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There is a “massive gap between rhetoric and reality” that must be closed by new climate pledges being drafted under the Paris Agreement, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) says.

In the 15th edition of its annual “emissions gap” report, the UNEP calls for “no more hot air” as countries approach the February 2025 deadline to submit their next nationally determined contributions (NDCs) setting mitigation targets for 2035.

These NDCs “must deliver a quantum leap in ambition in tandem with accelerated mitigation action in this decade”, the report says.

The report charts the “gap” between where emissions are headed under current policies and commitments over the coming decade, compared to what is needed to meet the Paris goal of limiting global warming to “well below” 2C and pursuing efforts to stay under 1.5C.

It highlights that greenhouse gas emissions reached record levels in 2023, up 1.3% from 2022, and rising notably faster than the average over the past decade.

The report warns that both progress and ambition have “plateaued” in recent years, with relatively little of substance occurring since the pledges made at COP26 in 2021. And many countries are not even on track to meet their existing NDCs, with current policy projections from G20 nations exceeding NDC commitments by a collective 1bn tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions (in carbon dioxide equivalent, CO2e) in 2030.

Current policies put the world on track for 2.9C of warming by 2100, the report finds – though this could be reduced to 2.4-2.6C, if all existing NDCs are met.

But unless global emissions in 2030 are brought below the levels implied by current NDCs, a pathway to 1.5C with no or limited overshoot becomes “impossible”, the report says, and “strongly” increases the challenge of limiting warming to 2C.

While the magnitude of the challenge is “indisputable”, there are “abundant opportunities for accelerating mitigation”, the report says. It finds that global emissions could be cut by 54% by 2030 and 72% by 2035 at a cost of less than $200 per tonne of CO2.

This indicates that the gap between commitments and current policies is a result of a lack of policy support rather than more fundamental barriers to decarbonisation.

(For previous reports, see Carbon Brief’s detailed coverage in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023.)

Global greenhouse gas emissions at record levels

The UNEP report finds that human emissions of greenhouse gases – CO2, methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases (F-gases) – reached a record 57.1bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2023.

The chart below shows how fossil CO2 (black) is by far the largest contributor to annual emissions and the main driver of the increase in recent decades, with methane (grey) playing the second largest role.

Global annual emissions of greenhouse gases (in GtCO2e using 100-year global warming potentials). Source: UNEP (2024) Figure 2.1.
Global annual emissions of greenhouse gases (in GtCO2e using 100-year global warming potentials). Source: UNEP (2024) Figure 2.1.

Global emissions grew 1.3% (0.7 GtCO2e) in 2023, compared with 2022 levels – a rate notably faster than that over the prior decade (2010-19, at 0.8 GtCO2e per year).

(As the report notes, these numbers do not include many of the climate-related impacts on greenhouse gas emissions that are not a result of direct human interventions – such as the catastrophic Canadian wildfires in 2023. The ability of the biosphere to absorb a portion of human emissions is broadly expected to weaken under scenarios where the world does not rapidly reduce emissions.)

These emissions were driven by energy use, industrial process emissions and land-use change across a variety of sectors.

As the chart below shows, electricity generation was the largest driver of greenhouse gas emissions globally in 2023, responsible for approximately 26% of the total. Other major contributors were transportation (15%), industry (11%), fossil-fuel production (10%) and industrial processes (9%).

Allocation of global greenhouse gas emissions by sector in 2023. Source: UNEP (2024) Figure 2.2
Allocation of global greenhouse gas emissions by sector in 2023. Source: UNEP (2024) Figure 2.2

The report finds that global aviation had the largest relative increase in emissions, increasing 19.5% between 2022 and 2023 as the sector recovered from Covid-era lows. Fossil-fuel production emissions, road transportation and industrial process emissions also increased notably from 2022.

The authors note that the fossil share of generation is starting to decrease in the power sector as solar and wind expand rapidly, with capacity additions increasing by 50% in 2023. Global investment in renewable power, grids and storage is now considerably higher than global investment in oil, gas and coal.

