It was the second defeat for the Trump administration’s unusual litigation to stop states from acting on climate change.

By Marianne Lavelle

In a setback to the Trump administration’s extraordinary legal campaign against state climate action, a federal judge threw out the Justice Department’s lawsuit seeking to prevent the state of Hawaii from suing oil companies for damages.

Judge Dismisses Trump Administration’s Bid to Block Hawaii Climate Lawsuit

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Oil prices rebound

OIL UP AGAIN: Oil prices surged by more than 7% and back above $100 a barrel on Monday after US-Iran peace talks faltered and US president Donald Trump ordered the blockading of Iranian ports, reported BBC News. The jump came after prices fell last week in the wake of the announcement of a conditional two-week ceasefire, it said.

RESCUE PLANS: European countries unveiled plans to protect citizens and businesses from rising energy prices. Ireland announced a support package worth €505m, reported BBC News, while Germany agreed on measures worth €1.6bn, said Bloomberg. Meanwhile, Reuters reported on a draft EU proposal due to be unveiled next week that would see the bloc reduce electricity prices and roll out clean energy more quickly in response to the crisis.

UNSOLICITED ADVICE: Trump renewed his criticism of UK energy policy and called on the government to “drill, baby drill”, reported the Independent. Via social media, the president said: “Europe is desperate for energy, and yet the United Kingdom refuses to open North Sea oil, one of the greatest fields in the world. Tragic!!!” (See Carbon Brief’s recent factcheck of various false claims about the North Sea.)

Around the world

• C-WORD: Faced with pressure from the US, countries attending spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were urged to “not mention the climate”, reported the Guardian. It added that plans to agree a new “climate change action plan” for the World Bank “may be shelved, along with substantive discussion of the climate crisis”.
• NEW DIRECTION: Péter Magyar’s landslide victory over Victor Orbán in Hungary’s elections “presents new opportunities for the country to reduce emissions and invest in clean energy”, reported Time. Carbon Brief explored what it means for European climate action.
• ‘FURNACE’ SUMMER: There was widespread coverage – including in the Boston Globe, ABC News, CNN, Euro Weekly News, Guardian and New Scientist – of warnings from meteorologists of the development of a “super” El Niño phenomenon that could ramp up temperatures and drive extreme weather.
• ANTALYA COP: The Turkish government unveiled the dates and venues for the “leaders’ summit” segment of November’s COP31 conference, according to Climate Home News.
• PACIFIC PRE-COP: Meanwhile, the Guardian reported that Tuvalu will host a special meeting of world leaders before the climate summit in Antalya.

€10bn a year

The amount of state support that French prime minister Sébastien Lecornu has pledged for electrification through to 2030 in a bid to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. In a speech late on Friday 10 April, Lecornu noted the figure amounted to a “doubling” of existing support.

Latest climate research

• Over a four-month period of 2023, more than 70% of editorials discussing net-zero in four right-leaning UK newspapers included “at least one misleading statement”  | Climate Policy
• Air pollution from global transport currently has a net cooling effect that offsets 80% of the warming impact of the sector’s CO2 emissions | npj Climate and Atmospheric Science
• The incorporation of “observational constraints” into climate-model projections suggests that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation could weaken by 50% by 2100 in a medium-emissions scenario | Science Advances

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) found that global electricity generation from fossil fuels fell in the first month of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Across all countries with real-time electricity data outside of China, coal-fired power generation fell 3.5% and gas-fired power generation fell 4.0%, according to CREA. This was offset by a rise in solar power and wind generation, which increased by 14% and 8%, respectively. Hydropower generation also saw a small increase, the analysis showed, but this was “more than offset” by a drop in nuclear power generation.

Spotlight

How climate change affects Afghan lives

This week, Carbon Brief reports on the impact of climate change in Afghanistan, following deadly floods this year.

Earlier this month, heavy rains, flash floods and landslides struck large parts of Afghanistan, damaging thousands of homes, destroying crops, bridges and roads and taking nearly 100 lives.

The flooding – reported to have affected 74,000 people in 31 of 34 provinces – is the latest weather-related catastrophe to afflict the nation, whose communities have suffered the brunt of repeated flash floods, droughts and landslides in recent years.

Hameed Hakimi, non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, told Carbon Brief the recent floods would hurt livelihoods and food security, noting reports of destroyed wheat and rice crops in the most affected eastern parts of the country. He said:

“This is common. For at least a decade now, [we have seen] these flash floodings and the damage that happens to rural life, farming, the disruption to crops…Flash flooding physically eats up the land. So, it not only damages where people live, but also people’s livelihoods, based on what they grow.”

