The European Commission has put forward a plan to boost production of EU-made, low-carbon steel, cement and renewables in an effort to rely less on other countries.

The proposed “Industrial Accelerator Act” (IAA) aims to boost “resilient and decarbonised” industrial production in EU manufacturing, says the commission.

Under the proposal, a percentage of products bought from “energy-intensive industries” and other sectors under public-procurement deals would be required to be “low-carbon” and made in the EU.

This includes targets for steel, aluminium and electric vehicle (EV) parts.

Non-EU countries with trade agreements, such as the UK and Japan, could also be included in the “Made in Europe” portion of the plan.

The proposal – which must be approved by the European Parliament and EU member states – could save millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) by 2030, claims the commission.

Much of the media coverage on the proposed policy focuses on its aim to tackle reliance on China for low-carbon technologies, while Politico calls it a “climate law in disguise”.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief outlines the key details of the proposal, what must happen for it to take effect and what it could mean for climate change.

Where does the ‘Industrial Accelerator Act’ proposal come from?

The publication of the proposed IAA follows weeks of delays as the EU attempts to boost its manufacturing industries – which have been struggling with international competition and high energy costs – while also supporting decarbonisation.

Industries such as steel, cement and chemicals produce roughly a fifth of the EU’s emissions, so decarbonising them will be essential for achieving the bloc’s net-zero goals.

The IAA is an effort to help energy-intensive industries cut their emissions while remaining globally competitive, in part by “creating lead markets for low-carbon products”.

It was first announced in the European Commission’s 2024 political guidelines, laying out its priorities for the five years out to 2029.

In the section concerning the EU’s plans for a “clean industrial deal” – referring to broader plans to support industries and accelerate their decarbonisation – the guidelines stated:

“We will put forward an industrial decarbonisation accelerator act to support industries and companies through the transition.”

When the clean industrial deal was subsequently released in February 2025, it said the promised act would introduce “clean, resilient, circular, cybersecure” criteria that would “strengthen demand for EU-made clean products”.

The act was also intended to “speed-up permitting for industrial access to energy and industrial decarbonisation” and “develop a voluntary label on the carbon intensity of industrial products”.

Underpinning these plans was the idea of increasing demand for low-carbon products in public and private procurements – in particular, those that were “Made in Europe”.

The proportion of products that will be included under the “Made in Europe” definition remains unclear. In the final proposal, the commission notes it will “tailor requirements to the specific structure, maturity and dependencies of each sector”.

The word “decarbonisation” was dropped from the act’s title by commission president Ursula von der Leyen in her state of the EU address in September 2025, in order “to allow for a broader sectoral and technological scope”.

This reflects wider disputes within the commission itself around the coverage of the IAA. There has also been strong opposition to the proposed “made in Europe” section of the act from different groups of member states.

The debate has also taken place against the background of calls to weaken key parts of EU climate policy – in particular, the EU emissions trading system (ETS).

Environmental groups have voiced concerns about the climate focus of the IAA being sidelined, at the expense of boosting the bloc’s competitiveness.

A major issue in the discussions has been whether the “made in Europe” label should include “trusted partners” from outside the EU, such as the UK and Switzerland.

The commission’s trade directorate has reportedly pushed for a more open system that includes more countries. Germany has been among the member states warning that restrictive rules could deter foreign investment and raise prices.

Meanwhile, Politico reported that the commission’s growth directorate, supported by France, wanted “made in Europe” to be restricted to countries in the European Economic Area – the 27 EU member states alongside Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

The publication of the IAA proposal – which follows on from the automotive package adopted by the EU in December 2025 – was delayed numerous times amid the disagreements.

According to Politico, “haggling” continued over the Monday and Tuesday before the proposal was released, before it could be agreed internally within the commission by the “college of commissioners”.

What is in the IAA proposal?

Following these tense internal negotiations, the European Commission released its IAA proposal on 4 March 2026. It says the proposal will “increase demand for low-carbon, European-made technologies and products”.

The act sets a goal of increasing manufacturing’s share of EU GDP to 20% by 2035, up from 14.3% in 2024.

It introduces “targeted and proportionate” low-carbon and “made in EU” requirements for public procurement and public support schemes for specific sectors.

