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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) latest assessment cycle has been beset by disagreements between nations over the timeline for publishing its next landmark report.

During the UN climate science body’s last five “sessions” – biannual meetings where governments discuss matters related to the IPCC’s work – governments have been unable to sign off on the delivery date of the “working group” reports.

The deadlock over the delivery plan for the seventh assessment cycle (AR7) has been described as “unprecedented”.

Some countries have pushed for reports to be approved in 2028, in time to inform the “second global stocktake”, which is due to conclude at COP33 that year and is designed to inform the next round of national climate goals under the Paris Agreement.

Other nations have argued that developing countries need more time to review and approve the reports – meaning that one, or more, would not be published until after the stocktake.

The next IPCC meeting – due to take place in Addis Ababa in October – is likely the last moment where a timeline could be agreed that would see the reports synchronised with the stocktake.

One expert tells Carbon Brief that the failure to align the IPCC’s reports with the stocktake would be a “major historical break [that] would be used to weaken the international climate process and Paris Agreement”.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the ongoing disagreements over the AR7 timeline.

How does the IPCC assessment report cycle work?

For almost 40 years, the IPCC has been one of the most visible examples of a “science-policy interface” – an institution that helps science to inform policy.

The UN General Assembly resolution that established the IPCC in December 1988 states that the panel will “provide internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socioeconomic impact of climate change and realistic response strategies”.

Four years later, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created, with an objective of “stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused] interference with the climate system”.

The IPCC’s official rulebook, last updated in 2013, highlights the IPCC’s role in producing comprehensive assessments of the state of human-caused climate change. It stipulates that its assessments must provide “relevant” information – and that reports should be “neutral with respect to policy”.

Credit: IPCC
Credit: IPCC.

The IPCC’s work has long helped inform the work of the UNFCCC, which meets annually for its “conference of the parties” (COP).

For example, the reports of the fifth assessment cycle (AR5), published over 2013-14, have been credited for informing the Paris Agreement’s headline goal to hold global temperature rise at “well below 2C” and “pursue efforts” to limit increases to 1.5C.

During each assessment cycle, the IPCC produces three “working group” (WG) reports on physical science (WG1), impacts and adaptation (WG2) and mitigation (WG3). These are summarised in a “synthesis” report (SYR). It also produces special reports and methodology reports.

There are a number of stages to the creation of an IPCC working group report, as shown in the graphic below.

Credit: IPCC
Credit: IPCC.

How have timeline negotiations been different for AR7?

The current assessment cycle – AR7 – formally began in July 2023, at the IPCC’s 59th session (IPCC-59) in Nairobi.

In January 2024, governments agreed to publish the AR7 synthesis report in 2029.

However, governments are yet to ratify a timeline for publication of the working group reports that will precede it, after negotiations on the issue ended in deadlock in Istanbul, Sofia, Hangzhou, Lima and Bangkok.

This puts AR7 at odds with the previous assessment cycles, where timelines were agreed more quickly. This is shown in the table below.

Assessment cycle Start date Report timeline agreed* Time until decision WG1 WG2
WG3 SYR
First IPCC-1, Nov 1988 IPCC-2, Jun 1989 7 months Aug 1990 Jun 1990 Jun 1990 Aug 1990
Second IPCC-7, Feb 1992 IPCC-9, Jun 1993 1 year, 4 months

Dec 1995 Oct 1995

Oct 1995 Dec 1995
Third IPCC-13,
Sep 1997
IPCC-14, Oct 1998 1 year, 1 months Jan 2001

Feb 2001 Mar 2001 Sep 2001

Fourth IPCC-19, Apr 2002 IPCC-21, Nov 2003 1 year, 8 months

Feb 2007

Apr 2007 May 2007 Nov 2007
Fifth IPCC-28,
Apr 2008
IPCC-31, Oct 2009 1 year, 5 months Sep 2013

Mar 2014 Apr 2014 Nov 2014

Sixth IPCC-42,
Oct 2015
IPCC-46, Sep 2017 1 year, 11 months

Aug 2021

Feb 2022

Apr 2022 Mar 2023

Seventh IPCC-59,
Jul 2023
2 years, 9 months and counting 2029

“Report timeline agreed” refers to when delivery timeline of working group reports was agreed. WG = working group and SYR = synthesis report. Analysis by Carbon Brief.

