The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) latest assessment cycle has been beset by disagreements between nations over the timeline for publishing its next landmark report.
During the UN climate science body’s last five “sessions” – biannual meetings where governments discuss matters related to the IPCC’s work – governments have been unable to sign off on the delivery date of the “working group” reports.
The deadlock over the delivery plan for the seventh assessment cycle (AR7) has been described as “unprecedented”.
Some countries have pushed for reports to be approved in 2028, in time to inform the “second global stocktake”, which is due to conclude at COP33 that year and is designed to inform the next round of national climate goals under the Paris Agreement.
Other nations have argued that developing countries need more time to review and approve the reports – meaning that one, or more, would not be published until after the stocktake.
The next IPCC meeting – due to take place in Addis Ababa in October – is likely the last moment where a timeline could be agreed that would see the reports synchronised with the stocktake.
One expert tells Carbon Brief that the failure to align the IPCC’s reports with the stocktake would be a “major historical break [that] would be used to weaken the international climate process and Paris Agreement”.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the ongoing disagreements over the AR7 timeline.
- How does the IPCC assessment report cycle work?
- How have timeline negotiations been different for AR7?
- Why have negotiations over the timeline of AR7 faltered?
- Why are some countries calling for a slower timeline for AR7 reports?
- How is the IPCC managing the impasse?
- Is delivering the reports in time for the global stocktake still possible?
- What could be the implications of an extended timeline for AR7?
How does the IPCC assessment report cycle work?
For almost 40 years, the IPCC has been one of the most visible examples of a “science-policy interface” – an institution that helps science to inform policy.
The UN General Assembly resolution that established the IPCC in December 1988 states that the panel will “provide internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socioeconomic impact of climate change and realistic response strategies”.
Four years later, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created, with an objective of “stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused] interference with the climate system”.
The IPCC’s official rulebook, last updated in 2013, highlights the IPCC’s role in producing comprehensive assessments of the state of human-caused climate change. It stipulates that its assessments must provide “relevant” information – and that reports should be “neutral with respect to policy”.

The IPCC’s work has long helped inform the work of the UNFCCC, which meets annually for its “conference of the parties” (COP).
For example, the reports of the fifth assessment cycle (AR5), published over 2013-14, have been credited for informing the Paris Agreement’s headline goal to hold global temperature rise at “well below 2C” and “pursue efforts” to limit increases to 1.5C.
During each assessment cycle, the IPCC produces three “working group” (WG) reports on physical science (WG1), impacts and adaptation (WG2) and mitigation (WG3). These are summarised in a “synthesis” report (SYR). It also produces special reports and methodology reports.
There are a number of stages to the creation of an IPCC working group report, as shown in the graphic below.

How have timeline negotiations been different for AR7?
The current assessment cycle – AR7 – formally began in July 2023, at the IPCC’s 59th session (IPCC-59) in Nairobi.
In January 2024, governments agreed to publish the AR7 synthesis report in 2029.
However, governments are yet to ratify a timeline for publication of the working group reports that will precede it, after negotiations on the issue ended in deadlock in Istanbul, Sofia, Hangzhou, Lima and Bangkok.
This puts AR7 at odds with the previous assessment cycles, where timelines were agreed more quickly. This is shown in the table below.
| Assessment cycle | Start date | Report timeline agreed* | Time until decision | WG1 | WG2 |
WG3 | SYR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First | IPCC-1, Nov 1988 | IPCC-2, Jun 1989 | 7 months | Aug 1990 | Jun 1990 | Jun 1990 | Aug 1990 |
| Second | IPCC-7, Feb 1992 | IPCC-9, Jun 1993 | 1 year, 4 months | Dec 1995 | Oct 1995 | Oct 1995 | Dec 1995 |
| Third | IPCC-13, Sep 1997 |
IPCC-14, Oct 1998 | 1 year, 1 months | Jan 2001 | Feb 2001 | Mar 2001 | Sep 2001 |
| Fourth | IPCC-19, Apr 2002 | IPCC-21, Nov 2003 | 1 year, 8 months | Feb 2007 | Apr 2007 | May 2007 | Nov 2007 |
| Fifth | IPCC-28, Apr 2008 |
IPCC-31, Oct 2009 | 1 year, 5 months | Sep 2013 | Mar 2014 | Apr 2014 | Nov 2014 |
| Sixth | IPCC-42, Oct 2015 |
IPCC-46, Sep 2017 | 1 year, 11 months | Aug 2021 | Feb 2022 | Apr 2022 | Mar 2023 |
| Seventh | IPCC-59, Jul 2023 |
– | 2 years, 9 months and counting | – | – | – | 2029 |
“Report timeline agreed” refers to when delivery timeline of working group reports was agreed. WG = working group and SYR = synthesis report. Analysis by Carbon Brief.