The damage to crops will be felt acutely, he explained, given that food security in the landlocked nation is already strained by the blockage of its main transit trade artery through Pakistan and international sanctions that have frozen long-term development aid.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Abdulhadi Achakzai, founding CEO of the Environmental Protection Trainings and Development Organization (EPTDO), an Afghan NGO, described flooding in Afghanistan as a “chronic situation”.

Achakzai, whose organisation runs projects that help urban and rural communities adapt to climate impacts, says climate change hurts the country in four key ways: extreme drought; extreme temperature; “natural hazards”, including landslides and dust storms; and, finally, flash flooding. He said:

“Climate change is a serious matter in Afghanistan. Every nation and every corner within this country is severely affected.”

Ranked 176 of 187 on the University of Notre Dame “global adaptation index”, Afghanistan is among the countries most vulnerable to climate change.

Average temperature across the country has increased from 12.2C in 1960 to 14.2C in 2024, according to the World Bank’s climate change knowledge portal. Drought is widespread, severe and persistent – harming food and water security in a nation of subsistence farmers.

Meanwhile, extreme weather events are the leading driver of internal displacement in the country. More than three-quarters of the 710,000 people who relocated within Afghanistan in 2024 did so driven by “environmental hazards”, such as drought and flood, according to a recent climate vulnerability assessment from the International Organization for Migration.

Finance struggles

Despite feeling the impacts of extreme weather, Afghanistan has been barred from UN climate negotiations and had limited access to climate finance since 2021. (The government attended COP29 in Baku as guests of the Azerbaijan hosts, but did not take part in formal negotiations.)

This is because the international community does not recognise the Taliban government, which resumed power in 2021, due to its record on human rights and its repression of women and girls in particular.

Almost all financing from key climate funds has been suspended, with the exception of a few projects where UN agencies and NGOs act simultaneously as a “requesting” and “implementation” partner.

Aid from UN climate funds fell from $5.9m annually over 2014-20 to $3.9m annually over 2021-24, according to recent analysis by the Berghof Foundation. Multilateral development banks provided a further $337m of funds badged as “climate finance” over 2021-23, it said.

By comparison, Afghanistan’s national climate plan, submitted to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2016, requested $17.4bn in climate finance over 2020-30. An updated national climate plan seen by Carbon Brief – completed in 2021 and later endorsed by the Taliban government, but not accepted by member governments of the UNFCCC – called for $20.6bn through to 2030.

Achakzai, whose organisation attends the COP climate summit each year in an observer capacity, has in the past been the sole delegate from Afghanistan to the conference.

He is calling on the UNFCCC to accept the country’s latest climate plan – and to find an “alternative solution” that would give the people of the country a voice in negotiations. He said:

“Every year we are losing hundreds, thousands of people because of climate change-related matters. Every year we are losing hundreds, thousands of hectares of crops. We are affected by [the decisions of] other countries. Why are we not part of this process?”

Watch, read, listen

BLOSSOM WATCHER: The Guardian reported on the successful search to find a researcher to continue Japan’s 1,200-year cherry blossom record.

COP OUT: Deutsche Welle spoke to experts to understand why India walked away from its bid to host COP33 in 2028.

‘BOMBS AND PORN’: The New Republic looked at who is set to benefit from the rapid build-out of energy-intensive AI datacentres.

Coming up

• 20-24 April: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) working group one report author meeting, Santiago, Chile
• 22 April: Earth day
• 22 April: Launch of third edition of the Lancet Countdown’s Europe report
• 24-29 April: First conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels, Santa Marta, Colombia

Pick of the jobs

• International Organization for Migration, senior thematic associate (climate action) | Salary: UN G-6 salary grade | Location: Dakar, Senegal
• Climate Action Network UK, several board member roles | Salary: Unknown. Location: Unknown 
• UK Department for Energy, Food and Rural Affairs, G7 science lead | Salary: £56,375. Location: Bristol, London, Newcastle-upon-Tyne or York, UK
• Save the Children UK, senior climate change advisor | Salary: £62,000-£65,000. Location: London

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

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The right-wing populist Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán has suffered a landslide electoral defeat to the centre-right Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar.

This brings to an end 16 years of rule by Orbán and his Fidesz party, a move welcomed by many around the world who were concerned about Hungary’s “slide toward authoritarianism”.

Hungary has played a disproportionate role in EU climate and energy policy in recent years, by repeatedly vetoing climate action and by delaying the phaseout of Russian fossil-fuel imports.

Magyar did not prioritise climate and energy issues in his electoral campaign, but he has championed cooperation with the EU and proposed a 2035 deadline for “eliminating Russian energy dependence”.

