The lithium sector took center stage this week when Lithium Americas (NYSE: LAC) stock soared nearly 95% on reports that the Trump administration is considering taking an equity stake in the company’s Thacker Pass mine in Nevada. If it happens, this move would be one of the biggest government actions in U.S. mining in years. It shows how important lithium is to national policy now.
Behind the headlines lies a deeper story: America’s ambition to lead the clean energy transition risks colliding with a stark supply shortage. We highlight below, with the two charts, both the opportunity and the vulnerability facing the United States in this lithium quest.
A Lithium Crisis in the Making
The United States faces a lithium crisis that makes its clean energy ambitions look more like an aspiration than an execution. Current domestic production is only 2,700 metric tons a year. That’s too small compared to the 500,000 tons needed by 2030 to hit electric vehicle (EV) goals.
To put this in perspective:
- The lithium in an iPhone weighs about the same as a penny.
- A Tesla Model 3 battery pack requires around 12 kilograms.
- A Ford F-150 Lightning demands closer to 17 kilograms.
At present mining levels, the U.S. produces enough lithium for only about 158,000 Tesla Model 3s annually. That’s in a market where Americans bought 1.4 million EVs in 2024 alone, with demand expected to climb sharply in the coming years.
This gap reveals a harsh reality: America’s lithium supply chain is ill-prepared for its electrification goals.
From Marginal Producer to Top Four — If Thacker Pass Delivers

The government’s solution to this issue is projects like Lithium Americas’ Thacker Pass. It’s one of the largest lithium deposits in North America. If fully developed, it could boost U.S. production to around 40,000 tons each year. This would place the country among the top four producers, following Australia, Chile, and China.
That would mark a tenfold increase in output, but it is still far from enough. Even under the most optimistic forecasts, Thacker Pass would meet just 8% of projected U.S. demand by 2030, and a mere 3% of the 1.2 million tons expected by 2035.
Meanwhile, China has spent more than a decade locking up supply chains, securing lithium assets in Africa, South America, and Australia. It is also building refining infrastructure that now processes nearly 80% of the world’s lithium.
The comparison is striking: Zimbabwe produces eight times more lithium than the U.S. Even smaller producers, like Argentina, surpass American output. In this context, Washington’s sudden push for equity stakes is less about profits and more about survival in a high-stakes race for supply.
Reserves Rich, Supply Poor: The Untapped U.S. Advantage
The second chart points to America’s hidden strength: the U.S. ranks first globally in lithium reserves, with more than 100 million tonnes identified. Despite this geological advantage, those resources remain largely untapped.

Encouragingly, the U.S. now ranks third in global exploration budgets, reflecting a deliberate policy pivot. Billions of dollars are going to exploration and project development, from Nevada to North Carolina. If even a fraction of these reserves is unlocked, the U.S. could rival today’s top producers and reduce dependence on foreign supply chains.
However, converting reserves into production requires more than exploration. Projects can hit delays with permits, face environmental lawsuits, struggle with financing, and deal with local opposition. All these issues can stretch timelines into decades. This is why federal involvement is becoming more important. This includes equity stakes, subsidies, and fast-tracking permits.
Why the LAC Surge Matters
The near-doubling of Lithium Americas’ stock was not just a speculative rally. It was a market signal that U.S. lithium policy is entering a new phase.
- Government backing reduces financing risk, making it easier to attract institutional investors.
- Aligning policies with EV makers like General Motors, which has a big stake in Thacker Pass, ensures supply security and offtake agreements.
- National security framing places lithium on the same level as oil and gas. This makes lithium a strategic commodity and allows for more state intervention.
For automakers and battery manufacturers, this could mark the start of a more stable domestic supply base. For investors, it highlights how policy can rapidly change the outlook for mining equities.
Demand, Prices, and the Rollercoaster Market
Lithium demand will rise quickly. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence (BMI) predicts that consumption of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) will surpass 2.4 million tonnes by 2030. That’s almost four times what we use now. By 2035, demand could climb past 5 million tonnes, fueled by electric vehicles and large-scale battery storage.

The industry needs hundreds of new projects to meet this surge. However, BMI points out that permitting delays, financing issues, and tech challenges are slowing supply growth.
Battery demand adds another layer of urgency. Analysts predict global battery capacity will reach nearly 4 terawatt-hours by 2030. This highlights lithium’s vital role in the clean energy shift.
The U.S. is still a minor player. Most refining and conversion happens in China, which holds about 80% of processing capacity. This imbalance shows why Washington supports projects like Lithium Americas. They want to secure a local supply.
Litium prices, meanwhile, have been highly volatile. After lithium carbonate reached over $80,000 per tonne in late 2022, prices dropped sharply. In 2023–2024, they fell by more than 80%, going below $10,000 earlier this year. BMI attributes the crash to oversupply from South America and weaker near-term EV sales in China, which created a temporary glut.

However, the consultancy stresses that volatility is cyclical, not structural. Demand is strong, and prices should bounce back. In fact, last August, prices climbed when China’s major battery player closed its major mine.

New supply can’t keep up with long-term consumption. BMI warns that without steady investment and diversification of supply, future shortages could push prices sharply higher again by the late 2020s.
For the U.S., this shows why public investment matters. It helps create a strong domestic lithium industry. This will support electrification goals and better handle global changes.
Government in the Game: Stabilizing Supply Chains
U.S. government equity in Lithium Americas offers help in these areas:
- Provide a floor for project financing — Government backing reduces the risk premium for lenders or institutional partners.
- Stabilize supply — A guaranteed domestic source reduces reliance on external shocks.
- Mitigate short-term volatility — If Thacker Pass operates under a model combining private and public capital, it could offer a more stable supply corridor insulated from market swings.
- Signal future project structures — The U.S. may increasingly demand “state-option carve-outs” or partial equity as a condition for major critical mineral projects.
In a market where excess supply can drive prices into unprofitable territory, having a strategic anchor on flagship projects becomes a competitive edge.
Lithium as a Strategic Commodity
Lithium is no longer just a commodity for battery makers — it is now a strategic asset shaping national policy. The U.S. has the reserves, capital, and political will to be a major producer. But it will take years of teamwork to turn potential into production.
The Trump administration’s willingness to consider a government equity stake in Lithium Americas suggests a broader trend: future large-scale projects may require some form of state participation to succeed.
For the U.S., the stakes could not be higher. Without a reliable domestic lithium supply, the country risks falling behind in the global EV race, remaining dependent on supply chains controlled by rivals. With it, America could not only meet its clean energy goals but also secure a critical pillar of its industrial future.
- READ MORE on Lithium:
- Lithium Market in 2025 and Beyond: Supply Deficit Looms with $116B Requirement
- Lithium’s Comeback in 2025: Will Surging EV Demand Fuel the Next Price Boom?
- Top 5 Lithium Producers Powering the Battery Market in 2025
The post U.S. Lithium Push: How Washington’s Bet on Lithium Americas Could Reshape the Global Market appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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