Why have negotiations over the timeline of AR7 faltered?

Part of the disagreement over the AR7 timeline centres on the question of whether the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle should align with the second global stocktake, a process that is due to culminate in the autumn of 2028 at COP33.

While a number of different timelines have been proposed, there are, broadly speaking, two camps in the AR7 timeline debate.

The first group has argued that all three working group reports should be published in 2028, so that they can inform the second global stocktake.

The other faction has advocated for a longer timeline, which would mean WG2 and WG3 would be finished after the stocktake is completed.

Established in 2015 under the Paris Agreement, the global stocktake is a five-yearly assessment of the world’s collective progress on tackling climate change. Under the terms of the treaty, countries pledged to consider the “best available science” during the process.

The first global stocktake concluded at COP29 in Dubai in 2023. Its outcomes informed national 2035 climate goals, which were due to the UN in 2025.

In the outcome decision of the first global stocktake, the UNFCCC officially invited the IPCC to consider how to “best align” with the “second and subsequent global stocktakes”.

The document also invited the IPCC to “provide relevant and timely information for the next global stocktake”.

Dr Bill Hare, CEO and senior scientist of Climate Analytics, tells Carbon Brief the stocktake is “at the guts, or heart, or the Paris Agreement’s ambition mechanism”.

He explains that the IPCC’s sixth assessment reports (AR6) – published over 2021-23 – were a “critical element” in the first global stocktake process:

“You had the IPCC reports there. You’ve had the IPCC co-chairs, or authors, in the discussions [and] workshops, pushing back on arguments from [countries]…They were able to anchor the fact that the world hasn’t done enough, that the NDCs [“nationally determined contributions”, or climate pledges] haven’t met the 1.5C goal by a wide margin – and that the cost of doing stuff is relatively cheap, which was a critical output of the WG3 report last time.”

Dozens of counties have advocated for a global stocktake-aligned timeline for AR7 reports, arguing that it is critical that findings from all working groups inform the exercise.

For example, the small-island state of Vanuatu said at IPCC-63 in Lima that delaying the reports would deprive countries of important scientific information ahead of key international meetings, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), reporting from inside the meeting.

Meanwhile, the Netherlands said at IPCC-64 in Bangkok that the delivery of reports after the stocktake would “significantly lower the policy relevance of AR7”, according to ENB.

A timeline where the reports are published ahead of the stocktake has been backed by co-chairs of IPCC reports. (See: How is the IPCC managing the impasse?)

Hare says that, in his analysis, a timeline where the AR7 reports align with the stocktake is supported by the “majority of countries, across geographies and levels of development, including least developed countries and small-island developing states”.

However, a number of emerging-economy nations have argued that a timeline where all reports are delivered by 2028 is too tight.

Why are some countries calling for a slower timeline for AR7 reports?

Among the most vocal proponents for the WG2 and WG3 reports being delivered after the stocktake, according to the ENB’s write-ups of negotiations in Bangkok and Lima, are India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

These countries have argued that authors, experts and governments from developing nations with fewer resources need more time to prepare, review and approve working group reports.

Some of the arguments in favour for a slower timeline are captured below in an excerpt from the ENB’s write-up of last October’s IPCC-63 in Lima.

Credit: Earth Negotiations Bulletin
Credit: Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

An article published in 2025 in Africa Climate Insights summarised some of the arguments in favour of a slower timeline. It says a stocktake-aligned timeline would have overlapping review periods for different working group reports that would place more pressure on governments and experts.

It also notes that researchers from the global south – who face greater institutional barriers to publishing research in academic journals – would benefit from a later cut-off date for scientific literature for the AR7 reports. It quotes Dr Patricia Nying’uro – Kenya’s IPCC “focal point” – saying:

“The current timeline does not provide adequate time for developing countries to conduct research, publish their findings and have meaningful input.”

On top of citing inclusivity concerns, countries have also argued that aligning reports with the global stocktake is not an IPCC priority.