These will initially apply to steel, cement, aluminium, cars and net-zero technologies – defined within the proposal as batteries, battery energy storage systems (BESS), solar PV, heat pumps, wind turbines, electrolysers and nuclear technologies. It also establishes a framework that could be extended to other energy-intensive sectors in the future.

The commission notes that these sectors have been chosen due to their strategic importance, as well as being “essential enablers of the clean transition and vital to downstream industries”.

However, it says they are facing declining production in Europe, slower decarbonisation investments and global competition and market distortions, such as unfair subsidies.

For steel, the proposal would introduce a requirement for public procurement and public support schemes to use low-carbon steel within the automotive and construction industries.

This will help “create market demand” and “give investors confidence and predictability, boosting innovation and making clean steel a core part of the EU’s industrial future”, says the commission.

However, this falls short of the 70% low-carbon steel requirement that had been included in an earlier draft of the act, according to Reuters. Other earlier drafts of the IAA proposal had also included an emissions label for steel.

This voluntary carbon-intensity label had previously been set out within the clean industrial deal and had originally been expected to come into effect in 2025, before being pushed back and, ultimately, excluded from the IAA.

Beyond steel, the IAA sets minimum “Made in EU” requirements for public procurement of 70% for EVs, 25% for aluminium and 25% for cement.

The European Commission will now offer the UK, Japan and other like-minded countries the opportunity to be included under the “Made in Europe” manufacturing targets, if they offer reciprocal access to EU-based manufacturers, according to the Financial Times. The outlet adds that this is being welcomed by the UK government, which had lobbied for such access for months.

The measures within the IAA are in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report on EU competitiveness, says the commission. As such, it says they are designed to “increase value creation in the EU, strengthening our industrial base against the backdrop of growing unfair global competition and increasing dependencies on non-EU suppliers in strategic sectors”.

Alongside the introduction of requirements on public procurement within the bloc, the IAA proposal highlights that the EU is “committed to maintaining that openness as a key source of economic strength and resilience”.

The EU hosted almost a quarter of global foreign direct investment in 2024.

To further support such investment and ensure the benefits extend to technology transfer and job creation, the IAA introduces additional conditions for international investments.

These would apply for investments of more than €100m in emerging sectors such as batteries, EVs, solar PV and critical raw materials by companies that hold more than 40% of global production capacities.

Conditions would include EU companies holding a majority share, technology transfer, integration into EU value chains and job creation, according to the European Commission. There would also need to be a guarantee that a minimum of 50% of employees are European.

The introduction of common conditions across the bloc would mean the IAA “strike[s] a carefully calibrated balance by ensuring that strategic foreign investments contribute to Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and industrial transformation, while preventing fragmentation”, according to the commission.

Additionally, EU member states would be required to set up a single digital permitting process to “speed up and simplify manufacturing projects” under the IAA.

This would include dedicated single points of contact and maximum timelines of 18 months for certain projects, such as energy-intensive industry decarbonisation projects or those located in “industrial acceleration areas”.

Member states would designate these areas to encourage strategic manufacturing clusters, it says. The commission adds that projects within these areas would benefit from improved coordination and access to infrastructure, finance and skills ecosystems, as well as faster permitting.

What comes next?

The commission’s proposal will now be negotiated by members of the European Parliament and then by country ministers at the Council of the EU.

After these negotiations take place, the proposal can be adopted and the act can take effect.

But this may not be a simple process, as many countries remain divided on the key terms of the proposed law. (See: Where does the ‘Industrial Accelerator Act’ proposal come from?)

Nine EU countries pushed back on the proposal last December, reported Politico. The UK has been “lobbying” countries including Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to oppose it, according to Bloomberg. Reuters noted that the plan is backed by France.

EU commissioner for internal market and services, Stéphane Séjourné, told a press conference on 4 March that the “faster” the proposal moves through the EU lawmaking stages, the “more stability we will actually have”.

After the law takes effect, the commission says it will evaluate the key results three years later. A full review is then proposed after five years.

What could the act mean for carbon emissions?

The IAA could save around 30.6m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) in 2030, according to the European Commission.

According to the impact assessment published alongside the proposed act, the changes brought in for the steel, cement, aluminium, battery and vehicle sectors would drive significant CO2 reductions by 2030.

The document breaks down these emissions savings for 2030 as follows:

• Producing more batteries in the EU, rather than relying on imports from China, could save 25.6MtCO2. 
• The 25% low-carbon steel target in the automotive and construction sectors could save around 3.4MtCO2. 
• Vehicle manufacturing emissions could drop by 0.7MtCO2 due to “shifts in production”. 
• The 5% low-carbon cement target could save 0.69MtCO2. 
• The 25% low-carbon aluminium target could save 0.22MtCO2. 

According to the impact assessment, the emissions required to produce a battery in the EU are around 25% lower than a “Chinese manufactured battery using the average Chinese grid”. This is due to “strict” EU environmental standards, it adds.

The report estimates that all of these savings in CO2 would be worth more than €3bn in avoided climate damages.

Streamlining the process for permitting to “accelerate” decarbonisation projects should also “lea[d] to an accelerated pace of GHG [greenhouse gas] savings”, the document says, but does not list a figure for this.

The impact assessment for the IAA proposal notes that there is currently a “structural imbalance” in the EU’s industrial transition.

It states that although emissions associated with industrial production are declining, this is “largely driven by shrinking production”, rather than improved carbon efficiency.

Carbon emissions and production volumes in the EU iron and steel sectors have dropped “almost in parallel” between 2005 and 2023, says the report.

It adds that projections show that these emissions will need to decline “much faster” to meet future EU climate targets.

The “competitiveness and decarbonisation” of EU manufacturing is “unlikely to improve” without further action, such as the IAA, says the report.

In other words, the IAA effectively aims to ensure that emissions cuts can accelerate while maintaining – or even increasing – industrial production within the EU.

What has the reaction to the IAA been?

While many welcomed the IAA proposal as a “first step”, others criticised the final proposal for walking back on the ambition in earlier drafts.

In a statement released alongside the proposal, Stéphane Séjourné, executive vice-president for prosperity and industrial strategy at the European Commission, said the IAA marked a “major step in the renewal of the European economic doctrine”. He added:

“Facing unprecedented global uncertainty and unfair competition, European industry can count on the provisions of this Act to boost demand and guarantee resilient supply chains in strategic sectors. It will create jobs by directing taxpayers’ money to European production, decreasing our dependencies and enhancing our economic security and sovereignty.”

Others shared his sentiment that in the face of a changing international trade environment, the IAA would boost European competitiveness. Neil Makaroff, director at the European thinktank Strategic Perspectives, said in a statement:

“With its first ‘made in Europe’ policy, the EU is embracing long-overdue economic realism and adapting itself to the new brutal global trade reality. Rather than letting the single market be an open outlet for Chinese overcapacities, each euro of taxpayer money can be directed to rebuild Europe’s manufacturing base. This is how Europeans can start learning the language of industrial powers.”

Tinne van der Straeten, the CEO of WindEurope, said the IAA sent an “important political signal”, but “a simple and harmonised implementation of the new rules is crucial”.

WWF highlighted that public procurement is only a small part of the EU economy and called for complementary measures that also target private consumption.

Camille Maury, senior policy officer on industrial decarbonisation at WWF EU, said:

“The commission has finally pressed the accelerator on clean industry by opening the door to create demand for clean products. However, to win the race to decarbonise, the commission and policy makers will need to put effort into strengthening low-carbon requirement criteria and designing truly green labels for steel and cement that exclude fossil fuel-based production.”

In particular, the lack of a low-carbon label for steel within the IAA drew criticism, with, for example, Daniel Pietikainen, policy manager for steel at climate NGO Bellona Europa, saying:

“The Act no longer provides the basis for a low-carbon steel label. While we can work with the Ecodesign Regulation as the vehicle for a steel label, the commission must commit to an ambitious timeline now. Any operational labelling scheme that is contingent on a delegated act with no clear timeline is not a signal; it is a delay.”

Similarly, the exceptions for international investment in emerging sectors, such as batteries and solar, were labelled as a “very disappointing…watering-down” by Christoph Podewils, secretary general of the European Solar Manufacturing Council. In a statement, he added:

“We need ‘Made in Europe’ to ensure the continent’s long-term energy security. The current explosion in energy prices, caused by the war in Iran, demonstrates the importance of being independent of other regions.

“If the European solar industry has to wait another three years after the legislation is adopted, many companies will have disappeared in the meantime due to ongoing unfair competition from China.”

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The post Q&A: What the EU’s new industry and ‘Made in Europe’ rules mean for climate action appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: What the EU’s new industry and ‘Made in Europe’ rules mean for climate action

The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 2.4% in 2025 to their lowest level in more than 150 years, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.