Despite rapid growth in clean energy, power-sector emissions have yet to peak, with new clean additions globally not quite keeping up with the rate of demand growth. However, the report notes that both power-sector emissions and overall global greenhouse emissions are expected to peak in the next few years, even if they did not in 2023.

An even wider emissions gap

The primary focus of this edition of the report is tracking the gap between where the world is heading today – both under current policies and near-term commitments – and what would be needed to meet Paris Agreement goals of limit warming to well-below 2C.

However, since the 2023 report, there have not been any notable changes in country pledges or policies – and global emissions continued to grow.

This means that the emissions gap is wider than it was last year and the world is further off track from its climate goals.

The report explores a number of different future emissions scenarios including: those under policies in place today; emissions if Paris Agreement NDCs are met; emissions if both NDCs and national-level net-zero pledges are met; and emissions required under scenarios that limit warming to below 2C and to 1.5C with no or limited overshoot by 2100.

While these NDCs – alongside other policies enacted by countries – have helped move the world away from some of the darkest climate futures that seemed plausible a decade ago, the gap continues to grow between where the world is today and a path to meeting the Paris Agreement.

The report finds an emissions gap in 2030 of around 14GtCO2e between where the world is headed if countries achieve their “unconditional” NDCs (that is, those not conditioned on “climate finance” or other external assistance) – shown by the mid-blue line – and an emissions pathway that limits warming to below 2C (defined in the report as a >66% chance of avoiding 2C warming) – shown by as the pale red line.

The gap is even larger – around 22GtCO2e – between unconditional NDCs and a scenario consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C by the end of the century (red line). If conditional NDCs are fully implemented in addition to unconditional ones (light blue line), this emissions gap would shrink by around 3GtCO2e in 2030 for both the 2C and 1.5C scenarios.

Median emission scenarios adapted from Figure 4.1 in the 2024 UNEP Emission Gap Report. The red line shows a scenario with no new climate policies after 2010, orange shows existing policies already implemented by governments, yellow and light blue lines show additional conditional and unconditional NDCs, respectively. The dark blue line shows emissions consistent with a below 2C trajectory, and grey line shows emissions consistent with a 1.5C trajectory. Chart by Carbon Brief.
Median emission scenarios adapted from Figure 4.1 in the 2024 UNEP Emission Gap Report. The dotted grey line shows a scenario with no new climate policies after 2010, while dark blue shows existing policies already implemented by governments, and mid and light blue lines show additional conditional and unconditional NDCs, respectively. The pale red line shows emissions consistent with a below 2C trajectory, and red line shows emissions consistent with a 1.5C trajectory. Chart by Carbon Brief.

If NDCs are not strengthened by 2035, this gap would grow to 18GtCO2e for keeping warming below 2C and 29GtCO2e for 1.5C, the report finds. In the absence of a ratcheting up of commitments in recent years, limiting warming to 1.5C with no or low overshoot is now much more difficult to achieve. Further delays could similarly imperil the 2C target.

In addition, many countries are “not even on track to deliver on their current NDCs” today, the report says. Major countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, the UK and the US, are all off track to meet their targets under existing policies. (Several of those that are on track had set weak targets, it adds.)

Countries are expected to update their NDCs by February 2025 and these should include mitigation targets up to the end of 2035 (compared to the 2030 date for the initial round of Paris NDCs).

However, the ability of post-2030 commitments to put the world on track to limit warming to below 2C is highly dependent on action pre-2030. As the report shows, strong climate action starting in 2024 would require a 4% reduction per year on average, while doing so in 2030 would increase this to 8% per year.

An upward revision of current policy warming

The UNEP report author team has been one of the main groups assessing the range of warming impacts the world could expect under current policies. However, their estimate has continued to increase over the past three reports – from 2.6C in 2022 to 2.7C in 2023 and 2.9C in 2024. This reflects both continued increases in global greenhouse gas emissions and methodology updates by UNEP.

The figure below compares these estimates between the 2022 (dark blue) 2023 (mid blue blue) and 2024 (light blue) versions of the UNEP report. Compared to the 2023 report, current policy warming outcomes increased notably, unconditional NDC outcomes were unchanged, conditional NDC warming increased slightly, and net-zero pledge warming decreased slightly.

