The European Commission has set out a proposal to cut EU emissions 90% by 2040, with up to 3% coming via carbon credits purchased from other countries.
In a proposed amendment to EU climate legislation, the commission has laid out what it calls a “new way to get to 2040”, including “flexibilities” to ease the burden on member states.
Besides the limited use of carbon credits, the proposal also gives a potentially larger role to carbon dioxide (CO2) removal technologies and leaves the door open for weaker sectoral goals.
It has drawn criticism from climate NGOs and left-leaning European politicians, who argue that it “waters down” the EU’s climate ambitions and presents “considerable risks”.
Yet, the proposal is seen by many as an acceptable compromise option, following strong pushback from many member states to the 90% target, originally proposed last year.
With all nations expected to come forward with new international climate targets for 2035 by September and ahead of the COP30 climate summit, the 2040 goal will also be crucial in determining where the EU’s pledge lands.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief outlines what the amendment proposed by the commission includes, why it has proved controversial and what is expected to happen next.
What has the European Commission proposed?
The European Commission has proposed an amendment to the EU Climate Law, which would set a target for a 90% reduction in net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2040, compared to 1990 levels.
It will “give certainty to investors, innovation, strengthen industrial leadership of our businesses and increase Europe’s energy security”, the commission says.
In a statement, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, added:
“As European citizens increasingly feel the impact of climate change, they expect Europe to act. Industry and investors look to us to set a predictable direction of travel. Today we show that we stand firmly by our commitment to decarbonise [the] European economy by 2050. The goal is clear, the journey is pragmatic and realistic.”
The proposal includes new “flexibilities”, such as a limited role for “high-quality international credits” from 2036, the use of domestic permanent emissions removals within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and additional flexibilities across certain hard-to-decarbonise sectors.
These additional flexibilities are designed to allow countries to meet targets in a cost-effective and “socially fair” way, the commission adds. It says they will provide the possibility that a member state could compensate for a struggling land-use sector with overachievement in other areas, such as emissions from waste or transport.
The target will “send a signal to the global community” that the EU will “stay the course on climate change, deliver the Paris Agreement and continue engaging with partner countries to reduce global emissions”, says the commission.
It has been announced ahead of the UN COP30 climate summit in Belém, Brazil in November.
The European Commission says it will now work with the council presidency – representing EU member state governments – to finalise the EU’s climate pledges for 2035, so that the EU can submit its “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.
The EU was among the 95% of countries that missed the UN deadline to submit their NDCs by February of this year.
A recent update from the European parliament noted that the EU “needs to update its NDC…by September”, in order to meet an extended deadline from the UN.
In 2023, independent advisory body the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change recommended that the EU should aim for net emissions reductions of 90-95% by 2040, compared to 1990 levels.
As such, the advisory board said that the bloc would need to limit its cumulative emissions from 2030-50 to 11-14bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e), in order to be in line with bringing global warming down to 1.5C by the end of the century.
The 90% emissions reduction figure set out by the EU is on the lower end of guidance.
Why is the commission making this proposal now?
The European Commission’s new proposal builds on previous targets and roadmaps, representing a significant step towards enshrining the 2040 target in law.
In July 2021, the European Climate Law officially entered into force, setting a target of a net GHG reduction of at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, as shown in the chart below.
Rules were introduced governing sectors, such as clean energy, energy efficiency and transport, among others, to help meet this target.
If all were successful in their implementation, they would reduce emissions by roughly 57% by 2030, according to a European parliament assessment in 2022.

Subsequently, the commission has been working on developing a target for 2040, as an interim benchmark between the 2030 target and the EU goal – announced in 2018 – to be “climate neutral” by 2050. At this point, the bloc would reach net-zero emissions overall and would stop adding to global warming.
In 2024, the commission published an impact assessment, detailing the underlying qualitative analysis it had undertaken around emissions reduction targets for 2040.
This, together with the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change’s report (detailed above) and advice from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, formed the basis for the 90% target, the commission says.
The headline 90% target for 2040 was announced as part of a roadmap outlined by the commission in February 2024.
