After lengthy and heated negotiations, diplomats have largely agreed on a draft framework for a new UN fund to help nations recover from the “loss and damage” caused by climate change.
Last year’s COP27 summit in Egypt marked a victory for developing nations when they secured agreement on this fund – an idea many had been advancing for decades.
A transitional committee composed of members from developed and developing countries was tasked with discussing everything from who would pay into this fund to where it would be located, ahead of a final decision due to be taken at COP28 in Dubai next month.
Meetings overran this year as members clashed over long-standing grievances. Developing countries did not want to see the fund based at the US-dominated World Bank and wanted to ensure it was accessible for as much of the global south as possible.
Developed countries wanted to see funds coming from sources besides their public coffers, including those of the wealthiest developing nations, such as China and Saudi Arabia.
In the end, the final committee meeting held last weekend in Abu Dhabi settled on a draft proposal that would see the new fund housed at the World Bank for at least four years.
Neither developed countries nor anyone else would be obliged to pay into the fund.
This proposal will now form the basis of a final decision by leaders at COP28.
While the committee’s recommendations were adopted by consensus, a last-minute objection from the US provides an early indication that those talks at the UN’s upcoming climate summit may not progress smoothly.
- What is ‘loss and damage’ and what was agreed at COP27?
- What progress has been made in setting up a loss-and-damage fund since COP27?
- Why are countries divided over the new fund?
- How much money is needed to deal with loss and damage?
- What options are being considered to raise money for loss and damage?
- How could countries claim money from the loss-and-damage fund?
What is ‘loss and damage’ and what was agreed at COP27?
“Loss and damage” is a term used to describe how climate change is already causing serious and, in many cases, irreversible impacts around the world – particularly in vulnerable communities.
For example, more intense and frequent extreme weather events are causing the loss of human life and damages to properties and cropland.
The issue is recognised in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, which says parties “recognise the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”. However, the Paris text did not commit countries – developed or otherwise – to providing funds for loss and damage.
At UN climate talks, the term is often used by nations and organisations to argue for developed, high-emitting nations to be held responsible for losses incurred in poorer regions, which are the least responsible for climate change. (Because of this, the term “loss and damage” is sometimes described as meaning “climate reparations”.)
At the COP27 climate summit, all countries agreed to set up a fund to pay for loss and damage. This came after a 30-year fight for such a fund led by small island states and developing countries.
After much back and forth between developed countries and the G77 and China – a major group of developing countries representing six out of every seven people in the world – a text was produced close to the end of the summit that “decided” to establish a new loss-and-damage fund.

This same text said that a “transitional committee” should be established, dedicated to coming up with a plan for how the fund would work in practice.
It added that a decision “related to the new funding arrangements” should be adopted “no later than at COP28”.
It was also decided that the committee should be composed of 24 members, including 14 members from developing countries and 10 from developed nations.
What progress has been made in setting up a loss-and-damage fund since COP27?
The transitional committee held four scheduled meetings and two workshops in Egypt, Germany, Thailand and the Dominican Republic during March-October 2023.
After the failure of the fourth meeting to reach consensus, it also held an emergency fifth meeting in Abu Dhabi from 3-4 November 2023.
The committee’s task was to come up with a series of recommendations for the loss-and-damage fund that could then be approved by leaders at COP28.
This included establishing which financial sources would feed into the fund, what kind of activities it could support and how it would work alongside existing funds. The recommendations also covered where the fund would be located and how it would be structured and governed.
Over the course of these meetings, nations and civil society groups submitted proposals for the fund. These ideas were assessed by the committee and, ultimately, fed into a series of documents that were subject to further scrutiny and debate.
As talks entered extra time in Abu Dhabi, the committee co-chairs presented members with what one of them, Outi Honkatukia of Finland, called a “take it or leave it package”. This attempted to distil all the competing views into a viable set of recommendations that could form the basis of a COP28 decision.
