Astrid Schomaker is the new executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
Schomaker, who is German, was previously the director for green diplomacy and multilateralism with the European Commission.
She took over as the UN’s biodiversity chief in July this year, just months out from the major UN biodiversity summit, COP16, which will take place in Cali, Colombia from 21 October to 1 November.
Carbon Brief spoke to Schomaker ahead of the Cali talks to discuss progress on nature targets, key negotiation sticking points and boosting the profile of biodiversity COPs.
- On COP16: “We had an ambitious framework put in place just two years ago and now we need to look at whether this has actually been the game-changer that people think it has been.”
- On low national biodiversity plan submissions: “The start was never going to be fast. I think the important thing we’re looking at is the work is underway.”
- On combining the efforts of the biodiversity, climate and desertification COPs: “What one would hope is that these three COPs now can actually give a push to countries committing to bringing this together.”
- On biodiversity finance: “There is movement across the world and, therefore, I think the outlook is broadly positive. Is it enough? No. Does it have to be scaled up? Absolutely.”
- On Colombia as host: “They’ve made a lot of efforts to make this COP a success. And, in Susana Muhamad, we have a very knowledgeable and a very charismatic and very dedicated COP host.”
- On security: “We are reassured that good security arrangements are in place, both in the city of Cali and for the COP specifically as well.”
- On world leaders at COP16: “The nature crisis has to be understood as being at the same level of seriousness as the climate crisis and, therefore, also requiring the same level of political attention.”
- On the US and the CBD: “Whatever the outcome of the next elections will be, ratification has not been a subject that was actively discussed in the US recently.”
- On Indigenous input: “This is actually a big issue on our agenda and also one that’s very important for Colombia.”
- On COP17 hosts: “We have two offers on the table at the moment – Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
- On genetic resources: “We think this could actually generate considerable finance streams for biodiversity-rich countries and, therefore, it’s important that we move ahead with it and put in place a mechanism that is workable.”
Carbon Brief: We are less than two weeks out from the start of COP16. There are thousands of people all around the world getting ready to head to Cali in Colombia to discuss implementation of the 2030 targets, sharing of genetic resources, biodiversity finance, all of this range of other issues. I assume this is going to be a huge moment for you in your role, especially as you only took it up in July. How are you feeling ahead of the talks? Are you excited, intimidated?
Astrid Schomaker: Well, mostly excited, and quite optimistic. I think for us in the convention, it’s a big moment. We had an ambitious framework put in place just two years ago [at COP15] and now we need to look at whether this has actually been the game-changer that people think it has been. And that, of course, means we need to look [to see if] these commitments[are being] actually implemented, and COP will give us a good chance.
For us, it’s important to see also the huge mobilisation. We have the biggest COP ever. We have the biggest green zone. We have more media, more business, more stakeholders [and] more delegates than we ever had before.
So we think that, in a way, when people say it’s nature’s moment, now really is nature’s moment. People [have] come to realise that we need to have a different relationship with nature. Take better care of nature. Look at nature together with climate change and see that we cannot solve the climate crisis without looking at the nature crisis. So it’s mostly a moment of anticipation and excitement.
CB: Broadly speaking, what are the main outcomes you want to see from COP16?
AS: The first thing is to have a look at how implementation is actually progressing. We said at COP15 [that] countries should prioritise national targets. So far, we have 79 countries that have put national targets in place. We expect more by COP, and maybe also some to be announced at COP. So that’s quite a good number.
What is important in particular, and then compared to what happened previously under the Aichi process, is that most of these national targets actually reflect the global targets, so they make direct linkages. And also, it’s not just a kind of pick-and-choose approach. But it’s in the majority, actually, [that] all targets of the GBF [Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework] are reflected in the national targets. Or at least, I think more than 75% of those targets are reflected in national targets. So that’s a good number.
On the national biodiversity strategies and action plans [NBSAPs], the number does not look quite so good. We are at 20 so far. Again, we know lots of countries are now finalising their plans, stepping up action. One may think it’s a low number – and certainly this has been pointed out by some NGOs.
On the other hand, we have been holding workshops around the world, and we’ve seen that countries literally around the world are working on these action plans and, in a way, they take longer because countries have taken to heart this call for a whole of government approach.
So it’s not an environment ministry which sits somewhere, drafts a plan, adopts it and submits it. It’s really an exercise where governments come together across the board, where stakeholders are being consulted and then often also where these action plans are then adopted at a higher political level.
So at the COP, we will have an opportunity to look at these first action plans and targets. We have a pre-meeting, our subsidiary body on implementation, that’s basically entirely dedicated to looking at these plans and then to discussing where are the bottlenecks, where are the difficulties, where are the good practices that can be shared.