For instance, ENB reported at IPCC-64 that Saudi Arabia said “compressing” the cycle to meet “external timelines” would be “improper” because the IPCC “serves a broader mandate than just providing inputs to the global stocktake”.

Meanwhile, Russia said inputs to the global stocktake were “not the key to IPCC success”.

These arguments have faced significant pushback.

At IPCC-63 in Lima, IPCC co-chairs pointed out that overlapping reviews of assessment reports were “intentional” and would allow experts to see both drafts at once, according to ENB.

At the meeting, IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea also pointed to the IPCC rulebook, which states that panel and working group sessions should be scheduled to coordinate “to the extent possible, with other related international meetings”.

Some have contested the framing of a stocktake-aligned timeline as “compressed”.

At IPCC-61 in Sofia, the delegation from Saint Kitts and Nevis argued that the proposed schedule for AR7 was “neither compressed nor rushed”, because, while it was shorter than the schedule for AR6, it would contain fewer special reports.

Meanwhile, at IPCC-62 in Hangzhou, representatives from Luxembourg reminded the conference that AR6 was produced under “global pandemic conditions and was, therefore, delayed”, reported ENB. As such, they said the “proper comparison of the timeline would be to AR5, relative to which the proposed timetable was not rushed”.

(AR6’s seven-year run has been attributed in IPCC documents to the Covid-19 pandemic interrupting workflows and an unprecedented number of reports.)

There have been accusations in some quarters that delegations advocating in favour of a slower timeline are deliberately stalling the process.

For example, in a statement released after the meeting, the French government expressed its “deep concern over attempts to arbitrarily slow down and postpone the publication schedule”.

It said that “any delay in taking into account the relevant scientific data to respond to the climate emergency would seriously compromise climate action on a global scale”.

Some observers have argued that dynamics playing out at the IPCC replicate those in UN climate negotiations. Yao Zhe from Greenpeace East Asia tells Carbon Brief:

“The group of countries that opposed the proposed AR7 timelines is similar to the group that tactically slowed down or blocked negotiations regarding mitigation ambition under the UNFCCC. And they are gaining more influence as global climate governance faces a leadership vacuum.”

Dr Kari de Pryck, a lecturer at the Institute for Environmental Sciences at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that, “clearly, there is obstruction”. She continues:

“It is in the interest of some countries to ensure that the IPCC reports are not published on time. But there are also interesting and legitimate comments on inclusivity and diversity.”

How is the IPCC managing the impasse?

Despite no formal timeline for report delivery being agreed, report production has continued undeterred, IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea tells Carbon Brief.

He says that, so far, the science “has not been held up” by the report timeline issue, with lead author meetings and drafting of the various working group, special and methodological reports underway.

However, he warns that a final decision will need to be made by the end of 2026 on a timeline. He explains:

“There are multiple proposals that have been made [on timelines] and they start to diverge during 2027 due to the scheduling of specific events, like lead author meetings and review periods. Because we need to establish a budget for 2027, we need to make a decision before the end of 2626 to have some certainty about the entire cycle.

“So far, we’ve operated by taking year by year decisions – you just take the decision for the next year and carry on. That’s been okay so far, because there has not been a divergence [between timeline proposals] at the earlier stages of the cycle. But we will see divergences coming up.”

At IPCC-63 last October, WG1 co-chair Dr Robert Vautard noted that reports production was currently aligned with a schedule that had been “considered” in the previous meeting in Hangzhou. He said this timeline would allow final approval sessions for WG1, WG2 and WG3 to take place in May 2028, June 2028 and July 2028, respectively.

After this timeline failed to garner consensus, WG1 co-chair Dr Xiaoye Zhang and WG2 co-chair Dr Bart Van den Hurk then presented a new “compromise” timeline to delegates.

This extended the expert and government review periods for draft reports and pushed final approval sessions for WG2 and WG3 to July 2028 and September 2028. Discussions about this updated timeline ended in deadlock.

At IPCC-64 in Bangkok in March 2026, the timeline for reports was initially not slated for discussion.

However, an item on “progress on AR7 reports” was added to the agenda on the first day of the conference, after some countries said the issue required structured discussion. In the end, no agreement was reached on how resolution could be reached.

Negotiations have been pushed – alongside a number of other unresolved decisions – to IPCC-65, scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October 2026.

Skea says the lack of agreement on a way forward in Bangkok leaves the secretariat with the “responsibility to try and figure out the process that will move us in the right direction”. He adds:

“Is there a bridging proposal, some kind of scheme that would help to bring the sides together? That’s what we need to work on over the next few months.”

A key issue the secretariat will need to consider is how to address a “loss of trust between different groups of countries”, as well as the “technicalities of how the timeline is constructed”, he says.

Is delivering the reports in time for the global stocktake still possible?

The IPCC maintains that delivering reports in time for the next global stocktake remains possible, if a decision is made by the end of this year.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Skea says all timeline options in contention are still feasible “in principle”, if countries show flexibility. He counts four different proposals – two of which would see all reports produced before the stocktake in 2028 and two where WG2 and WG3 would be published in 2029.

He says, though, that he is optimistic a “constructive” result can be delivered in Addis Ababa – but stresses it will only be possible with “a lot of hard work”.

Experts have noted that, even if reports are published in 2028, they will come later in the stocktake process.

Dr Matti Goldberg, director of international climate policy at the Woodwell Climate Research Center and former staffer at the UNFCCC secretariat, explains:

“It is already kind of late. If you want to have a meaningful consideration of the IPCC reports in the global stocktake, they need to be there now or at the beginning of the information collection stage. Otherwise, you’ll have a bunch of parties saying: ‘No, can’t do it. It is too short a timeframe, too big a report.’”

The global stocktake is a process that is split into three phases: an information collection phase to gather inputs; a technical assessment of inputs and other evidence; and a “consideration of outputs” phase where countries decide what to collectively take away from the process.

The information phase of the second global stocktake is due to kick off at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey in November 2026. The technical assessment phase will take place from June 2027 to June 2028, giving way to the final political phase that culminates at COP33 in November 2028.

Under the revised AR7 timeline proposed by IPCC co-chairs in Lima, WG1 would be ready during the technical phase of the second global stocktake and WG2 and WG3 would be able to inform its final, political phase.

Goldberg emphasises that the publication of the reports – and their respective summaries for policymakers – in 2028 would mean countries would face “much higher pressure to deliver stronger messages of ambition” in the second global stocktake.

However, he adds that a faster timeline for the reports will not change the “fundamental calculations of interest” that shape international climate politics:

“There are a series of negotiations: first, over the summary of policymakers and then throughout the whole global stocktake. In the end, that is the process that determines a lot of the result.”

De Pryck from the University of Geneva similarly notes that scientific input is not “the only input” to the stocktake:

“It is a political process. So, at the end of the day, science and expertise is very important – but it’s not going to translate directly into the global stocktake.”

What could be the implications of an extended timeline for AR7?

If AR7 reports are not published until after the global stocktake, governments would likely turn to other sources of science in their submissions, experts tell Carbon Brief.

De Pryck explains that a broad range of science was submitted by governments to the first global stocktake. She says this includes the UN Environment Programme’s annual adaptation and emissions gap reports; updates from the International Energy Agency and climate-finance analysis from Oxfam:

“There are quite a lot of other academic and epistemic reports that could be used by countries in the negotiations that, in a way, could support what the IPCC is doing.”

Greenpeace Asia’s Yao Zhe notes that AR7’s special report on climate change and cities, due to be published in 2027, could play a “good scientific basis” for policy discussions around climate mitigation in the absence of the WG3 report from the stocktake.

Climate Analytics’ Bill Hare warns that a failure to align the the IPCC cycle with the global stocktake could result in less robust science being considered:

“There’s a general consensus that the IPCC is the best available science. It is the formal science, if you like, delivered to the Paris Agreement and climate convention. So, if that doesn’t happen, then it opens the space for other sources of so-called science to come in.”

He adds that any disconnect between the global stocktake cycle and the IPCC assessment cycle would be a “major historical break and one which would be used to weaken the international climate process and Paris Agreement”.

The impacts would also be felt within the climate science community, Hare continues. The IPCC’s role in advising the UNFCCC has long provided a “really strong sense of relevance” to many climate scientists, he says:

“That relevance is a very strong motivator for what [scientists] do. I wonder whether the failure of the IPCC to agree timetable alignment would have a negative impact on that. And that wouldn’t be just for this global stocktake cycle, it would be for subsequent ones.”

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Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis

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Global fossil-fuel emissions are set to fall by around 0.5% in 2026 amid the fallout from the Hormuz crisis, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The US-Iran war has severely disrupted trade through the strait of Hormuz, causing a spike in oil and gas prices that continues to ripple around the global economy.

Each month of disruption – and each new flashpoint, such as in Yemen – is increasing the incentive to switch to alternatives.

Those alternatives include coal, with the latest forecasts pointing to a 1.2% rise in coal demand this year – apparently supporting media claims of a “return to coal” in the wake of the crisis.

Yet Carbon Brief’s analysis shows the rise in emissions associated with this increased coal use, much of which is unrelated to Hormuz, is set to be more than offset by declines for oil and gas.

The estimated overall impact on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels in 2026 is shown in the figure below and amounts to a reduction of around 0.5% from 2025 levels.

(Fossil fuels account for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions.)

The emissions estimates for each fossil fuel are based on the latest forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for coal, oil and gas, in light of the ongoing global energy crisis.

For example, the agency initially estimated that global coal demand would decline this year. In its 2025 coal report, published in mid-December, it said that declining coal demand in China would outweigh the impact of pro-coal policies under US president Donald Trump.

In contrast, the latest update, published in September 2026, said that global coal demand would rise by 1.2% in 2026, instead of the small decline that had been expected.

The report highlighted the boost to coal demand from higher gas prices in the wake of Hormuz. However, there are limits to this, because few countries can switch from gas to coal at large scale.

The IEA’s latest report also noted the role of a strong El Niño, which is pushing up the need for cooling and depressing hydropower output in key markets. Other short-term factors are also affecting coal demand this year, including a rising amount of “wasted” wind and solar in China.

For gas, the IEA did not initially update its previous forecast that global gas demand would rise by 2.0% in 2026, which had been published in January of this year.

Its most recent forecast – published in July – already pointed to a 0.6% drop in demand in 2026. Since then, pressure on gas demand from high prices has only grown stronger.

For oil, there has been an even more dramatic shift in forecasts since the start of the year.

In its January 2026 oil market report, the IEA forecast a rise in demand in 2026 of 930,000 barrels per day (bpd). As shown in the figure below, this has been steadily revised downwards over the course of the year, as the Hormuz crisis was first ignited – and then extended.

By September, the IEA was forecasting a 2,500,000bpd drop in oil demand in 2026, equivalent to a reduction of 2.4% from 2025 levels.

(A 15 September research note from Morgan Stanley, not available online, found a “consensus” forecast of a 2,415,000bpd drop in demand in 2026.)

Chart title reads: Global oil demand is now set to fall in 2026 due to Iran war

While there are many short-term factors at play in the shifting forecasts for 2026, it is clear that the latest energy crisis will also affect fossil-fuel demand in the next year and beyond.

For example, whereas the IEA initially forecast that oil demand would rebound in 2027 to well above 2025 levels, it is now expecting use of the fuel to be effectively flat for two years.

This puts a question mark over its previous expectation – published in October last year – that global oil demand would not peak until as late as 2030.

“For every month the conflict lasts, the probability of permanent [oil] demand destruction increases,” wrote Sverre Alvik, vice president at consultancy DNV in a late August analysis.

As fuel prices have surged, electric vehicles (EVs) have captured record shares of major car markets, from Australia and China through to Europe, Indonesia and Thailand.

In July, EV sales nearly doubled year-on-year in “new markets”, noted Alvik, pointing to countries outside China, Europe and North America.

The IEA says the 2027 outlooks for coal and gas are interdependent, with coal demand potentially increasing again if gas prices remain elevated – or dropping back if gas prices ease.

At the same time, governments in countries that had planned to rely on imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been signalling shifts towards favouring domestic clean energy instead – or continuing to use coal for longer.

The current crisis, therefore, has the potential to not only lower fossil-fuel use and emissions in the short term, but also on a more lasting basis.

