Earlier this month, China published its long-awaited plan to reduce methane emissions.
The document is seen as an important step for China, which is the world’s largest emitter of methane.
It has a focus on emissions from the energy, agriculture and waste sectors. It lists a series of actions, but lacks numerical targets for emissions reduction.
The action plan had been promised in the US-China joint climate statement, issued during the COP26 climate talks in 2021. It finally emerged just days before the launch this month of a new US-China “Sunnylands statement” on climate, in which China pledged to expand its next international climate pledge to cover all greenhouse gases, not just carbon dioxide (CO2).
This Q&A looks at why tackling methane is important, where China’s methane emissions come from, what is in the action plan and whether it will be successful.
The Q&A also looks at the challenges China will face and the prospects for global cooperation.
This is an extended version of a Spotlight section published in the latest issue of Carbon Brief’s China Briefing email newsletter. For the latest on China’s energy and climate policy, sign up here.
- Why is tackling methane important?
- Where do methane emissions come from in China?
- What does the methane action plan say?
- Will China’s plan be effective in curbing emissions?
- What are the most pressing challenges in curbing methane?
- What does this mean for global cooperation on methane?
Why is tackling methane important?
Methane is a potent greenhouse gas, with around 30 times the warming power of CO2 100 years after it is emitted.
It is the second-biggest contributor to current warming, responsible for around 30% of the rise in global temperatures since the industrial revolution.
Reducing methane emissions by 30% by 2030 – the target of the global methane pledge, which China is not a signatory to – is the “fastest way to reduce near-term warming” and keep 1.5C “within reach”, according to a US and EU factsheet.
Cutting methane releases during fossil fuel production to 75% below current levels by 2030 is a key “pillar” to get on track for 1.5C, says the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Methane also leads to the formation of ground-level ozone, according to the UN environment programme, exposure to which causes one million premature deaths every year.
Where do methane emissions come from in China?
China is responsible for 10% of all human-caused methane emissions, with two estimates in 2021 placing its annual output at 58m tonnes (Mt) and 65Mt, respectively, equivalent to 1.7-1.9bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e).
This makes China the world’s largest emitter of the gas, according to the IEA.
Around 40% of China’s methane emissions are gas that escapes during the mining of coal, according to the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress (iGDP), a Chinese thinktank.
Another 42% is from agriculture, including livestock and rice cultivation, says the iGDP. Different studies attribute different levels of agricultural emissions to different sources, but, generally, cattle and mid-season rice paddies are considered the largest contributors.
Meanwhile, 10% is attributed to waste and wastewater as a whole. At least 3.2Mt of methane was emitted solely from animal manure, as per China’s last official tally in 2014.
Coal-mine methane emissions are particularly challenging to detect, according to the IEA, as they are “diffuse”.
It adds that abandoned mines, which could contribute “almost one fifth” of global methane emissions, cannot be included in calculations as “reliable data” is often unavailable.
“Many of the methane sources are fugitive emissions, which are usually difficult to accurately account for,” Zhang Yuzhong, a researcher at China’s Westlake University, tells Reuters.
Climate Home reports, however, that according to Global Energy Monitor (GEM) research, “the real figure for coal-mine methane [in China] is almost double what the government claims”.
Shanxi province in northern China, the country’s largest coal-producing region, could emit as much methane from its coal mines as the rest of the world combined, according to GEM.
What does the methane action plan say?
The Methane Emission Control Action Plan, released jointly by the ministry of ecology and environment (MEE) and 10 other Chinese ministries, describes China’s approach as to “control methane emissions in a scientific, rational and orderly manner”, with a specific focus on the energy, agriculture and waste sectors.
It includes 20 “key tasks” in emissions monitoring, technological innovation, development of policy frameworks, global cooperation and other areas.
During the 15th five year plan period (2026-2030), monitoring and accounting of methane emissions will be “significantly enhanced”, it adds. Methane utilisation, emissions control technologies and policy frameworks will be “effectively improved”.
Other notable pledges include that, by 2030, oil and gas producers will “strive” to “gradually” eliminate flaring, and utilisation of coal mine methane will reach 6bn cubic metres annually.
This “corresponds to about 10%” of the coal-mining sector’s total methane emissions, says Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).
(While current levels of coal-mine methane utilisation are unknown, various Chinese oil and gas giants, including Sinopec, PetroChina and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, have been “actively promoting methane emission reduction”, say two researchers from the Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) in China.)
In agriculture, the methane emissions intensity per unit of agricultural product will “steadily decline”. “Utilisation” of livestock waste will reach 80% by 2025 and 85% by 2030.
The document calls for control of both enteric fermentation – the digestive process in ruminant livestock – and methane emissions from rice paddies. The language around rice is more tentative, with calls for control to be pursued “in an orderly manner”.
Will China’s plan be effective in curbing emissions?
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), a global NGO with a significant presence in China, has written on WeChat it believes that, “in the long term”, the plan will provide “a clear guiding framework” and better coordination of methane reduction efforts in China.
EDF also points to the role that the plan’s alignment with carbon trading policy could play in methane reduction, by helping to establish “a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system” for the gas. This could underpin a methodology for methane in the “China Certified Emission Reductions” (CCER) mechanism, China’s voluntary carbon market.
Dr Teng Fei, deputy director of the Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy at Tsinghua University, has similarly identified the impact on carbon trading in comments to China Dialogue.
In his view, China needs to establish either binding emissions standards or subsidies for methane utilisation through carbon markets, saying that, without the incentive, “policy targets will be hard to deliver”.
Dr Chen Meian, program director and senior analyst at iGDP, tells Carbon Brief that some of the sector-specific targets in the plan “can help China to reduce methane emissions”, particularly from coalbed methane, livestock manure, sewage sludge and landfill waste.
However, she adds, it is “difficult” for China to set hard targets at this point.
“China is still facing challenges in methane emission data monitoring and data collection”, she says, “[which is why] China also listed the improvement of methane emissions MRV as one of its key tasks”.
Others are less convinced. The plan is “too ambiguous”, “descriptive” and lacking in quantitative targets, Refinitiv lead carbon analyst Yan Qin tells Reuters.
What are the most pressing challenges in curbing methane?
Developing technological solutions to reduce methane emissions from the agriculture sector and sewage treatment will be “crucial” to achieve carbon neutrality, iGDP tells the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. (China’s 2060 carbon neutrality target includes all greenhouse gas emissions, according to climate envoy Xie Zhenhua.)
Methods to cut down methane emissions in the agriculture and waste sectors are already in practice in China, including system of rice intensification (SRI), using drought-resistant rice, installing digesters in farms to utilise biogas – for example, in electricity generation – and optimising livestock feed to reduce enteric fermentation.
However, many of these methods are challenging to scale. SRI “isn’t practical”, according to China Dialogue, as farmers found it confusing.
Cattle farms “tend to be small-scale and use non-standardised methods”, researchers at the Feed Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences tell the outlet, making it hard to assess emissions and plan accordingly.
Nevertheless, methods that reduce methane through efficiency gains or monetising emissions cuts could gain more traction.
“I don’t have strong feelings about climate change, melting ice caps or rising sea levels”, one farm executive tells China Dialogue, “but I believe waste has its value…That’s why I’m interested.”
The challenge lies in resolving the “large initial investment, insignificant short-term returns and high levels of technical risk” that deter companies from implementing methane utilisation projects, according to CUFE.
Challenges measuring methane emissions from coal mines also complicate China’s methane mitigation efforts. Ember’s methane analyst Anatoli Smirnov tells Climate Home that the “only real solution to reduce methane emissions is to close coal mines”.
The outlet also quotes CREA’s Myllyvirta saying there is a lack of “political will and buy-in” to curb methane in China. He states that China stopped releasing methane emissions figures in 2014, which he believes was to avoid calling attention to the “huge increase” in emissions since the Paris Agreement.
“I think China is trying to be realistic in target-setting [for its] coal-sector emissions,” Chen tells Carbon Brief. She adds that China “used to set ambitious targets” for coalbed methane capture and utilisation in its five-year plans, but that it repeatedly missed them.
She adds:
“This is in part due to coal mine safety concerns and a lack of cost-effective technologies in methane capture and use for low-concentration coalbed methane (with methane concentration of less than 30%) and ventilation air methane, which is the largest source of methane emissions in China’s energy sector.”
The MEE itself has signalled a cautious approach to curbing methane emissions. In a press conference covered by BJX News, it says that its implementation of the plan will “give full consideration to the actual affordability [of methane utilisation]…and take easy steps before difficult ones”.
One next step, the MEE adds, is to “strengthen coordination” between departments and define different stakeholders’ responsibilities.
Chen agrees that it would be important for local governments to “set their own methane plans…tailored to local conditions” and to improve data monitoring.
What does this mean for global cooperation on methane?
A week after the plan was released, the US and Chinese climate envoys John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua issued a declaration on enhancing climate cooperation, known as the “Sunnylands statement”.