Why have negotiations over the timeline of AR7 faltered?
Part of the disagreement over the AR7 timeline centres on the question of whether the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle should align with the second global stocktake, a process that is due to culminate in the autumn of 2028 at COP33.
While a number of different timelines have been proposed, there are, broadly speaking, two camps in the AR7 timeline debate.
The first group has argued that all three working group reports should be published in 2028, so that they can inform the second global stocktake.
The other faction has advocated for a longer timeline, which would mean WG2 and WG3 would be finished after the stocktake is completed.
Established in 2015 under the Paris Agreement, the global stocktake is a five-yearly assessment of the world’s collective progress on tackling climate change. Under the terms of the treaty, countries pledged to consider the “best available science” during the process.
The first global stocktake concluded at COP29 in Dubai in 2023. Its outcomes informed national 2035 climate goals, which were due to the UN in 2025.
In the outcome decision of the first global stocktake, the UNFCCC officially invited the IPCC to consider how to “best align” with the “second and subsequent global stocktakes”.
The document also invited the IPCC to “provide relevant and timely information for the next global stocktake”.
Dr Bill Hare, CEO and senior scientist of Climate Analytics, tells Carbon Brief the stocktake is “at the guts, or heart, or the Paris Agreement’s ambition mechanism”.
He explains that the IPCC’s sixth assessment reports (AR6) – published over 2021-23 – were a “critical element” in the first global stocktake process:
“You had the IPCC reports there. You’ve had the IPCC co-chairs, or authors, in the discussions [and] workshops, pushing back on arguments from [countries]…They were able to anchor the fact that the world hasn’t done enough, that the NDCs [“nationally determined contributions”, or climate pledges] haven’t met the 1.5C goal by a wide margin – and that the cost of doing stuff is relatively cheap, which was a critical output of the WG3 report last time.”
Dozens of counties have advocated for a global stocktake-aligned timeline for AR7 reports, arguing that it is critical that findings from all working groups inform the exercise.
For example, the small-island state of Vanuatu said at IPCC-63 in Lima that delaying the reports would deprive countries of important scientific information ahead of key international meetings, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), reporting from inside the meeting.
Meanwhile, the Netherlands said at IPCC-64 in Bangkok that the delivery of reports after the stocktake would “significantly lower the policy relevance of AR7”, according to ENB.
A timeline where the reports are published ahead of the stocktake has been backed by co-chairs of IPCC reports. (See: How is the IPCC managing the impasse?)
Hare says that, in his analysis, a timeline where the AR7 reports align with the stocktake is supported by the “majority of countries, across geographies and levels of development, including least developed countries and small-island developing states”.
However, a number of emerging-economy nations have argued that a timeline where all reports are delivered by 2028 is too tight.
Why are some countries calling for a slower timeline for AR7 reports?
Among the most vocal proponents for the WG2 and WG3 reports being delivered after the stocktake, according to the ENB’s write-ups of negotiations in Bangkok and Lima, are India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
These countries have argued that authors, experts and governments from developing nations with fewer resources need more time to prepare, review and approve working group reports.
Some of the arguments in favour for a slower timeline are captured below in an excerpt from the ENB’s write-up of last October’s IPCC-63 in Lima.

An article published in 2025 in Africa Climate Insights summarised some of the arguments in favour of a slower timeline. It says a stocktake-aligned timeline would have overlapping review periods for different working group reports that would place more pressure on governments and experts.
It also notes that researchers from the global south – who face greater institutional barriers to publishing research in academic journals – would benefit from a later cut-off date for scientific literature for the AR7 reports. It quotes Dr Patricia Nying’uro – Kenya’s IPCC “focal point” – saying:
“The current timeline does not provide adequate time for developing countries to conduct research, publish their findings and have meaningful input.”
On top of citing inclusivity concerns, countries have also argued that aligning reports with the global stocktake is not an IPCC priority.
For instance, ENB reported at IPCC-64 that Saudi Arabia said “compressing” the cycle to meet “external timelines” would be “improper” because the IPCC “serves a broader mandate than just providing inputs to the global stocktake”.