The roadmap kicked off a lengthy process in which EU politicians and institutions worked to cement the details of this target, ahead of this week’s proposal on turning it into law.
This process included “substantial engagement” with member states, the European parliament, stakeholders, civil society and citizens, the commission says.
In particular, certain European countries have been placing pressure on the commission to change or adapt the 2040 target, slowing the progress of this week’s proposal, which had been due out in February.
For example, Italy called for the goal to be weakened and France asked for “flexibility” to be introduced (See: Who has supported and opposed the proposed climate target?).
The commission hopes that publishing the proposed target now will allow it to be factored into the EU’s upcoming NDC, in which it will establish an emissions reduction target for 2035.
What does it say about international carbon credits and ‘flexibilities’?
The European Commission’s proposal sets out a “pragmatic” pathway towards the 2040 target, including specific measures to give EU member states “flexibility”.
Of these, the one that has received the most attention is to allow limited use of international carbon credits, under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, starting in 2036.
In effect, this flexibility means that emissions within the EU would only need to fall to 87% below 1990 levels by 2040, with the remaining 3% taking place overseas.
This would mean member states could buy credits generated by emissions-cutting projects in other countries and count those cuts towards their own targets.
Other nations, including Japan and Switzerland, have already welcomed the use of international credits to meet their climate goals.
In an unusual intervention that coincided with the proposal itself, the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change stated that the EU should not count such credits towards the 2040 target. It said:
“Using international carbon credits to meet this target, even partially, could undermine domestic value creation by diverting resources from the necessary transformation of the EU’s economy.”
The board also mentioned other concerns that are frequently levelled at “carbon offsetting”, such as credits not resulting in real-world emissions cuts.
The commission’s proposal refers to “high-quality international credits under Article 6”, but does not specify which types of credit. This leaves the door open for lower quality options.
For example, carbon trading under Article 6.2 is subject to far less oversight than trading of Article 6.4 credits.
The proposal also states that: “The origin, quality criteria and other conditions concerning the acquisition and use of any such credits shall be regulated in union law.”
This suggests that the EU would conduct its own assessment of any credits used by member states, beyond the rules that have been negotiated at an international level.
Jonathan Crook, the lead expert on global carbon markets at Carbon Market Watch, tells Carbon Brief that additional safeguards would be “essential”, given outstanding issues with Article 6 carbon credits.
A Q&A accompanying the commission proposal states that credits would be bought from “credible and transformative” projects in nations with Paris-aligned climate goals.
It mentions direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) as examples of the kinds of projects that the EU could source credits from.
This could severely limit the pool of available credits, because – as it stands – almost all carbon credits are from tree planting, forest conservation and clean-energy projects.
DACCS and BECCS projects could result in relatively permanent carbon removal. Crook says this would be one of the “many necessary safeguards” needed for credit purchases, although he points to potential issues with such projects. He adds:
“This potential durability criterion is only mentioned in the Q&A, rather than in the actual commission proposal and so currently has very limited standing unless it is introduced [into the legal text] during the co-legislation process.”
There are two additional “new flexibilities” mentioned in the commission’s proposal, to help member states meet the 2040 emissions target more easily.
One is the inclusion of permanent carbon dioxide (CO2) removal in the EU ETS, something that was already being discussed as part of an ETS revision.
This would mean that DACCS and BECCS projects in EU member states could sell credits to help high-emitting companies, such as steel plant operators, stay within their ETS limits.
Paying for such credits could become more appealing as the number of available emissions “allowances” under the overall “cap” for ETS system shrinks and the allowances become more expensive.
The commission says this would help to “compensate for residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors”, referring to those that are expensive or difficult to reduce to zero.
The need to remove CO2 from the atmosphere is widely recognised and inclusion in the ETS could help to drive investment into early-stage technologies, such as DACCS.
However, there are concerns that focusing on removals diverts investment from readily available technologies that cut emissions, such as electric-arc furnaces for steel plants.
In its recommendations, the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change says there should be separate targets for emissions reductions and removals. This would ensure the removals contribute to EU targets “without deterring emission reductions”, it says.