After passing up opportunities to object earlier on, US committee member Christina Chan raised a last-minute concern about language “urg[ing]” developed countries to support the fund.
Throughout the talks, the US had consistently pushed back against any language that compelled developed countries to pay into the fund. (While “urge” is towards the stronger end of the lexicon of UN legal drafting, it does not, in fact, imply compulsion.)
Chan asked for this text to be bracketed, indicating it had not been resolved.
The co-chairs reasoned that all members had objections to the final text for various reasons, but the committee had already reached consensus and it was too late to reopen negotiations. “Once we start bracketing, that doesn’t stop,” Honkatukia told the meeting.
Given this, Chan said the US did not view the final decision as reaching consensus. Teresa Anderson, global lead on climate justice at ActionAid International, tells Carbon Brief that the US’s “forceful objections to the transitional committee’s recommendations suggest that this text might not sail smoothly through COP28”.
Why are countries divided over the new fund?
Tensions ran high throughout the five transitional committee meetings as long-standing arguments between representatives from developed and developing nations were revisited.
Developing country committee members reportedly threatened to walk out, accusing a small group of nations – particularly the US – of pushing them into a “Faustian bargain”, involving many compromises, in order to make progress on the loss-and-damage fund.
Below are some of the key areas that sparked divisions within the committee.
Who would receive money from the fund?
At COP27, nations agreed to create the fund to assist “developing nations, especially those that are particularly vulnerable” to climate change. However, the interpretation of “particularly vulnerable” remained a point of contention.
EU committee members, for example, suggested that the fund should only serve least developed countries (LDCs), small-island states and “other particularly vulnerable countries based on specific eligibility criteria”.
Members of the G77 and China resisted what they perceived as efforts to narrow the focus of the fund. In a statement released towards the end of the fourth meeting, Cuban G77 chair Pedro Pedroso Cuesta said:
“We must ensure that the administrative arrangements of the fund do not impede direct access to all developing countries particularly vulnerable to climate change.”
Sherry Rehman, former climate minister of Pakistan and G77 chair at COP27, told a press conference that the fund should be “more inclusive” – citing flood-struck Pakistan and Libya as middle-income nations that might not be able to access it, should more limited criteria be adopted.
The final text agreed by the committee does not specify which countries would be eligible to receive funds. Instead, it says the fund’s board would develop a “resource allocation system”, based on the available evidence and with a minimum percentage allocated to LDCs and small islands.

Who would contribute to the fund?
Currently, only a small group of “Annex II” countries, which were deemed “developed” when the original UN climate treaty was agreed in 1992, are obliged to provide climate finance.
These parties have consistently failed to meet their existing climate-finance pledges to developing countries.
However, neither the 1992 climate convention nor the Paris Agreement say who should give money to pay for climate change loss and damage.
The US and European nations have stressed the need to share the burden with wealthier emerging economies – specifically singling out China and Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia. UK climate minister Graham Stuart told a UN ministerial meeting in September:
“It will simply not be possible to deliver what is needed if we stay trapped in outdated categories from decades ago and we must break out of this to get a positive outcome at COP28.”
Developed countries also say that scaling up the fund sufficiently would mean opening it up to contributions from non-government sources, including the private sector and humanitarian groups. (See: What options are being considered to raise money for loss and damage?)
Developing countries are not entirely opposed to drawing finance from this “mosaic” of funding sources. However, as one joint submission by committee members from developing countries states, they want to keep the focus primarily on grant-based finance from developed countries.
Referencing climate finance more broadly, the Saudi Arabian government voiced its concerns in a statement delivered at the pre-COP event in Abu Dhabi and seen by Carbon Brief. The statement said Saudi Arabia expected “those who have clear obligations to own up to them and not attempt to pass on the baton to other countries or entities outside the process”.
Brazilian diplomat Matheus Bastos, representing the G77 and China, called for language reflecting the “principles and provisions” of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
He said the function of this would be to make it clear, as those treaties do, that developed countries are obliged to provide climate finance. In the view of the G77, this extended to the “full costs incurred” in developing countries, including not only mitigation and adaptation but also loss and damage, Bastos added. The US said it would not accept this text.