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CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’

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Aviation is on track to be responsible for 80% of the UK’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 2050, according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

Emissions from flying have more than doubled since 1990 – driven by rising passenger numbers – even as the climate impact of every other sector in the UK economy has fallen.

The UK does not have “credible” policies in place to reverse this trend of rising emissions, says the CCC in new advice to the government on future aviation policy.

The government has signalled its support for expanding Heathrow, the nation’s largest airport, while relying on “techno-fixes” such as “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs) to cut emissions.

Yet, even without Heathrow expansion, the CCC says aviation emissions are on track to be higher in 2050 than they are today – reaching 38m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2).

As the chart below shows, this would account for most of the remaining CO2 from the UK economy, all of which would need to be removed from the atmosphere in order to meet the legal target of net-zero emissions.

Expanding Heathrow would add another 2.4MtCO2 in 2050, amounting to around 5% of all the UK’s emissions. (This would increase to 4.5MtCO2 when expansion is complete in 2054.)

With a final decision on Heathrow expansion expected by 2029, the government asked the CCC for its advice on whether the plan is compatible with the UK’s climate targets.

The CCC has concluded that the UK simply lacks sufficient policies to reduce aviation emissions and “expanding Heathrow would compound the problem”. In a press briefing, CCC chair Nigel Topping told journalists:

“The UK does not currently have a credible plan to reduce [aviation emissions] in line with net-zero, so that creates a serious challenge for meeting our climate commitments.”

The “jet-zero strategy”, launched by the previous Conservative government in 2022, set out plans to cut aviation emissions. However, the Labour government has since accepted that the strategy’s expectations for SAFs, electric planes and fuel-efficiency improvements were unrealistic.

The CCC says a “credible and robust net-zero policy framework for aviation” should be set out in a revised strategy, which is planned for 2027. Only then could Heathrow expansion be aligned with the net-zero goal, adds the committee.

As part of this new strategy, the CCC says the “aviation sector needs to take responsibility for its emissions”. It says policies should be designed based on the “polluter pays” principle, requiring the aviation industry to fund its own SAFs and CO2 removal.

Specifically, the committee says funding will be needed for “engineered removal” technologies, such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS).

These technologies are currently “not yet available at the scale required”, but are vital for the kind of permanent CO2 removal needed to mop up aviation emissions, says the CCC.

(“Natural solutions” such as tree planting are the other main way CO2 is expected to be removed from the atmosphere. However, the CCC envisages these removals offsetting the remaining methane emissions from livestock agriculture in the UK, whereas it says “engineered removals” would be required to remove and store CO2 from flights.)

The CCC acknowledges that placing decarbonisation costs on airlines would likely lead to higher ticket prices. It estimates that this could mean an increase, in 2024 prices, of around £150 for a return trip to Alicante, Spain, and £400 for a return trip to New York by 2050.

However, it says this is preferable to a public spending approach, which would result in the roughly 50% of the population who do not fly paying for flight-related CO2 removals.

In addition, the committee notes that higher costs would help to manage demand for flights, which would otherwise be expected to increase considerably over the coming decades.

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International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored

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A fifth of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions are linked to international trade in goods and services, a new tracker shows, spotlighting a little-studied issue that researchers say should be tackled by the UN climate process.

Currently, as part of the Paris Agreement, every country is responsible for counting and reducing the planet-heating emissions that are produced within its territory. Manufacturing countries, for example, may have high emissions even if what they make is exported for consumption elsewhere.

But new analysis from the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and climate consultancy Matière, based on the tracker’s data, shows that some countries have a high footprint of “imported emissions” from goods and services they ship in. These emissions are often ignored in the places where the products are consumed because they are not formally counted under greenhouse gas inventories.

In the European Union, for example, while domestic emissions have declined since 2015, imported emissions have remained unchanged, the analysis shows. In some countries, like Austria or Sweden, they are as high as the country’s entire annual carbon footprint.

    Former EU lead climate negotiator Jacob Werksman said that under the Paris Agreement, these traded emissions are accounted for in the countries where they are originally produced, but importing countries can also take responsibility for their consumption.