The biggest factors were gas use falling to a 34-year low and coal use dropping to levels last seen in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth I was on the throne and William Shakespeare was writing Hamlet.

These shifts were helped by record-high UK temperatures, elevated gas prices, the end of coal power in late 2024 and a sharp slowdown in the steel industry.

Other key findings of the analysis include:

• The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell to 364m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2025, the lowest level since 1872.
• Coal use roughly halved, with more than half of this due to the end of coal power and another third due to closures and other issues in the steel industry.
• Gas use fell by 1.5% to the lowest level since 1992, with roughly equal contributions from cuts in heat for buildings and industry, more than offsetting a small rise in gas power.
• Oil use fell by 0.9%, despite rising traffic, helped by more than 700,000 new electric vehicles (EVs), electric vans and plug-in hybrids on the nation’s roads.
• The UK’s emissions are now 54% below 1990 levels, while its GDP has nearly doubled.

The 2.4% (8.9MtCO2e) fall in emissions in 2025 was only slightly more than half of the 15MtCO2e cut needed each year on average until 2050, to reach the UK’s legally binding net-zero target.

The analysis is the latest in a decade-long series of annual estimates from Carbon Brief, covering emissions during 2024, 2023, 2022, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014.

Emissions fall to 150-year low

The UK’s territorial greenhouse gas emissions – those that occur within the country’s borders – have now fallen in 27 of the 36 years since 1990.

(The recent fall in territorial emissions has not been “offset” by a rise in the amount of CO2 embedded in imports, which has stayed relatively constant since around 2008.)

Apart from brief rebounds after the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 lockdowns, UK emissions have fallen every year for the past two decades.

The latest 9MtCO2e (2.4%) reduction takes UK emissions down to 364MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis, which is 54% below 1990 levels.

This is the lowest since 1872, as shown in the figure below.

The latest fall puts UK emissions below the level seen during the 1926 general strike, when the nation’s industrial base was brought to a standstill.

It means that UK emissions are now at sustained lows not seen since Victorian times.

Nevertheless, emissions will need to continue falling in order to meet the UK’s legal climate goals and its net-zero target, which is part of international efforts under the Paris Agreement to stop dangerous warming.

Record lows for coal and gas

The key factors in driving down UK emissions in 2025 were coal and gas use falling to their lowest levels since 1600 and 1992, respectively.

For gas, this was mainly down to lower demand from building heat and from industry, likely at least partly related to record-high temperatures and elevated gas prices. For coal, this was a combination of the end of coal power and a steel-industry slowdown, as shown below.

These were not the only factors driving the change in UK emissions in 2025.

The UK saw record generation from renewable sources, particularly wind and solar, but a further decline in nuclear generation, the end of coal power and an increase in electricity demand for the second year running meant that gas-fired power output also went up slightly.

In the transport sector, demand for oil fell by 0.9% year-on-year, even though traffic levels went up by around 1%, according to provisional figures through to September 2025.

This partly reflects the changing makeup of vehicles on the road.

By 2024, there were 2.8m fewer diesel vehicles than there were in 2019, a trend likely to continue due to falling diesel car sales. In contrast, there are now nearly 3m EVs, plug-in hybrids or electric vans on the nation’s roads, making up 5% of the car fleet overall and 2% of vans.

These electrified vehicles are cutting UK emissions by more than 7MtCO2 every year, according to Carbon Brief analysis, with the 700,000 new EVs in 2025 alone saving nearly 2MtCO2.

Drivers with EVs saved a total of £2m in lower fuel costs in 2025, the analysis shows, as EVs are much more efficient and, therefore, cheaper to run than petrol or diesel vehicles. This amounts to more than £700 per EV per year and more than £1,100 for each electric van.

Despite falling demand for oil-derived fuels and the impact of the growing EV fleet, Carbon Brief estimates that the UK’s oil-related emissions actually increased by 0.2% in 2025. This is largely down to a shift in the amount and type of biofuel blended into diesel and petrol at the pump.

Coal falls to lowest level in 400 years

There have been dramatic declines in UK coal use over the past decade, in particular resulting from the phaseout of coal-fired electricity generation.