It includes commitments to establish a working group that will look at several areas of cooperation, including methane emissions, and to create another working group to focus on “building on” their current national methane plans.
In addition, the pair have committed to include “actions/targets” on methane reduction in their nations’ next climate pledges under the Paris Agreement, which will also cover other non-CO2 greenhouse gases. They will host, with the UAE, a summit on non-CO2 gases at COP28.
COP28 president-designate Sultan Al Jaber said China’s announcement was a “crucial step for global climate action”, the Financial Times reports.
At COP26, China and the US issued a joint declaration committing to cooperate on a variety of climate change issues, including methane emissions.
In this 2021 declaration, China committed to issuing a national action plan on methane emissions. It finally released the plan just days before the Sunnylands statement.
“Methane is particularly important for our cooperation,” US climate envoy John Kerry told a US congressional hearing in July, according to Reuters.
Li Shuo, director of the China climate hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, has described China’s decision to publish the plan as “a goodwill gesture”, Bloomberg reports.
While it is “too early to tell” what other outcomes for bilateral methane cooperation might be, without China’s plan there “certainly wouldn’t have been further deals”, he adds.
However, differences in the sources of the US and China’s methane emissions could hamper cooperation. Teng tells China Dialogue that the main source of EU and US methane emissions is oil and gas, compared to coal mining for China.
Tackling coal-mining methane emissions is harder and more costly than oil and gas, analysts told Carbon Brief in 2020. This could be why China has not signed up to the global methane pledge, which may be easier for the EU and US to meet, says Teng.
The post Q&A: What does China’s new methane plan mean for its climate goals? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s new methane plan mean for its climate goals?
The launch of the Africa Energy Bank (AEB) has been put back yet again, raising doubts about the institution’s future ability to finance fossil fuel projects – its main objective – as global lenders retreat from such investments over climate concerns, experts told Climate Home News.
The bank, which had been billed to launch in September after a series of delays, is now scheduled to begin operations in November, according to the head of the African Energy Chamber, an advocacy body for the continent’s oil and gas sector.
Even as the world aims to transition away from fossil fuels, many African leaders have made clear they want to continue exploring and extracting the continent’s large oil and gas deposits – estimated at around 125 billion barrels of crude and over 600 trillion cubic feet of gas – to boost economic development.
As a group, Africa sided with a number of powerful oil-and-gas producing nations in blocking progress on negotiations to craft a global roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels at last year’s UN COP30 climate talks, although some countries did individually support the proposal.
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Meanwhile, major projects under development across the continent – including the 1,443-km East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) and Dangote’s 700,000-barrel-per-day Kenyan refinery – show that African governments see oil and gas as playing a significant role in meeting their energy and economic needs for many years to come.
In 2022, at a gathering of the African Petroleum Producers’ Organization (APPO) in oil-rich Angola, ministers from its member states adopted a resolution to create the Africa Energy Bank to finance projects for the production, use and trade of oil, gas and broader energy sources.
African control over energy resources
An article on the APPO website explains that the bank was conceived as a way to overcome “disenchantment” with fossil fuels among “the international community” which it said had crystallised around the “energy transition” concept.
“If Western countries, after having long taken advantage of the energy sources they now revile to develop, can afford the luxury of abandoning them, this is not the case in Africa,” it adds, noting that many of the continent’s economies are still largely dependent on oil and gas revenues.
A separate web page about the bank, also hosted on APPO’s website, says its objectives include financing the exploration, production and refining of oil and gas, as well as supporting member states in transitioning from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources “while ensuring energy security”.
Said Addi, a former executive with Shell and energy commodities trading house Gunvor, said the new bank was judged necessary because financing for hydrocarbons from many traditional international lenders has become constrained.
In trying to fill this financing gap, Africa is not simply setting up another fund to support oil and gas, he added. “It is also an attempt to give African countries greater control over how their energy resources and infrastructure are financed,” he explained.
Nigeria to host the AEB
The energy bank – a joint initiative of APPO and the African Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank) – has so far suffered several delays and is almost two years behind schedule. The initial plan was to start operations in January 2025, with Nigeria as the host country, but the bank’s opening was delayed to June of that year to allow Nigeria time to finalise the construction of the bank’s headquarters in Abuja.
After the government announced the completion of the offices in late November 2025, a new launch date was set for January 2026, which was moved back to April, June and then September. Now it has shifted again to November, raising concerns that the institution may be losing momentum.
Former Shell executive Addi said that if the capital is eventually paid in, the bank becomes operational and its first projects are commercially credible, then the delays will be regarded as normal teething troubles in setting up a multilateral institution. But, he added, scepticism will be justified if it continues to stall.