Global average surface warming projections in 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels from the 2022, 2023 and 2024 UNEP Emissions Gap reports. Bars show the central (50th percentile) estimate, while 90th percentile uncertainties are shown by the grey bars on top. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The report finds that a continuation of current policies would result in a 100% chance of exceeding 1.5C, a 97% chance of exceeding 2C and a 37% chance of exceeding 3C by 2100. (And the world will continue to warm after 2100 as long as CO2 emissions remain above (net) zero.)

Under NDCs, the odds of exceeding 1.5C remains at 100%, while there is a 94% chance of exceeding 2C by 2100 under unconditional NDCs and a 79% chance under conditional NDCs.

If all country net-zero pledges are implemented (which, the report notes, few, if any, countries are on track to achieve today), these likelihoods are reduced to a 77% chance of exceeding 1.5C, a 20% chance of exceeding 2C and a near-zero chance of exceeding 3C.

The figure below compares the latest UNEP estimates (mid blue bars) to others in the literature – the emissions scenarios featured in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report (dark blue), estimates published by Climate Action Tracker (light blue), and the IEA’s 2024 World Energy Outlook (grey).

Global average surface warming projections in 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels from the IPCC sixth assessment report (dark blue bars), UNEP report (mid blue), Climate Action Tracker (light blue), and IEA 2024 World Energy Outlook (grey). Bars show the central (50th percentile) estimate, while uncertainty ranges are shown by the upper and lower lines. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Current policy outcomes are broadly in-line with the IPCC’s middle-of-the-road SSP2-4.5 scenario, though a notable gap has developed in recent years between UNEP and IEA estimates. While the three were nearly identical in 2021, the UNEP’s current policy warming estimate has increased while the IEA’s has decreased.

The UNEP provides a high-end warming estimate for its scenarios that is notably higher than that of other groups. This is because its approach includes both future emissions uncertainties associated with each scenario, plus the range of possible climate system responses from climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedbacks. While the latter can be expressed probabilistically, the likelihood of future emissions outcomes under these scenarios are more difficult to assess.

High potential for deep emissions cuts

While countries are far from being n track to meet Paris Agreement goals today, the new report explores what it would entail – and cost – to close the emissions gap.

They find that, across all sectors of the economy, global emissions could be reduced by 31GtCO2e by 2030 (54% below current policy levels) for a cost of less than $200 per tonne of CO2. In 2035 this increases to 41GtCO2e (a 72% reduction from current policy levels), reflecting expected continued cost declines of mitigation technologies.

The figure below, taken from the report, shows the assessed mitigation potential for $200 per tonne of CO2 or below for each different sector of the economy.

Annual mitigation potential estimates (GtCO2e/year) for each sector in 2030 and 2035 for under US$200/tCO2e. Source: UNEP (2024) Figure 6.1
Annual mitigation potential estimates (GtCO2e/year) for each sector in 2030 and 2035 for under US$200/tCO2e. Source: UNEP (2024) Figure 6.1

The energy sector has the largest potential for low-cost decarbonisation at 12GtCO2e/yr in 2030 and 15GtCO2e/yr in 2035, largely driven by the replacement of fossil fuel electricity production with clean energy sources.

Agriculture, forestry and other land uses (AFOLU sector) have the second largest potential for decarbonisation, with forestry making up the largest component of this.

While substantial increases in investments and finance are required to accelerate mitigation across all of these sectors, the report shows that deep decarbonisation is achievable in the next decade at a reasonable cost.

Ultimately, the report highlights that the growing emissions gap reflects a lack of political will by countries to address emissions, rather than any fundamental constraint on the world’s ability to rapidly mitigate.

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Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change

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A federal election is taking place in Germany on 23 February, following the collapse of the coalition government at the end of last year.

Germans will vote to elect 630 members of the nation’s parliament.

Polling suggests there will be a political shift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the lead and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) set to make significant gains.