Meanwhile, Russia said inputs to the global stocktake were “not the key to IPCC success”.
These arguments have faced significant pushback.
At IPCC-63 in Lima, IPCC co-chairs pointed out that overlapping reviews of assessment reports were “intentional” and would allow experts to see both drafts at once, according to ENB.
At the meeting, IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea also pointed to the IPCC rulebook, which states that panel and working group sessions should be scheduled to coordinate “to the extent possible, with other related international meetings”.
Some have contested the framing of a stocktake-aligned timeline as “compressed”.
At IPCC-61 in Sofia, the delegation from Saint Kitts and Nevis argued that the proposed schedule for AR7 was “neither compressed nor rushed”, because, while it was shorter than the schedule for AR6, it would contain fewer special reports.
Meanwhile, at IPCC-62 in Hangzhou, representatives from Luxembourg reminded the conference that AR6 was produced under “global pandemic conditions and was, therefore, delayed”, reported ENB. As such, they said the “proper comparison of the timeline would be to AR5, relative to which the proposed timetable was not rushed”.
(AR6’s seven-year run has been attributed in IPCC documents to the Covid-19 pandemic interrupting workflows and an unprecedented number of reports.)
There have been accusations in some quarters that delegations advocating in favour of a slower timeline are deliberately stalling the process.
For example, in a statement released after the meeting, the French government expressed its “deep concern over attempts to arbitrarily slow down and postpone the publication schedule”.
It said that “any delay in taking into account the relevant scientific data to respond to the climate emergency would seriously compromise climate action on a global scale”.
Some observers have argued that dynamics playing out at the IPCC replicate those in UN climate negotiations. Yao Zhe from Greenpeace East Asia tells Carbon Brief:
“The group of countries that opposed the proposed AR7 timelines is similar to the group that tactically slowed down or blocked negotiations regarding mitigation ambition under the UNFCCC. And they are gaining more influence as global climate governance faces a leadership vacuum.”
Dr Kari de Pryck, a lecturer at the Institute for Environmental Sciences at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that, “clearly, there is obstruction”. She continues:
“It is in the interest of some countries to ensure that the IPCC reports are not published on time. But there are also interesting and legitimate comments on inclusivity and diversity.”
How is the IPCC managing the impasse?
Despite no formal timeline for report delivery being agreed, report production has continued undeterred, IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea tells Carbon Brief.
He says that, so far, the science “has not been held up” by the report timeline issue, with lead author meetings and drafting of the various working group, special and methodological reports underway.
However, he warns that a final decision will need to be made by the end of 2026 on a timeline. He explains:
“There are multiple proposals that have been made [on timelines] and they start to diverge during 2027 due to the scheduling of specific events, like lead author meetings and review periods. Because we need to establish a budget for 2027, we need to make a decision before the end of 2626 to have some certainty about the entire cycle.
“So far, we’ve operated by taking year by year decisions – you just take the decision for the next year and carry on. That’s been okay so far, because there has not been a divergence [between timeline proposals] at the earlier stages of the cycle. But we will see divergences coming up.”
At IPCC-63 last October, WG1 co-chair Dr Robert Vautard noted that reports production was currently aligned with a schedule that had been “considered” in the previous meeting in Hangzhou. He said this timeline would allow final approval sessions for WG1, WG2 and WG3 to take place in May 2028, June 2028 and July 2028, respectively.
After this timeline failed to garner consensus, WG1 co-chair Dr Xiaoye Zhang and WG2 co-chair Dr Bart Van den Hurk then presented a new “compromise” timeline to delegates.
This extended the expert and government review periods for draft reports and pushed final approval sessions for WG2 and WG3 to July 2028 and September 2028. Discussions about this updated timeline ended in deadlock.
At IPCC-64 in Bangkok in March 2026, the timeline for reports was initially not slated for discussion.
However, an item on “progress on AR7 reports” was added to the agenda on the first day of the conference, after some countries said the issue required structured discussion. In the end, no agreement was reached on how resolution could be reached.
Negotiations have been pushed – alongside a number of other unresolved decisions – to IPCC-65, scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October 2026.
Skea says the lack of agreement on a way forward in Bangkok leaves the secretariat with the “responsibility to try and figure out the process that will move us in the right direction”. He adds:
“Is there a bridging proposal, some kind of scheme that would help to bring the sides together? That’s what we need to work on over the next few months.”