CB: Back on the NBSAPs then. As you say, there has been criticism from NGOs like WWF and other places about this figure of 20-odd countries at the moment out of 196 – about 10% – that have submitted these national biodiversity plans. That seems like a very low number, especially if you think about the climate COP. If only that number of nationally determined contributions were submitted, there would be uproar, let’s say. Were you surprised by this low level of submissions so far? And also, are you worried that it could indicate that countries are not taking global nature pledges seriously and even that they could not be met by 2030 as a result?
AS: I think if we look at the deadline, it was very short. I mean, COP15 took place in December 2022, so it’s less than two years. Many countries had to put new processes in place, had to get funding. So I mean, the start was never going to be fast. I think the important thing we’re looking at is the work is underway. And there, I’m confident to say, it’s literally underway around the world in countries. So whether the deadline itself is met on the dot is not what I think we’re really looking at. We’re looking at how far countries advance, how are they talking to their stakeholders, how are they managing to also have these new processes that would involve better reflecting traditional knowledge, for example, involving Indigenous people, where that’s relevant.
Bringing the business sector on board was, as you know, in the Global Biodiversity Framework. There are also targets for business. So all of that takes time. Since we’ve done these workshops, and we understand that countries are working on that, I think our assessment is globally positive. This is not to say that more than 20 would [not] have been better, but I think the important thing is to look that progress is there. And I’m confident that by the end of the year, the number will be significantly higher.
CB: Do you have any estimate of what that number could be?
AS: No, I don’t.
CB: Will CBD analysis on the plans and targets put forward by countries still be done this year, in light of the low number of NBSAP submissions?
AS: The full analysis is basically for COP17. That’s when we have our stocktake. So what we’ve done now, and you can see that in the documents that have been published, we’ve been just looking basically at how the targets are reflected. We haven’t got an in-depth analysis and also, at this point in time, countries were asked to submit their targets. They were not asked to report to us how they are implementing those targets. So we’re basically still at this level of really demonstrating that the commitments were taken seriously and looking at how they’re being translated into targets, but we’re not at the stage of analysing implementation.
CB: Do you think that the NBSAP issue indicates that there needs to be a wider, more UN COP-level reform? Susana Muhamad this week was talking about unifying these targets that are put forward to the climate change, biodiversity and desertification COPs. What is your take on that opinion?
AS: I don’t think that’s a call for UN reform or necessarily unifying targets. I think what everybody is looking at is, first of all, the opportunity that we have this year with these three Rio Conventions having their COPs in rapid succession. And, of course, with basically planning processes going on under land degradation neutrality for desertification, and then national adaptation plans and the enhancement of the NDCs [nationally determined contributions] under the climate convention, then our NBSAPs.
What we have all been saying – specifically two weeks ago in New York when the Rio Trio initiative was launched – [is] that it makes sense to bring this planning process together, especially at the national level. We very often have different focal points for climate change, desertification and biodiversity. They don’t necessarily talk to each other. They are often in different ministries.
These planning processes are often subject to different funding streams and support, so it’s actually difficult to bring them together at a national level. But it would make a lot more sense and we’ve seen the potential is big [as] the numbers, the percentages, where the plans refer to each other are not high. So there’s scope for improvement.
What one would hope is that these three COPs now can actually give a push to countries committing to bringing this together and, ideally, also to us as convention secretariats to get a mandate to support this better coordination of processes at national level.
CB: I wanted to ask about finance, because that is obviously going to be a huge talking point as well at this COP. How would you like to see developed countries showing leadership at COP16 in meeting the nature finance target in particular of hitting at least $20 billion per year by 2025 for developing countries? Are you optimistic that this goal will be achieved?
AS: Well, that’s a difficult question. First of all, the goal on ODA [official development assistance] is part of a broader financing goal, of course. But since you asked specifically about ODA, we don’t have figures beyond 2022. The figures that the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] has published, which you may have seen, indicate a very positive trend on nature finance up to 2022. We have no reason to believe that this trend would have changed and if the trend persists, we are probably on a good way towards the $20 billion by 2025.
From the perspective of many developing countries, I think the expectation was that more funds would have been put into the newly created Global Biodiversity Framework Fund at the GEF [Global Environment Facility]. So we hope that at the COP, indeed, new pledges will be made so that this fund will see more funding.
But I think we have to realise that most biodiversity finance streams are bilateral streams and don’t go through the funds. We also have to see that in addition to the framework fund, there is the Kunming Biodiversity Fund that China put in place that has also been capitalised with $200 million.