A “traffic light” coalition of parties has ruled since 2021, led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), alongside the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

However, successive crises led to its breakup at the end of 2024, when the liberal, free market-oriented FDP split from the rest.

This prompted a vote of no confidence by the German parliament, which, in turn, triggered a snap election several months earlier than previously scheduled.

The coalition government has been plagued by ideological differences, particularly between the FDP and its two centre-left partners.

Climate policies were at the heart of many of the disputes. 

The centre-left SPD and Greens have broadly favoured more public spending on climate issues, while the FDP is opposed to state intervention of any sort.

In the interactive grid below, Carbon Brief tracks the commitments made by each of the main parties in their election manifestos, across a range of issues related to climate and energy.

The parties covered are:

  • Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU): The centre-right CDU and its regional Bavarian “sister party”, CSU, has been the dominant political force in modern Germany and is currently polling highest ahead of the election.
  • Social Democratic Party (SPD): The centre-left SPD has led the ruling coalition in Germany since the last election in 2021 and has traditionally been the other dominant party in the nation’s politics.
  • Green Party: The centre-left and environmentalist Greens have been part of the coalition government since 2021.
  • Free Democratic Party (FDP): The FDP is an economically liberal party that prioritises free markets and privatisation. It was part of the coalition government, but its departure at the end of 2024 ultimately triggered the federal election.
  • Left Party: In recent years, this left-wing, democratic-socialist party has lost much of its support base in the east of the country.
  • Alternative for Germany (AfD): The far-right party has become a major force in the country’s politics over the past decade, particularly in eastern Germany.
  • Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW): The party was only founded last year, as an offshoot of the Left Party, but it has rapidly risen in popularity with a left-wing economic message and a conservative approach to some social and cultural issues.

Each entry in the grid represents a direct quote from a manifesto document.

Net-zero and climate framing

Climate action has become a divisive topic in German politics.

This is evident in the major parties’ manifestos, which range from supporting more ambitious net-zero goals to outright climate scepticism.

Germany is currently aiming to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, with interim targets including a 65% cut by 2030.

Government climate advisors on the Council of Experts on Climate Change have stated that the nation is on track to miss the 2030 target.

Despite starting out with ambitious aims, the coalition’s climate progress has faltered, with the FDP successfully pushing for weaker climate policies. Moreover, a major court ruling curtailed the government’s climate spending by enforcing Germany’s limit on debt. 

Amid these wider tensions, Germany’s two traditionally dominant parties still want to retain the nation’s headline climate target. The CDU, which is leading the polls in the run-up to election day, commits to meeting the Paris Agreement goals in its manifesto, saying its sights are “firmly set” on net-zero by 2045.

The SPD, which is currently third in the polls and likely to end up in coalition with the CDU, also supports the 2045 net-zero target, as well as the interim goals.

However, the two parties differ substantially in their approach to meeting the 2045 target. The CDU prioritises carbon pricing and rejects the tougher policies to decarbonise heating and transport favoured by the SPD. (See: Heating dispute and Combustion engine phaseout.)

Meanwhile, the AfD manifesto repeatedly questions the “supposed scientific consensus” on “man-made climate change”. The party, which is currently second in the polls, “therefore rejects every policy and every tax that is related to alleged climate protection”.

Mainstream German parties across the spectrum have long agreed to a “firewall” against far-right groups, meaning they will not form coalitions with the AfD. However, the CDU recently sparked controversy when it backed an anti-immigration policy with the AfD.

The Green Party also supports the 2045 net-zero target in its manifesto, emphasising Germany’s status as the EU member state with the highest emissions. The Left Party goes further, calling for a 2040 net-zero goal.

As for the FDP, its manifesto argues for the 2045 net-zero goal to be pushed back to 2050, stating that this would align Germany with the EU target. Prior to exiting the coalition government last year, the party had demanded this policy change, claiming that it would be a way to boost the German economy.

(Germany already revised its net-zero target, bringing it forward by five years, following a supreme court ruling in 2021 that its 2050 goal was insufficient. Moreover, even with a later goal, Germany would still need to align with wider EU targets, meaning its climate policies may not change much due to its “effort sharing” obligations.)