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Baron Lamarré, an oil and gas expert and former Petronas oil trader, said that missing “three deadlines in a row is not normal”, and warned that if the timeline slips again, “the story flips from ‘ambitious institution finding its footing’ to ‘good idea that lost momentum before it found any’.”
The Nigerian government, APPO and Afreximbank did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication.
The funding challenge
The Africa Energy Bank is targeting base capital of $5 billion, with plans to scale up to $120 billion within five years by mobilising private-sector funds. However, it is expected to start operations with initial seed capital of $500 million.
The funding plan is to have the 18 member countries of the APPO contribute $83 million each to the bank as equity for a combined $1.5 billion. Afreximbank, other non-APPO African countries and investors outside the continent are expected to provide the remaining $3.5 billion.
But even the initial $500 million has not been easy to mobilise. In May, APPO Secretary-General Farid Ghezali called on members to deliver on their pledges towards the startup goal before the end of June. But the delays suggest this may not have been met, with experts saying Africa may be finding it difficult to self-fund its oil and gas projects in the absence of international capital.
Lamarré said every extension of the deadline points to the fact that “raising fossil fuel capital in Africa without the majors and their financing networks is brutally hard”.
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Since 2020, Western lenders, export credit agencies and insurers have been in steady retreat from African hydrocarbons, he said, while oil majors are divesting their African assets, handing over fields to smaller local operators whose credit ratings are not high enough to borrow cheaply.
Even capital from China and the Gulf, which has partially filled the gap, cannot match the volume, tenor or pricing that Western investors once offered, Lamarré argued.
“If mobilising the first $500 million of seed capital [for the AEB] has taken this long, that’s the clearest signal yet of how steep the climb to $120 billion looks,” he said, noting that the continent’s energy financing gap is as large as $30 billion-$45 billion per year.
Africa’s investment landscape, meanwhile, has been shifting. While foreign direct investment dropped from a 2024 peak, inflows remained roughly one-third above the continent’s long-term average in 2025, according to the 2026 World Investment Report from UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). They are concentrated in a few sectors including critical minerals needed for renewable energy technologies, battery manufacturing and advanced industrial production.
At the same time, data on global energy investment from the International Energy Agency (IEA) shows that fossil fuel investment in Africa has declined over the last decade.
“Trojan horse” for fossil fuels
While the Africa Energy Bank struggles to get off the ground, climate campaigners have criticised its primary aim of financing oil and gas on the continent at a time when the world is starting to move away from high-carbon fuels to cleaner alternatives.
Bhekumuzi Dean Bhebhe, founder of Africa Change Lab, described the bank as a “Trojan horse”, arguing that its focus on fossil fuel financing runs counter to the global energy transition and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 goals of sustainable development and inclusive growth.
The energy bank, he warned, “risks locking Africa into a new cycle of debt, dependency and fossil fuel entrenchment”, adding that its financing blueprint does not pave the way for a climate-resilient future. “In truth, it is to deepen the same extractive, carbon-heavy pathways that the continent should be moving away from,” he added.
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Kenya-based climate and energy expert Joab Okanda said the AEB’s plan to finance oil and gas is “a misplaced priority” and it should instead back clean energy in line with the policies of some of Africa’s major export markets like Europe.
In addition, the new bank could struggle to mobilise enough resources to advance large-scale oil and gas projects, he added, noting that its proposed $5-billion initial capital is equivalent to the cost of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline alone.
The AEB’s aim of backing more fossil fuels should be flipped “to support countries that are oil-dependent to start working on their transition plans”, Okanda said.
The post Launch of Africa Energy Bank delayed again in blow to oil and gas hopes appeared first on Climate Home News.
Launch of Africa Energy Bank delayed again in blow to oil and gas hopes
A booklet published by the UK’s opposition Conservative party includes a “cost of net-zero” that appears to have been doubled by a spreadsheet error.
The “common sense” policy document argues that “what people ultimately want is a government competent enough to solve the problems for which it takes responsibility”.
In a section that says “sophisticat[ed]…modelling” should not be a substitute for “political judgement”, the “Right Way” document disparages various estimates of the cost of net-zero.
The Conservative document then claims – incorrectly – that the government’s official adviser, the Climate Change Committee (CCC), had put the cost of net-zero at close to £1tn. It says:
“In 2020, the CCC estimated that its route to net-zero would cost £957bn.”
In fact, the CCC’s 2020 estimate was exactly half this amount – £478bn – and last year it published a revised figure of