Finally, the commission’s proposal also includes a vague mention of “enhanced flexibility across sectors, to support the achievement of targets in a cost-effective way”.
Linda Kalcher, executive director of the thinktank Strategic Perspectives, tells Carbon Brief that this is “alluding to the fact that we might see weakening of some laws”.
Michael Forte, a senior policy advisor at thinktank E3G, expands on this, noting that it could mean member states adjusting emissions targets between different parts of the EU climate architecture, depending on where they were over- or underperforming.
“I would infer that this means letting member states transfer a greater share of their mitigation efforts between these different instruments,” Forte tells Carbon Brief.
Kalcher notes that such changes cannot be regulated in this law, but instead would need to be part of the expected 2040 framework or other pieces of law:
“They are more alluding to future changes, instead of making them now. So that…gives confidence to the countries that have concerns [about the 2040 target] that something will happen.”
Who has supported and opposed the proposed climate target?
Climate campaigners and left-leaning politicians were highly critical of the “flexibilities” included in the commission’s proposal, in particular the use of international carbon credits.
The options proposed were described by civil-society groups as “creative accounting” and a “dangerous new precedent” that relies on “outsourcing Europe’s responsibility” to other countries.
The European parliament’s centre-left Socialists and Democrats coalition issued a statement warning that “the inclusion of international carbon credits as a means to meet the target carries considerable risks”.
Critics also noted that using such flexibilities contradicted the official advice offered by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change.
Yet the proposal, presented as a “new way to get to 2040”, is widely viewed as an attempt to find a political compromise against a tricky geopolitical backdrop.
It allows the EU to aim for the target set out by its scientific advisers, albeit at the lower end of the “90-95%” emissions reduction that had been proposed. This is in spite of a strong political pushback from some member states.
A statement released by Peter Liese and Christian Ehler, German members of the European parliament’s centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) group, explained:
“We think it’s very dangerous to criticise the European Commission because they intend to include flexibility in their proposal on the 2040 target. We don’t see a majority in parliament nor council for any 2040 target without flexibility.”
Some member states, including Spain and Denmark, supported the 90% target without asking for major concessions. Others, including Poland and Italy, have argued for a less stringent headline goal.
Meanwhile, others pushed for some kind of compromise during discussions of the new target.
Notably, the newly elected, right-leaning German government gave qualified support for the 90% goal in its coalition agreement, subject to conditions such as the inclusion of international carbon credits. Other influential nations have also increasingly stressed the need for “flexibility” around the target.
Meanwhile, according to Politico, France has been part of a push – alongside “climate laggards” Hungary and Poland – to separate discussions of the EU’s domestic 2040 target from its international 2035 NDC pledge.
According to the news outlet, such decoupling could result in a weaker 2035 target, compared to the 2035 target that is expected to be derived from the 90% reduction 2040 goal.
How does the goal fit with the EU’s industrial growth plans?
The commission says its 2040 proposal goes “hand in hand” with its clean industrial deal strategy, its affordable energy action plan and its “competitiveness compass” plan.
Alongside tabling its 2040 climate goal, the commission issued a new “communication” on “delivering on the clean industrial deal”. (The deal was first announced in February.)
The communication says that “decarbonisation and reindustrialisation are two sides of the same coin” and reaffirms that the aim of the deal is to “enable the EU to lead in
developing the clean-technology markets of the future”.
The commission says delivery of the deal is “already underway”. It points to the adoption of the clean industrial deal state aid framework on 25 June, an €85bn ($100bn) state-aid package for helping member states transition their economies.
Environmental law charity Client Earth said a draft version of the framework risked “entrenching support for fossil gas and fossil based low-carbon gases”.
The clean industrial deal communication also notes that the commission this week published recommendations on tax incentives for speeding up the energy transition.
On 18 June, the European parliament and council agreed on a commission proposal to simplify the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a policy for taxing carbon-intensive imports at levels equivalent to the EU ETS.
The agreement introduces a new exemption threshold of 50 tonnes for CBAM goods, meaning small and medium-sized companies that do not exceed this weight of imports per year will now be exempt from the measure.