So there is movement across the world and, therefore, I think the outlook is broadly positive. Is it enough? No. Does it have to be scaled up? Absolutely. I think we will have good discussions at COP [on] how that can be done. And, of course, we also need to continue in the same vein as we discussed before, how the climate and biodiversity crises overlap and how also these funding streams, to an extent, overlap.
CB: Looking then at Colombia’s role as host country for this COP and Susana Muhamad’s role as summit president. Do you think that the profile of both the country and her as president will have a positive impact on the outcome of the talks? Especially compared to COP15, which didn’t end up taking place in the host country of China.
AS: At COP15, we had a very active presidency and then supported by an active host. So there was almost a beautiful coming together of China and Canada and we had an excellent outcome.
For COP16, yes, I think the fact, first of all, that the COP is taking place in a biodiversity-rich country is already positive. We have seen Colombia take leadership on biodiversity issues for many years. Including, for example, at COP15, when they led with Germany on the accelerator initiative.
There’s a lot that this country can bring to the debate including, incidentally, in terms of a very lively Indigenous community and a lot of traditional knowledge and discussion around that which will, in any case, take place at our COP.
So I think Colombia is an excellent host. They’ve made a lot of efforts to make this COP a success. And in Susana Muhamad, we have a very knowledgeable and a very charismatic and very dedicated COP host. So I think the ingredients are in place for this to be a very good, successful COP.
CB: Also, though, their role as host has not been without a couple of difficulties along the way. There were reports during the summer that there was a dissident rebel group threatening to disrupt the COP, although the threat has since been withdrawn. Also there are peace talks ongoing between the government and the ELN [National Liberation Army]. Are you, and the CBD in general, reassured about the security of the summit?
AS: Yes, we are. Of course, we know that Colombia is a country with an ongoing internal conflict. We know that there is an ongoing peace process to which the government is dedicating a lot of attention. We have worked very closely with the government, both at country level, then also at sub-national level with the Valle del Cauca and with the city to look at the security plans. We have seen the government come together, ministries across the board working on that. So, yes, I think, we are reassured that good security arrangements are in place both in the city of Cali and for the COP specifically as well.
CB: There are going to be several world leaders there that you were announcing a couple of weeks ago – Lula, the president of Brazil, the newly inaugurated President Sheinbaum in Mexico, alongside other world leaders. This is definitely a change of pace from COP15 and previous biodiversity COPs, where there was not this same politicking around it, especially compared to climate COPs. Do you think that this will help to bring more attention to the biodiversity COP, given that it generally receives a fraction of the coverage and the interest compared to the climate COP in particular? Was it the aim of inviting world leaders to amp up the profile?
AS: Yes to both. I think the presence of world leaders amplifies the profile of the convention. I think the intention of Colombia as a host – and, of course, we very much support that – is to demonstrate that the nature crisis has to be understood as being at the same level of seriousness as the climate crisis and therefore also requiring the same level of political attention.
That’s why they have invited heads of state and government to come to the COP. We think that’s a very good signal, especially because, as I think Susana Muhamad always indicates, and I mentioned earlier, we will not be able to look at climate change in isolation from the nature and biodiversity crisis.
So if we want the climate targets of 1.5C to be within reach, we really also need to look at how nature can contribute. And by bringing heads of state and government that are talking about this a lot to our COP, I think we will succeed more to get this message heard by a wider audience.
CB: My next question is slightly off topic but, out of curiosity, has the CBD engaged in any talks with the US in recent years about them ratifying the convention? And also, could the upcoming presidential election have any impact on this prospect?
AS: I mean, we always have contacts with the United States. We’re just across the border [at the CBD headquarters in Montreal], so we regularly talk to the government. The United States are always participating at the COPs with reasonably big delegations. They are engaged in all our meetings. I’m not aware that we have had specific discussions about ratification and, at the same level, whatever the outcome of the next elections will be, ratification has not been a subject that was actively discussed in the US recently. As well as I know, inter alia, because it needs a congressional majority that has not been available in the past years.
CB: Looking at your own background in the European Commission, you must be well versed in figuring out how to make policies work for both developed and developing countries. Particularly around policies like the anti-deforestation regulation, which was recently postponed for a year. How do you plan to ensure that the input of biodiverse, developing countries and also Indigenous peoples and local communities, these other key stakeholders, remain at the front and centre of COP16 talks?
AS: Well, especially on this latter issue, on the Indigenous peoples and local communities, this is actually a big issue on our agenda and also one that’s very important for Colombia. [It’s] where a lot of mobilisation has taken place over the past weeks, of Indigenous groups coming together and formulating their policies.