Ultimately, the final recommendations would not oblige developed countries to pay into the fund. They also mention a “wide variety of sources of funding”.
Developed countries are asked to “take the lead” in providing start-up finance for the fund, rather than loss-and-damage relief.
In addition, the recommended text “urge[s]” developed countries to “continue to provide support”, while other countries would be subject to a weaker exhortation “enourag[ing]” them to do the same “on a voluntary basis”. (This is the element that the US raised its last-minute objection to as the meeting came to a close.)

Where would the fund be located?
One major issue blocking progress was the location of the loss-and-damage fund.
The US and the EU wanted to see the fund hosted by the US-based World Bank, a proposal that G77 and China members strongly opposed.
They argued that World Bank finance is based not on grants but on loans, which are not desirable for debt-burdened countries in the global south. They also said the bank is not set up to allow fast, direct access of the kind required when dealing with climate disasters.
In addition, they said it would not be accountable to all parties, due to the dominance of the US – its largest shareholder – and other major donors in decision-making.
Diann Black-Layne, a committee member representing the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) said the World Bank would charge a hosting fee of 17%, which she described as “highway robbery…pure gangster behaviour”:
“[That] means that the biggest beneficiary of this fund will be the World Bank. The 10,000 employees of the World Bank will get more money from this fund than the 63 million people of the population of AOSIS countries.”
(This sum, which others have placed at 24%, refers to administration costs taken from the fund’s secretariat and is, therefore, not a portion of the total money flowing into the fund. According to the Loss and Damage Collaboration, it would amount to 1-2% of total funds.)
A coalition of nearly 70 US NGOs wrote an open letter to the US negotiating team stating that “the world does not need yet another channel for international finance that is donor-driven and unaccountable to communities in the global south”.
The World Bank issued a statement pushing back against such criticism and emphasising that it could be flexible in how it allowed countries to access loss-and-damage funds.
(This dispute recalls arguments at the 2009 COP15 climate talks in Copenhagen. There, the so-called “Danish text” – which was never adopted – would have “hand[ed] effective control of climate change finance to the World Bank”, the Guardian reported at the time.)
Developing countries argued instead for a new, independent entity operating under the financial mechanism of the UN climate convention itself.
This would be similar to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is overseen by a 24-person board that includes an equal number of developed and developing country representatives.
After this dispute prevented consensus at the fourth committee meeting, developing countries came to the final meeting stating that they would accept the World Bank as the host on an “interim” basis. Committee members stressed that they were making a “huge concession” in doing so.
Some developed country members also said they wanted to see a clear pathway to move the fund out of the bank within two years.
In the end, the committee agreed to a text that would establish the World Bank as an interim host of the fund for four years. It included conditions such as allowing communities to access small grants and providing access to countries that are not World Bank members.
Laura Schäfer, a senior advisor in climate risk management at Germanwatch, tells Carbon Brief that while these elements are promising, they should also be “basic conditions” for a loss-and-damage fund.
She says there remain concerns that the World Bank will end up being the fund’s permanent home, an issue that has faced other funds that were meant to be housed there temporarily:
“There is no exit strategy defined in the text, so this basically means if the World Bank performs well and fulfils all the conditions set, it will be the host even after four years.”
One of the key demands of developing countries was that, wherever the loss-and-damage fund ended up being based, it would have the status of a standalone entity under the UNFCCC. However, civil-society groups said the final language on this in the text was unclear.
The GCF, seen by some as a model for the new fund, is clearly designated as an “operating entity” under the UN climate convention’s financial mechanism. By contrast, the proposed text for the World Bank-based loss-and-damage fund describes it only as being “entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism”.
This “somewhat murky” language is expected to face legal scrutiny in the weeks ahead of COP28.