EU climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra described it as a “win for both climate policy and competitiveness of our companies”, with the new measure meaning 90% of companies will now be exempt from the CBAM, but 99% of emissions will still be covered.
Previous analysis has found that, in isolation, the CBAM will have a limited impact on global emissions.
What comes next?
Before the target can be adopted, it must be agreed by member states and pass through the European parliament.
Once the parliament and national ministers have agreed on their separate positions, three-way “trialogue” negotiations between them and the commission can begin with the aim of finalising the 2040 legislative proposal.
All nations were asked to submit new 2035 climate pledges, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), to the UN by February of this year (see: What has the European Commission proposed?). The EU was among the vast majority of parties to miss the deadline.
UN climate chief Simon Stiell has now asked all parties to submit their NDCs “by September”. This is to allow time for the preparation of a report on the collective ambition of all nations’ pledges before COP30 in November.
The EU’s NDC will include an “indicative 2035 figure” derived from the bloc’s 2040 climate target, according to the commission.
The commission says it will work with the Danish presidency of the EU council and member states to finalise its NDC.
It is expected that the EU will aim to finalise both its 2035 NDC and its 2040 climate goal ahead of the next UN general assembly, which starts on 9 September in New York.
The post Q&A: European Commission’s proposal to cut EU emissions 90% by 2040 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: European Commission’s proposal to cut EU emissions 90% by 2040
Climate Change
Climate adaptation helps African nations tackle rising conflict over resources
Somali farmers and herders battered by droughts, floods and decades of conflict are starting to get help in the form of climate-smart crops and animals, new wells and restoration of barren landscapes to boost their resilience in a warming world.
Some of this support is being provided under Ugbaad, the Somali name for a new project meaning “fresh sprouting pasture”. Backed by an $80-million grant from the UN’s Green Climate Fund, it is enabling farmers to earn a more reliable living as climate shocks intensify. The project is also reducing conflict tensions among communities, according to a government representative.
Abdiaziz Ibrahim Aden, adaptation and resilience lead at Somalia’s Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, said farmers who lost their land to floods and erosion have been able to rehabilitate it and plant crops like banana and sesame for export. “Their productivity is increasing now,” he told Climate Home News.
He said the project, which aims to benefit over 2 million people in total, has made young people less vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. Beyond improved water access for pastoralists, the initiative also includes ways to disseminate timely climate information to communities and build government capacity to keep land and ecosystems in better shape.
Nonetheless, Somalia remains one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, with millions of its people facing food insecurity, displacement and recurring climate disasters.


Poor rains and major aid shortfalls have forced critical food and nutrition programmes to close, worsening hunger. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a global system used to measure hunger crises, has warned that nearly 2 million Somali children could face acute malnutrition this year.
Climate change – a threat multiplier
Somalia’s economy hinges on agriculture and repeated climate shocks continue to inflame tensions related to farming and food production. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), every two in three conflicts in the country stems from competition over natural resources.
During drought periods, disputes often flare up among neighbouring communities over scarce water sources as herders move with their livestock in search of boreholes, Haji said.
Clashes can quickly escalate in Somalia where many herders carry guns for protection, he added. “If two people meet at the water borehole and they fight over that area, then the war prolongs and extends from that zone to other zones,” he explained.
Aid agencies grapple with climate adaptation in fragile states
Somalia is not alone. Across conflict-affected parts of Africa, climate change is fast becoming more than just an environmental challenge. From the shrinking of Lake Chad in the Sahel region to devastating floods in South Sudan and prolonged droughts across the Horn of Africa, stronger climate impacts are intensifying competition to maintain livelihoods in regions already struggling with weak governance, displacement and insecurity.
Alec Crawford, director of nature for resilience at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), described climate change as a “threat multiplier” that worsens already existing social and economic tensions. “It is a contributing factor to violence and instability and conflict, but it’s not the sole driver,” he emphasised.
Fragile states coordinate peacebuilding and adaptation
The growing overlap between climate vulnerability and insecurity is forcing governments and development agencies to rethink adaptation efforts. This was evident at a recent conference in Nigeria that brought together conflict-affected African countries including Burkina Faso, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad.