A key issue the secretariat will need to consider is how to address a “loss of trust between different groups of countries”, as well as the “technicalities of how the timeline is constructed”, he says.
Is delivering the reports in time for the global stocktake still possible?
The IPCC maintains that delivering reports in time for the next global stocktake remains possible, if a decision is made by the end of this year.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Skea says all timeline options in contention are still feasible “in principle”, if countries show flexibility. He counts four different proposals – two of which would see all reports produced before the stocktake in 2028 and two where WG2 and WG3 would be published in 2029.
He says, though, that he is optimistic a “constructive” result can be delivered in Addis Ababa – but stresses it will only be possible with “a lot of hard work”.
Experts have noted that, even if reports are published in 2028, they will come later in the stocktake process.
Dr Matti Goldberg, director of international climate policy at the Woodwell Climate Research Center and former staffer at the UNFCCC secretariat, explains:
“It is already kind of late. If you want to have a meaningful consideration of the IPCC reports in the global stocktake, they need to be there now or at the beginning of the information collection stage. Otherwise, you’ll have a bunch of parties saying: ‘No, can’t do it. It is too short a timeframe, too big a report.’”
The global stocktake is a process that is split into three phases: an information collection phase to gather inputs; a technical assessment of inputs and other evidence; and a “consideration of outputs” phase where countries decide what to collectively take away from the process.
The information phase of the second global stocktake is due to kick off at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey in November 2026. The technical assessment phase will take place from June 2027 to June 2028, giving way to the final political phase that culminates at COP33 in November 2028.
Under the revised AR7 timeline proposed by IPCC co-chairs in Lima, WG1 would be ready during the technical phase of the second global stocktake and WG2 and WG3 would be able to inform its final, political phase.
Goldberg emphasises that the publication of the reports – and their respective summaries for policymakers – in 2028 would mean countries would face “much higher pressure to deliver stronger messages of ambition” in the second global stocktake.
However, he adds that a faster timeline for the reports will not change the “fundamental calculations of interest” that shape international climate politics:
“There are a series of negotiations: first, over the summary of policymakers and then throughout the whole global stocktake. In the end, that is the process that determines a lot of the result.”
De Pryck from the University of Geneva similarly notes that scientific input is not “the only input” to the stocktake:
“It is a political process. So, at the end of the day, science and expertise is very important – but it’s not going to translate directly into the global stocktake.”
What could be the implications of an extended timeline for AR7?
If AR7 reports are not published until after the global stocktake, governments would likely turn to other sources of science in their submissions, experts tell Carbon Brief.
De Pryck explains that a broad range of science was submitted by governments to the first global stocktake. She says this includes the UN Environment Programme’s annual adaptation and emissions gap reports; updates from the International Energy Agency and climate-finance analysis from Oxfam:
“There are quite a lot of other academic and epistemic reports that could be used by countries in the negotiations that, in a way, could support what the IPCC is doing.”
Greenpeace Asia’s Yao Zhe notes that AR7’s special report on climate change and cities, due to be published in 2027, could play a “good scientific basis” for policy discussions around climate mitigation in the absence of the WG3 report from the stocktake.
Climate Analytics’ Bill Hare warns that a failure to align the the IPCC cycle with the global stocktake could result in less robust science being considered:
“There’s a general consensus that the IPCC is the best available science. It is the formal science, if you like, delivered to the Paris Agreement and climate convention. So, if that doesn’t happen, then it opens the space for other sources of so-called science to come in.”
He adds that any disconnect between the global stocktake cycle and the IPCC assessment cycle would be a “major historical break and one which would be used to weaken the international climate process and Paris Agreement”.
The impacts would also be felt within the climate science community, Hare continues. The IPCC’s role in advising the UNFCCC has long provided a “really strong sense of relevance” to many climate scientists, he says:
“That relevance is a very strong motivator for what [scientists] do. I wonder whether the failure of the IPCC to agree timetable alignment would have a negative impact on that. And that wouldn’t be just for this global stocktake cycle, it would be for subsequent ones.”
The post Q&A: Why the standoff between nations over the next IPCC reports matters appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: Why the standoff between nations over the next IPCC reports matters
Climate Change
New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation
New Zealand’s parliament has adopted a controversial new law blocking a whole avenue of climate litigation and shutting down its most advanced corporate lawsuit, which has been blamed by the government for shaking business confidence and investment.