Finally, the BSW is not specific about when the net-zero goal should be achieved, but pushes for a “departure from the wishful thinking of quickly achieving complete climate neutrality”.

It does not reject climate policies outright, stating that climate change should be “taken seriously”. However, it frames many climate policies as being “extremely expensive and often unrealistic”.

Heating dispute

Home heating has become a major political issue in Germany. Along with transport, buildings make up one of the key German sectors that have repeatedly missed their decarbonisation goals, prompting the coalition government to take action.

Towards the end of 2023, the German parliament passed an amendment to the Building Energy Act, meaning that newly installed heating systems had to be powered by at least 65% renewable energy. 

This covered heat pumps, “hydrogen-ready” gas boilers and other low-carbon systems. There are caveats to ensure the law is phased in gradually in different areas and types of homes, starting with new builds.

The amendment had been watered down compared to the coalition’s initial proposal, with allowances for people to keep gas boilers for longer. This followed relentless campaigning by the AfD and the right-leaning tabloid newspaper Bild, which dubbed the policy the “heizhammer” – or “heating hammer”.

There were also attacks from within the coalition, with the FDP criticising the law proposed by its partners in the Greens and SDP. Opponents framed the policy as an excessive burden on consumers.

These disputes are reflected in the election manifestos, with many parties outright rejecting the amended law. The CDU, FDP and AfD all say they would abolish it, as does the populist left BSW.

Meanwhile, the Green Party pledges to provide more government support for the installation of new heating systems by covering up to 70% of the price. The Left Party commits to covering 100% of the cost for low-income households.

(The current law covers 30% of the cost as a starting subsidy, with more available for low-income households and people who replace their boilers before 2028.)

Combustion engine phaseout

Several German political parties are pushing back against the EU-wide ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, which is set to come into effect in 2035.

The CDU says the “ban on combustion engines must be reversed”, while the AfD says the “one-sided preference for electromobility must be stopped immediately”.

(EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].)

The FDP and the BSW also argue that the 2035 phaseout date should be dropped, with less focus on the transition to electric cars. (This is in spite of Germany being the second-biggest manufacturer of electric cars in the world.)

These parties also favour getting rid of supposed “anti-car” policies. For example, they oppose speed limits on the German “autobahns” and support funding for alternative fuels, such as synthetic fuels.

The issue with ending the 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars is that this policy is set at the EU level. Far-right and centre-right coalitions within the EU, including German parties, have been pushing hard to weaken the ban across the bloc. 

However, the centre-left parties that may end up forming a coalition with the CDU, notably the SPD, stand by the 2035 phaseout date.

There is growing pressure on Germany’s car industry, linked to global competition and slow economic growth. Some German industry figures have stressed the need for consistent policy signals from the government, regarding the transition to electric vehicles.

Clean energy and fossil fuels

Broadly speaking, German parties on the left tend to be more supportive of renewables, while strongly opposing nuclear power. Those on the right are generally more open to nuclear and in some cases coal power.

Germany, which uses more coal than any other EU member state, has a coal power phaseout date of 2038. This is supported by the CDU and the FDP, but the Greens and the Left Party want a quicker phaseout by 2030.

(When the coalition government formed in 2021, the parties agreed to “ideally” move the coal phaseout date to 2030, but this has not happened formally. The SPD manifesto does not include any mention of coal power,)

Only the AfD advocates for the construction of new coal power plants, framing them as filling a gap until new nuclear plants are built.

Last year, Germany closed down its final nuclear reactors, bringing an end to a long-term plan to phase out the power source. However, nuclear power continues to be a politicised topic, with some arguing that its continued use is necessary to ensure the nation’s energy security.

Notably, the CDU suggests in its manifesto that it is open to reviving nuclear power in the future. It proposes an “expert review” around restarting closed plants and advocates for research on advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors.

Despite this wording, CDU leader Friedrich Merz has conceded that it is unlikely any old reactors will be restarted. This echoes views expressed by German utility companies and energy experts.

Both the CDU and the SPD support the expansion of renewables in their manifestos. The Greens include a specific target to achieve a net-zero electricity grid by 2035. By contrast, the AfD calls for an end to wind power expansion, in favour of other technologies.

Finally, both the far-right AfD and the BSW say the German government should repair the damaged Nord Stream pipelines in order to import what the BSW refers to as “cheap” gas from Russia. (The Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up in 2022 under mysterious circumstances.)

Germany has tried to wean itself off Russian gas since the country’s invasion of Ukraine, with considerable success. However, both the AfD and the BSW are more open to cooperating with Russia, and less supportive of Ukraine, than mainstream German parties.

The post Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica 

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“Atmospheric rivers” are bringing rain to the frozen slopes of the West Antarctic ice sheet, hitting the ice shelves that play a major role in holding back rapidly retreating glaciers.

In a new study, my colleagues and I show how rain is occurring in sub-zero temperatures due to these “rivers in the sky” – long, narrow plumes of air which transport heat and moisture from the tropics to the mid-latitudes and poles.

Rain in Antarctica is significant, not only because it is a stark indicator of climate change, but because it remains an under-studied phenomenon which could impact ice shelves.

Ice shelves in Antarctica are important gatekeepers of sea level rise.

They act as a buffer for glaciers that flow off the vast ice sheet, slowing the rate at which ice is released into the ocean.

In the study, we explore the causes of rain falling on ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment region, which stand in front of the critically important Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.

Researchers have warned the collapse of ice shelves in this region could trigger the loss of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet over several centuries.

Rivers in the sky

Atmospheric rivers are typically associated with bringing extreme rainfall to the mid-latitudes, but, in the frigid Antarctic, they can deliver metres of snow in just a few days. 

In West Antarctica, atmospheric rivers deliver a disproportionate quantity of the year’s snowfall. Research shows they account for around 13% of annual snowfall totals, despite occurring on just a few days per year.

But what makes atmospheric rivers in Antarctica so interesting is that snow is only part of the story. In extreme cases, they can also bring rain.

To explore how extreme precipitation affects the Amundsen Sea embayment region, we focused on two events associated with atmospheric rivers in 2020. The summer case took place over a week in February and the winter case over six days in June.

We used three regional climate models to simulate the two extreme weather events around the Thwaites and Pine Island ice shelves, then compared the results with snowfall observations.

During both the winter and summer cases, we find that atmospheric rivers dumped tens of metres of snow over the course of a week or so.

Meanwhile, the quantities of rain driven by these events were not insignificant. We observed up to 30mm of rain on parts of the Thwaites ice shelf in summer and up to 9mm in winter.

Amundsen sea, map.
A map of the Amundsen Sea embayment region in West Antarctica. Source: Produced by the British Antarctic Survey’s Mapping and Geographic Information Centre, 2025.

A mountain to climb

Antarctica’s cold climate and steep, icy topography make it unique. It also makes the region prone to rain in sub-zero temperatures.

The first reason for this is the foehn effect, which is when air forced over a mountain range warms as it descends on the downward slope.

Commonly observed across Antarctica, it is an important cause of melting over ice shelves on the Antarctic peninsula, the northernmost point of the continent. 

When air passes over the mountainous terrain of the West Antarctic ice sheet during atmospheric river events, temperatures near the surface of the ice shelves can climb above the melting point of 0C.

This can accentuate the formation of rain and drizzle that stays liquid below 0C – also known as “supercooled drizzle”.

Another factor which leads to liquid drizzle, rather than snow, in sub-zero conditions is a lack of dust and dirt – particles which are usually needed to trigger the formation of ice crystals in clouds.

In the pristine Antarctic, these particles – which act as “ice nuclei” – are few and far between. That means that pure liquid water can exist even when temperatures are below 0C.

The origins of rain over ice shelves

It is easy to assume that rain that reaches the surface in Antarctica is just snow that has melted after falling through a warm layer of air caused by the foehn effect. Indeed, this is what we initially supposed.

But our research shows that more rain reaches the surface of Antarctica when the air near the ground is within a few degrees of freezing.

At times when the foehn effect is strongest, there is often little or no rainfall, because it evaporates before it gets a chance to reach the surface.