At the event, governments explored how peacebuilding can be integrated with their national climate adaptation plans, helping prevent conflict in communities facing mounting pressure over fertile land, water and other natural resources.
For many of these countries, none of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals will be achieved until peace and security are in place, Crawford said. They are currently trapped in a vicious cycle. “Some of these climate impacts are potentially worsening the conflict dynamics, while at the same time conflict is really getting in the way of reducing vulnerabilities and adapting to climate change,” he explained.
Politically fragile countries are increasingly looking for solutions to reduce the tensions within their borders that are preventing them from tackling climate change impacts. At the COP28 climate summit in Dubai in 2023, governments and aid agencies issued a joint call for “bolder collective action to build climate resilience at the scale and speed required in highly vulnerable countries and communities”.
Crawford said many fragile states are overstretched and under-resourced because of conflict. He pointed to South Sudan as an example of a country simultaneously trying to house displaced people, rebuild schools and clinics, and restore basic infrastructure after war, making climate adaptation difficult to prioritise. However, ignoring climate risks could undermine any progress such countries manage to make, he warned.
UN adaptation metrics exclude conflict
Another thorny problem is finding ways to track progress on climate adaptation in conflict-affected states. A set of indicators to measure how countries are doing in their efforts to implement the Paris Agreement’s Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), finally agreed 10 years later at COP30 in Brazil, deliberately left out metrics relating to peace and conflict.
Katharina Schmidt, policy advisor at the NAP Global Network, a global initiative coordinated by IISD to help developing countries advance their climate adaptation planning, pointed to longstanding reluctance to formally integrate peace and conflict issues into core UN climate frameworks. This, she said, is partly because some countries want climate finance to stay separate from funding for peacebuilding and development.
However, Schmidt said the absence of specific indicators in the GGA framework does not mean adaptation in fragile and conflict-affected states is being ignored. “Everybody agrees that there needs to be adaptation in [these] states,” she said, even if it is “often not reflected prominently in these negotiation documents”.
New data shows rich nations likely missed 2025 goal to double adaptation finance
This is why the NAP Global Network, which organised the recent conference in Abuja, is trying to strengthen coordination and peer learning among conflict-affected countries, helping them overcome some of the barriers that make adaptation planning difficult.
Many lack the climate data and infrastructure needed to understand and respond to climate risks, in some cases because conflicts destroy weather stations and disrupt climate monitoring systems, Crawford said. To fill these gaps, the network is helping countries tap into existing global systems and open-source data platforms.
Bridging the gap through the NAP process
For over a decade, the process for putting together National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), established under the UN climate framework in 2010, has helped countries identify climate vulnerabilities, integrate adaptation into long-term development planning and strengthen resilience to climate impacts.
Crawford, who also works with the NAP Global Network, said one core pillar is to strengthen governments’ capacity to plan and implement adaptation measures across ministries.
As part of its NAP process, Somalia conducted vulnerability assessments in several states and regions, helping the government understand how climate impacts, risks and adaptation needs vary across the country, according to government official Aden. This also revealed previously undocumented challenges facing different communities, from drought and water scarcity to coastal threats and land degradation.
“The NAP project helped Somalia identify some cases that were not known before,” he said, adding that it allowed the government to plan its budget to meet differing regional needs.




More than 6,000 kilometres away, the Liberian government, through its NAP process, is also identifying potential sources of tension around land rights, tenure and resource distribution, particularly as people fleeing conflict in Burkina Faso cross into Liberia through Ivory Coast.
Arthur Becker, Liberia’s NAP coordinator, said Liberia’s ongoing NAP review process will incorporate peacebuilding considerations that were largely absent from its current 2020-2030 adaptation plan.
The NAP process aims to help countries move beyond short-term responses to climate disasters, Crawford said.
“It’s really about looking to the medium and long term and saying, this is how the climate is changing within our country, this is going to have fundamental impacts on our development trajectory – how do we put adaptation to climate change at the heart of that development trajectory?”
Nigeria addresses conflict and climate risks together
Nigeria, which is already grappling with multiple security challenges linked to resource competition and environmental pressures, is also integrating peacebuilding into its NAP.