Hungarian experts tell Carbon Brief that, while the new government is yet to be formed, it is likely that Magyar will move quickly to secure EU funds for “green” measures.

One expert notes that “this is not a progressive pivot”, with Hungary unlikely to emerge as a climate leader in the EU, even if it is less disruptive to the bloc’s wider climate strategy.

• What was Orbán’s approach to climate action?
• What will be the new Hungarian government’s climate and energy policies?
• How will the new government approach EU climate policy?
• What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?

What was Orbán’s approach to climate action?

Hungary has had a mixed record on climate change under then prime minister Orbán, supporting some relevant actions while opposing others – particularly those taken at an EU level. This broadly reflects his Fidesz party’s populist and Eurosceptic leanings.

Orbán has described the EU’s climate goals as a “utopian fantasy” that would “destroy the middle class”. He has also accused “western elites” of wanting people to “live in fear” of climate change.

Yet, despite being embraced by climate sceptics elsewhere and supporting climate-sceptic lobbyists, Orbán’s government has not overtly adopted such sceptical rhetoric.

In fact, reflecting broad Hungarian support for climate action, Orbán has framed his nation as a “climate champion” – albeit one taking a “pragmatic” approach. This was captured in his speech at the COP29 summit in 2024, when he said:

“We must continue advancing the green transition, while also maintaining our use of natural gas, oil and nuclear energy…Our climate policy should be guided by careful consideration and common sense, not by ideology, alarmism or panic.”

Domestically, Orbán’s government has pursued various climate goals, including a 2050 net-zero target, phasing out coal power by 2029 and supporting the expansion of solar power. 

What will be the new Hungarian government’s climate and energy policies?

Climate change was not a major issue in the April election and Magyar, the incoming prime minister, hardly mentioned it in his campaign.

However, the 243-page manifesto released by his Tisza party includes many climate-related proposals, such as home insulation, railway electrification and tackling drought.

The document says some of these measures – notably “energy modernisation and efficiency programmes” – will be funded with billions of euros in EU funds that have been frozen under Orbán. (See: How will the new government approach EU climate policy?) 

One notable pledge is to “double the share of renewable energy in domestic energy supply” by 2040. As the chart below shows, Hungary already generates three-quarters of its electricity from clean sources – predominantly Paks, its single nuclear power plant.

Nearly a third of Hungary’s electricity comes from solar, which has benefited from supportive government schemes in recent years. In contrast, for years, the Orbán government blocked the construction of wind turbines, meaning there is virtually no wind power in Hungary.

The Tisza manifesto recognises this imbalance, stating that “we will abolish the unnecessary restrictions preventing the installation of new wind turbines”, while also supporting geothermal energy.

Energy prices are a key political issue in Hungary, as they are in many nations around the world. Orbán’s “utility cost reduction” has been a flagship policy for many years, capping household prices using large state subsidies.

During the election, Orbán accused his opponent of planning to get rid of the energy price cap. In fact, the Tizsa manifesto says the new government will “maintain and expand” the scheme and add new VAT cuts on firewood.

Despite having few batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) domestically, Hungary has emerged in recent years as a major battery manufacturer, driven by Chinese and South Korean investment. However, this boom has sparked environmental and social concerns.

Zsolt Lengyel, founder and chair of the Institute for European Energy and Climate Policy (IEECP), tells Carbon Brief:

“Orbán’s battery and EV strategy – in theory, a flagship of the transition – has backfired politically…So Tisza inherits a paradox: it needs to accelerate the transition, but does so in an environment where parts of that transition have already lost public legitimacy.”

With much still unknown about Magyar’s attitude to climate and energy policy, some Hungarian experts that Carbon Brief spoke to cautioned against “speculation” and “wishful thinking” when assessing his climate credentials.

How will the new government approach EU climate policy?

There is cautious optimism among EU officials and leaders that a Hungarian government led by Magyar will be more cooperative on EU-led initiatives.

Under Orbán, Hungary has been a vocal and persistent opponent of EU climate policies.

Since 2011, 21 of all the 48 vetoes on joint EU actions have been used by Hungary. These include blocking efforts to sanction Russia following the country’s invasion of Ukraine. (See: What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?)

Among other issues, Hungary has vetoed or obstructed progress on the EU’s 2050 net-zero target, the “fit for 55” legislative package to help meet that goal and the 2035 ban on petrol and diesel cars.

Generally, this opposition did not totally block these policies, as most did not require unanimous agreement among EU member states. However, it did tend to slow down or complicate the process. Hungary was also not acting alone – it was often joined by fellow eastern and central European states, claiming the policies would have high costs.

