia with “sizeable” domestic production of accessible EVs.

Vinfast reported a 219% year-on-year increase in orders for electric motorbikes and e-bikes in the first quarter of 2026, but the company has yet to turn a profit.

Pham noted that “growing public awareness of air pollution” has also “dramatically strengthened” public support for EVs.

Future plans

Vietnam’s major cities also have plans to get drivers to go electric or turn to public transport.

The capital city Hanoi announced that it would ban fossil-fuel-powered motorbikes from a central zone this month, but this has been postponed until 2028.

Ho Chi Minh City, the nation’s largest city with more than 9.5 million people, intends to introduce low-emission zones and swap 400,000 petrol-powered motorbikes to electric by 2028.

The city’s green transport plans focus on metro lines, electric buses and e-bikes, explained RMIT associate professor Catherine Earl. She noted that walking and cycling are currently “not popular, accessible or safe for many residents in Ho Chi Minh City’s hot and humid climate”.

Looking ahead, Pham said Vietnam could focus on “purchase subsidies, financing schemes and adequate charging or battery-swapping infrastructure, to ensure lower-income riders, including delivery and ride-hailing drivers, are not negatively affected”.

Watch, read, listen

‘JUST 1%’ OF EMISSIONS: The Guardian debunked arguments that climate actions from smaller countries are “insignificant”.

DRILLING RISKS: Mongabay reported on the possible impacts oil drilling in the Amazon could have on a “little-known reef”.

HEATING UP: The BBC Climate Question podcast discussed the weather pattern El Niño and its links to climate change.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge

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Climate Change

Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action?

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The World Bank has abandoned a target for 45% of the funding it gives developing countries to be “climate finance”, following months of pressure from the Trump administration in the US.

However, a concerted effort by developed- and developing-country shareholders has seen the bank hold onto its “action plan” for tackling climate change.

The multilateral development bank (MDB) – which is headquartered in Washington DC – is the single largest provider of climate finance globally, distributing $39.2bn in 2025 alone, primarily as loans.

Amid widespread aid cuts by developed countries, the World Bank and other MDBs have previously pledged to significantly scale up their climate finance over the next decade.

Despite scrapping its central target, the bank says it will continue to support the demands of its “clients”, many of which have explicitly stated their need for climate-related investment.

Here, Carbon Brief looks at the likely impact of the World Bank’s policy shift and whether it is – as one expert puts it – “mostly a symbolic victory” for the US.

How does the World Bank support climate action?

The World Bank is the oldest and largest MDB. It is tasked by its 189 member governments – the bank’s shareholders – with supporting development projects around the world.

The US is the bank’s largest shareholder, followed, in order, by Japan, China, Germany, France and the UK.

Every year, the bank provides billions of dollars – predominantly as loans – to developing countries.

(One part of the World Bank, the International Development Association – IDA – specifically distributes grants to lower-income nations, as well as lower-interest loans.)

Through its financing, the World Bank also has an important role in “mobilising” private investments in developing countries.

In recent years, the bank has increasingly focused on helping developing countries to cut emissions and adapt their economies for climate change.

The World Bank provided $164bn in what it calls financing with climate “co-benefits” between 2020 and 2025.

The largest share of this funding – roughly one-fifth – went to clean energy and electricity access projects. Smaller shares went to areas such as public transport, water supply and sustainable farming.

As the map below shows, the largest recipients of the bank’s climate funds since 2020 have been emerging economies, such as Turkey ($10.3bn), India ($9bn) and Nigeria ($6.3bn).

Map showing total climate-related finance received,$bn, between 2020-2025. Source: World Bank and Carbon Brief analysis.

Among the largest World Bank projects in recent years are two extensive programmes in India, totalling nearly $3bn, supporting renewables and green hydrogen.

Others include $1.7bn for a Pakistan hydropower project, $926m for Iraq’s railways and $803m to boost “green development” in Colombia.

Despite the bank’s major role in providing climate finance to developing countries, it has faced heavy scrutiny from climate advocates.

In particular, they have noted the dominance of loans that push developing countries further into debt. The World Bank has also been criticised for a lack of transparency around how it classifies projects as “climate-related”, as well as “over-reporting” of climate finance.

Why has the World Bank abandoned its climate-finance target?

When World Bank president Ajay Banga – nominated by former US president Joe Biden – took over the institution in 2023, there were widespread calls for MDB reform.

Many of the bank’s shareholders wanted to see billions more dollars being channelled to support climate action. Later that year, Banga announced that the bank would ensure that 45% of the bank’s funding was climate finance by 2025.

This replaced an existing target of 35% for climate finance between 2021 and 2025, which had been set out in the bank’s second climate change action plan (CCAP).

The CCAP is intended to “mainstream” climate action in the bank’s work. With it in place, the World Bank’s climate finance more than doubled from $17.2bn in 2020 to $39.2bn in 2025.

As the chart below shows, this meant the World Bank exceeded its 2025 goal, with climate-related projects making up a 48% share of total funding that year.

Chart showing that the World Bank has surpassed its 45% climate finance target
Share of World Bank finance with climate “co-benefits”, 2020-2025. Source: World Bank.

When Biden was replaced by Donald Trump as president in 2025, the US administration turned against international cooperation, including climate finance.

However, the US did not walk away from the World Bank, where it exerts considerable power as the largest shareholder.

With the CCAP due to expire in July 2026, the US has spent months pressuring the bank and its shareholders to weaken or abandon the plan altogether.

US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent issued a statement during the 2026 World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) spring meetings in April 2026, in which he called for “jettisoning” the 45% climate-finance target. More broadly, he said:

“We welcome the coming expiration of the CCAP and…expect the bank to immediately shift its myopic focus on climate and financing volumes to one that emphasises high-quality, durable projects.”

This vision involves a push for the World Bank to finance more fossil-fuel projects, including drilling for new gas. (The bank has committed since 2019 to stop funding upstream oil and gas projects.)

The decision on whether to continue with the CCAP was negotiated behind closed doors by the board of directors – representing national shareholders. There were reports of “deep divides”.

A joint statement from 19 of the 25 directors last year affirmed the need for both a plan and a target. The US, Russia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all declined to sign up, while Japan and India abstained, according to Reuters.

There were reports of European nations championing a climate plan, bolstered by support from the developing countries that would stand to receive climate finance. The US call to drop the 45% target entirely was reportedly backed by Saudi Arabia and Russia.

Ultimately, the day before the CCAP was due to lapse, the World Bank announced what appeared to be a middle ground. It would drop both the 45% target and the 35% goal it had replaced, while also “extend[ing]” the CCAP.

UK development minister Jenny Chapman told a committee hearing in the House of Commons the next day that this marked a “compromise”. She said:

“It wasn’t clear we were going to get a CCAP at all and a bank without an action plan on climate is a problem for us – so that’s a good outcome.”

Supportive shareholders had been pushing for a one-year extension of the plan. While the World Bank did not initially define the length, Chapman confirmed on LinkedIn that the plan had, in fact, been extended “indefinitely”.

The bank said it would also engage an “independent evaluation group” to assess the CCAP, in line with a board request.

Gaia Larsen, director of climate finance at the World Resources Institute (WRI), tells Carbon Brief that this evaluation will likely be “relatively free from political ideology” and could be “focused on how to make the CCAP more effective”.

Why is the World Bank important for international climate finance?

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries – including major World Bank shareholders in Europe and elsewhere – are obliged to provide climate finance for developing countries.

This includes a target of $300bn a year by 2035, which is expected to largely come from developed countries. One significant way these nations can contribute to this goal is via their support for MDBs, particularly the World Bank.

The World Bank has described itself as “by far the largest provider of climate finance to developing countries”. Each year, it oversees half of all climate finance from MDBs and far more than any single donor country.

Many developed countries have, therefore, enthusiastically backed the World Bank’s climate efforts, as well as a “bigger” role for MDBs in development more broadly. The bank can lend sums that far exceed the amount of new public finance that individual nations are willing to commit.

This is particularly significant, given many of these nations, including the UK, Germany and France, have announced large cuts to their aid budgets in recent years.