A climate risk and vulnerability assessment found that factors such as drought and desertification across northern Nigeria have made food less available and encouraged criminality and banditry. Down south, sea level rise, coastal erosion and flooding are destroying livelihoods and property and displacing people. Those impacts are increasingly fuelling tensions between communities and driving protests over environmental injustice.
Nigeria’s deadly flood exposes urgent need for climate adaptation plan
Kayode Aboyeji, Nigeria’s NAP coordinator, said it was in the course of the NAP process that “we realised that some of the conflicts in Nigeria are not just politically driven but that environmental issues, demand for natural resources, [and the] threat of climate change are some of the triggers.”
He said Nigeria has now integrated conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into its NAP – which has yet to be formally approved and published – recognising the need for climate responses that do not worsen existing tensions. It is also raising awareness among key actors, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, around the importance of adopting conflict-sensitive approaches to climate adaptation.
In addition, Nigeria has developed adaptation strategies tailored to each of its geopolitical zones, which local authorities can use to better address climate-related challenges in their regions.
Finance a major barrier to implementation
While countries are increasingly integrating peacebuilding into their climate adaptation planning, financing such work on the ground remains a major challenge, especially for fragile African states already grappling with insecurity, debt and weak public finances.
Nigeria’s Aboyeji said the country’s NAP requires resources to roll it out across the country. While the government is looking to development bodies, philanthropies and the private sector for support, it is also exploring domestic financing mechanisms such as green bonds and budget appropriations to help fund implementation.
For countries like South Sudan – where ongoing instability continues to undermine the government’s ability to finance adaptation measures – the struggle is even more pronounced. Peter Jonglei Kureng, acting deputy director for its Budget Policy Directorate, said the government tries to include adaptation in national budgets, but implementation often stalls because the promised funds are never released.
“We can budget for it, but when it’s time for execution, there is no money,” he said.
Can climate funders overcome fear to tread in conflict zones?
Liberia faces similar constraints. Becker said adaptation interventions are expensive, and the country is committing domestic resources to climate action even while expecting the bulk of financing to come from international partners.
The financing gap remains one of the biggest hurdles to adaptation efforts. New OECD data shows that wealthy nations are likely to have missed their 2025 goal of doubling adaptation finance for developing countries, with funding reaching just under $35 billion in 2024 – far below estimated needs.
While international support remains non-negotiable and should be increased, especially for fragile countries, Crawford said they cannot rely solely on external funding, especially as many donors are cutting their overseas development assistance.
Governments will also need to explore how to harness more domestic resources, while recognising the role private-sector actors can play, he added.
“Advocating for more of that financing flowing into adaptation is going to be crucial, because after all the work that goes into NAPs, it’s essential that they turn into concrete measures and don’t just gather dust on a shelf,” he said.
The post Climate adaptation helps African nations tackle rising conflict over resources appeared first on Climate Home News.
Climate adaptation helps African nations tackle rising conflict over resources
Climate Change
Threads of Earth’s Underground Fungal Networks Are Long Enough to Reach Beyond the Solar System
For the first time ever, researchers have quantified the length and mass of arbuscular mycorrhizal fungal networks globally and mapped the ecosystems where they are densest.
Hidden underground around the world lie 110 quadrillion kilometers of arbuscular mycorrhizal fungal networks—webs of ultra-thin threads that, if connected in a single line, would stretch almost a billion times thge distance between the Earth and the sun, according to new research published in Science on Thursday.
Threads of Earth’s Underground Fungal Networks Are Long Enough to Reach Beyond the Solar System
Climate Change
Fewer journalists register for Bonn talks, as cuts to climate reporting bite
The number of journalists registered to attend the annual climate negotiations in Bonn has declined this year, as climate reporters have been let go and media coverage of climate issues falls around the world.
Data from UN Climate Change, which runs the two weeks of talks, shows that just 135 media representatives have signed up to attend. Climate Home News analysis of previous data shows this is the lowest figure since 2021, when COVID-19 restrictions limited travel and the Bonn talks were held in a hybrid format to enable online participation.