    “It starts with a wide recognition by many jurisdictions around the world that we need to know the carbon content of these products, and we then need to agree what is a fair, effective, transparent and relatively easy-to-implement way of measuring that carbon in traded products,” he told a launch event for the trade emissions tracker, which contains data for different countries, sectors and gases.

    Trade and its role in addressing climate change has become a higher priority at UN climate talks after a push led by emerging economies including China, India and South Africa led to the first trade and climate change dialogue held this year at the mid-year session in Bonn.

    At the upcoming COP31 UN summit in Antalya, some voluntary initiatives like the Brazil-led Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade are expected to continue, but the issue does not feature in Türkiye’s Action Agenda of climate initiatives and formal negotiations are not scheduled on the topic.

    China: the world’s top emissions exporter

    As a manufacturing powerhouse, China ranks first in the new tracker as the world’s top-emitting country, but the data shows that a large chunk of the country’s carbon emissions – an amount larger than Brazil’s entire annual carbon footprint – are linked to products that are exported and consumed abroad.

    Russia, Brazil, the US and the EU rank as the top destinations for Chinese trade-related emissions, which are mostly linked to components for power generation, basic metals like copper and lead, and non-metallic minerals like graphite and phosphorus.

    Yet China is also the world’s top emissions importer, related mostly to agricultural products, fossil fuels and minerals brought from the US, the EU, Japan and India, among others. The US ranks second by a close margin, with both countries importing about 1.6 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent.

    China’s industrial engine starts to break its fossil fuel habit

    Richard Baron, ECF’s industrial policy and trade director, said Chinese clean energy products are key for reducing emissions around the world, adding that Europe is “not able to do without those technologies” for its energy transition.

    “China has an emissions trading system that counts CO2 differently there. But if China and the EU were to agree on some kind of translation mechanism to say ‘this is how we measure it’, and companies can understand the protocol to navigate both markets, that would set the tone for a lot of other conversations,” he said at the platform’s launch event last week.

    The analysis suggests that if the EU and China aligned their climate requirements for products, the resulting standards could influence trade flows representing about 7% of global emissions.

    Baron said there’s “a plethora” of multilateral spaces to hold these discussions, including the climate and trade dialogue at the UN climate talks or the Climate Club at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which seeks to cut industrial emissions.

    Trade breaks into agenda of UN climate talks – but will it have teeth?

    Controversial trade measures

    Instruments like the Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – a recent piece of legislation that penalises emissions-heavy imported products – are one tool that could be used to address trade-related emissions, said Antoine Oger, executive director at the Institute for European Environmental Policy.

    He said a significant portion of imported emissions in Europe are already covered by CBAM, as it includes sectors like cement, iron and steel, fertilisers and aluminium. This then allows the EU “to engage in constructive dialogue with our trade partners”, he added.

    An employee of Dirostahl, a medium-size forging steel firm that produces large parts, works on a glowing steel element that has been heated in a classic natural gas-fired furnace to 1,200C in Remscheid, Germany, June 30, 2025. (Photo: REUTERS/Thilo Schmuelgen)

    An employee of Dirostahl, a medium-size forging steel firm that produces large parts, works on a glowing steel element that has been heated in a classic natural gas-fired furnace to 1,200C in Remscheid, Germany, June 30, 2025. (Photo: REUTERS/Thilo Schmuelgen)

    But across diplomatic summits, including at UN climate talks, emerging economies have pushed back heavily against the CBAM and other trade measures. The most recent BRICS declaration adopted on Saturday by 11 such countries – including China, India and Russia – condemns “protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives”.

    The declaration calls for the “elimination of such unlawful measures”, which they argue have “far-reaching negative implications for the human rights, including the rights to development, health and food security” of vulnerable communities.

    “The question of responsibility is a political question,” Oger said. “These emissions exist – they are emitted somewhere to make a product that will be consumed elsewhere. So you can debate responsibility but the idea is for the two parts to recognise there’s a problem.”

    The aim, he added “is not to point fingers, but to accept this is a reality of our emissions profiles and ask what we can do about it”.

    The post International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored appeared first on Climate Home News.

    International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored

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