Other issues
In an earlier draft text released at the fourth meeting, developing-country committee members disputed a line stating that the fund “does not involve liability or compensation”.
This has long been a fundamental issue for the US, in particular, because it does not want to be held legally accountable for its high historical emissions.
US committee member Chan told other members it was “absolutely unacceptable” that this was viewed as “a point of contention”:
“This was a key piece of the understanding that led to the agreement for this agenda item at Sharm el-Sheikh.”
She said that if this text was removed, “we don’t see a pathway to an outcome” on the fund overall. This language remained in the final recommendations.
Civil society groups also raised concerns about the removal of language committing to human-rights protections from the final recommendations.
How much money is needed to deal with loss and damage?
Developing-country transitional committee members made a submission in September calling for “at least” $100bn a year in loss-and-damage funding by 2030.
They cited a UN-commissioned report by the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, which says “recent events suggest [costs] could be as high as $150-300bn by 2030 to cope with immediate impacts and for subsequent reconstruction”.
The expert report also emphasises the uncertainty of these figures, adding that climate models “likely underestimate” loss-and-damage costs in developing countries.
Indeed, the expert group’s figures are towards the lower end of existing estimates. Their report cites other studies as placing the costs of “residual damages” from climate hazards far higher – as much as £290-580bn annually in developing countries by 2030.
With this in mind, developing country representatives emphasised that a £100bn goal “is not meant as a ceiling, but rather as a minimum commitment.”
By contrast, US and EU submissions did not back any specific targets.
A draft of the final outcome, released at the fourth meeting in October, included a section titled “scale”, with the developing countries’ proposal in square brackets, meaning it had not yet been agreed by all parties.

However, US committee member Chan said that she would not accept such a figure in the document. “This is not part of our mandate, it’s not part of what is in the Sharm decision,” she said.
Ultimately, any reference to the scale of funding was scrubbed from the final recommendations.
What options are being considered to raise money for loss and damage?
One of the transitional committee’s goals was to “take into account the landscape of institutions and solutions relevant to responding to loss and damage”.
As part of the deal that emerged from COP27, countries commissioned the UNFCCC secretariat to review existing loss-and-damage funding and identify “gaps existing within the landscape”.
The secretariat released a synthesis report summarising its findings in May 2023, which has fed into the decisions made by the committee.
It identifies a variety of existing sources that are relevant for tackling loss and damage, including adaptation funds and insurance facilities.
Meanwhile, scientists and civil society groups have proposed alternative sources for loss-and-damage funds, such as taxes or levies on fossil fuels and global shipping.
One paper suggests allocating hundreds of billions of dollars in “climate reparations” charges to fossil-fuel majors such as, for example, Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil.
Earlier versions of the transitional committee’s recommendations reflected a variety of potential sources, again in square brackets. These included private entities, NGOs and “special drawing rights (SDRs), levies, voluntary carbon market or international pricing mechanisms”.
However, the question of funding sources is contentious as, broadly speaking, developing countries have tried to keep the emphasis on grant-based finance from developed countries.
Developed countries, meanwhile, say that “innovative” new sources must be explored to raise money on a sufficient scale.
Speaking at the fourth committee meeting for the G77 and China, Brazilian diplomat Bastos told fellow committee members that they had “repeatedly asked for deletion” of language around raising money for the fund from the voluntary carbon market and other pricing mechanisms.
The final recommendation text does not include much detail on types of funding, but mentions a “wide variety of sources”, as well as saying it will be open to public, private and “innovative” contributions. It also specifies that it should be open to receiving funds from philanthropic foundations.
It says the fund’s board will prepare a strategy to “mobilise new, additional, predictable and adequate financial resources from all sources of funding”.
How could countries claim money from the loss-and-damage fund?
As with many aspects of the fund, the question of how countries could actually claim money after experiencing loss and damage is still far from being answered.
Traditionally, countries access UN climate funds by filing lengthy project proposals in a process that typically takes several years.
For the loss-and-damage fund, some countries are instead calling for a “trigger-based mechanism” to allow them to claim funds immediately in the wake of extreme weather events, explains Zoha Shawoo, a scientist working on loss and damage at the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). She tells Carbon Brief:
“Something like that could work if there is an immediate recovery and relief window. But we know that developed countries have been saying that that is largely covered by humanitarian aid, so maybe the fund should focus more on medium- and long-term recovery.”
There are also still question marks around what sort of losses and damages countries would be able to claim for.
Loss and damage can be caused by immediate climate impacts, such as more intense and frequent extreme weather events, as well as impacts that gradually worsen over time, such as sea level rise and the retreat of glaciers.
The study of how climate change is affecting the likelihood and severity of extreme weather events is known as “attribution” science.
Attribution is playing an increasingly important role in proving liability in climate court cases. For example, a recent landmark court case won by young climate activists in Montana relied heavily on attribution science.
This has prompted some to question whether attribution could play a role in helping countries to make claims from the loss-and-damage fund.
However, Shawoo notes it may not be preferable for developed or developing countries to use attribution science in deciding who should access loss-and-damage funding:
“First, developed countries may not be comfortable with being held liable for particular losses. But then I think it could potentially also be a burden on developing countries to have to prove that a certain event is due to climate change. So I don’t think either side would want that.”
There still could be a role for attribution science in helping to provide evidence for the claims of developing countries however, she adds:
“Rapid attribution studies could provide additional evidence that developing countries could use to back up their claims and access funding. Not a formal requirement, but just something to give them additional leverage.”
So far, there has been little cross-talk between attribution scientists and those involved in the UN process for operationalising the loss-and-damage fund, Dr Izidine Pinto, a scientist from the World Weather Attribution initiative, tells Carbon Brief:
“Right now we’re separate because no one knows how the loss-and-damage fund is going to work.”
He adds that attribution may only be able to play a limited role in determining how much money countries should be able to claim from the loss-and-damage fund:
“Attribution studies are just one side of the coin. Attribution is saying that the amount of rainfall or heat was made more likely by climate change. But vulnerability is the other side of the coin, because the same amount of rainfall can destroy a house in region A but not B. So it’s very tricky to just focus on attribution without looking at vulnerability and exposure.”
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Q&A: The fight over the ‘loss-and-damage fund’ for climate change
Climate Change
New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation
New Zealand’s parliament has adopted a controversial new law blocking a whole avenue of climate litigation and shutting down its most advanced corporate lawsuit, which has been blamed by the government for shaking business confidence and investment.
The Climate Change Response (Tort Liability) Amendment Bill, expected to take effect in the coming days after it is formally signed by the Governor-General, prevents all current and future civil claims for climate loss or harm under tort law.
Justice minister Paul Goldsmith said last week that the aim was to give businesses “certainty around their climate change obligations”, noting it would not alter the government’s responsibilities under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 nor business obligations under the Emissions Trading Scheme.
“Our response to climate change is best managed by the Government at a national level and not through piece-meal litigation in the courts,” he added in a statement.
Such litigation, he said, “risks developing a new regime that contradicts the framework Parliament has already enacted” to tackle climate change.
Goldsmith singled out a key domestic climate lawsuit brought by Northland iwi leader and activist Mike Smith against six big companies: dairy firms Fonterra and Dairy Holdings, energy firms Genesis Energy and Z Energy, New Zealand Steel and coal mining firm BT Mining. A seventh original defendant, Channel Infrastructure, was dropped after it permanently decommissioned its Marsden Point oil refinery.
Smith argued that these companies had caused him harm under public nuisance and negligence law, as well as a third breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change that has yet to be tested domestically. He did not seek financial compensation, instead asking for the companies to immediately stop emitting or contributing to net greenhouse gas emissions.
In one of the most advanced corporate climate accountability lawsuits in the world, a trial had been scheduled for April 2027 after the Supreme Court unanimously allowed the case to continue.
