India, Vietnam and Argentina are among the roughly 70 nations that did not submit updated climate plans to the United Nations in 2025, despite the 2015 Paris Agreement’s requirement that countries do so every five years.

According to Climate Action Tracker, about three-fifths of countries have submitted their latest nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the UN climate body. Most of them landed in late 2025 and outline targets and measures to cut planet-heating emissions and adapt to climate impacts through to 2035.

Those countries that have formally submitted new NDCs include all G20 nations except India and Argentina. The Trump administration, meanwhile, has indicated it will not deliver on the US’s Biden-era NDC as it pulls the world’s second-largest emitting country out of the Paris Agreement. Saudi Arabia submitted its NDC, which does not contain any firm emissions reduction targets, on December 31.

Many of the governments that have not submitted NDCs are low-emitting small or poorer nations, especially in Africa. But major economies that have not submitted an NDC – some of which also have energy transition deals with donors – include Egypt, the Philippines and Vietnam.

The United Nations tried to encourage on-time submission of this third round of NDCs by setting soft deadlines. Just 13 countries met a first February 10 deadline and around 60 of the 195 signatories to the Paris Agreement met a September deadline, allowing them to be included in a key UN synthesis report.

The UN’s Paris Agreement Compliance Committee – made up of climate negotiators from different governments – has expressed concern about governments not submitting NDCs, or doing so late, and asked them to explain themselves.

After talking to governments that missed the February deadline, it found a host of obstacles including insufficient financial support; technical challenges like a lack of data or problems coordinating across sectors and including different groups; and other issues like political instability or genocide.

India keeps world guessing

The Indian government has been tight-lipped on its NDC, although an unnamed official told the Indian Express back in February that it was in “no hurry”.

The official added that the NDC would reflect India’s disappointment at the new global climate finance goal for 2035, agreed at COP29 in 2024. India has repeatedly argued that without sufficient climate finance, developing countries cannot be as ambitious as they would like to be in reducing emissions.

Some media outlets and analysts were expecting India to announced its NDC at COP30 in November. Instead, the Indian government said only during the summit that it would submit an NDC “on time”, with environment minister Bhupender Yadav telling reporters it would be “by December”.

Argentina sets emissions caps but no NDC

The right-wing government of Argentina, which has considered leaving the Paris Agreement, unveiled caps on the country’s emissions for 2030 and 2035 in an online event on November 3, but has yet to formalise those targets in an NDC.

At the event and in subsequent communications with Climate Home News, Undersecretary of the Environment Fernando Brom said the country would present its NDC during the first week of COP30. But that did not happen, although Argentinian negotiators participated in the climate summit.

Some local experts have pointed to November’s trade deal with the US as one of the reasons for the delay in submitting the NDC, while others cited the government’s disinterest in the climate agenda.

In contrast, the governments of Egypt and Vietnam have faced less scrutiny and have not publicly commented on whether and when their NDCs will be released.

In August, the Vietnamese government said it was “actively advancing the update” of its NDC. The country has a Just Energy Transition partnership with rich nations, but the International Energy Agency predicts coal use will continue to grow there until at least 2030, driven by power-hungry manufacturing.

The Philippines government has organised consultation events on its new NDC but has not said when it will be released.

This article originally said that Saudi Arabia had not submitted its NDC in 2025. Climate Home News later learned that the Saudi NDC was submitted to the UN climate body on December 31 by email but not published on the UNFCCC website until the start of 2026. The article has been amended to reflect this information.

The post India, Vietnam and Argentina fail to submit climate plans in 2025 appeared first on Climate Home News.

India, Vietnam and Argentina fail to submit climate plans in 2025

Ben Marshall is a teaching fellow at Harvard University and Aditya Bhayana is a climate fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School.

The dust is settling after COP30, and two things have become clear. First, the outcomes of the world’s most important climate conference were disappointing. Secondly, those outcomes had less to do with the limits of climate science and more to do with geopolitics.

If they want to meaningfully push for better climate agreements, future COP presidencies will need to take a more proactive role in orchestrating climate negotiations and do so in a way that accounts for the new geopolitical reality. If they don’t, climate action will remain mostly talk.

The shortcomings in Belém

Brazil’s COP30 presidency placed three big bets on the 2025 climate summit: it would be “the COP of implementation;” the rainforest setting would unify actors; and wider participation would unlock new avenues for progress.

Instead, the summit – held in Belém (the “gateway to the Amazon”), in the most deforested country on earth – ended with no roadmap for fossil fuel phaseout, an agreement that only briefly mentions deforestation, and an institutional apparatus less trusted than it was at the start.

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In part, these outcomes reflect rare missteps by COP President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, who pushed contentious issues like unilateral trade measures (including the EU’s carbon border tax) into a separate negotiation track and dedicated only a small part of the agenda to political conversation.

But COP30 also suffered from broader issues that are straining multilateralism. Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have made it harder to form cross-regional coalitions, record debt distress in developing countries has weakened trust in global institutions, and collaborative efforts to regulate global shipping emissions and reform international taxation have stalled.

How geopolitics show up at COP

Climate diplomacy is becoming less insulated from these geopolitical pressures. Observers noted this during COP28 (Dubai), and since then, it has become more pronounced, while COP hosts have done little in response.

Great-power rivalry is now shaping even technical negotiations, trust in the idea of COP is waning, and the lines between climate and trade are increasingly blurred. At COP30, we saw this firsthand in the form of three key shifts compared to past summits:

Feasibility is no longer the binding constraint. The scientific, technical, and policy cases for rapid decarbonisation have never been stronger – pathways to limit warming to 1.5°C have been well mapped by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; onshore wind and solar power are respectively 60% and ~80% cheaper than in 2015; and each year of inaction measurably raises the costs of mitigation.

But inside the negotiation rooms in Belém, we saw countries not only weighing climate commitments against fiscal, trade, and energy priorities, but also calibrating their positions to avoid antagonising key international partners (chiefly the United States) or empowering domestic political rivals in upcoming elections.

Narrative power has reached its limits. Narratives once turbocharged climate deals, from stories of shared purpose building momentum at COP21 (Paris) to discussions of climate justice pushing “loss and damage” to the fore at COP27 (Sharm-el-Sheikh). But while Brazil saw some of the most compelling storytelling of any COP – with President Lula framing the Amazon as a global commons to be protected, indigenous flotillas on the river, and even the Pope pushing for concrete action – it was not enough to overcome structural blockages to progress on fossil fuels, climate finance or forests.

Emerging powers have gone from adapting to institutions to reshaping them. China, India, Brazil, and the Gulf states are no longer negotiating at the edges of a Western-designed system, but actively redesigning climate governance to reflect their strategic interests. This showed up in a desire to compartmentalise discussions on trade and emissions, and in resistance to overly prescriptive language on mitigation. Red lines will likely continue to harden as developing countries flex – especially if the US stays away from the table.

Action options for future COP presidencies

COP presidencies historically acted as conveners, focusing on the agreement text – largely with the interests of major developed countries in mind. Convening power and elegant drafting are necessary but no longer sufficient. To be successful in the new reality, COP presidencies must act as orchestrators – managing political interdependencies, sequencing issues strategically, and brokering alignment across rival blocs.

Below are four options available to Türkiye and Australia for 2026, and Ethiopia for 2027, to help set up climate negotiations for greater success:

1. Invest in the pre-work to build momentum and trust. The landmark Paris Agreement was achieved in part because ministers were engaged early and often, and expectations were disciplined. COP presidencies should engage political stakeholders throughout the 12 (or ideally, 18) months leading up to the summit and keep a tighter lid on public ambitions. They should also push countries to make good on their commitments if they are to overcome a growing sense of mistrust. This year, more than 70 new national climate plans for 2035 were still missing by the end of COP, including top-10 emitters India, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

2. Explicitly engage with influential blocs. The COP presidency can play a much more proactive role in brokering agreements. With China, that will mean focusing on implementation (e.g., clean manufacturing, grid-scale deployment and technology diffusion) rather than rehashing mitigation targets.

With other ‘Like-Minded Developing Countries’, including India, it will mean moving from abstract calls for “ambition” toward specific packages that link mitigation to predictable finance, technology access, and transition timelines – especially in hard-to-abate sectors. And with progressives like the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance and AOSIS, it will mean translating “climate leadership” into real economic signals, with the COP presidency pushing existing multilateral institutions to provide access to transition finance in response to ambitious climate commitments.

3. Use creative approaches, but carefully. Brazil offered a response to brittle relationships in the form of mutirão (Portuguese for “collective effort”) sessions. These included closed-door meetings, informal consultations and sidebars, typically without technical staff present, where ministers and high-level delegates could have off-the-record conversations and negotiate political trade-offs that would not survive plenary scrutiny.

Mutirão showed some promise, but its overuse at COP30 degraded transparency and highlighted a paradox in climate diplomacy that the means of identifying compromise and building consensus among some parties also damages trust with others. Future COP presidencies should be careful not to over-use mutirão itself, but instead to design other approaches that structure informal bargaining and connect it to the formal process.

This could include: making political huddles mandatory; baking in more inclusiveness by inviting fixed or rotating representatives from large coalitions (as happens in the G77 and WTO “Green Room” meetings); withholding details on the deliberations themselves but publicly communicating what issues are in scope and any red lines (akin to the forward guidance issued by central banks); and requiring closed-door sessions to feed outcomes back into open negotiating tracks (which helped rapidly translate ministerial consultations into draft text at COP21 in Paris). The combined candour and accountability of these and other approaches could help COP presidencies broker alignment among blocs with fundamentally different political economies.

4. Acknowledge climate governance is entering a post-consensus era. The assumption that all 198 parties to the UNFCCC can converge on a single, high-ambition pathway is no longer credible. Progress will increasingly depend on coalitions of the willing and plurilateral arrangements that complement the multilateral system. COP presidencies should feel comfortable speaking hard truths to power and pushing for stronger, narrower agreements than broader, weaker ones.

The challenge of climate negotiations is no longer knowing what needs to be done or how to do it, but aligning the interests, power and institutions needed to make it possible.

Responding to these dynamics requires a different kind of COP presidency – one focused less on targets and text, and more on managing real-world political priorities. Until geopolitics becomes the starting point of climate action, rather than an inconvenient backdrop, real world implementation will remain a promise deferred.

The opinions expressed in this article the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of Harvard or any other institution.

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COP presidencies should focus less on climate policy, more on global politics

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