Governments have decided against adopting a new structure for the next Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment cycle, committing instead to the traditional set of three “working group” reports and just one “special” report.
At a three-day meeting in Istanbul last week, delegates debated several different approaches for the work programme of the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle.
These included a more radical option to replace its huge assessment report with a series of shorter special reports on specific topics.
Nonetheless, delegates decided in favour of the usual assessment report and instead focused on the possibility of its three working group reports being delivered by the end of 2028.
This would allow the reports to inform the UN’s second global stocktake, which will gauge progress towards the Paris Agreement goals.
However, despite most governments agreeing on the accelerated timetable, a few countries “strenuously objected”, blocking a final decision on timelines, which will be revisited at an IPCC meeting in the summer.
One person present at the meeting tells Carbon Brief that “most of the resistance about the 2028 timeline came from Saudi Arabia, China and India”.
IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea described the gathering of more than 375 delegates from 120 governments – which overran into a fourth day – as the “one of the most intense meetings” he had ever experienced.
The seventh assessment cycle will also include a special report on climate change and cities as well as a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers – decisions that governments had previously already agreed.
The deliberations saw the addition of a second methodology report on carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage, plus a revision to the IPCC’s 1994 technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation. An overall “synthesis” report for AR7 will follow in 2029.
Reacting to the decisions, one scientist tells Carbon Brief that she is “not thrilled” by the decision to produce “a whole set of working group reports again”, given they will “not say that much new”.
And another says that “waiting until 2028 for the three reports and 2029 for the synthesis is too late to have an impact on decision-making. The world will be significantly different by then”.
In this article, Carbon Brief unpacks the following questions:
- What was the purpose of the meeting?
- What decisions were delegates making?
- What was agreed for the AR7 ‘programme of work’?
- How many special reports will AR7 have?
- What other reports will AR7 include?
- What is the timeline for producing these reports?
What was the purpose of the meeting?
The synthesis report, published in March 2023, marked the final product of the IPCC’s sixth assessment report (AR6) cycle.
Just weeks after its publication, the secretary of the IPCC invited member countries to submit nominations for the IPCC bureau for the AR7 cycle. Over the following months, 100 nominations were submitted for 34 positions – including IPCC chair, vice chairs and co-chairs and working group vice chairs.
Four candidates were nominated for the position of IPCC chair – Dr Debra Roberts from South Africa, Dr Thelma Krug from Brazil, Prof Jean-Pascal Van Ypersele from Belgium and Prof Jim Skea from the UK. These were the first elections in the history of the IPCC with women running for the position of chair.
The new IPCC chair and leadership team were elected at a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, in July last year, via a secret ballot.
Prof Jim Skea was elected as chair, as the IPCC announced:
“With nearly 40 years of climate science experience and expertise, Jim Skea will lead the IPCC through its seventh assessment cycle. Skea was elected by 90 votes to 69 in a run-off with Thelma Krug.”
To select the rest of the bureau, the IPCC mandates that at least one IPCC vice chair and one co-chair from each working group should be from a developing country.
Dr Ladislaus Chang’a from Tanzania, Prof Ramón Pichs-Madruga from Cuba and Prof Diana Ürge-Vorsatz from Hungary were elected to the positions of IPCC vice chair.
IPCC documentation adds that “consideration should also be given to promoting gender balance”. Women make up 40% of the IPCC bureau for AR7 (pdf).
The meeting in Turkey was the first full meeting for the new leadership team. Its purpose was to make a series of decisions for AR7, such as discussing the IPCC budget over 2023-26 and reviewing lessons learned from AR6.
Skea also presented his “vision for the seventh assessment cycle”, in which he highlighted three key themes – policy relevance, inclusivity and interdisciplinarity.
For example, on interdisciplinarity, Skea said that he is “keen to explore ways of enhancing collaboration” with the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), given the “intertwined nature of the climate, biodiversity and pollution challenges”.
What decisions were delegates making?
Among all the decisions that government delegates debated last week, the one that dominated discussions was which option to choose for AR7’s “programme of work”.
This programme sets out the overall approach that the IPCC takes through the assessment cycle, including the number and types of reports that the body produces.
Traditionally, the centrepiece of an IPCC cycle is an “assessment report” that comprises three working group reports and an overall “synthesis” report. The IPCC’s three working groups are:
- Working Group I (WG1): The physical science basis
- Working Group II (WG2): Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability
- Working Group III (WG3): Mitigation of climate change
For AR6, these reports were published in August 2021, February 2022 and April 2022, respectively. They were each around 2,000-3,000 pages in length.
The synthesis report then “integrates” the main findings of the three working group reports. It also takes into account any “special reports” that the IPCC has published during the assessment cycle.
These are shorter reports on specific topics, written by authors from across the three working groups. In AR6, for example, the IPCC published three special reports – each around 600-900 pages long:
- Global warming of 1.5C (“SR15”) in October 2018
- Climate change and land (“SRCCL”) in August 2019
- The ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate (“SROCC”) in September 2019
Finally, an assessment cycle typically also includes “methodology” reports, which “provide practical guidelines for the preparation of greenhouse gas inventories” and “technical papers”, which are “prepared on topics for which an objective international scientific/technical perspective is essential”.
Ahead of the meeting in Turkey, an “informal group on the programme of work” had been established to prepare a paper setting out the options for the AR7 programme of work, taking into account the lessons learned from AR6 and the views of IPCC member countries. (Of the IPCC’s 195 members, 66 sent in submissions – roughly split 60-40 between developing and developed countries.)
One of the challenges faced during AR6 was the “very high workload” as a result of “the unprecedented number of reports, the rapidly increasing literature, and a significant increase of review comments on the final government draft [of the reports]”, the paper says.
It notes the need for IPCC reports to be “shorter and more concise, focused on new science and [able to] provide policy relevant information”.
The paper adds that “many member countries recommended ensuring adequate input from the IPCC is available for the second global stocktake to be concluded in 2028, either as a contribution from the assessment reports, topical [special reports], or as a specific dedicated product”.
The global stocktake is a five-yearly temperature check that is a vital part of the Paris Agreement. It is meant to help countries collectively assess where they are, where they want to go and how to get there in terms of climate action and to identify gaps to course correct.
In the text of the first global stocktake, agreed at COP28 in Dubai last year, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), invited the IPCC to “consider how best to align its work with the second and subsequent global stocktakes” and also “to provide relevant and timely information for the next global stocktake”.
What was agreed for the AR7 ‘programme of work’?
The informal group set out three options for AR7’s programme of work:
- A “light” option with the usual assessment report and then just one special report and methodology report. This would see a “reduced workload compared to the AR6” and a shorter timeline.
- A “classical” option with the usual assessment report and up to two special reports and two methodology reports.
- A “special report gallery” option that replaces the assessment report with a larger collection of special reports (a working assumption of four).
The paper notes that “nearly all” member countries wanted AR7 to include the three working groups reports and synthesis, and the “vast majority” were also in favour of more than one special report and methodology report. (There were 13 countries that wanted to stick with one special report and methodology report.)
Previous assessment cycles suggest that a single working group report takes four years to produce from start to finish, the paper notes, while a special or methodology report can take three or three-and-a-half years. Although working group reports within an assessment cycle are produced in parallel, a complete set – including a synthesis report – ”is not considered possible in less than about four and a half years”, the paper says.
The table below, from the paper, presents the feasibility of when the reports could be published under each of the three options – from “not feasible” (grey) to “risk of delay” (yellow) and “feasible” (green).
| Option | Report | 2027 H1 | 2027 H2 | 2028 H1 | 2028 H2 | 2029 H1 | 2029 H2 | 2030 H1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Light | Special 1 | |||||||
| Light | Methodology 1 | |||||||
| Light | Assessment | |||||||
| Light | Synthesis | |||||||
| Classical | Special 1 | |||||||
| Classical | Methodology 1 | |||||||
| Classical | Special 2 | |||||||
| Classical | Methodology 2 | |||||||
| Classical | Assessment | |||||||
| Classical | Synthesis | |||||||
| SR gallery | Special 1 | |||||||
| SR gallery | Methodology 1 | |||||||
| SR gallery | Methodology 2 | |||||||
| SR gallery | Special 2 | |||||||
| SR gallery | Special 3 | |||||||
| SR gallery | Special 4 | |||||||
| SR gallery | Synthesis |
Feasibility of release of the products listed in the AR7 structure options at indicated periods in time, based on past practice, from “not feasible” (grey) to “risk of delay” (yellow) and “feasible” (green). Source: IPCC (2024)
The paper analysed the three options against a series of criteria that include the time allowed for “engagement of underrepresented communities”. The findings, shown in the “scorecard” below, classify how achievable each criterion is for the three options – yes (green), no (red) or partly (yellow).
| Criterion | Light | Classical | SR gallery |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allows strong integration across working groups |
Somewhat constrained
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
| Input available to second global stocktake |
Special report 1 only
|
Special reports 1 & 2
|
Special reports 1 & 2
|
| Time window allows significant new literature |
Somewhat constrained
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
| Time window long enough to allow engagement of underrepresented communities |
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
| Level of undue stress to authors and IPCC Technical Support Unit |
Medium
|
Low
|
Low
|
| Number of topics to be covered |
Somewhat constrained
|
Large
|
Somewhat constrained
|
| Comprehensive literature assessment |
Somewhat constrained
|
Yes
|
Highly constrained
|
| Time distance to the third global stocktake |
Long
|
Medium
|
Medium
|
Scorecard for the three programme options assessed against a series of criteria. Shading refers to whether that criterion is achievable – yes (green), no (red) or partly (yellow). Source: IPCC (2024)
Despite being a “fairly straightforward exercise in agenda setting”, the discussions over these options at the IPCC meeting in Turkey “evolved into fraught deliberations that ran overnight on Friday and well into Saturday morning”, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) reports.
It adds that the discussions “came down to the wire as delegates laboured in plenary and huddles to secure consensus on the programme of work”.
The final decision falls between the “light” and “classical” options – comprising a full assessment report with synthesis, as well as one special report and two methodology reports. In addition, AR7 will also include a revision of the IPCC’s technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation, published way back in 1994. (See following sections for more details.)
Skea tells Carbon Brief that the “big issue in the mind of most governments when they went into the meeting” was for “the IPCC to produce something that’s useful for the global stocktake by the end of 2028”. (Even though this process actually starts “in late 2026 through 2027”, he notes.)
There were “kind of two ways of going about” this, explains Skea:
“One was to have a second special report, which was prepared in time for the global stocktake with the working group reports coming after that – and, obviously, not being ready in time. The second option was to dispense with the second special report and produce the three working group reports on quite a fast timetable.”
Therefore, says Skea, “what we’ve ended up with is much more like what was labelled ‘light’, because the key point of ‘light’ is that there were no extra products before the second global stocktake”. (The agreed second methodology report “could take place later” in the assessment cycle, Skea notes.)
However, while there was agreement on the selection of reports, the “accelerated” timeline for working group reports was not agreed as “some countries didn’t necessarily want that”, he adds.
Prof Sonia Seneviratne, a climate scientist from ETH Zurich who is a WG1 vice-chair for AR7, notes that “it was very difficult to reach a final decision because a majority of countries wanted to have all assessment reports completed at the latest in 2028”. She tells Carbon Brief:
“Delivery of the IPCC [assessment] report in 2028 would be critical for the IPCC to fulfil its mandate of being ‘policy relevant’. [Nonetheless,] the final decision keeps the door open for the three assessment reports to be released by 2028 – that is, in time for the global stocktake – provided that the schedule is carefully developed.”
Prof Friederike Otto, senior lecturer in climate science at Imperial College London’s Grantham Institute and IPCC AR6 author, says she is “not thrilled” by the decision to produce “a whole set of working group reports again”, which “will require a huge amount of work for many scientists”.
The final reports for WG1 and WG3 will especially “not say that much new”, she tells Carbon Brief, costing the “best scientists…a lot of time they cannot use to actually advance the pressing questions”.
Dr Valérie Masson-Delmotte, a senior researcher at the Laboratoire des Science du Climat et de l’environnement in France and IPCC WG1 co-chair during AR6, says that the “positive” of not adding further special reports “is that there will be more time for expert meetings or workshops in particular on topics possibly stimulating the integration across working groups”.
However, she tells Carbon Brief:
“The less positive outcome is a lack of innovation for the AR7, which I see as a transition cycle, and where I think it is critical to prepare a different approach for the AR8 in order to keep IPCC policy relevant and motivating for scientists.”
This timeline (see section below) means that, even with only one special report, the AR7 cycle “might be much more challenging” than AR6, says Prof Joeri Rogelj, professor of climate science and policy at Imperial College London and IPCC AR6 author. He tells Carbon Brief that “this looks like a daunting cycle”, adding:
“Given the sequence of working group reports and the time needed to finalise, review and approve reports, this puts enormous time pressure on WG1 and WG2.”
How many special reports will AR7 have?
The decision to limit the production of new special reports is in line with the reported preferences of IPCC chair Jim Skea, who previously promised that he would strongly resist pressure to produce more reports, saying they dragged on the IPCC’s core work and resources.
“I’ll say something very strongly – over my dead body will we see lots and lots of special reports,” Skea said shortly after he was elected.
At its 43rd session in April 2016, the IPCC decided to include a special report on climate change and cities in the AR7 cycle. A “cities and climate change science conference” was held in Edmonton, Canada, in March 2018 to “inspire the next frontier of research focused on the science of cities and climate change”.
The comments submitted by member countries suggest that “nearly all countries supported the idea of additional products in the seventh assessment cycle, such as special reports, technical papers or methodology reports”, the IPCC says. It adds that countries suggested a total of 28 different topics, with special reports on tipping points, adaptation, and loss and damage receiving the most support.
However, some countries had expressed concern that the three special reports included in AR6 involved a “substantial amount of work”. Some suggested that only two special reports should be produced in AR7 – including the report on cities – to “avoid overburdening the authors”.
At last week’s meeting in Istanbul, delegates decided to stick with just the already agreed special report on climate change and cities.
Despite the focus on tipping points before the meeting, the view that emerged during discussions in Turkey was that “if there were to be a second special report…it has to have a sufficiently comprehensive character that it would be useful for the second global stocktake”, Skea explains to Carbon Brief.
Several governments mentioned that a second special report “should provide guidance or evidence on climate action”, says Skea, “which a tipping points report would not” because it would be focusing on “yet another reason for acting urgently, whereas a lot of governments were looking for guidance on how to take urgent action”.
Similarly, while there was “a big push for adaptation from some governments as the subject of the second special report” at the meeting, says Skea, “a lot of the arguments were ‘well, that’s WG2’s job anyway to produce an impacts, adaptation and vulnerability report’ – hence, it would be a duplicative effort”.
Overall, the deliberations in Turkey “went much more towards the accelerated working group reports rather than the second special report option”, Skea says.
However, this logic has not been universally welcomed. Prof Lisa Schipper – a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn and AR6 coordinating lead author – tells Carbon Brief that “the fact that none of the additional special reports was agreed is not good”.
She notes that special reports can “take a lot of time and energy away” from the IPCC’s Technical Support Units and authors. However, she adds:
“A series of special reports instead of a series of working group reports before 2029 would have allowed for this science to be more regularly assessed, and for countries to have continuous input for decision-making. When the assessment is put off to 2029, this also means that governments’ attention is delayed until then.”
Dr Céline Guivarch is a professor at Ecole des Ponts ParisTech and was a lead author on AR6. She tells Carbon Brief that the decision on special reports “was probably to be expected”. However, she adds:
“It is a very concerning sign because special reports are important to give faster assessments and to cover topics in more integrated ways than the WG1, WG2 and WG3 ‘siloes’.”
What other reports will AR7 include?
As well as working group reports and special reports, there are a range of other products that the IPCC can produce.
At the 49th session in May 2019, it was decided that the IPCC Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI) should produce a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers. Short-lived climate forcers, such as methane and black carbon, are gases and particulates that cause global warming, but typically only stay in the atmosphere for less than two decades.
Ahead of last week’s meeting in Turkey, around half of IPCC member countries had indicated that they want an “additional product” from the TFI. By far the most sought-after product was on carbon dioxide removal and carbon capture and storage. The meeting saw the addition of a second methodology report on “carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage”.
In addition to the methodology reports, AR7 will also include a revision of the IPCC’s technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation, published in 1994, as well as adaptation indicators, metrics and guidelines. This will be “developed in conjunction with the WG2 report and published as a separate product”.
Dr Chandni Singh, senior researcher at the School of Environment and Sustainability at the Indian Institute for Human Settlements and IPCC AR6 author, says this is “very welcome”. She tells Carbon Brief:
“There is a bewildering range of frameworks being suggested and applied to track and monitor adaptation progress, and the policy salience is pressing, with discussions for the global goal on adaptation ongoing.”
What is the timeline for producing these reports?
The delegates also used the meeting to begin discussing the timeline for the upcoming AR7 cycle. In a press release, Skea stressed the importance of “getting policy-relevant, timely and actionable scientific information as soon as possible and providing input to the 2028 second global stocktake”.
However, a full timeline for the AR7 cycle was not agreed at the meeting in Turkey. The dates for the working group reports will be developed by the IPCC bureau and presented at the next meeting in late July or early August for a decision.
The ENB reports that while most countries “broadly agreed on the need to ensure that a balanced set of scientific inputs, covering both mitigation and adaptation, would be available in time for the second global stocktake in 2028, a few countries strenuously objected”. It adds:
“Until late on the final day of the session, governments’ positions were converging towards having the three working group assessment reports completed by 2028, or at least ‘striving’ to have them completed. Still, the small number of delegates who opposed this timeline held fast.”
One person present at the meeting tells Carbon Brief that “most of the resistance about the 2028 timeline came from Saudi Arabia, China and India”. This “seems politically motivated given the political position of these countries regarding climate mitigation”, they add.
Delegates did agree on a timeline for some of the reports, the ENB notes:
- The special report on climate change and cities will be published in “early 2027”.
- The methodology report on short-lived climate forcers will be published “by 2027”.
- The TFI will hold an expert meeting on carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage, and provide a methodology report on these “by the end of 2027”.
(Some of the IPCC documents published ahead of the meeting report that author selections for the special report on cities are already underway. More than 1,200 experts were nominated and the IPCC bureau is currently working to pare down the list to around 100 people. The list is expected to be finalised by the end of January, when the chosen experts will be invited to an initial scoping meeting, which will be held in April in Riga, Latvia.)
In addition, the IPCC says that the synthesis report – the final product of the AR7 cycle – will be “released by late 2029”.
If governments do agree that all working group reports are ready in time for the second global stocktake, the timeline for the WG1 report, in particular, will be “very time constrained”, says Rogelj, as it would need to “conclude around late 2027”. He explains:
“Otherwise, there will be insufficient time available for the two other working group reports to go through final review and approval in time for the global stocktake. For the research and climate modelling community, this also means a literature cut-off earlier in 2027 leaving very little time for new coupled climate model runs.”
However, Prof Roberto Sánchez-Rodríguez, a professor in the department of urban and environmental studies at the College of the Northern Border in Mexico and IPCC vice chair for WG2 during AR6, says that even this timetable “fails to recognise the severity of the climate crisis and the pace of change in socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions in the world”. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Waiting until 2028 for the three reports and 2029 for the synthesis is too late to have an impact on decision-making. The world will be significantly different by then.”
Schipper says that getting the reports out before 2030 is important, as 2030 is a “mental tipping point for many”. She adds:
“The IPCC special report on 1.5C said that we needed to be well on our way with action to stay below 1.5 by 2030 – and, clearly, we are not.”
The post IPCC: Governments split on ‘accelerated’ climate reports for next UN global stocktake appeared first on Carbon Brief.
IPCC: Governments split on ‘accelerated’ climate reports for next UN global stocktake
Climate Change
The 2026 budget test: Will Australia break free from fossil fuels?
In 2026, the dangers of fossil fuel dependence have been laid bare like never before. The illegal invasion of Iran has brought pain and destruction to millions across the Middle East and triggered a global energy crisis impacting us all. Communities in the Pacific have been hit especially hard by rising fuel prices, and Australians have seen their cost-of-living woes deepen.
Such moments of crisis and upheaval can lead to positive transformation. But only when leaders act with courage and foresight.
There is no clearer statement of a government’s plans and priorities for the nation than its budget — how it plans to raise money, and what services, communities, and industries it will invest in.
As we count down the days to the 2026-27 Federal Budget, will the Albanese Government deliver a budget for our times? One that starts breaking the shackles of fossil fuels, accelerates the shift to clean energy, protects nature, and sees us work together with other countries towards a safer future for all? Or one that doubles down on coal and gas, locks in more climate chaos, and keeps us beholden to the whims of tyrants and billionaires.
Here’s what we think the moment demands, and what we’ll be looking out for when Treasurer Jim Chalmers steps up to the dispatch box on 12 May.
1. Stop fuelling the fire
2. Make big polluters pay
3. Support everyone to be part of the solution
4. Build the industries of the future
5. Build community resilience
6. Be a better neighbour
7. Protect nature
1. Stop fuelling the fire

In mid-April, Pacific governments and civil society met to redouble their efforts towards a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific. Moving beyond coal, oil and gas is fundamental to limiting warming to 1.5°C — a survival line for vulnerable communities and ecosystems. And as our Head of Pacific, Shiva Gounden, explained, it is “also a path of liberation that frees us from expensive, extractive and polluting fossil fuel imports and uplifts our communities”.
Pacific countries are at the forefront of growing global momentum towards a just transition away from fossil fuels, and it is way past time for Australia to get with the program. It is no longer a question of whether fossil fuel extraction will end, but whether that end will be appropriately managed and see communities supported through the transition, or whether it will be chaotic and disruptive.
So will this budget support the transition away from fossil fuels, or will it continue to prop up coal and gas?
When it comes to sensible moves the government can make right now, one stands out as a genuine low hanging fruit. Mining companies get a full rebate of the excise (or tax) that the rest of us pay on diesel fuel. This lowers their operating costs and acts as a large, ongoing subsidy on fossil fuel production — to the tune of $11 billion a year!
Greenpeace has long called for coal and gas companies to be removed from this outdated scheme, and for the billions in savings to be used to support the clean energy transition and to assist communities with adapting to the impacts of climate change. Will we see the government finally make this long overdue change, or will it once again cave to the fossil fuel lobby?
2. Make big polluters pay

While our communities continue to suffer the escalating costs of climate-fuelled disasters, our Government continues to support a massive expansion of Australia’s export gas industry. Gas is a dangerous fossil fuel, with every tonne of Australian gas adding to the global heating that endangers us all.
Moreover, companies like Santos and Woodside pay very little tax for the privilege of digging up and selling Australians’ natural endowment of fossil gas. Remarkably, the Government currently raises more tax from beer than from the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) — the main tax on gas profits.
Momentum has been building to replace or supplement the PRRT with a 25% tax on gas exports. This could raise up to $17 billion a year — funds that, like savings from removing the diesel tax rebate for coal and gas companies, could be spent on supporting the clean energy transition and assisting communities with adapting to worsening fires, floods, heatwaves and other impacts of climate change.
As politicians arrive in Canberra for budget week, they will be confronted by billboards calling for a fair tax on gas exports. The push now has the support of dozens of organisations and a growing number of politicians. Let’s hope the Treasurer seizes this rare window for reform.
3. Support everyone to be part of the solution
As the price of petrol and diesel rises, electric vehicles (EVs) are helping people cut fuel use and save money. However, while EV sales have jumped since the invasion of Iran sent fuel prices rising, they still only make up a fraction of total new car sales. This budget should help more Australians switch to electric vehicles and, even more importantly, enable more Australians to get around by bike, on foot, and on public transport. This means maintaining the EV discount, investing in public and active transport, and removing tax breaks for fuel-hungry utes and vans.
Millions of Australians already enjoy the cost-saving benefits of rooftop solar, batteries, and getting off gas. This budget should enable more households, and in particular those on lower incomes, to access these benefits. This means maintaining the Cheaper Home Batteries Program, and building on the Household Energy Upgrades Fund.
4. Build the industries of the future

If we’re to transition away from fossil fuels, we need to be building the clean industries of the future.
No state is more pivotal to Australia’s energy and industrial transformation than Western Australia. The state has unrivaled potential for renewable energy development and for replacing fossil fuel exports with clean exports like green iron. Such industries offer Western Australia the promise of a vibrant economic future, and for Australia to play an outsized positive role in the world’s efforts to reduce emissions.
However, realising this potential will require focussed support from the Federal Government. Among other measures, Greenpeace has recommended establishing the Australasian Green Iron Corporation as a joint venture between the Australian and Western Australian governments, a key trading partner, a major iron ore miner and steel makers. This would unite these central players around the complex task of building a large-scale green iron industry, and unleash Western Australia’s potential as a green industrial powerhouse.
5. Build community resilience
Believe it or not, our Government continues to spend far more on subsidising fossil fuel production — and on clearing up after climate-fuelled disasters — than it does on helping communities and industries reduce disaster costs through practical, proven methods for building their resilience.
Last year, the Government estimated that the cost of recovery from disasters like the devastating 2022 east coast floods on 2019-20 fires will rise to $13.5 billion. For contrast, the Government’s Disaster Ready Fund – the main national source of funding for disaster resilience – invests just $200 million a year in grants to support disaster preparedness and resilience building. This is despite the Government’s own National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) estimating that for every dollar spent on disaster risk reduction, there is a $9.60 return on investment.