Nevertheless, the Orbán government’s aversion to the EU has taken it further than other states. In recent months, for example, Hungary has launched a legal case against the EU over its phaseout plan for Russian oil and gas imports.

In this context, Lengyel tells Carbon Brief:

“Orbán’s exit removes Hungary’s most damaging feature in EU climate politics: the ideological reflex to oppose ‘anything Brussels does’.”

However, just because Magyar is less hostile to the EU does not mean his government will be a climate leader.

Magyar’s centre-right Tisza party is aligned with the European People’s Party (EPP) grouping in the European parliament, which has been instrumental in weakening EU climate goals in recent months. Given this, Lengyel tells Carbon Brief.

“Let’s be clear: this is not a progressive pivot. Tisza sits close to the EPP mainstream and is unlikely to challenge it. If anything, it will follow it, including on any watering down of green-deal elements.”

Crucially, Hungary is entitled to billions of euros of EU funds that have been blocked due to breaches of conditions regarding the rule of law and human rights under Orbán.

These include €9.5bn for Hungary’s recovery and resilience plan, the EU’s post-Covid recovery fund, much of which is earmarked for the “green transition”.

This finance needs to be disbursed before the end of August – and both Magyar and the EU have been clear that unlocking the funds is a priority.

Jozsef Feiler, director of the south-east Europe and Hungary programme at the European Climate Foundation, which funds Carbon Brief, says “full EU compliance” will be crucial for Hungary over the coming months, in order to obtain these funds. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The economic and financial stability of the new government [will depend] on obtaining the recovery and resilience facility funds and managing some kind of absorption before the 26 August hard deadline.”

Another early challenge will be the new government’s approach to the new part of the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) – known as ETS2 – which will put a price on emissions from buildings, cars and other sources not covered in the original ETS.

ETS2 is already facing criticism from member states concerned about rising fuel costs. Moreover, Hungary is likely to be one of the countries that is most exposed to high fossil-fuel prices.

István Bart, a senior director in carbon pricing at the Environmental Defence Fund, tells Carbon Brief that Orbán’s government has done little to help with the implementation of ETS2, which is currently due to start in 2028. He notes that, with the question of affordability so fraught in Hungary, it is unclear how Magyar will tackle this issue.

What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?

One of the most notable policy statements made in Tisza’s manifesto is a commitment that:

“By 2035, we will eliminate Russian energy dependence and diversify our domestic energy supply.”

Despite its relatively clean electricity supply, Hungary is still heavily reliant on fossil fuels – including in its transport, heating and industrial sectors – the majority of which are imported.

Russia is Hungary’s main fossil-fuel trading partner, with the Druzhba and TurkStream pipelines supplying much of the smaller nation’s needs for oil and gas, respectively.

Among EU member states, Hungary is second only to Slovakia in terms of reliance on Russian fossil fuels. In 2024, 74% of Hungary’s gas and 48% of its oil were imported from Russia, as shown in the chart below.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most EU nations have taken steps to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels.

The EU has implemented a series of sanctions on Russia and the European Commission launched the REPowerEU plan to “fully end dependency on Russian energy”.

Under Orbán, however, Hungary has obstructed efforts to wean the EU off Russian fossil fuels, citing energy-security concerns. It has successfully negotiated exemptions from Russian oil sanctions, allowing the country to increase its reliance on cheap Russian crude.

The REPowerEU regulation involves a ban on Russian pipeline gas by September 2027. Unlike sanctions, the EU did not need unanimity among states to pass this.

It is notable that Tisza has only committed to end reliance on Russian energy by 2035 – eight years after the EU deadline. It is unclear how Magyar’s new government will negotiate this discrepancy, especially given long-term contracts with Russian suppliers.

Hungary also relies on Russia for nuclear technology and supplies of uranium for its nuclear plant. In its manifesto, Tisza says it will explore the possibility of sourcing nuclear fuel from US or French suppliers, as well as building small modular reactors.

Orbán had already started pursuing diversified nuclear and fossil-fuel supplies by buying from the US, even as it secured exemptions from US sanctions on Russian energy imports. It is possible that Tisza may maintain this approach.

However, with the Iran war and energy crisis looming in recent months, Bart, from EDF, tells Carbon Brief:

“Before the Iran war started, you could have said: ‘Why don’t you just buy LNG [liquified natural gas]?’…Now it seems like less of an option, so, unfortunately, in the short term, [Russian gas] has to stay because we don’t really have an alternative.”

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The post Q&A: What Magyar’s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: What Magyar’s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy