Nearly 100 UK newspaper editorials opposed climate action in 2025, a record figure that reveals the scale of the backlash against net-zero in the right-leaning press.

Carbon Brief has analysed editorials – articles considered the newspaper’s formal “voice” – since 2011 and this is the first year opposition to climate action has exceeded support.

Criticism of net-zero policies, including renewable-energy expansion, came entirely from right-leaning newspapers, particularly the Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph.

In addition, there were 112 editorials – more than two a week – that included attacks on Ed Miliband, continuing a highly personal campaign by some newspapers against the Labour energy secretary.

These editorials, nearly all of which were in right-leaning titles, typically characterised him as a “zealot”, driving through a “costly” net-zero “agenda”.

Taken together, the newspaper editorials mirror a significant shift on the UK political right in 2025, as the opposition Conservative party mimicked the hard-right populist Reform UK party by definitively rejecting the net-zero target that it had legislated for and the policies that it had previously championed.

Record climate opposition

Nearly 100 UK newspaper editorials voiced opposition to climate action in 2025 – more than double the number of editorials that backed climate action.

As the chart below shows, 2025 marked the fourth record-breaking year in a row for criticism of climate action in newspaper editorials.

This also marks the first time that editorials opposing climate action have overtaken those supporting it, during the 15 years that Carbon Brief has analysed.

This trend demonstrates the rapid shift away from a long-standing political consensus on climate change by those on the UK’s political right.

Over the past year, the Conservative party has rejected both the “net-zero by 2050” target that it legislated for in 2019 and the underpinning Climate Change Act that it had a major role in creating. Meanwhile, the Reform UK party has been rising in the polls, while pledging to “ditch net-zero”.

These views are reinforced and reflected in the pages of the UK’s right-leaning newspapers, which tend to support these parties and influence their politics.

All of the 98 editorials opposing climate action were in right-leaning titles, including the Sun, the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph, the Times and the Daily Express.

Conversely, nearly all of the 46 editorials pushing for more climate action were in the left-leaning and centrist publications the Guardian and the Financial Times. These newspapers have far lower circulations than some of the right-leaning titles.

In total, 81% of the climate-related editorials published by right-leaning newspapers in 2025 rejected climate action. As the chart below shows, this is a marked difference from just a few years ago, when the same newspapers showed a surge in enthusiasm for climate action.

That trend had coincided with Conservative governments led by Theresa May and Boris Johnson, which introduced the net-zero goal and were broadly supportive of climate policies.

Notably, none of the editorials opposing climate action in 2025 took a climate-sceptic position by questioning the existence of climate change or the science behind it. Instead, they voiced “response scepticism”, meaning they criticised policies that seek to address climate change.

(The current Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, has described herself as “a net-zero sceptic, not a climate change sceptic”. This is illogical as reaching net-zero is, according to scientists, the only way to stop climate change from getting worse.)

In particular, newspapers took aim at “net-zero” as a catch-all term for policies that they deemed harmful. Most editorials that rejected climate action did not even mention the word “climate”, often using “net-zero” instead.

This supports recent analysis by Dr James Painter, a research associate at the University of Oxford, which concluded that UK newspaper coverage has been “decoupling net-zero from climate change”.

This is significant, given strong and broad UK public support for many of the individual climate policies that underpin net-zero. Notably, there is also majority support for the “net-zero by 2050” target itself.

Much of the negative framing by politicians and media outlets paints “net-zero” as something that is too expensive for people in the UK.

In total, 87% of the editorials that opposed climate action cited economic factors as a reason, making this by far the most common justification. Net-zero goals were described as “ruinous” and “costly”, as well as being blamed – falsely – for “driving up energy costs”.

The Sunday Telegraph summarised the view of many politicians and commentators on the right by stating simply that said “net-zero should be scrapped”.

While some criticism of net-zero policies is made in good faith, the notion that climate change can be stopped without reducing emissions to net-zero is incorrect. Alternative policies for tackling climate change are rarely presented by critical editorials.

Moreover, numerous assessments have concluded that the transition to net-zero can be both “affordable” and far cheaper than previously thought.

This transition can also provide significant economic benefits, even before considering the evidence that the cost of unmitigated warming will significantly outweigh the cost of action.