Carbon Brief analysis suggests that roughly a fifth of the international climate finance provided and “mobilised” by developed countries in recent years can be attributed to their World Bank contributions, as the chart below shows.

(This only accounts for the World Bank financing that can be linked to developed-country shares in the bank. Developing countries, such as China, also have significant shares, which are not included in the chart below.)

Chart showing that around a fifth of climate finance provided by developed countries is channelled via the World Bank
Developed-country climate finance provided and mobilised for developing countries. The share of World Bank finance that can be attributed to developed countries (blue), is calculated based on the collective shares in the bank held by developed countries. Source: World Bank, OECD, Carbon brief analysis.

MDBs – including the World Bank – have committed to providing $120bn in climate finance to developing countries by 2030.

This was set to come from greater shareholder contributions, combined with a programme of reforms to free up capital.

If the World Bank continued to provide half of the MDB total, it would need to increase its climate finance by around 50%, from $39.2bn today to $60bn in 2030.

Therefore, experts see a “key” role for the World Bank in achieving not only the $300bn target, but also the more aspirational $1.3n target that countries agreed as part of the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) on climate finance at COP29 in 2024. This includes the private capital it could “unlock” through its lending.

Joe Thwaites, international climate finance director at Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), tells Carbon Brief that these “NCQG politics” are “quite important”. He says:

“The maths of the $300bn does not work if the MDBs pull back and so I think that’s why you’re seeing developed countries taking a stand.”

How will these changes affect global climate action?

To date, the World Bank has only released minimal details about its new climate plans. As such, experts say the impact on future climate finance remains uncertain.

Jon Sward, environment project manager at the Bretton Woods Project, tells Carbon Brief:

“They have said they are going to retain all the same processes about climate-finance reporting. So, of course, there is a world in which, actually, climate finance continues to increase like it has been.”

Some of the World Bank’s internal organisations will, in fact, keep their climate-finance goals for the time being. For example, the IDA’s largely grant-based funding retains a 45% target for its current round, which will last until 2028 – the year of the next US presidential election.

However, WRI’s Larsen tells Carbon Brief that the changes, from a bank that was previously a “champion for climate action”, remain significant:

“This reality, reinforced by the elimination of the 45% goal, means that it would not be surprising to see a reduction in climate investments.”

In a statement, the World Bank said its “work on climate is and will remain firmly client driven”, noting that it supports nations undertaking their Paris Agreement climate plans.

Therefore, its climate focus may come down to whether there is demand for climate action from “client” countries receiving finance.

At an April event in discussion with the climate sceptic Bjørn Lomborg, Bessent said that global financial institutions should focus on growth, characterising climate action as an “elite belief”.

The implication from the US Treasury secretary was that recipient countries are not interested in climate action. However, as reported by Devex, a group of World Bank shareholders representing nearly 100 developing countries, wrote a letter that appeared to push back against this framing.

This “G11+” group, led by Brazil and China, said the bank “must remain firmly client-driven”, noting that countries are “following nationally determined pathways toward climate action”. NRDC’s Thwaites tells Carbon Brief:

“It’s one thing for the Europeans to talk about climate…This was the client countries [100 developing countries] saying: ‘No, we want this.’”

Recent research by the ODI thinktank found that 79% of developing-country officials polled wanted to see MDB investment in solar projects, 54% wanted hydropower and 47% wanted wind power. Only 13% wanted investment in gas-power plants.

Rishikesh Ram Bhandary, a senior development researcher at Boston University, has stressed the need for an “enhanced CCAP”, which could be supported by the bank’s new independent evaluation. Among other things, he tells Carbon Brief:

“The bank needs to make a more convincing case about how climate change is being integrated into development priorities rather than competing with them.”

Thwaites says he is hopeful that the outcome is “mostly a symbolic victory for the US”.

However, he says major shareholders from Europe and elsewhere should make it clear to the bank that it is not “the only game in town” when it comes to climate finance. He says:

“If [the World Bank] are going to cave into one shareholder, when the vast majority of the other shareholders are supportive of continuing climate action, they can take their money elsewhere.”

The post Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action?

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As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments 

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Rich Wilson is CEO of the Iswe Foundation and co-founder of the Global Citizens’ Assembly.

The numbers are stark. According to the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises, 266 million people across 47 countries experienced high levels of acute food insecurity last year, nearly double the figure recorded a decade ago.

Meanwhile, disruptions to oil, gas and fertiliser flows through the Strait of Hormuz drove a 46% month-on-month spike in urea prices early this year, sending agricultural price indices up 8% and raising the spectre of a global affordability crisis.

This is not a blip. It is a new baseline. The EAT-Lancet Commission concluded that food systems now account for roughly 30% of total greenhouse gas emissions and are the largest single contributor to the climate crisis. The science has been clear for years.

Now some of the solutions to the problem are becoming socially acceptable too.

    Earlier this year, people from more than 60 countries and territories, selected not by vested interest, but by lottery, spent seven weeks examining the evidence on food and climate for the latest Global Citizens’ Assembly. They heard from scientists, farmers and industry. They worked through 42 hours of structured deliberation, engaging with some difficult trade-offs. 

    They were not asked to endorse a predetermined conclusion. They were asked an open question: what changes, if any, should we make to how we grow, share and eat food, so that everyone has enough to nourish themselves while tackling the causes and impacts of climate change?

    Phase down industrial animal farming

    Their answer was unambiguous. They voted to protect forests. They voted to phase down industrial animal food production. They voted for supply chain reform and corporate accountability, explicitly rejecting the idea that the burden of change should fall on individual consumers. All 22 of their Calls to Action passed with over 85% support, a super-majority of randomly selected people from every region of the world, in agreement.

    Consider what the assembly was actually being asked to decide. Industrial animal food production is the primary driver of tropical deforestation. Protecting more land as forest and ecosystem means less land available for the expansion of industrial production. That is a real trade-off, with real consequences for real livelihoods. Politicians have spent years avoiding it.

    Food systems are the missing ingredient from the COP30 menu

    These randomly selected people looked at the evidence, deliberated across time zones and cultures, and chose the forests, with 64% in strong support and a further 20% in favour. People from livestock farming communities voted for change. Not because they were told to. Because deliberation led them there.

    We estimate there have now been more than 7,000 citizen participation initiatives worldwide in the last decade. They have been organised because, as our 2025 report: People in the Lead demonstrated, people are now consistently and significantly ahead of politicians on issues ranging from climate to AI governance.

    The people know best

    What the research consistently shows is that ordinary people, given proper evidence and time, produce recommendations that are more effective and more aligned with public values than what emerges from elected legislatures. The gap in global governance is no longer primarily between science and the public. It is between citizens and their political leaders.

    That gap matters for more than procedural reasons. When policy treats people as passive recipients rather than active participants, it leaves out the very actors whose behaviour, trust and consent the transition depends on. Institutions that speak only to other institutions, and negotiate only with state actors and industry lobbies, are missing out on the trust and energy of the people they are supposed to serve.

    Governments, left to their own devices, are not moving fast enough to prove that argument wrong. At COP30 in Belém last November, countries failed to agree on a fossil fuel phaseout roadmap, and even full implementation of every submitted national climate plan still leaves the world on course for 2.3 to 2.8C of warming.

    Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. Photo: Artyc Studio

    Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. Photo: Artyc Studio

    Citizens’ track at COP

    But the Brazilian presidency grasped something important. Among the conference’s more significant outcomes was the formal launch of a Citizens’ Track within the UNFCCC process, a mechanism for connecting the global participation field to intergovernmental climate negotiations. Türkiye and Australia, who together hold the COP31 presidency in Antalya this November, now have the opportunity to strengthen and institutionalise what Brazil began.

    In Guatemala, Indigenous women build climate resilience with old and new farming methods

    The question before us is no longer whether citizens can contribute to solving these problems. Across the world, in local food networks, in community assemblies and in participatory planning processes, they already are, quietly generating more ambitious and more legitimate solutions than those emerging from formal diplomatic channels.

    What is required now is the political courage to connect people to power. Not to consult citizens and file the results. Not to invite them to observe while the real decisions are made elsewhere. But to recognise the public as partners in perhaps the most consequential governance challenge of our time.

    The post As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments  appeared first on Climate Home News.

    As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments 

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