The Climate Change Response (Tort Liability) Amendment Bill, expected to take effect in the coming days after it is formally signed by the Governor-General, prevents all current and future civil claims for climate loss or harm under tort law.
Justice minister Paul Goldsmith said last week that the aim was to give businesses “certainty around their climate change obligations”, noting it would not alter the government’s responsibilities under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 nor business obligations under the Emissions Trading Scheme.
“Our response to climate change is best managed by the Government at a national level and not through piece-meal litigation in the courts,” he added in a statement.
Such litigation, he said, “risks developing a new regime that contradicts the framework Parliament has already enacted” to tackle climate change.
Goldsmith singled out a key domestic climate lawsuit brought by Northland iwi leader and activist Mike Smith against six big companies: dairy firms Fonterra and Dairy Holdings, energy firms Genesis Energy and Z Energy, New Zealand Steel and coal mining firm BT Mining. A seventh original defendant, Channel Infrastructure, was dropped after it permanently decommissioned its Marsden Point oil refinery.
Smith argued that these companies had caused him harm under public nuisance and negligence law, as well as a third breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change that has yet to be tested domestically. He did not seek financial compensation, instead asking for the companies to immediately stop emitting or contributing to net greenhouse gas emissions.
In one of the most advanced corporate climate accountability lawsuits in the world, a trial had been scheduled for April 2027 after the Supreme Court unanimously allowed the case to continue.
Corporate lobbying in the shadows
Smith described the passing of the bill as “deeply concerning”, particularly as it coincided with the Supreme Court hearing another of his climate lawsuits. In that case, Smith v Attorney-General, he argues that the government’s response to climate change and its impacts on Māori communities in particular breaches rights to life and culture.
“That timing raises profound questions about the separation of powers and the rule of law,” said Smith. “Whatever one’s view of the merits of these cases, it is deeply troubling when parliament intervenes to remove a legal pathway while the courts are actively considering fundamental questions about climate responsibility, rights and the crown’s obligations.”
The bill – which says that no person (including the government) can be found liable in tort for emissions-related climate change effects – followed major lobbying efforts by the companies defending themselves in Smith’s lawsuit. They outlined a proposed legal amendment in a briefing note to the government in 2024.
The centre-right government has been fiercely criticised over its lack of transparency in relation to this lobbying activity. The national ombudsman recently found that the Prime Minister’s Office effectively withheld information requested by the Environmental Law Initiative about meetings, discussions and conversations regarding Smith’s case.
Green groups fail to stop bill
The bill sparked huge concern among environmental campaigners in New Zealand and elsewhere. Greenpeace Aotearoa called it a “shocking abuse of executive power” and the vast majority of submissions to a parliamentary inquiry said it should be rejected.
But in the end, it was adopted with little resistance, moving relatively smoothly through parliament, passing its third reading by 67 votes to 53. Sam Bookman, climate law lecturer at Melbourne Law School, told Climate Home News he was not surprised by this, given that the coalition government has a secure majority.
A complaint has been made to the UN special rapporteur on climate change and human rights by Smith, the National Iwi Chairs Forum Pou Tikanga and youth coalition Climate Clinic Aotearoa over what they see as the government’s heavy-handed approach. Smith is also challenging the new law in yet another lawsuit.
“Pathetic”: New Zealand plans to barely cut emissions between 2030 and 2035
Bookman thinks it “very unlikely” that such a challenge will succeed, noting that New Zealand’s constitution is firmly anchored in parliamentary sovereignty.
But the expert in climate law does not see the bill as the end of legal action in the country, noting that New Zealand has a “sophisticated climate litigation landscape with a growing number of specialist and experienced lawyers and NGOs”.
The country is also approaching its next general election in November, and some opposition parties have pledged to restore access to the courts if elected.
Amanda Larsson, global project lead on agriculture for Greenpeace International, said: “This law deserves to be tested, and I strongly encourage the international climate litigation community to unite and help defend New Zealanders’ fundamental right to hold polluters accountable before this becomes a global blueprint.”
Copycat legislation on the rise
New Zealand’s move is part of a small but growing legislative effort to shut down climate litigation around the world.
In the US, Republican politicians introduced legislation in the House and Senate in April that would shield fossil fuel firms from climate liability lawsuits. Similar laws have already been passed at state level in Tennessee, Utah, Iowa and Louisiana.
The German state of Bavaria has put forward a similar proposal to the Federal Council, aiming to block private climate claims as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments imposing such liability. There are also proposals to limit available remedies and actions in the Netherlands and Belgium.