Corporate lobbying in the shadows
Smith described the passing of the bill as “deeply concerning”, particularly as it coincided with the Supreme Court hearing another of his climate lawsuits. In that case, Smith v Attorney-General, he argues that the government’s response to climate change and its impacts on Māori communities in particular breaches rights to life and culture.
“That timing raises profound questions about the separation of powers and the rule of law,” said Smith. “Whatever one’s view of the merits of these cases, it is deeply troubling when parliament intervenes to remove a legal pathway while the courts are actively considering fundamental questions about climate responsibility, rights and the crown’s obligations.”
The bill – which says that no person (including the government) can be found liable in tort for emissions-related climate change effects – followed major lobbying efforts by the companies defending themselves in Smith’s lawsuit. They outlined a proposed legal amendment in a briefing note to the government in 2024.
The centre-right government has been fiercely criticised over its lack of transparency in relation to this lobbying activity. The national ombudsman recently found that the Prime Minister’s Office effectively withheld information requested by the Environmental Law Initiative about meetings, discussions and conversations regarding Smith’s case.
Green groups fail to stop bill
The bill sparked huge concern among environmental campaigners in New Zealand and elsewhere. Greenpeace Aotearoa called it a “shocking abuse of executive power” and the vast majority of submissions to a parliamentary inquiry said it should be rejected.
But in the end, it was adopted with little resistance, moving relatively smoothly through parliament, passing its third reading by 67 votes to 53. Sam Bookman, climate law lecturer at Melbourne Law School, told Climate Home News he was not surprised by this, given that the coalition government has a secure majority.
A complaint has been made to the UN special rapporteur on climate change and human rights by Smith, the National Iwi Chairs Forum Pou Tikanga and youth coalition Climate Clinic Aotearoa over what they see as the government’s heavy-handed approach. Smith is also challenging the new law in yet another lawsuit.
“Pathetic”: New Zealand plans to barely cut emissions between 2030 and 2035
Bookman thinks it “very unlikely” that such a challenge will succeed, noting that New Zealand’s constitution is firmly anchored in parliamentary sovereignty.
But the expert in climate law does not see the bill as the end of legal action in the country, noting that New Zealand has a “sophisticated climate litigation landscape with a growing number of specialist and experienced lawyers and NGOs”.
The country is also approaching its next general election in November, and some opposition parties have pledged to restore access to the courts if elected.
Amanda Larsson, global project lead on agriculture for Greenpeace International, said: “This law deserves to be tested, and I strongly encourage the international climate litigation community to unite and help defend New Zealanders’ fundamental right to hold polluters accountable before this becomes a global blueprint.”
Copycat legislation on the rise
New Zealand’s move is part of a small but growing legislative effort to shut down climate litigation around the world.
In the US, Republican politicians introduced legislation in the House and Senate in April that would shield fossil fuel firms from climate liability lawsuits. Similar laws have already been passed at state level in Tennessee, Utah, Iowa and Louisiana.
The German state of Bavaria has put forward a similar proposal to the Federal Council, aiming to block private climate claims as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments imposing such liability. There are also proposals to limit available remedies and actions in the Netherlands and Belgium.
UN General Assembly backs “climate obligations” set by world’s top court
Bookman said he expects more efforts to counter climate damages litigation and advised plaintiffs to think about how to respond, including drawing on broader support in opposing them.
“Even though it’s very hard for plaintiffs to win these types of cases, companies are very eager to avoid the expense, embarrassment and political accountability that come even with unsuccessful lawsuits,” he said.
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New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation
Climate Change
Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry
Bhima Yudhistira Adhinegara is the Executive Director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), an Indonesia-based economic think tank. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China-Indonesia desk at CELIOS.
Indonesia produces around 60% of the world’s nickel, a metal used to manufacture batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) – more than any other country in the world. But in 2026, the government sharply reduced how much of its nickel can be extracted from the ground.
Production quotas were reduced by around 40% this year compared to 2025. Weda Bay, the largest nickel mine on Earth, had its allowance cut by more than 70% and exhausted its full-year quota by the end of May, halting mining entirely; it cannot resume large-scale extraction until next year unless regulators grant an extension.
The policy has sparked a vivid debate in Indonesian policy circles: how can the country shift its strategy from a decade of mining vast quantities of cheap nickel to producing a high-value and low-carbon material that the rest of the world wants for EV batteries.
The cuts aren’t a silver bullet to clean up Indonesia’s nickel industry, whose smelters are powered by coal – the most polluting fossil fuels. But alongside stricter enforcement of environmental rules, it is one side of efforts to produce more sustainable nickel for a premium.
Restricting Indonesia’s nickel output
Production quotas were introduced to stop the collapse of nickel prices because of oversupply in the market. Prices had fallen more than 40% in 2023 alone and kept sliding as Indonesian supply kept growing, hitting a four-year low of around $13,900 a ton in late 2025.
Critics called the recent tightening of production quotas proof that Indonesia’s nickel strategy has failed, arguing that the industry shouldn’t need to throttle its own output to survive. But when assessed against what the policy was supposed to do – push up nickel prices – it has worked. Prices jumped to $20,000 a ton in May, the highest since 2024.
Chinese industry groups representing companies that have invested billions to mine and refine the country’s nickel were furious, warning Indonesia’s president Prabowo Subianto that the cuts put $50 billion worth of investment at risk. But much of that Chinese capital is sunk into smelters and processing plants built specifically to run on Indonesian ore, and cannot simply be moved elsewhere. That gives Jakarta more room to hold its ground than the warning suggests.
Stronger environmental enforcement
Since the start of the year, Indonesia’s forestry task force has seized more than four million hectares of land from mines and plantations operating illegally in protected forests, collecting over two trillion rupiah ($113 million) in fines.
This included 148 hectares seized from Weda Bay for lacking a forestry permit. The share of nickel produced from illegal small-scale mining also fell from about a quarter in 2022 to roughly 10% by 2024.
The crackdown responds to serious environmental damages in the nickel industry. On Obi Island, a waste pond collapsed after heavy rain in June 2025, flooding three villages and killing a resident. Internal company tests found chromium-6 – a carcinogen – in the water, in quantities far above the legal limit. The footprint of another mine near Raja Ampat, which is home to some of the world’s richest coral reefs, grew 60-fold in just eight years.

The market is responding to early cleanup efforts. Low-carbon nickel now sells for a real premium, roughly $18,800 to $19,300 a ton compared with $17,900 to $18,300 otherwise, as carmakers seek to source cleaner materials to comply with the European Union’s new emissions rules for imports.
In turn, this is incentivising the industry to do more to green its operations. Vale Indonesia’s smelter in South Sulawesi now runs almost entirely on hydropower, for example.
None of this addresses coal use, however. Major Indonesian nickel producers still emitted an estimated 15 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2023. Indonesia may be cracking down on illegal mining and rewarding cleaner producers but it is still running its mines on the dirtiest fuel available.
Unequal benefits
For Indonesia to truly benefit from producing cleaner and high-value nickel, it needs to reap the economic benefits too. Although the industry has boosted the country’s economic growth, the reality on the ground tells a different story.
Konawe in Southeast Sulawesi is home to a major smelting complex. Growth in the district jumped from 6% to 22% between 2015 and 2023, driven almost entirely by the nickel industry, according to a study by the Lowy Institute study. At the same time, poverty levels increased slightly and unemployment remained unchanged.
In Halmahera, another epicentre of the nickel industry, spending by the poorest fifth grew just 5% between 2019 and 2022, compared with 28% for the wealthiest fifth, according to a separate study.
Part of the reason for this inequality is the system for transferring mining royalties to district authorities where the mines are located. In theory, they are entitled to the largest share. But in practice, payments are delayed, companies routinely dispute what they owe and royalties are pooled and distributed across a larger area.
The Natural Resource Governance Institute has found that decentralisation handed local governments power to approve new mines faster than they could build their capacity to manage them. Higher output raises national income on paper, but local governments remain constrained by fiscal rules and infrastructure costs that scale with mining.
None of this makes the 2026 quota cuts a mistake. Indonesia has every right to defend its pricing power over a resource it controls. But limiting extraction isn’t going to fix underlying issues around environmental enforcement and revenue-sharing. That requires rules that are consistently enforced, royalties that reach communities living by the mines, and a plan to wean smelters off coal.
The post Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry appeared first on Climate Home News.
Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry
Climate Change
Risk of “catastrophic” oil spill reaching Kimberley coast found in Woodside’s Scott Reef gas drilling plans
SYDNEY, Monday 24 August 2026 – New analysis of Woodside modelling released by Greenpeace Australia Pacific and Environs Kimberley has revealed the oil and gas corporation’s plans to drill at Scott Reef could cause an oil spill up to 30 times bigger than the 2009 Montara disaster, impacting the Kimberley coastline and reaching as far as Indonesia.
The new analysis details the “catastrophic” oil spill risk put to environmental regulators for approval by Woodside in its Browse to North West Shelf Project (Browse) plans, the worst-case scenario being a blowout directly below Scott Reef, polluting whale migratory pathways and covering isolated turtle nesting ground with oil condensate.
An FOI application (F348) revealed the federal environment department (DCCEEW) asked offshore oil and gas regulator NOPSEMA to look into the oil spill risk in 2025. NOPSEMA’s response to the application refused access to its report, and one document shows DCCEEW sought further advice this year.
Greenpeace and Environs Kimberley are calling on the Federal Government to publicly release the NOPSEMA report given the risk of an uncontrolled release of oil condensate from directly below Scott Reef.
Hannah Schuch, Senior Campaigner at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “Woodside is aware that drilling at Scott Reef risks a massive oil spill that would have severe, far-reaching consequences. It appears environmental regulators are aware too.
“The state and federal governments need to take this risk from Woodside’s drilling plans seriously, as they could end up allowing the worst oil spill in Australian history.
“The pygmy blue whales that migrate up and down the WA coast with their newborns each year could be swimming and feeding in toxic, oil-slicked water. Woodside’s proposal to drill at Scott Reef is an environmental disaster waiting to happen, and the WA and federal governments have one surefire way to prevent catastrophe — reject Browse.”
Martin Prichard, Executive Director at Environs Kimberley, said: “A catastrophic oil spill by Woodside would be disastrous not just for marine life in the area but also for the Kimberley’s $500 million tourism industry.
“The state and federal governments will see five marine parks on the Kimberley coast included in the risk area of a catastrophic Woodside oil spill.
“The Montara oil spill was disastrous for West Timor with the toxic oil destroying seaweed farmers’ livelihoods. The Kimberley dodged a bullet with Montara, we were lucky the spill didn’t head our way. Myself and a crew flew over the Montara oil spill and followed it as far as we could. It was like a scene from a disaster movie.”
After the WA Environmental Protection Authority deemed Browse “unacceptable” due, in part, to oil spill risk, Woodside submitted a mitigation plan based on technology that has never been used “in anger”, a weakness stated in an independent expert review of the plan.
Professor Richard Steiner, independent oil spill expert, said: “A large offshore spill is impossible to effectively contain or recover. Historically, only 2-6% of total spill volume is recovered and the ecological injury from the release of toxic hydrocarbons in the sea can be severe, extensive, and long-term.
“Here in Alaska, government research concludes that several marine populations injured by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, including whales, fish, and seabirds, are still not recovering today, 37 years later. We should expect similar long-term ecological impacts in Western Australia if there were to be a major oil spill. The only sure way to avoid the risk of a catastrophic marine oil spill is to not develop oil and gas projects in marine environments.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Emma Sangalli on emma.sangalli@greenpeace.org or 0431 513 465
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