UK coal demand fell by another 56% in 2025 to just under 1m tonnes (Mt). This is down 97% from the 37Mt burned in 2015 and is 99.6% below the peak of 221Mt in 1956.

As shown in the figure below, coal demand is now at the lowest level since 1600, when Elizabeth I was the queen of England and Ireland.

(It was during her five-decade reign that coal had become the country’s main source of fuel, following an Elizabethan “energy crisis” triggered by a lack of wood for making charcoal.)

The UK’s last coal-fired power plant, at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire, closed down on 30 September 2024. It had run at low levels that year, but still burned some 0.7m tonnes of coal. The end of coal power contributed nearly three-fifths of the fall in demand for the fuel in 2025.

There has also been a marked reduction in UK steel production in recent years, particularly since the closure of two of the nation’s last blast furnaces at Port Talbot in south Wales in 2024.

The last blast furnaces in the country are at the British Steel plant in Scunthorpe in Lincolnshire, which had been due for closure in early 2025 until the government stepped in to keep it open.

The slowdown in coal-based steel production accounts for around a third of the decline in UK coal use in 2025, but only 14% of the drop in the past decade, which was mainly due to coal power.

Globally, the steel industry is facing intense competition in an oversupplied market, with a growing “glut” that has driven down prices. At the same time, the industry in the UK has ageing equipment and expensive electricity, which UK Steel says is largely a result of high gas prices.

The Port Talbot site is being converted to “electric arc furnace” (EAF) steelmaking, which does not rely on coal. The same shift is under discussion for the Scunthorpe site. Analysis from thinktank Green Alliance suggests EAFs would be the cheapest option for both sites.

Gas falls to lowest level in 34 years

There have also been dramatic declines in UK demand for gas over the past 15 years. After another 1.5% drop in 2025, gas use is now at the lowest level since 1992, as shown below.

This means gas demand is now similar to when the UK began its “dash for gas” in the early 1990s. Starting in 1991, this period saw a wave of new gas-fired power stations being built. It was triggered by a change in regulations to allow the use of gas to generate electricity, advances in turbine technology, a period of low gas prices and the privatisation of the UK electricity system.

In total, UK gas demand has fallen by nearly two-fifths since 2010. Half of this overall reduction is due to a 50% fall in gas-fired electricity generation, which has been displaced by falling demand and renewable sources. Another third of the overall reduction is from home heating, where demand has dropped due to more efficient gas boilers and improved insulation.

In 2025, the 1.5% reduction in gas use was caused by roughly equal contributions from lower demand for building heat and from industrial users.

This was helped by 2025 being the hottest year on record, with high gas prices likely also a factor.

Gas prices have remained significantly above the levels seen before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the start of March 2026, UK gas prices roughly doubled as a result of the conflict in the Middle East triggered by the US and Israeli attacks on Iran.

Whereas the UK’s fleet of EVs is already having a significant impact on emissions, domestic heat pump sales remain at relatively low levels, particularly compared with other European nations.

After a 25% year-on-year increase in 2025, there were still only 125,000 heat pump sales in the UK. These new installations will have cut UK emissions by around 0.2MtCO2 in 2025 relative to gas heating, shows Carbon Brief analysis.

By the end of 2025, the UK had a total of around 450,000 domestic heat pumps, generating total savings of roughly 0.7MtCO2 after accounting for the increase in electricity demand.

The 2.3m domestic heat pumps expected by 2030 in the National Energy System Operator’s “future energy scenarios” would save the UK around 4.5MtCO2 per year.

Emissions continue to decouple from growth

In total, UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals.

Since then, the UK economy has nearly doubled in size, with GDP growing by 95% according to data from the World Bank, as shown in the figure below.

Transport remains the single-largest sector, accounting for around 30% of UK emissions, followed, in order, by buildings, agriculture, industry and electricity generation.

The majority of emissions cuts over recent decades have come in the power sector – formerly, the UK’s largest emitter – as coal has been phased out and renewables have replaced gas.

This is set to change over the next 10-15 years. The rise of EVs is set to make transport the largest source of emissions cuts from now until 2040, according to the Climate Change Committee.

While industrial emissions have also declined significantly since 1990, falling some 74% by 2025, the size of UK manufacturing output has also roughly doubled.

Despite the progress in cutting emissions to date, the UK has a long way to go if it is to meet its climate goals in the future, including the yet-to-be legislated seventh “carbon budget”, covering the years 2038-2042, as well as the 2050 net-zero target.

Emissions would need to fall by 15MtCO2e each year until 2050 on average, in order to meet the net-zero target. Meeting the UK’s 2035 international pledge under the Paris Agreement, a 78% reduction below 1990 levels, emissions would need to fall by 22MtCO2e per year.

These figures can be compared with the 9MtCO2e cut achieved in 2025. Emissions did, in fact, fall by an average of 15MtCO2e per year over the past decade – and by an average of 13MtCO2e per year since the turn of the century.

Methodology

The starting point for Carbon Brief’s analysis of UK greenhouse gas emissions is preliminary government estimates of energy use by fuel. These are published monthly, with the final month of each year appearing in figures published at the end of the following February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).

Annual change in UK greenhouse gas emissions, %

One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which is revised at the end of March each year and often again later on.

Emissions data is also subject to revision in light of improvements in data collection and the methodology used, with major revisions in 2021 and more minor changes in early 2026.

The latest changes to the DESNZ emissions methodology have led to 2% reduction in baseline 1990 emissions, but the impact on recent years is minimal.

This does not affect the UK’s carbon budgets, which are set in terms of tonnes of emissions over a five-year period, rather than a percentage reduction compared with 1990 levels.

The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the comparable energy use and emissions figures, which may differ from those published previously.

Another source of uncertainty is the fact that Carbon Brief’s approach to estimating the annual change in emissions differs from the methodology used for the government’s own provisional estimates. The government has access to more granular data not available for public use.

Carbon Brief’s analysis takes figures on the amount of energy sourced from coal, oil and gas reported in Energy Trends 1.2. These figures are combined with conversion factors for the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, published annually by the UK government. Conversion factors are available for each fuel type, for example, petrol, diesel, gas and coal for electricity generation.

For oil, the analysis also draws on Energy Trends 3.13, which further breaks down demand according to the subtype of oil, for example, petrol, jet fuel and so on. Similarly, for coal, the analysis draws on Energy Trends 2.6, which breaks down solid fuel use by subtype.

Emissions from each fuel are then estimated from the energy use multiplied by the conversion factor, weighted by the relative proportions for each fuel subtype.

For example, the UK uses roughly 50m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the form of oil products, around half of which is from road diesel. So half the total energy use from oil is combined with the conversion factor for road diesel, another one-fifth for petrol and so on.

Energy use from each fossil fuel subtype is mapped onto the appropriate emissions conversion factor. In some cases, there is no direct read-across, in which case the nearest appropriate substitute is used. For example, energy use listed as “bitumen” is mapped to “processed fuel oils – residual oil”. Similarly, solid fuel used by “other conversion industries” is mapped to “petroleum coke” and “other” solid fuel use is mapped to “coal (domestic)”.

The energy use figures are calculated on an inland consumption basis, meaning they include bunkers consumed in the UK for international transport by air and sea. In contrast, national emissions inventories exclude international aviation and shipping.

The analysis, therefore, estimates and removes the part of oil use that is due to the UK’s share of international aviation. It draws on the UK’s final greenhouse gas emissions inventory, which breaks emissions down by sector and reports the total for domestic aviation.

This domestic emissions figure is compared with the estimated emissions due to jet fuel use overall, based on the appropriate conversion factor. The analysis assumes that domestic aviation’s share of emissions is equivalent to its share of jet fuel energy use.

In addition to estimating CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, Carbon Brief assumes that CO2 emissions from non-fuel sources, such as land-use change and forestry, are the same as a year earlier. The remaining greenhouse gas emissions are assumed to change in line with the latest government energy and emissions projections.

These assumptions are based on the UK government’s own methodology for preliminary greenhouse gas emissions estimates, published in 2019.

Note that the figures in this article are for emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has published detailed comparisons between various approaches to calculating UK emissions, on a territorial, consumption, “environmental accounts” or “international accounting” basis.

The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar number of tonnes as emissions within the UK.

Bioenergy is a significant source of renewable energy in the UK and its climate benefits are disputed. Contrary to public perception, however, only around one-quarter of bioenergy is imported.

International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector has a target to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.

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The post Analysis: UK emissions fall 2.4% in 2025 as coal hits 400-year low appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK emissions fall 2.4% in 2025 as coal hits 400-year low

Half of nations have met a UN deadline to report on how they are tackling nature loss within their borders, Carbon Brief analysis shows.