UN General Assembly backs “climate obligations” set by world’s top court
Bookman said he expects more efforts to counter climate damages litigation and advised plaintiffs to think about how to respond, including drawing on broader support in opposing them.
“Even though it’s very hard for plaintiffs to win these types of cases, companies are very eager to avoid the expense, embarrassment and political accountability that come even with unsuccessful lawsuits,” he said.
The post New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation appeared first on Climate Home News.
New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation
Climate Change
Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry
Bhima Yudhistira Adhinegara is the Executive Director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), an Indonesia-based economic think tank. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China-Indonesia desk at CELIOS.
Indonesia produces around 60% of the world’s nickel, a metal used to manufacture batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) – more than any other country in the world. But in 2026, the government sharply reduced how much of its nickel can be extracted from the ground.
Production quotas were reduced by around 40% this year compared to 2025. Weda Bay, the largest nickel mine on Earth, had its allowance cut by more than 70% and exhausted its full-year quota by the end of May, halting mining entirely; it cannot resume large-scale extraction until next year unless regulators grant an extension.
The policy has sparked a vivid debate in Indonesian policy circles: how can the country shift its strategy from a decade of mining vast quantities of cheap nickel to producing a high-value and low-carbon material that the rest of the world wants for EV batteries.
The cuts aren’t a silver bullet to clean up Indonesia’s nickel industry, whose smelters are powered by coal – the most polluting fossil fuels. But alongside stricter enforcement of environmental rules, it is one side of efforts to produce more sustainable nickel for a premium.
Restricting Indonesia’s nickel output
Production quotas were introduced to stop the collapse of nickel prices because of oversupply in the market. Prices had fallen more than 40% in 2023 alone and kept sliding as Indonesian supply kept growing, hitting a four-year low of around $13,900 a ton in late 2025.
Critics called the recent tightening of production quotas proof that Indonesia’s nickel strategy has failed, arguing that the industry shouldn’t need to throttle its own output to survive. But when assessed against what the policy was supposed to do – push up nickel prices – it has worked. Prices jumped to $20,000 a ton in May, the highest since 2024.
Chinese industry groups representing companies that have invested billions to mine and refine the country’s nickel were furious, warning Indonesia’s president Prabowo Subianto that the cuts put $50 billion worth of investment at risk. But much of that Chinese capital is sunk into smelters and processing plants built specifically to run on Indonesian ore, and cannot simply be moved elsewhere. That gives Jakarta more room to hold its ground than the warning suggests.
Stronger environmental enforcement
Since the start of the year, Indonesia’s forestry task force has seized more than four million hectares of land from mines and plantations operating illegally in protected forests, collecting over two trillion rupiah ($113 million) in fines.
This included 148 hectares seized from Weda Bay for lacking a forestry permit. The share of nickel produced from illegal small-scale mining also fell from about a quarter in 2022 to roughly 10% by 2024.
The crackdown responds to serious environmental damages in the nickel industry. On Obi Island, a waste pond collapsed after heavy rain in June 2025, flooding three villages and killing a resident. Internal company tests found chromium-6 – a carcinogen – in the water, in quantities far above the legal limit. The footprint of another mine near Raja Ampat, which is home to some of the world’s richest coral reefs, grew 60-fold in just eight years.

The market is responding to early cleanup efforts. Low-carbon nickel now sells for a real premium, roughly $18,800 to $19,300 a ton compared with $17,900 to $18,300 otherwise, as carmakers seek to source cleaner materials to comply with the European Union’s new emissions rules for imports.
In turn, this is incentivising the industry to do more to green its operations. Vale Indonesia’s smelter in South Sulawesi now runs almost entirely on hydropower, for example.
None of this addresses coal use, however. Major Indonesian nickel producers still emitted an estimated 15 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2023. Indonesia may be cracking down on illegal mining and rewarding cleaner producers but it is still running its mines on the dirtiest fuel available.
Unequal benefits
For Indonesia to truly benefit from producing cleaner and high-value nickel, it needs to reap the economic benefits too. Although the industry has boosted the country’s economic growth, the reality on the ground tells a different story.
Konawe in Southeast Sulawesi is home to a major smelting complex. Growth in the district jumped from 6% to 22% between 2015 and 2023, driven almost entirely by the nickel industry, according to a study by the Lowy Institute study. At the same time, poverty levels increased slightly and unemployment remained unchanged.
In Halmahera, another epicentre of the nickel industry, spending by the poorest fifth grew just 5% between 2019 and 2022, compared with 28% for the wealthiest fifth, according to a separate study.
Part of the reason for this inequality is the system for transferring mining royalties to district authorities where the mines are located. In theory, they are entitled to the largest share. But in practice, payments are delayed, companies routinely dispute what they owe and royalties are pooled and distributed across a larger area.
The Natural Resource Governance Institute has found that decentralisation handed local governments power to approve new mines faster than they could build their capacity to manage them. Higher output raises national income on paper, but local governments remain constrained by fiscal rules and infrastructure costs that scale with mining.
None of this makes the 2026 quota cuts a mistake. Indonesia has every right to defend its pricing power over a resource it controls. But limiting extraction isn’t going to fix underlying issues around environmental enforcement and revenue-sharing. That requires rules that are consistently enforced, royalties that reach communities living by the mines, and a plan to wean smelters off coal.
The post Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry appeared first on Climate Home News.
Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry
Climate Change
Risk of “catastrophic” oil spill reaching Kimberley coast found in Woodside’s Scott Reef gas drilling plans
SYDNEY, Monday 24 August 2026 – New analysis of Woodside modelling released by Greenpeace Australia Pacific and Environs Kimberley has revealed the oil and gas corporation’s plans to drill at Scott Reef could cause an oil spill up to 30 times bigger than the 2009 Montara disaster, impacting the Kimberley coastline and reaching as far as Indonesia.
The new analysis details the “catastrophic” oil spill risk put to environmental regulators for approval by Woodside in its Browse to North West Shelf Project (Browse) plans, the worst-case scenario being a blowout directly below Scott Reef, polluting whale migratory pathways and covering isolated turtle nesting ground with oil condensate.
An FOI application (F348) revealed the federal environment department (DCCEEW) asked offshore oil and gas regulator NOPSEMA to look into the oil spill risk in 2025. NOPSEMA’s response to the application refused access to its report, and one document shows DCCEEW sought further advice this year.
Greenpeace and Environs Kimberley are calling on the Federal Government to publicly release the NOPSEMA report given the risk of an uncontrolled release of oil condensate from directly below Scott Reef.
Hannah Schuch, Senior Campaigner at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “Woodside is aware that drilling at Scott Reef risks a massive oil spill that would have severe, far-reaching consequences. It appears environmental regulators are aware too.
“The state and federal governments need to take this risk from Woodside’s drilling plans seriously, as they could end up allowing the worst oil spill in Australian history.
“The pygmy blue whales that migrate up and down the WA coast with their newborns each year could be swimming and feeding in toxic, oil-slicked water. Woodside’s proposal to drill at Scott Reef is an environmental disaster waiting to happen, and the WA and federal governments have one surefire way to prevent catastrophe — reject Browse.”
Martin Prichard, Executive Director at Environs Kimberley, said: “A catastrophic oil spill by Woodside would be disastrous not just for marine life in the area but also for the Kimberley’s $500 million tourism industry.
“The state and federal governments will see five marine parks on the Kimberley coast included in the risk area of a catastrophic Woodside oil spill.
“The Montara oil spill was disastrous for West Timor with the toxic oil destroying seaweed farmers’ livelihoods. The Kimberley dodged a bullet with Montara, we were lucky the spill didn’t head our way. Myself and a crew flew over the Montara oil spill and followed it as far as we could. It was like a scene from a disaster movie.”
After the WA Environmental Protection Authority deemed Browse “unacceptable” due, in part, to oil spill risk, Woodside submitted a mitigation plan based on technology that has never been used “in anger”, a weakness stated in an independent expert review of the plan.
Professor Richard Steiner, independent oil spill expert, said: “A large offshore spill is impossible to effectively contain or recover. Historically, only 2-6% of total spill volume is recovered and the ecological injury from the release of toxic hydrocarbons in the sea can be severe, extensive, and long-term.
“Here in Alaska, government research concludes that several marine populations injured by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, including whales, fish, and seabirds, are still not recovering today, 37 years later. We should expect similar long-term ecological impacts in Western Australia if there were to be a major oil spill. The only sure way to avoid the risk of a catastrophic marine oil spill is to not develop oil and gas projects in marine environments.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Emma Sangalli on emma.sangalli@greenpeace.org or 0431 513 465
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy10 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits









