The energy world is changing fast, yet not fast enough to protect the planet from dangerous warming. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2025, released at the start of COP30 in Brazil, lays out three futures for global emissions. These scenarios show how close — or far — the world is from meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. The findings are sobering, but they also give countries clear signals on where action must accelerate.
The IEA makes one point very clear: 2024 was the hottest year ever recorded, and for the first time, global temperatures stayed above 1.5°C across the entire year. The last decade was also the hottest in history. This puts huge pressure on countries as they update their national climate plans at COP30.
Yet the IEA also stresses something important — none of its scenarios are forecasts. They are pathways, and the direction we take still depends on policy choices made today.
A World on a Hotter Track: What the IEA’s Scenarios Show
The IEA’s three major scenarios outline different ways the global energy system could evolve. Two reflect today’s conditions. The third shows what it would take actually to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.

Current Policies Scenario (CPS): The Dangerous Path
This scenario assumes governments stop at policies already written into law. No new climate pledges. No new incentives. No strengthened targets.
Under this path:
- Coal use falls only slightly.
- Oil and gas demand have been rising for decades.
- Global energy-related emissions stay close to 2024 levels all the way to 2050.
The result is alarming. Global warming will hit 2°C by around 2050 and reach 2.9°C by 2100, and temperatures will still be rising. The IEA even warns there is a 5% chance of hitting 4°C, a level associated with extreme climate disruptions and irreversible tipping points.
The CPS was removed after 2020 because it seemed unrealistic in a world trying to cut emissions. But political pressure, especially from the Trump administration, pushed the IEA to bring it back. Its return shows how vulnerable global climate ambition can be when big economies shift direction.
Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS): Better, but Still Off-Track
This scenario reflects what governments say they plan to do — but not what they have legally locked in.
Here:
- Emissions peak within a few years.
- They fall slightly to 35.2 gigatonnes (Gt) in 2035.
- Advanced economies and China reduce emissions.
- But developing economies emit more as energy demand rises.
Even with these changes, the STEPS pathway still results in 2.5°C of warming by 2100. This is far above the Paris goal of “well below 2°C” and nowhere near keeping warming under 1.5°C. The IEA notes that this year’s STEPS outcome is worse than last year’s due to slower clean energy progress and higher expected coal use.
Net Zero by 2050 Scenario (NZE): The Only Path that Stabilizes the Climate
Net Zero by 2050 Scenario, often called the NZE, shows what a 1.5°C-aligned future would require. It is the only pathway that eventually brings warming back below 1.5°C by the end of the century.
But the challenge has grown sharply. Because real-world emissions remain high, the NZE scenario now includes:
- a higher and longer overshoot of the 1.5°C limit
- warming peaks around 65°C mid-century and slowly declines
Large-Scale Carbon Removal Technologies: The Saviour
The only way to return below that threshold later this century is to combine deep emissions cuts with large-scale carbon removal technologies. These technologies remain expensive and unproven at the scale required.
So the IEA emphasizes that countries must do everything possible to limit the overshoot by cutting emissions faster now. Notably, in the NZE pathway, global emissions fall by more than half by 2035 and reach net zero by 2050.
By the end of the century, carbon removal technologies would need to eliminate nearly four gigatonnes of CO₂ each year to bring temperatures back down.
A Fossil Peak Nears as Clean Energy Surges — but the World Still Falls Short
The IEA shows the energy system shifting, with coal already at or near its peak and oil expected to peak around 2030, though its decline will be slower than once expected. Gas demand levels off around 2035, but at a higher baseline than earlier forecasts, revealing how deeply rooted fossil fuels remain in the global mix.

At the same time, clean energy is rising fast. Solar capacity could more than triple by 2035, wind is set to nearly triple, and nuclear expands by close to 40 percent. Renewables will even overtake oil as the largest energy source by the early 2040s. Yet the world is still not moving fast enough. Under stated policies, renewable capacity reaches about 13,700 gigawatts by 2035, far short of the roughly 19,600 gigawatts required under the net-zero pathway.

Global Carbon Emissions: Peaks and Plateaus
Both IEA scenarios point to sustained high emissions, though at different levels. In the CPS, global energy emissions stay near 2024 levels through 2050, as small coal reductions are offset by rising oil and gas use. In the STEPS, emissions peak soon, drop to 35.2 gigatonnes by 2035, and decline slowly to 2050.
Reductions in advanced economies and China are balanced by rising emissions in developing regions. The gap between CPS and STEPS comes mainly from higher coal emissions, slower industrial efficiency, and delayed adoption of electric and efficient vehicles.
All in all, this gap underscores the need to accelerate clean energy deployment to align with global climate goals.

Why COP30 Matters More Than Ever
With the world heating faster than expected and the 1.5°C threshold already breached annually, COP30 becomes a turning point. The IEA’s outlook directly shapes negotiations because it:
- Shows the world is far off-track.
- Highlights the widening gap between political promises and real action.
- Makes clear that overshoot is now unavoidable.
- Warns that delay will force much heavier reliance on expensive CO₂ removals later.
At COP30, countries need to submit new Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The IEA warns that current NDCs do not reflect the full potential of national policies or domestic clean energy momentum. In other words, many countries are doing more at home than they are willing to commit to on paper.
COP30 is a chance to fix this gap.
What Can Be Done to Get on Track? The IEA’s Priority Actions
The message is clear: the world is not on track, and the window to avoid the worst climate impacts is shrinking. Still, the IEA shows that meaningful progress is underway.
It highlights several actions that could quickly bring global emissions closer to the NZE path. The world needs faster renewable energy deployment, stronger energy efficiency improvements, and large reductions in methane emissions from the energy sector.
Electrification of vehicles, buildings, and industry has to accelerate, and sustainable fuels such as biofuels and hydrogen must expand significantly. These steps are well understood, often cost-effective, and achievable with current technology. What remains missing is the political will to scale them up at the speed required.
With COP30, countries certainly have an opportunity to match ambition with action and take decisive steps toward a safer climate future.
The post What the IEA’s New Scenarios Mean for the Global Climate — and for COP30 appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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