By redirecting funds currently spent on subsidising fossil fuel production, the Government can both stop incentivising climate destruction in the first place, and ensure that Australian communities and industries are better protected from worsening climate extremes.
No communities have more to lose from climate damage, or carry more knowledge of practical solutions, than Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The budget should include a dedicated First Nations climate adaptation fund, ensuring First Nations communities can develop solutions on their own terms, and access the support they need with adapting to extreme heat, coastal erosion and other escalating challenges.
6. Be a better neighbour
The global response to climate change depends on the adequate flow of support from developed economies like Australia to lower income nations with shifting to clean energy, adapting to the impacts of climate change, and addressing loss and damage.
Such support is vital to building trust and cooperation, reducing global emissions, and supporting regional and global security by enabling countries to transition away from fossil fuels and build greater resilience.
Despite its central leadership role in this year’s global climate negotiations, our Government is yet to announce its contribution to international climate finance for 2025-2030. Greenpeace recommends a commitment of $11 billion for this five year period, which is aligned with the global goal under the Paris Agreement to triple international climate finance from current levels.
This new commitment should include additional funding to address loss and damage from climate change and a substantial contribution to the Pacific Resilience Facility, ensuring support is accessible to countries and communities that need it most. It should also see Australia get firmly behind the vision of a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific.
7. Protect nature

There is no safe planet without protection of the ecosystems and biodiversity that sustain us and regulate our climate.
Last year the Parliament passed important and long overdue reforms to our national environment laws to ensure better protection for our forests and other critical ecosystems. However, the Government will need to provide sufficient funding to ensure the effective implementation of these reforms.
Greenpeace has recommended $500 million over four years to establish the National Environment Agency — the body responsible for enforcing and monitoring the new laws — and a further $50 million to Environment Information Australia for providing critical information and tools.
Further resourcing will also be required to fulfil the crucial goal of fully protecting 30% of Australian land and seas by 2030. This should include $1 billion towards ending deforestation by enabling farmers and loggers to retool away from destructive practices, $2 billion a year for restoring degraded lands, $5 billion for purchasing and creating new protected areas, and $200 million for expanding domestic and international marine protected areas.
Conclusion
This is not the first time that conflict overseas has triggered an energy crisis, or that a budget has been preceded by a summer of extreme weather disasters, highlighting the urgent need to phase out fossil fuels. What’s different in 2026 is the availability of solutions. Renewable energy is now cheaper and more accessible than ever before. Global momentum is firmly behind the transition away from fossil fuels. The Albanese Government, with its overwhelming majority, has the chance to set our nation up for the future, or keep us stranded in the past. Let’s hope it makes some smart choices.
The 2026 budget test: Will Australia break free from fossil fuels?
Climate Change
What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war
Anne Jellema is Executive Director of 350.org.
The war on Iran and Lebanon is a deeply unjust and devastating conflict, killing civilians at home, destroying lives, and at the same time sending shockwaves through the global economy. We, at 350.org, have calculated, drawing on price forecasts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Goldman Sachs, just how much that volatility is costing us.
Even under the IMF’s baseline scenario – a de facto “best case” scenario with a near-term end to the war and related supply chain disruptions – oil and gas price spikes are projected to cost households and businesses globally more than $600 billion by the end of the year. Under the IMF’s “adverse scenario”, with prolonged conflict and sustained price pressures, we estimate those additional costs could exceed $1 trillion, even after accounting for reduced demand.
Which is why we urgently need a power shift. Governments are under growing pressure to respond to rising fuel and food costs and deepening energy poverty. And it’s becoming clearer to both voters and elected officials that fossil dependence is not only expensive and risky, but unnecessary.
People who can are voting with their wallets: sales of solar panels and electric vehicles are increasing sharply in many countries. But the working people who have nothing to spare, ironically, are the ones stuck with using oil and gas that is either exorbitantly expensive or simply impossible to get.
Drain on households and economies
In India, street food vendors can’t get cooking gas and in the Philippines, fishermen can’t afford to take their boats to sea. A quarter of British people say that rising energy tariffs will leave them completely unable to pay their bills. This is the moment for a global push to bring abundant and affordable clean energy to all.
In April, we released Out of Pocket, our new research report on how fossil fuels are draining households and economies. We were surprised by the scale of what we found. For decades, governments have reassured people that energy price spikes are unfortunate but unavoidable – the result of distant conflicts, market forces or geopolitical shocks beyond anyone’s control. But the numbers tell a different story.
What we are living through today is not an energy crisis. It is a fossil fuel crisis. In just the first 50 days of the Middle East conflict, soaring oil and gas prices have siphoned an estimated $158 billion–$166 billion from households and businesses worldwide. That is money extracted directly from people’s pockets and transferred, almost instantly, into fossil fuel company balance sheets. And this figure only captures the immediate impact of price spikes, not the permanent economic drain of fossil dependence. Fossil fuels don’t just cost us once, they cost us over and over again.
First, through our bills. Every time there is a war, an embargo or a supply disruption, fossil fuel prices surge. For ordinary people, this means higher costs for energy, transport and food. Many Global South countries have little or no fiscal space to buffer the shock; instead, workers and families pay the price.
