At night, the Lázaro Cárdenas refinery – Mexico‘s oldest, built in 1906 – lights up the city of Minatitlán, in the southern oil-producing state of Veracruz. Gas flaring turns night into day, inhabitants say, while a mix of industrial smells in the air reminds visitors they have arrived in Mexico’s oil and gas heartland.
“It is like Mordor,” said one resident, referring to the volcanic realm in the fantasy novel “The Lord of the Rings” with a tone between humour and resignation. “There are no more dark nights in Minatitlán,” said another local interviewed by Climate Home.
The refinery is a key pillar of Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicano (Pemex), and a testament to the firm’s problems with climate-heating methane gas. Pemex has struggled for years to control its rocketing methane emissions despite promises to the contrary and has failed to find an efficient way to use the gas – instead venting or flaring it, which releases methane into the atmosphere.
While its oil production went down in the decade from 2013 to 2023, Pemex now has one of the highest methane footprints per barrel of oil in the world, about eight times that of ExxonMobil and 83 times Saudi Aramco’s, according to local think-tank Mexico Evalúa.
Methane is a greenhouse gas that is around 80 times more potent than carbon dioxide in the first 20 years after it is emitted. Experts say cutting methane emissions is “low-hanging fruit” in tackling climate change.
To that end, a coalition of 160 countries – among them Mexico – have signed a global methane pledge, aiming to reduce emissions by 30% globally by 2030 with respect to 2020 levels. The initiative was first launched in 2021 at the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow.
Pemex has also joined voluntary initiatives like the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP) in 2014, under which ten oil and gas giants – including BP, Shell and TotalEnergies – promised to track and evaluate ways to reduce their emissions. Pemex left the partnership when it was ratcheted up in scope and relaunched in 2020. Meanwhile, the company’s emissions have continued to go up.
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Pemex’s rising methane emissions, even as its oil and gas production fell, could put Mexico’s ambitious climate goals at risk, analysts warned. The government recently announced at COP29 it will set a net zero greenhouse gas emissions target for 2050, making it the last G20 country to adopt a net zero pledge.
“This new ambition from the Mexican state to reach net zero by 2050 needs to consider the country’s energy policy and Pemex in particular,” said Fernanda Ballesteros, Mexico country manager at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI).
Like many of the world’s largest economies, Mexico is still due to submit a new nationally determined contribution (NDC) – a climate plan with a 2035 target to cut emissions of all greenhouse gases including methane. Countries are expected to file their new NDCs before September.
Mexican environment secretary Alicia Bárcena has called this round of climate plans “our last hope” to keep global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial times.
But the country’s new NDC will need to address Pemex’s emissions and show a clear plan for change, Ballesteros said. “[Pemex] is a very relevant actor for Mexico to achieve this [net zero] goal,” she added.
Fugitive methane
Minatitlán is a small city of just over 144,000 inhabitants, including a large floating population from neighbouring states like Oaxaca and Tabasco. Mexico’s southern region made headlines in 2021 when a pipeline rupture caused a gas leak that set fire to the ocean in the Gulf of Mexico.
Around the time of that incident, Pemex promised to reduce flaring (where gas is burned off), as well as venting (where it is released directly) and other types of fugitive emissions such as leaks, as outlined in its 2021-2025 business plan.
A Climate Home analysis of the company’s last four sustainability reports shows that Pemex did manage to reduce flaring, but gas venting and leaks kept growing. And over the past decade, methane emissions still followed an upward trend.
Many methane leaks from Pemex-run facilities – some major – have occurred in recent years, with one in the Deer Park refinery, located in Texas, leaving two dead in 2024.
Climate Home has identified another large leak of methane emissions from a Pemex plant in Minatitlán.
On April 28, 2024, methane monitoring platform Carbon Mapper detected one of the largest methane plumes in the Americas coming from a Pemex plant located right in the heart of the city. Climate Home confirmed that a second satellite data provider, Kayrros, also recorded this plume.
The plume released more than 16 tonnes of methane per hour into the atmosphere, a rate higher than any other single plume detected in oil-producing countries on the continent such as the US or Venezuela over that same year.
Both Kayrros and Carbon Mapper recorded the plume only once, meaning it is not possible to know how long it was active and thus the amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere.