This includes 11 of the 17 “megadiverse nations”, countries that account for 70% of Earth’s biodiversity.

It also includes all of the G7 nations apart from the US, which is not part of the world’s nature treaty.

All 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty were due to submit their seventh “national reports” by 28 February, of which 98 have done so.

Their submissions are supposed to provide key information for an upcoming global report on actions to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, in addition to a global review of progress due to be conducted by countries at the COP17 nature summit in Armenia in October this year.

At biodiversity talks in Rome in February, UN officials said that national reports submitted late will not be included in the global report due to a lack of time, but could still be considered in the global review.

Tracking nature action

In 2022, nations signed a landmark deal to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030, known as the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF).

In an effort to make sure countries take action at the domestic level, the GBF included an “implementation schedule”, involving the publishing of new national plans in 2024 and new national reports in 2026.

The two sets of documents were to inform both a global report and a global review, to be conducted by countries at COP17 in Armenia later this year. (This schedule mirrors the one set out for tackling climate change under the Paris Agreement.)

The deadline for nations’ seventh national reports, which contain information on their progress towards meeting the 23 targets of the GBF based on a set of key indicators, was 28 February 2026.

According to Carbon Brief’s analysis of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity’s online reporting platform, 98 out of the 196 countries that are part of the nature convention (50%) submitted on time.

The map below shows countries that submitted their seventh national reports by the UN’s deadline.

This includes 11 of the 17 “megadiverse nations” that account for 70% of Earth’s biodiversity.

The megadiverse nations to meet the deadline were India, Venezuela, Indonesia, Madagascar, Peru, Malaysia, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Australia.

It also includes all of the G7 nations (France, Germany, the UK, Japan, Italy and Canada), excluding the US, which has never ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The UK’s seventh national report shows that it is currently on track to meet just three of the GBF’s 23 targets.

This is according to a LinkedIn post from Dr David Cooper, former executive secretary of the CBD and current chair of the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee, which coordinated the UK’s seventh national report,

The report shows the UK is not on track to meet one of the headline targets of the GBF, which is to protect 30% of land and sea for nature by 2030.

It reports that the proportion of land protected for nature is 7% in England, 18% in Scotland and 9% in Northern Ireland. (The figure is not given for Wales.)

National plans

In addition to the national reports, the upcoming global report and review will draw on countries’ national plans.

Countries were meant to have submitted their new national plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPs), by the start of COP16 in October 2024.

A joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian found that only 15% of member countries met that deadline.

Since then, the percentage of countries that have submitted a new NBSAP has risen to 39%.

According to the GBF and its underlying documents, countries that were “not in a position” to meet the deadline to submit NBSAPs ahead of COP16 were requested to instead submit national targets. These submissions simply list biodiversity targets that countries will aim for, without an accompanying plan for how they will be achieved.

As of 2 March, 78% of nations had submitted national targets.

At biodiversity talks in Rome in February, UN officials said that national reports submitted late will not be included in the global report due to a lack of time, but could still be considered in the global review.

Funding ‘delays’

At the Rome talks, some countries raised that they had faced “difficulties in submitting [their national reports] on time”, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

Speaking on behalf of “many” countries, Fiji said that there had been “technical and financial constraints faced by parties” in the preparation of their seventh national reports.

In a statement to Carbon Brief, a spokesperson for the Global Environment Facility, the body in charge of providing financial and technical assistance to countries for the preparation of their national reports, said “delays in fund disbursement have occurred in some cases”, adding:

“In 2023, the GEF council approved support for the development of NBSAPs and the seventh national reports for all 139 eligible countries that requested assistance. This includes national grants of up to $450,000 per country and $6m in global technical assistance delivered through the UN Development Programme and UN Environment Programme.

“As of the end of January 2026, all 139 participating countries had benefited from technical assistance and 93% had accessed their national grants, with 11 countries yet to receive their funds. Delays in fund disbursement have occurred in some cases, compounded by procurement challenges and limited availability of technical expertise.”

The spokesperson added that the fund will “continue to engage closely with agencies and countries to support timely completion of NBSAPs and the seventh national reports”.

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The post Analysis: Half of nations meet UN deadline for nature-loss reporting appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Half of nations meet UN deadline for nature-loss reporting