Second, through our taxes. Governments around the world continue to pour vast sums of public money into fossil fuel subsidies. These are often justified as a way to protect the most vulnerable at the petrol pump or in their homes. But in reality, the benefits are overwhelmingly captured by wealthier households and corporations. The poorest 20% receive just a fraction of this support, while public finances are drained.
Third, through climate impacts. New research across more than 24,000 global locations gives a granular account of the true costs of extreme heat, sea level rise and falling agricultural yields. Using this data to update IMF modelling of the social cost of carbon, we found that fossil fuel impacts on health and livelihoods amount to over $9 trillion a year. This is the biggest subsidy of all, because these massive and mounting costs are not charged to Big Oil – they are paid for by governments and households, with the poorest shouldering the lion’s share.
Massive transfer of wealth to fossil fuel industry
Adding up direct subsidies, tax breaks and the unpaid bill for climate damages, the total transfer of wealth from the public to the fossil fuel industry amounts to $12 trillion even in a “normal” year without a global oil shock. That’s more than 50% higher than the IMF has previously estimated, and equivalent to a staggering $23 million a minute.
The fossil fuel industry has become extraordinarily adept at profiting from instability. When conflict drives up prices, companies do not lose, they gain. In the current crisis, oil producers and commodity traders are on track to secure tens of billions of dollars in additional windfall profits, even as households face rising bills and governments struggle to manage the fallout.
Fossil fuel crisis offers chance to speed up energy transition, ministers say
This growing disconnect is impossible to ignore. Investors are advised to buy into fossil fuel firms precisely because of their ability to generate profits in times of crisis. Meanwhile, ordinary people are told to tighten their belts.
In 2026, unlike during the oil shocks of the 1970s, clean energy is no longer a distant alternative. Now, even more than when gas prices spiked due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, renewables are often the cheapest option available. Solar and wind can be deployed quickly, at scale, and without the volatility that defines fossil fuel markets.
How to transition from dirty to clean energy
The solutions are clear. Governments must implement permanent windfall taxes on fossil fuel companies to ensure that extraordinary profits generated during crises are redirected to support households. These revenues can be used to reduce energy bills, invest in public services, and accelerate the rollout of clean energy.
Second, we must shift subsidies away from fossil fuels and towards renewable solutions, particularly those that can be deployed quickly and equitably, such as rooftop and community solar. This is not just about cutting emissions. It is about building a more stable, fair and resilient energy system.
Finally, we need binding plans to phase out fossil fuels altogether, replacing them with homegrown renewable energy that can shield economies from future shocks. Because what the current crisis has made clear is this: as long as we remain dependent on fossil fuels, we remain vulnerable – to conflict, to price volatility and to the escalating impacts of climate change.
The true price of fossil fuels is no longer hidden. It is visible in rising bills, strained public finances and communities pushed to the brink. And it is being paid, every day, by ordinary people around the world.
It’s time for the great power shift.
Full details on the methodology used for this report are available here.
The Great Power Shift is a new campaign by 350.org global campaign to pressure governments to bring down energy bills for good by ending fossil fuel dependence and investing in clean, affordable energy for all


The post What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war appeared first on Climate Home News.
Climate Change
Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts
Computer models that use artificial intelligence (AI) cannot forecast record-breaking weather as well as traditional climate models, according to a new study.
It is well established that AI climate models have surpassed traditional, physics-based climate models for some aspects of weather forecasting.
However, new research published in Science Advances finds that AI models still “underperform” in forecasting record-breaking extreme weather events.
The authors tested how well both AI and traditional weather models could simulate thousands of record-breaking hot, cold and windy events that were recorded in 2018 and 2020.
They find that AI models underestimate both the frequency and intensity of record-breaking events.
A study author tells Carbon Brief that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
AI weather forecasts
Extreme weather events, such as floods, heatwaves and storms, drive hundreds of billions of dollars in damages every year through the destruction of cropland, impacts on infrastructure and the loss of human life.
Many governments have developed early warning systems to prepare the general public and mobilise disaster response teams for imminent extreme weather events. These systems have been shown to minimise damages and save lives.
For decades, scientists have used numerical weather prediction models to simulate the weather days, or weeks, in advance.
These models rely on a series of complex equations that reproduce processes in the atmosphere and ocean. The equations are rooted in fundamental laws of physics, based on decades of research by climate scientists. As a result, these models are referred to as “physics-based” models.
However, AI-based climate models are gaining popularity as an alternative for weather forecasting.
Instead of using physics, these models use a statistical approach. Scientists present AI models with a large batch of historical weather data, known as training data, which teaches the model to recognise patterns and make predictions.
To produce a new forecast, the AI model draws on this bank of knowledge and follows the patterns that it knows.
There are many advantages to AI weather forecasts. For example, they use less computing power than physics-based models, because they do not have to run thousands of mathematical equations.
Furthermore, many AI models have been found to perform better than traditional physics-based models at weather forecasts.
However, these models also have drawbacks.
Study author Prof Sebastian Engelke, a professor at the research institute for statistics and information science at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that AI models “depend strongly on the training data” and are “relatively constrained to the range of this dataset”.
In other words, AI models struggle to simulate brand new weather patterns, instead tending forecast events of a similar strength to those seen before. As a result, it is unclear whether AI models can simulate unprecedented, record-breaking extreme events that, by definition, have never been seen before.
Record-breaking extremes
Extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent as the climate warms. Record-shattering extremes – those that break existing records by large margins – are also becoming more regular.
For example, during a 2021 heatwave in north-western US and Canada, local temperature records were broken by up to 5C. According to one study, the heatwave would have been “impossible” without human-caused climate change.
The new study explores how accurately AI and physics-based models can forecast such record-breaking extremes.
First, the authors identified every heat, cold and wind event in 2018 and 2020 that broke a record previously set between 1979 and 2017. (They chose these years due to data availability.) The authors use ERA5 reanalysis data to identify these records.
This produced a large sample size of record-breaking events. For the year 2020, the authors identified around 160,000 heat, 33,000 cold and 53,000 wind records, spread across different seasons and world regions.
For their traditional, physics-based model, the authors selected the High RESolution forecast model from the Integrated Forecasting System of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. This is “widely considered as the leading physics-based numerical weather prediction model”, according to the paper.
They also selected three “leading” AI weather models – the GraphCast model from Google Deepmind, Pangu-Weather developed by Huawei Cloud and the Fuxi model, developed by a team from Shanghai.
The authors then assessed how accurately each model could forecast the extremes observed in the year 2020.
Dr Zhongwei Zhang is the lead author on the study and a researcher at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. He tells Carbon Brief that many AI weather forecast models were built for “general weather conditions”, as they use all historical weather data to train the models. Meanwhile, forecasting extremes is considered a “secondary task” by the models.
The authors explored a range of different “lead times” – in other words, how far into the future the model is forecasting. For example, a lead time of two days could mean the model uses the weather conditions at midnight on 1 January to simulate weather conditions at midnight on 3 January.
The plot below shows how accurately the models forecasted all extreme events (left) and heat extremes (right) under different lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy.
The chart on the left shows how two of the AI models (blue and green) performed better than the physics-based model (black) when forecasting all weather across the year 2020.
However, the chart on the right illustrates how the physics-based model (black) performed better than all three AI models (blue, red and green) when it came to forecasting heat extremes.

The authors note that the performance gap between AI and physics-based models is widest for lower lead times, indicating that AI models have greater difficulty making predictions in the near future.
They find similar results for cold and wind records.
In addition, the authors find that AI models generally “underpredict” temperature during heat records and “overpredict” during cold records.
The study finds that the larger the margin that the record is broken by, the less well the AI model predicts the intensity of the event.
‘Warning shot’
Study author Prof Erich Fischer is a climate scientist at ETH Zurich and a Carbon Brief contributing editor. He tells Carbon Brief that the result is “not unexpected”.
He adds that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
The analysis, he continues, is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
AI models are likely to continue to improve, but scientists should “not yet” fully replace traditional forecasting models with AI ones, according to Fischer.
He explains that accurate forecasts are “most needed” in the runup to potential record-breaking extremes, because they are the trigger for early warning systems that help minimise damages caused by extreme weather.
Leonardo Olivetti is a PhD student at Uppsala University, who has published work on AI weather forecasting and was not involved in the study.
He tells Carbon Brief that “many other studies” have identified issues with using AI models for “extremes”, but this paper is novel for its specific focus on extremes.
Olivetti notes that AI models are already used alongside physics-based models at “some of the major weather forecasting centres around the world”. However, the study results suggest “caution against relying too heavily on these [AI] models”, he says.
Prof Martin Schultz, a professor in computational earth system science at the University of Cologne who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the results of the analysis are “very interesting, but not too surprising”.
He adds that the study “justifies the continued use of classical numerical weather models in operational forecasts, in spite of their tremendous computational costs”.
Advances in forecasting
The field of AI weather forecasting is evolving rapidly.
Olivetti notes that the three AI models tested in the study are an “older generation” of AI models. In the last two years, newer “probabilistic” forecast models have emerged that “claim to better capture extremes”, he explains.
The three AI models used in the analysis are “deterministic”, meaning that they only simulate one possible future outcome.
In contrast, study author Engelke tells Carbon Brief that probabilistic models “create several possible future states of the weather” and are therefore more likely to capture record-breaking extremes.
Engelke says it is “important” to evaluate the newer generation of models for their ability to forecast weather extremes.
He adds that this paper has set out a “protocol” for testing the ability of AI models to predict unprecedented extreme events, which he hopes other researchers will go on to use.
The study says that another “promising direction” for future research is to develop models that combine aspects of traditional, physics-based weather forecasts with AI models.
Engelke says this approach would be “best of both worlds”, as it would combine the ability of physics-based models to simulate record-breaking weather with the computational efficiency of AI models.
Dr Kyle Hilburn, a research scientist at Colorado State University, notes that the study does not address extreme rainfall, which he says “presents challenges for both modelling and observing”. This, he says, is an “important” area for future research.
The post Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts
-
Climate Change9 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases9 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Renewable Energy6 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Renewable Energy2 years ago
GAF Energy Completes Construction of Second Manufacturing Facility