Miliband attacks intensify

Meanwhile, UK newspapers published 112 editorials over the course of 2025 taking personal aim at energy security and net-zero secretary Ed Miliband.

Nearly all of these articles were in right-leaning newspapers, with the Sun alone publishing 51. The Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and the Times published most of the remainder.

This trend of relentlessly criticising Miliband personally began last year in the run up to Labour’s election victory. However, it ramped up significantly in 2025, as the chart below shows.

Around 58% of the editorials that opposed climate action used criticism of climate advocates as a justification – and nearly all of these articles mentioned Miliband, specifically.

Editorials denounced Miliband as a “loon” and a “zealot”, suffering from “eco insanity” and “quasi-religious delusions”. Nicknames given to him include “His Greenness”, the “high priest of net-zero” and “air miles Miliband”.

Many of these attacks were highly personal. The Daily Mail, for example, called Miliband “pompous and patronising”, with an “air of moral and intellectual superiority”.

Frequently, newspapers refer to “Ed Miliband’s net-zero agenda”, “Ed Miliband’s swivel-eyed targets” and “Mr Miliband’s green taxes”.

These formulations frame climate policies as harmful measures that are being imposed on people by the energy secretary.

In fact, the Labour government decisively won an election in 2024 with a manifesto that prioritised net-zero policies. Often, the “targets” and “taxes” in question are long-standing policies that were introduced by the previous Conservative government, with cross-party support.

Moreover, the government’s climate policy not only continues to rely on many of the same tools created by previous administrations, it is also very much in line with expert evidence and advice. This is to prioritise the expansion of clean power and to fuel an economy that relies on increasing levels of electrification, including through electric cars and heat pumps.

Despite newspaper editorials regularly calling for Miliband to be “sacked”, prime minister Keir Starmer has voiced his support both for the energy secretary and the government’s prioritisation of net-zero.

In an interview with podcast The Rest is Politics last year, Miliband was asked about the previous Carbon Brief analysis that showed the criticism aimed at him by right-leaning newspapers.

Podcast host Alastair Campbell asked if Miliband thought the attacks were the legacy of his strong stance, while Labour leader, during the Leveson inquiry into the practices of the UK press. Miliband replied:

“Some of these institutions don’t like net-zero and some of them don’t like me – and maybe quite a lot of them don’t like either.”

Renewable backlash

As well as editorial attitudes to climate action in general, Carbon Brief analysed newspapers’ views on three energy technologies – renewables, nuclear power and fracking.

There were 42 newspaper editorials criticising renewable energy in 2025. This meant that, for the first time since 2014, there were more anti-renewables editorials than pro-renewables editorials, as the chart below shows.

As with climate action more broadly, this was a highly partisan issue. The Times was the only right-leaning newspaper that published any editorials supporting renewables.

By far the most common stated reason for opposing renewable energy was that it is “expensive”, with 86% of critical editorials using economic arguments as a justification.

The Sun referred to “chucking billions at unreliable renewables” while the Daily Telegraph warned of an “expensive and intermittent renewables grid”.

At the same time, editorials in supportive publications also used economic arguments in favour of renewables. The Guardian, for example, stressed the importance of building an “affordable clean-energy system” that is “built on renewables”.

There was continued support in right-leaning publications for nuclear power, despite the high costs associated with the technology. In total, there were 20 editorials supporting nuclear power in 2025 – nearly all in right-leaning newspapers – and none that opposed it.

Fracking was barely mentioned by newspapers in 2023 and 2024, after a failed push by the Conservatives under prime minister Liz Truss to overturn a ban on the practice in 2022. This attempt had been accompanied by a surge in supportive right-leaning newspaper editorials.

There was a small uptick of 15 editorials supporting fracking in 2025, as right-leaning newspapers once again argued that it would be economically beneficial.

The Sun urged current Conservative leader Badenoch to make room for this “cheap, safe solution” in her future energy policy. The government plans to ban fracking “permanently”.

North Sea oil and gas remained the main fossil-fuel policy focus, with 30 editorials – all in right-leaning newspapers – that mentioned the topic. Most of the editorials arguing for more extraction from the North Sea also argued for less climate action or opposed renewable energy.