The number of journalists that actually attend the talks will not be known until later this month but is typically significantly less than are registered. Press conferences, held back-to-back each day by campaign groups, have been sparsely attended in the first few days and often filled mainly with climate campaigners and researchers rather than journalists.
Alexandra Endres, a reporter for German-language website Table Briefings, told Climate Home News in Bonn there are fewer German journalists covering the conference in-person. “I think it is important to have more journalists covering the negotiations because when the climate coverage increases, the interest of the public grows,” she said.
Media outlets that have registered fewer journalists than previous years, or no journalists, include global heavyweights like Reuters, Bloomberg and the BBC, as well as German outlets like Deutsche Welle and ZDF television, and specialist publications like business information service Argus and climate broadcaster We Don’t Have Time.
Activist Harjeet Singh, who is in Bonn advising the Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative, said that “the empty press seats here in Bonn are a warning signal. While the world’s gaze is often fixed on the annual COP summits, the real-world consequences of the climate crisis—from financing the fossil fuel transition to protecting vulnerable populations—are being shaped, or ignored, in these mid-year negotiations right now.”
“Journalists are the essential eyes and ears of the public,” he said. “We need them to shine a light on these rooms: hold negotiators accountable, defend the principles of equity and historical responsibility, and ensure that ‘technical’ negotiations do not become an excuse for delay.”
UN Climate Change said they could not comment on the situation at this point in the Bonn talks.
Climate coverage is falling
Outside of Bonn and the official UN climate negotiations, coverage of climate change is falling to lows not seen since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to analysis of newspapers and television reporting conducted by the Media and Climate Change Observatory (MECCO).
MECCO’s head Max Boykoff told Climate Home News that climate coverage in the first five months of 2025 was 35% down on the same period of 2025 and 41% less than in 2021. New analysis by the Yale Programme on Climate Change Communication found a similar fall in climate coverage in 2026.
Boykoff said media attention has been drawn away from climate change to issues like the Iran war and now the World Cup getting underway in North America.
While both stories have climate implications, he said, the media have “failed to connect the dots” on the conflict in the Middle East, with coverage focusing on the politics, air strikes and violence of the war. “Reporters have been pulling up short,” he said.
He added that since 2025 there have been cuts to climate teams at US outlets like the Washington Post, CBS, National Public Radio and the Los Angeles Times. On top of this, the Thomson Reuters Foundation’s Context website has been shut down and Politico recently folded specialist environmental outlet E&E News into its broader energy coverage.
Mark Hertsgaard, head of global journalism collaboration Covering Climate Now, also said that fewer reporters at Bonn is “part of a larger pattern”. He said no US television network sent reporters to the recent Santa Marta conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels “and as a result they missed covering what turned out to be a landmark development in the climate story”.
“No one can know if the Bonn talks will yield something similar until the [they] actually take place and conclude. But the fewer journalists that are on the scene, the less the world’s people and policymakers will know about that. And that’s a problem,” he said.
Media may also have been put off from attending by a new registration system which is more complicated, especially for freelance journalists. In addition, the rise in jet fuel prices has made travelling by plane to Bonn much more expensive than last year and reporters from many developing countries continue to face hurdles getting visas to enter the Schengen area, of which Germany is part.
Diego Arguedas Ortiz, who led the Oxford Climate Journalism Network from 2022 until it was shut down by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in 2025, said journalists can’t cover the talks so well remotely.
While press conferences, plenaries and open negotiating sessions are broadcast for the public to watch on the UNFCCC’s website, Ortiz said relying solely on this means “you miss the interviews in the hall”.
“You can´t catch scientists and ministers as they leave the rooms. And the audience is back home suffering. Because audiences are relying on reporters and editors to explain how these seemingly abstract negotiations have daily implications for them,” he explained.
The post Fewer journalists register for Bonn talks, as cuts to climate reporting bite appeared first on Climate Home News.
Fewer journalists register for Bonn talks, as cuts to climate reporting bite
-
Climate Change10 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases10 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy8 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Greenhouse Gases11 months ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测