The plume was detected over Pemex’s Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex, located 5km from the centre of Minatitlán, near a university and a hospital. The complex contains four ammonia plants, of which only one is currently operational, according to six Pemex workers interviewed.
Cosoleacaque produces ammonia from gas, which is then sold to make fertilisers. This is a business Pemex has recently resuscitated with support from President Claudia Sheinbaum, a climate scientist, in a bid to boost the domestic agriculture sector.
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Pemex plans to invest almost $400 million in reactivating petrochemical plants that were dormant for more than two decades. Cosoleacaque is one of the plants that was restarted in 2023 after operating at minimum levels for years. Workers said there are plans for all four ammonia plants in the complex to come back online, with a second one due to restart around March.
When asked about the leak there, workers suggested it could have gone undetected, because it was active on a Sunday. “If the leak happened on the weekend, there is no way we could have known, because we just work from Monday to Friday,” said one Pemex worker who requested anonymity.
Climate Home contacted Pemex for comment on its growing methane emissions and the plume detected over the Cosoleacaque complex, but did not receive a response.
Soaring emissions
Pemex received a boost from the government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2018, as he vowed to “rescue the national oil industry again”. Up to then, the company had struggled through years of high debt and plummeting production. Nonetheless, Mexico’s former president described oil as “the best business in the world”.
As the company started to drill more oil under the new mandate to increase production, it found itself with a lot of excess gas it could not take advantage of, mostly due to a lack of suitable infrastructure, analysts said. It resorted to flaring and venting the gas instead.
“Deliberate gas flaring and venting was a problem in the past, but it really worsened during the previous government’s six-year term,” said Adrián Duhalt, a Minatitlán-born energy researcher at US-based think-tank the Texas-Mexico Center.
As deliberate methane releases soared and accidental leaks continued, Pemex’s methane emissions rocketed, almost doubling between 2018 – when López Obrador was elected – and 2022, according to Pemex statistics.
The country’s current president, Sheinbaum, has doubled down on the previous administration’s spending on new oil and gas projects, with the goal of making Mexico self-sufficient in gasoline consumption.
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Health impacts unknown
While flaring is the most obvious source of emissions, leaks are frequent in Minatitlán, according to residents – but most are only perceptible when ammonia is emitted, because of its distinct smell. The oil and gas industry’s toll on the public health in the area remains largely unknown, analysts said.
Neighbours of the plant interviewed by Climate Home – most of whom have worked in the oil and gas industry themselves – raised concerns over ammonia leaks from the Cosoleacaque complex, which they said caused headaches, dizziness and allergies.
The city was ranked among the top 30 industrial cities in Mexico with worsening health indicators due to air pollution and other types of contamination, according to a 2023 multidisciplinary study sponsored by the Mexican government. Researchers reported rising cases of cancer, kidney failures, birth defects and spontaneous abortions.
In La Oaxaqueña, a neighbourhood immediately adjacent to the ammonia plants, people have learned to live with the chemical smell in the air, which they describe as “that of a public restroom” or “hair dye”.
“Coughing and sneezing is nothing – sometimes you want to run away. I once had to carry my daughter in the middle of the night to the hospital because she was vomiting,” said one woman, describing the effects of an ammonia leak incident. She wished to remain anonymous.
While experts say there is a research gap on the health impacts of oil and gas infrastructure in southern Mexico, a group of NGOs reported similar symptoms last year in the neighbouring state of Tabasco, where they found headaches, nausea and nosebleeds to be common among people living near Pemex plants.
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On the other side of Minatitlán, flaring at the Lázaro Cárdenas refinery adds to the air pollution, locals said. As the city relies on northern winds to blow away air pollutants from the refinery, the situation worsens when those winds shift or stop.
“Whenever the North [wind] is not blowing, you can really see the cloud of gases on the horizon, and sometimes also perceive the smell,” explained Ramón García, a lawyer who has worked on cases of health complications blamed on the local oil industry.
García said such legal cases are common in the region, especially those related to environmental damage and health impacts – but they almost never reach local administrative courts, as Pemex often settles early in the process, he added.
The details of the cases are also kept secret, García said. In one, involving an oil spill in the region of Papantla, north of Veracruz, the National Agency for Safety, Energy and Environment (ASEA) ordered Pemex to implement an 11-point plan to clean up the spill. When García asked for details of the case in January, he was told they were confidential.
Researcher Duhalt said such issues haven’t “affected the loyalty from the community to the company”.
From an academic standpoint, the Minatitlán-Coatzacoalcos corridor might be considered a sacrifice zone, “but from the standpoint of the head of family, it is just your source of employment,” he added.
Aging infrastructure
Pemex has struggled to control its methane emissions partly due to aging infrastructure and a lack of political will, analysts told Climate Home.
“There are already corporate procedures and technological changes for Pemex to [be able to] emit much less methane. It has been in their plans for years,” said Viviana Patiño Alcala, an energy researcher at think-tank México Evalúa. “But this has not translated into meaningful (emissions) reductions,” she added.
Ballesteros from NRGI noted that the company has focused most of its investments on new projects rather than maintaining existing ones.
In Minatitlán, one worker interviewed near the Cosoleacaque complex said, “it’s all messed up inside, but we are working to fix it”, while a neighbour said it was common to see fires and hear ambulances heading to the plant.
Ballesteros noted that the poor state of Pemex’s infrastructure is reflected in the number of leakage and spill events, which have increased since 2018, rising from 912 recorded events in 2018 to 1,211 incidents in 2023, according to the company’s annual statistics.
It may also be contributing to the high number of worker accidents. In 2023, Pemex reported 129 injuries and 11 fatalities. Its index for accident frequency in that same year was 57% above the industry standard set by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP).
A 2024 report by Reuters showed that the company put off urgent repairs to two of its offshore platforms, causing key components to fail and forcing it to flare large amounts of gas as a result.
“It’s very difficult for this trend [of rising methane emissions] to change soon,” said Patiño Alcala. “If this current administration has been clear in something it is that the environment is important, but it’s more important to provide Pemex with a market.”
Meanwhile, in Minatitlán, residents seem resigned to living with the clouds of gas and the light of the refinery’s flares painting the sky orange.
“With the leaks, even if we don’t see clearly, we know what is in the breeze,” said Irving, a 27-year-old oil worker who lives near the Cosoleacaque plant. “We know how this is, but that’s life for us.”
The post Oil giant Pemex fails to control methane emissions, threatening Mexico’s net zero goal appeared first on Climate Home News.
Oil giant Pemex fails to control methane emissions, threatening Mexico’s net zero goal
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
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Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
-
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Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.
Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.
The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.
An unprecedented territory grab for extraction
Deep sea mining is a speculative industry. Everywhere it has tried to launch, it has failed. From Norway to New Zealand, efforts to exploit the seabed have crashed into a wall of opposition: legal challenges, parliamentary blocks, and fierce resistance from local communities, scientists, the fishing industry, and environmental groups. The world is not waiting for deep sea mining; it is actively mobilising against it.
As scientists increasingly warn of potentially irreversible ecological destruction to the planet’s last pristine wilderness, independent financial audits have exposed the industry’s underlying economic model as it underestimates its own financial and legal risks. A powerful coalition of over 43 governments, Indigenous activists, hundreds of scientists, and corporate giants, from the fishing industry to major automakers, has formed a global line of defence to keep the deep ocean off-limits to mining.
Major global banks such as BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank and the Asian Development Bank have refused to finance these projects. Faced with international deadlock and financial stress, key players in an increasingly desperate industry have abandoned multilateral diplomacy. Instead, they have pivoted to a dangerous geopolitical gamble: teaming up with the Trump administration to unilaterally claim the global commons in blatant defiance of international law.
A unilateral power grab
Deep sea mining isn’t just an environmental disaster, it is a unilateral power grab disguised as a resource war, and a modern iteration of colonial history in the Pacific. For centuries, Western empires exploited Pacific nations; today, Global North corporations are attempting a new wave of “blue colonisation.” By treating the Pacific Ocean as an empty warehouse of commodities, tech ventures are undermining the sovereign rights, cultural heritage, and birthright guardianship of Indigenous Pacific peoples who have protected and been sustained by these waters for generations.
Time and time again we’ve been reminded that decisions are already being made about us, without us. It’s a never-ending pattern of colonial oppression and extraction… The people of Guam [are] not asking or slow progress. They are asking not to be sacrificed.
Sheila Babauta (Northern Marianas) / Delegate James Moylan (Guam)
But the rush by global superpowers and corporations to seize deep sea minerals has become a critical catalyst for unity across the Pacific. While a few states (such as Nauru, Cook Islands, and Tonga) sponsor exploration contracts, a powerful regional front is forming to resist what local leaders and Indigenous advocates describe as a new wave of resource exploitation.
Key Priorities for the July 2026 ISA Session
The July International Seabed Authority (ISA) Council session represented a critical crossroads for the protection of our global commons. This gathering offered a pivotal opportunity for responsible governments to wrestle control of the timeline away from commercial actors, reject corporate bullying, and prioritise precaution for the common good. Fast- tracking the Mining Code is not a neutral administrative step; it is a monumental, irreversible trigger that opens the floodgates to commercial exploitation. The only way to finalise these regulations this year would be for governments to abandon their legal obligations to protect the marine environment and deny safeguarding global equity. Rushing this process would permanently erode multilateral norms and inadvertently validate lax, unilateral mining pathways.
Governments have the opportunity and tools to diffuse this threat and demonstrate global cooperation for the common good at the International Seabed Authority.
- Governments have the tools to create major barriers to unlawful mining efforts and defend this global commons. The legal obligations of 170+ governments to constrain any companies or nationals from participating in unlawful deep sea mining are clear. This provides the opportunity to shut off access to personnel, offshore engineering, ports, financing, processing, refining, and markets for unlawful mining. A recent legal opinion concludes that Allseas’ May 2026 contract to operate deep sea mining machinery for The Metals Company under unilateral U.S. authorisation triggered the obligation under international and Dutch law for the Dutch government to intervene against this corporate violation.123 Failing to do so would constitute a breach of its binding obligations under UNCLOS.
- Unless the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber decides to order a suspension of the ISA’s inquiry into any contractors involved in unilateral mining, the ISA’s advisory commission and governments should conclude the ISA inquiry into whether any contractors are supporting unilateral efforts, and support punitive consequences for any companies breaching their obligations. It would be untenable for contractors to retain internationally legitimate rights to exploration while simultaneously participating in a violation of international law.
- This common ground across delegations is that the international community does not want mining to start right now, and is not ready to adopt a Mining Code that would open the gates to exploitation applications. Governments can join the 43-strong coalition calling for a moratorium, and show their support for the centrality of science-based decision-making at the Assembly by supporting a resolution tabled by Vanuatu.
- The ISA Council is due to establish a roadmap for the next phase of its work. Progressive governments must stand united to ensure this decision formalises strong pre-conditions before any mining can begin – including having enough scientific knowledge to make informed decisions. Adopting flawed, premature regulations will not stop unilateralism; it will only legitimise bad faith action. Rushing to adopt weak regulations means falling into a trap set by corporate actors who are trying to make a mockery of international law. Whereas agreeing a clear set of conditions for international approval of mining would help the ISA to shield itself from receiving commercial mining applications submitted under false expectations of the Mining Code being ready for adoption.
A line in the sand
As geopolitical tensions rise and the erosion of international norms by a few rogue actors breeds global instability, it is vital that governments act decisively to safeguard the collective interest. There is no better place to demonstrate the power of international cooperation than over the high seas, the waters that connect all continents. This collective strength is already proven, buoyed by the historic success story of the Global Ocean Treaty dedicated to protection, which triumphantly entered into force in January 2026.
The biggest threat to our oceans is not industrial fisheries or deep sea mining machines. It is the infection of doom and gloom that fools us into thinking we are powerless to stop things from getting worse.
But people power and international cooperation are showing their resilience. Despite intense corporate headwinds, the Global Ocean Treaty is now law, and deep sea mining has been successfully held back from the Arctic to the Pacific. We can win big together—even in the toughest of times.
As Greenpeace, we know we can win historic victories for the oceans. People before us in our movement had a harder time and they fought – and won. Putting Antarctica off-limits to mining and drilling during the Cold War.
Stopping deep sea mining through international agreement can signal a shift. It builds on the growing momentum that when Indigenous peoples are included and involved in decision-making, nature and the life-support system it provides for us all win. It’s a site battle where we can agree to limit private greed for the common good.
Governments who believe in the importance of international cooperation, the rule of law and science need to stand up and make progress where they can.
The threat of deep sea mining represents a new potential source of conflict over minerals, environmental degradation, and unilateral efforts to seize resources and territories in breach of international law. This is the last thing the world needs right now.
Published by Greenpeace International, July 2026
The Stakes for the ISA and Deep Sea Mining for 2026 and Beyond
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