None of these editorials noted that the UK is expected to be significantly less reliant on fossil-fuel imports if it pursues net-zero, than if it rolls back on climate action and attempts to squeeze more out of the remaining deposits in the North Sea.

Methodology

This is a 2025 update of previous analysis conducted for the period 2011-2021 by Carbon Brief in association with Dr Sylvia Hayes, a research fellow at the University of Exeter. Previous updates were published in 2022, 2023 and 2024.

The count of editorials criticising Ed Miliband was not conducted in the original analysis.

The full methodology can be found in the original article, including the coding schema used to assess the language and themes used in editorials concerning climate change and energy technologies.

The analysis is based on Carbon Brief’s editorial database, which is regularly updated with leading articles from the UK’s major newspapers.

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The post Analysis: UK newspaper editorial opposition to climate action overtakes support for first time appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK newspaper editorial opposition to climate action overtakes support for first time

Tsvetelina Kuzmanova is EU sustainable finance lead for the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL), based in Brussels.

Europe is set to arrive in Davos on the defensive after a year of trade uncertainty and tariff threats from the Trump administration, as well as pressure to roll back core elements of the EU’s Green Deal. The war in Ukraine and situation in Greenland also continue to test Europe’s security and strategic cohesion.

While Trump’s administration is “coming in force” to the World Economic Forum in the Swiss ski resort of Davos with the largest-ever US delegation, Europe is not showing up in a strong position or as a shaper of the global agenda. Instead, it has become reactive to other global powers.

Amid the pressure, it is crucial that the EU maintains its ambitions on energy security and decarbonisation, both against headwinds at Davos and by continuing to uphold the energy transition. This is not about climate leadership alone, but a question of power and independence. Maintaining the energy transition is central to reducing geopolitical exposure, limiting external leverage and preserving Europe’s ability to act strategically, including in negotiations on the next EU budget.

Over the past year, debates in Europe have increasingly framed climate ambition as a liability to competitiveness. Green policies have been softened, delayed or revised in the name of industrial survival.

Yet global leaders identify climate-driven disruption as the most likely defining risk of the 2030s.  Looking a decade into the future, climate collapse and extreme weather dominate the risk landscape, according to the World Economic Forum’s newly published Global Risks Report 2026 . Economic downturn, by contrast, sits far lower on the list at 24.

Near-term risks for Europe

Even setting aside the risk of climate change, Europe’s vulnerabilities are painfully concrete in the short-term: energy remains a pressure point, trade is increasingly weaponised, supply chains are exposed, and geopolitical leverage continues to be exercised through fossil fuel supplies.

If recent history taught Europe anything, it should have been that such dependency directly threatens economic prosperity, as was seen during the 2022 energy crisis.

Oil and gas remain central to geopolitical arm-twisting, including supply threats, price manipulation or diplomatic pressure – for example, the US and Qatar telling the European Union that its corporate sustainability due diligence directive threatens LNG supplies to the bloc.

Strategic spending or strategic drift

In this context, the EU budget is a geopolitical choice as much as a fiscal exercise. It will run until 2034, meaning it overlaps almost exactly with when long-term risks will become tomorrow’s reality and frame Europe’s place on the global stage for almost a decade.

Choices will have to be made as public money is scarce and there is no chance of further joint European debt. The question is whether Europe uses its limited fiscal firepower to preserve the status quo or to address its vulnerabilities and the long-term economic risks.

This is where electrification, grids, incentivising cleantech and greening Europe’s heavy industry come in. These shouldn’t be viewed just as climate projects, but as instruments of strategic autonomy.

Governments defend clean energy transition as US snubs renewables agency

Other economies are already doing this. China will spend 4 trillion yuan ($574 billion) by 2030 in electricity grid infrastructure, treating transmission and system balancing as core national assets.

Even under the Trump administration, the US has continued to scale up grid investment. Last year, it recorded the highest level of grid spending globally, at around $115 billion, accounting for roughly a quarter of total worldwide investment. A significant share of this has been driven by federal funding for grid modernisation and transmission expansion, explicitly linking energy infrastructure to industrial competitiveness and security.

Meanwhile, Europe estimates that it needs close to €600 billion in grid investment by 2030, yet annual spending remains fragmented across national systems and constrained by permitting and financing bottlenecks. This comparison underscores why the next Multiannual Financial Framework (the EU budget) must prioritise strategic public spending on grids, electrification and related infrastructure.

Bolstering competitiveness with electricity

Despite the narrative being pushed by the US in forums like Davos, industrial electrification, system flexibility and cleantech scale-up are prerequisites for a competitive industry in a decarbonising world.

Electrification is critical to reducing vulnerability to fossil fuel imports and grids are essential to do this at scale. This shift would also reduce Europe’s exposure to the very risks flagged by the World Economic Forum, from climate-driven instability to energy and supply-chain shocks, turning vulnerability into strategic resilience.

This is a textbook case for mission-oriented public investment – not picking individual corporate winners but backing system-level capabilities that markets will not support enough despite their strategic importance.

Q&A: “False” climate solutions help keep fossil fuel firms in business

In today’s global economy, power flows from control over infrastructure, energy systems and industrial capacity. Without the underlying investment, even the most sophisticated regulatory frameworks risk becoming aspirational.

And, if Europe does not decisively shift towards investing in electrification, grids and industrial transformation, it will remain exposed to pressure tactics, with oil and gas supplies shaping Europe’s future and making it reactive rather than proactive at meetings like Davos.

Any talk of resilience, competitiveness and strategic autonomy at Davos will be hollow if Europe is unable to match it with spending decisions that address future risks and drive ahead with decarbonisation.

The post Power play: Can a defensive Europe stick with decarbonisation in Davos? appeared first on Climate Home News.

Power play: Can a defensive Europe stick with decarbonisation in Davos?

The year ahead in 2026 is an important period for China’s climate policy, amid hints that its emissions could peak and as the government publishes targets for the next five years.

Analysis for Carbon Brief shows the country’s emissions have been “flat or falling” for more than 18 months, but the timing of a peak remains uncertain.

In March 2026, the government is expected to publish a series of energy and climate targets for 2030 as part of its 15th five-year plan.

These targets could boost – or moderate – the pace of its energy transition.

A number of policy mechanisms that are already due to fully come into effect this year – such as non-binding total emissions targets and the expansion of carbon market coverage to more sectors – could also help decarbonise the country’s economy.

Meanwhile, the rise in extreme weather events intensified by human-caused climate change makes adaptation as important as ever, while also adding to the challenge of advancing clean energy.

Finally, as the US turns even further away from climate action and towards fossil-fuel expansion in 2026 – notably with Venezuelan oil – China’s climate diplomacy could send a strong signal for sustained global climate action.

Carbon Brief asked 11 leading experts on China what energy and climate developments they are watching for in 2026. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity.

Shuo Li

Director of the China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute

After decades of the rapid growth that made China the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, independent analyses suggest China’s CO2 emissions may have plateaued or even begun to decline in 2025.

Strong growth in renewable power has, for the first time outside economic contraction, outpaced rising electricity demand, pushing power-sector emissions down and contributing to an overall modest drop in total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This latest trend was picked up by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), as something that should continue over the next five years, marking an official nod to a peak in energy-related CO2 emissions years ahead of the 2030 timeline Beijing previously set.

The transition from emissions growth to stabilisation and early decline will be the key watch point for 2026 and will be shaped by the forthcoming 15th five-year plan. [This plan will set key economic goals, including energy and climate targets, for 2030.] Early policy signals suggest that the plan will introduce more explicit controls on total emissions alongside China’s traditional reliance on intensity-based targets.

However, the precise timing, scale and enforceability of these absolute emissions control measures remain under active debate. Chinese experts broadly agree that if the 2021-2025 period was characterised by continued emissions growth, and 2031-2035 is expected to deliver a clear decline, then 2026-2030 will serve as a critical “bridge” between the two.

The central questions are what this transitional period will look like in practice, how it will lay the groundwork for a sustained and timely emissions decline and whether meaningful reductions can be achieved before the end of the decade.

Xinyi Shen

China team lead and researcher, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air

In 2026, I’ll be closely watching whether China moves beyond high-level industrial decarbonisation targets and begins to address the domestic, structural constraints that have slowed progress so far. 

In heavy industry, particularly steel, the main barriers are not technological readiness, but persistent blast furnace overcapacity and the lack of clear economic incentives for low-carbon production pathways, which continue to lock in emissions-intensive assets. 

Against this backdrop, carbon-related trade measures, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), will make 2026 an important test of how China balances export competitiveness with climate commitments. In addition, we will see whether growing international scrutiny accelerates more substantive demand-side and policy reform in industry, rather than prolonging a reliance on incremental efficiency gains.

Min Hu

Director and co-founder, Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress

Of course, I’ll be tracking all the critical energy and climate targets under the 15th five-year plan.

More importantly, I’m watching whether a coherent package of measures can truly take hold to unlock green electricity on the demand side – not just expand renewable capacity – and translate policy intent into a genuine market pull for renewable electricity, especially from the manufacturing sector.

Given the challenge of balancing rapidly growing electricity demand with the pace of grid decarbonisation, progress on this front will be decisive for the long-term trajectory of emissions.

I’m also watching how provincial and municipal governments translate the dual-carbon goals into concrete targets and sectoral implementation. Subnational action – through overarching dual-carbon plans and sector-specific measures – will be fundamental to achieving national objectives. It will be critical to ensure that the subnational momentum around zero-emission industrial parks and clean-tech manufacturing competition results in measurable, additional emissions reductions.

Biqing Yang

Energy Analyst for Asia, Ember

2026 marks the first year of China’s 15th five-year plan, the planning cycle that ends with China’s target year of 2030 for carbon peaking. China’s fossil-fuel use in power generation is seeing an early sign of peaking and the upcoming years will be crucial in driving the plateau into an absolute decline.

As renewables expand, system flexibility and stability will increasingly become the priorities. By 2027, China aims to retrofit its existing coal-power fleet “as much as possible” and deploy more than 180 gigawatts (GW) of battery energy storage. Development in coal retrofit and further policies to support battery development will both be important to watch in 2026. 

On the other hand, maximising flexibility potential will rely on continued reforms in the power market and system operations, following the milestone year of 2025, which saw substantial policy development in China’s ambition to establish a unified national power market.

Yan Qin

Principal analyst, ClearBlue Markets

In 2026, I am monitoring three pivotal developments in China.

First, the 15th five-year plan inaugurates the “dual control of carbon” system. This year marks the first time industries and local governments face binding caps on total emissions, not just intensity. Watching how these national constraints cascade down to the local level will be critical.

Second, the national carbon market is aggressively tightening. With the inclusion of steel, cement and aluminum this year, regulators are executing a “market reset” – de-weighting older [emissions] allowances and enforcing stricter benchmarks to bolster prices ahead of the EU CBAM’s full rollout.

Finally, expect a surge in zero-carbon industrial parks. Following the NDRC’s announcement of 52 pilot sites, new guidelines now mandate 60% on-site renewable consumption. These “green microgrids” are becoming the primary vehicle for reducing grid reliance and certifying low-carbon exports.

Xiaopu Sun

Senior China counsel, Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development

2026 marks China’s first year of advancing a comprehensive shift from “dual control” of energy consumption to “dual control” of carbon emissions. At the policy level, it will be essential to track how this transition strengthens the governance architecture for controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly methane.

Key developments to watch for may include efforts to strengthen measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems that enable facility- and company-level accountability.

It will also be essential to monitor progress on the voluntary GHG emission trading scheme, and the extent to which methane and other non-CO2 GHG controls are embedded in broader policy frameworks, including the environmental impact assessment system.

Finally, it will be critical to understand how non-CO2 GHG data collection and management requirements are incorporated into industry policy developments, including those addressing supply chains and product carbon-footprint initiatives.

Tu Le

Managing director, Sino Auto Insights

China’s electric vehicle (EV) industry has been the primary force pushing the global passenger vehicle market toward clean energy. Its domestic market has already crossed a more than 50% new-energy vehicle (NEV) retail take rate, while exports surged 86% year-on-year to around 2.4m units [in 2025]. That momentum should continue – especially as US legacy automakers pull back from EV investment in 2026.

As China’s domestic demand cools this year, export pressure will intensify. But a growing headwind has emerged: tariffs. Mexico, Brazil, Europe and the US are just a few of the countries raising barriers, complicating the next phase of global NEV expansion.

At the same time, 2026 looks like a prove-it year for next-generation battery technologies. Longer life, lower volatility and new chemistries could unlock more range, broader use cases and wider adoption – including in tougher markets like the US.

One new wildcard: the US now effectively controls Venezuelan oil. If that meaningfully impacts global oil prices, it could either slow – or unexpectedly accelerate – the shift toward clean-energy vehicles.

Yingjie Chen

Climate and energy program manager, Greenovation Hub

In 2026, a key focus will be how China translates its 2035 “climate-adaptive society” goal into inclusive action. Finance for adaptation is a critical enabler, requiring both policy guidance and scalable financing models. As climate risks increase, financing resilience in sectors such as energy, transportation, infrastructure and public health is paramount. While China’s green finance taxonomy already includes some climate-adaptive activities, clear labeling and expanded coverage are important next steps.

Additionally, the global goal on adaptation (GGA) indicators can help measure project impact and inform policy. We have observed good practices already in motion, such as integrating meteorological technology with finance to enhance agricultural resilience.

Looking forward, expanding these innovative models to other sectors and regions is a key step, as these pilots can enhance policymaking and be replicated. In this process, identifying and managing risks for vulnerable groups, such as women and children, in public health and education is essential for an inclusive transition.

Prof Scott Moore

Practice professor of political science and director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania

First and foremost, I’ll be looking for details on climate and energy targets in China’s next five-year plan cycle, which we expect to be approved as usual in March. This will essentially operationalise China’s recent nationally determined contribution and its longstanding commitment to peak emissions before 2030.

It will also give us a sign of the tempo we can expect for non-fossil energy capacity growth and whether China will be aiming for the high end of its stated emissions-reduction range. One area I’m especially focused on is the promised expansion of China’s emissions trading system.

Second, given my particular interest in and focus on geopolitics, I’m looking for signs of how the geopolitical disruption we’ve seen in Venezuela, Iran and other regions might affect China’s energy policy – in particular, in terms of long-term contracts for liquified natural gas. 

Finally, I’m looking for signs of changes to China’s climate diplomacy following the US withdrawal from both the Paris Agreement and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This leaves a big hole in global climate governance and many countries will be looking increasingly to China for leadership – and funding – in this area.

Cecilia Trasi

Senior policy advisor for industry and trade, ECCO

China’s solar manufacturing overcapacity is prompting Beijing’s first serious consolidation efforts. The government is introducing stricter licensing requirements and tighter energy-consumption caps for polysilicon facilities, while export-tax rebates for solar products will be abolished.

At the same time, China’s offshore wind technology is advancing rapidly. In early 2026, China installed the world’s first 20 megawatt (MW) offshore wind turbine and plans mass production of 50MW dual-rotor designs, with deployment expected from 2027-2028. MingYang’s £1.5bn announced investment in Scotland signals that Chinese wind companies are pursuing entry into European markets through local production, mirroring strategies adopted by battery manufacturers.

Together, these dynamics suggest that the next phase of cleantech competition will be shaped less by trade defense alone and more by the interaction between Chinese supply-side reforms and global market-absorption capacity.

Meanwhile, following a first wave of rare-earth restrictions in April 2025, Beijing announced controls in October that extended licensing requirements to additional rare earths and introduced unprecedented extraterritorial provisions. While China suspended the October controls for one year, the April controls on seven heavy rare earths remain fully operational.

This creates persistent procurement risk for European cleantech supply chains reliant on Chinese-processed rare earths, although China has begun issuing general export licenses, providing some operational predictability.

Yixian Sun

Senior lecturer in international development, University of Bath

The biggest question is obviously the emission peak, because it’s essential to confirm if China’s carbon and greenhouse gas emissions are actually flattening or even falling. I really hope China has already reached its peak and the net-zero transition is underway.

Another important area is the evolution of China’s cleantech industries, which have become a new pillar of the country’s economy in recent years. In 2026, it is critical to see if this momentum can be sustained in China.

Given fierce competition and the gradual saturation of the domestic market, I’m also watching how Chinese cleantech companies expand their global footprint through investments in overseas manufacturing, especially as a growing number of countries want Chinese investors to create more “green jobs” and transfer cutting-edge technologies.

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The post Experts: What to expect from China on energy and climate action in 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Experts: What to expect from China on energy and climate action in 2026