However, we saw rain falling well above the warm layer of air near the surface, where temperatures were universally below 0C – and, in some cases, as low as -11C.

Rare rain

Rain in Antarctica is a rare occurrence. The region’s normally frigid temperatures mean that most precipitation over the continent falls as snow.

However, exactly how rare rain is in the region remains relatively unknown, because there are virtually zero measurements of rainfall in Antarctica.

There are a number of reasons for this – rain falls infrequently, and it is very difficult to measure in the hostile Antarctic environment.

Our results show that extreme events such as atmospheric rivers can bring rain. And it is likely that rain will become a more common occurrence in the future as temperatures rise and extreme weather events occur more frequently.

However, until rain starts being measured in Antarctica, scientists will have to rely entirely on models to predict rain, as we did in this research.

It is also not yet known exactly how rain could impact ice in Antarctica.

We do know that rain falling on snow darkens the surface, which can enhance melting, leading to greater ice losses. Meanwhile, rain that refreezes in the snowpack or trickles to the base of the ice can change the way that glaciers flow, impacting the resilience of ice shelves to fracture.

So, if we want to understand the future of the frozen continent, we need to start thinking about rain too. Because while rain may be rare now, it may not be for long.

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Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns

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Susana Muhamad, Colombia’s minister of environment since 2022 and president of the COP16 UN biodiversity negotiations, has announced she will step down from government, but has asked President Gustavo Petro to let her stay in her post to conclude the UN nature talks later in February.

In her resignation letter, addressed to the president and dated February 8, Muhamad said she was quitting as a minister but urged him to consider “the need to conclude COP16” – the summit left unfinished in Colombia last year and now scheduled to resume from February 25 to 27 in Rome.

“I’ve led the complex negotiations in progress and I exercise the role of president (of the COP). Therefore, if you so decide, this resignation could be made effective from March 3,” the letter reads.

Muhamad has been one of the most vocal opponents of the recent appointment of former senator Armando Benedetti as Petro’s chief of staff. Benedetti has faced allegations of domestic abuse and corruption, and was previously fired as ambassador to Venezuela by Petro himself.

In a televised session of the council of ministers held last week, Muhamad heavily opposed Benedetti’s appointment and threatened to resign if he remained in the cabinet. “As a feminist and as a woman, I cannot sit at this table of our progressive project with Armando Benedetti,” she told Petro.

According to Oscar Soria, veteran biodiversity campaigner and CEO of think-tank The Common Initiative, the Colombian government is likely to keep Muhamad as COP president, but her resignation could have a negative impact on the talks.

“To have a good result in Rome, proactive and energetic diplomatic work by the presidency was needed in the last months. However, some key issues have not been discussed recently. The internal political crisis (in Colombia) has likely been a great distraction,” Soria told Climate Home.

Since Muhamad’s announcement, several other ministers have also resigned, leading Petro to place all of his cabinet on hold and asking for “protocolary resignations” from every member.

“It’s not clear how much support from the president and ministers (Muhamad) can count on when her counterparts from other countries need to be approached by the Colombian foreign service,” Soria added.

Upcoming nature talks

The COP16 biodiversity negotiations are set to resume later this month, with important decisions coming up on finance for nature and a monitoring framework to track progress on nature restoration. These decisions were left pending after negotiators ran out of time in Cali, Colombia, last year.

One of the most pressing issues is the future of the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF), which currently sits under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) until 2030. Some developing countries have called for the creation of a new fund, citing barriers at the GEF to access the funds.

Observers said COP16 could play an important role in the future of biodiversity finance, especially as the new US president, Donald Trump, cuts development funding for climate and nature projects.

“In Rome, countries must give a firm response to the measures and visions promoted by the Trump administration, reaffirming [their] commitment to protecting biodiversity,” said Karla Maas, campaigner at Climate Action Network (CAN) Latin America.

“This implies guaranteeing public resources for conservation instead of depending on the will of private actors or philanthropy,” Maas added.

(Reporting by Sebastian Rodriguez; editing by Megan Rowling)

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