So what we think will happen at the COP is that we will adopt a new work programme for Indigenous people, but possibly also look at the upgrading of what we currently have as a working group to a proper subsidiary body. So that would elevate, in a way, the voice of Indigenous people and all the traditional knowledge they bring to the debate.
For developing countries, I mean more broadly, I think everybody realises that, like climate change, biodiversity may be a localised issue, but it is a global challenge. So we need action at all levels and the biodiversity-rich countries are, notably, [largely] in the global south.
So that’s why we have such a big discussion on resource mobilisation, why we have a big discussion on sharing of expertise, of knowledge and technology. This will have to continue at COP. There’s a lot of south-south cooperation that we also like to support and there’s a lot of, let’s say, willingness and mobilisation across the global south that will also come with big delegations that we hope to support through the COP discussions and also through the decisions that are being taken and through the various support programmes that UN agencies like UNEP [UN Environment Programme] and UNDP [UN Development Programme] run, for example, in supporting NBSAP processes and others.
CB: Looking far ahead into the future, it was recently confirmed that Azerbaijan has put its name forward to host COP17, the next UN biodiversity summit. Firstly, what is your reaction to that, especially given some of the controversies around their hosting of the climate COP – given that they are a petrostate – and also their human rights issues? Also, when will the next host be decided? Will the announcement be made at the end of COP16?
AS: The way that works for the biodiversity convention, we adopted a decision I think at COP13 that looks at a regional rotation. And, indeed, COP17 should be hosted by the eastern European group. We have two offers on the table at the moment – Azerbaijan and Armenia. If there would be no consensus in the eastern European group, that they would sort of put forward one or the other, the way this works for us is that this is a procedural decision. Such procedural decisions could be taken by vote at the end of the COP.
CB: What is your reaction then to both Azerbaijan and Armenia having put their names forward for it? Are you excited about either option?
AS: Well, hosting a COP is a huge responsibility and I think Azerbaijan experiences this now as they’re getting ready to host the climate COP. If a country puts itself forward, it puts its national policies under a global spotlight. So I think it takes courage to do it and we’re grateful that we have two candidates that want to host us in 2026.
CB: Thank you for taking the time to speak, I really appreciate it. Is there anything else you wanted to add, or anything else you think would be good to mention just two weeks out from the start of COP?
AS: As you mentioned yourself in the beginning, there are important decisions to be taken. You might think it’s just an implementation COP, but it is an implementation COP. And implementation, in many ways, is just as important or more important than making new commitments.
Maybe one area I would highlight in addition to the ones we discussed, and that’s that of digital sequencing information [DSI]. At COP15, we already put in place a decision to say that we wanted a multilateral mechanism that looks at how this digital sequence information from genetic information, [how] the benefits of it could be shared more equitably.
So we are looking forward to this complex issue now being resolved at COP16 with such a mechanism being instituted. Because we think this could actually generate considerable finance streams for biodiversity-rich countries and, therefore, it’s important that we move ahead with it and put in place a mechanism that is workable for all countries and that allows us, in a way, to move ahead with this mindset shift that we see in the business world. With more and more businesses coming to the discussion, but also the businesses realising that you cannot build your business model and your business success on nature for free.
So there is a price to be paid and the sequencing information discussion sort of exemplifies this very well. As, in general, the fact that business is now coming to the table in greater numbers and is asking a lot of questions about how they can measure their impacts, how they can disclose what are the right metrics.
All these discussions that will take place at COP16, I think, are very important given that business is not only very dependent on nature, but also has important impacts on nature. They just need to be part of the discussion along with everybody else.
CB: On that, on both DSI and also businesses showing up in greater numbers at COP, are you worried about a potential impact of lobbying weakening the text around DSI, in particular now that the talks that have been ongoing for so long are reaching their end stage and everything is going to hit the fan, essentially, with businesses and countries needing to start taking these things into account? Are you worried that there could be a ramping up of this lobbying at this COP?
AS: Well, I think there are different groups of businesses that will be involved at COP, and there’s only a certain subset of businesses that might be concerned in the first place by the DSI.
So yes, of course, if you are a company, you are worried about how this mechanism will work and I think they will come to the table expressing their concerns and arguing for a workable mechanism.
But we have heard lots of companies from sectors that are most concerned, of pharmaceuticals, biotech, etc, that have actually already done this what I call the ‘mindset shift’ and that have said ‘we realise this is something we need to do, we want to do, but we also want it to be workable’. And I think that’s an important consideration and they will bring that to the table for sure.
CB: Great, thanks again.
AS: Thank you and see you in Cali.
The post The Carbon Brief Interview: UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The Carbon Brief Interview: UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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