India is preparing a major public funding push for carbon capture, utilization, and storage, also known as CCUS. In the Union Budget for 2026–27, the government set out a plan to support CCUS with a proposed outlay of ₹20,000 crore over the next five years. That is ₹200 billion, which is about US$2.2 billion.
The budget document places the measure under efforts to improve long-term energy security and stability. It also describes CCUS as a scheme with that ₹20,000 crore outlay.
The amount matters because CCUS is expensive and hard to scale. A clear budget line signals that India wants to move beyond small pilots and research projects. It also shows the government is looking for options to reduce emissions in industries that are difficult to clean up quickly.
The plan comes as India faces a practical challenge. The country is building large amounts of renewable energy, but parts of the economy still rely on high-emitting industrial processes.
Cement, steel, refineries, chemicals, and thermal power remain central to growth. These sectors often cannot cut emissions to near zero with renewables alone, at least not in the short term. This is where the government sees a role for carbon capture.
From Policy Papers to Pipes and Storage
The budget measure points to CCUS as a way to raise “technology readiness” and expand end-use applications. In plain terms, that means the government wants more projects that move from study to real equipment in real plants. It also suggests the plan will target large emitting sectors where capture and storage could, in theory, reduce emissions without shutting down existing production too quickly.
India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has already described CCUS as an area where it is working to build a practical strategy and encourage collaboration across the oil and gas sector. That includes planning for how to implement capture, transport, use, and storage options in India’s energy system.
This new budget funding could connect to that effort in two ways.
- First, it can reduce early financial risk for companies. Carbon capture equipment adds cost. It also adds operating needs, such as energy use, maintenance, and monitoring. Without support, many firms delay investment because they do not see a near-term return.
- Second, it can help build shared infrastructure. CCUS is not just one machine, and it often needs pipelines, compressors, monitoring systems, and long-term storage sites. Shared infrastructure can lower costs when several plants connect to the same transport and storage network.
The budget document does not yet list every rule, incentive rate, or eligibility condition in the public summary. But the stated five-year outlay sets a clear ceiling for public support and signals that the government expects a pipeline of projects, not a single pilot.
Why India is Looking at Carbon Capture Now
India has set a long-term goal of net-zero emissions by 2070. That pledge has shaped policy planning across power, industry, fuels, and carbon markets.
In a 2022 press release on a national CCUS policy study, the government highlighted India’s climate direction, including steps toward net zero by 2070 and the need to cut emissions in hard-to-abate sectors.

In late 2025, India also released a national R&D roadmap for CCUS through the Department of Science and Technology. The roadmap aims to guide coordinated action and speed up technology deployment, with a focus on hard-to-abate sectors such as cement, steel, and power.
These moves show a pattern. India is building the “soft” parts of a CCUS system first—research priorities, policy frameworks, and coordination. The budget outlay is a step toward the “hard” parts—real projects and infrastructure.
There is also an external trade pressure. Many Indian exporters expect stricter carbon rules in major markets. Policies such as the European Union’s carbon border measures have pushed firms to look for ways to reduce the emissions tied to their products.
CCUS is one option that can reduce emissions at the facility level, especially in cement, steel, and refining, where process emissions are hard to remove.
At the same time, India still needs to expand its energy supply for growth. That includes reliable power for industry and cities. A CCUS program can fit into this reality because it aims to cut emissions without requiring an immediate shutdown of existing assets.
A Tool for Tough Emissions, Not a Silver Bullet
CCUS works in three main steps. First, a plant captures carbon dioxide from flue gases or industrial streams. Second, it compresses and transports the CO₂. Third, it stores the CO₂ underground or uses it in products such as fuels, chemicals, building materials, or enhanced oil recovery.
In practice, storage is the main constraint. Projects need suitable geology, injection tests, monitoring systems, and long-term rules on liability. Without proven storage, capture alone does not deliver lasting emissions cuts. Below is India’s carbon storage capacity shown in a geological map:

Globally, CCUS remains far below the scale required in net-zero scenarios. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that global carbon capture capacity reached just over 50 million tonnes of CO₂ per year as of early 2025. This is up modestly from earlier years but still far below the levels needed in most net-zero climate pathways.
In its Net Zero pathway, capture rises to 1,024 Mt by 2030 and 6,040 Mt by 2050. As of early 2025, only just over 50 Mt per year of capture capacity is operating worldwide.

The IEA reports that even if all planned projects move forward, global capture capacity will only hit about 430 Mt per year by 2030. The planned storage capacity is around 670 Mt. This gap explains why the IEA stresses faster storage development and shorter project lead times.
India has been laying the groundwork for this challenge. A draft 2030 CCUS roadmap linked to the oil and gas sector compiles early estimates of national storage potential.
It identifies deep saline aquifers as the largest category, with about 291 gigatonnes (Gt) of estimated capacity. It mentions potential storage of 97–316 Gt in basalt formations, 3.5–6.3 Gt in coal reservoirs, and around 1.2 Gt in oil fields for CO₂-enhanced oil recovery. These figures reflect theoretical or early-stage estimates and still require site-level validation.

CCUS is most relevant in hard-to-abate sectors where emissions come from chemistry, not just fuel use. Cement is a clear example. Even with clean power, roughly half of cement emissions come from the calcination process itself. Steel also poses challenges, as the sector emits high carbon.
Costs remain a key barrier. The IEA estimates capture costs of $15–25 per tonne of CO₂ for high-purity industrial streams. In contrast, more diluted streams, like cement or power generation, cost $40–120 per tonne. Transport, injection, and long-term monitoring add further costs and complexity.
These limits explain why CCUS is not a replacement for renewables, efficiency, or electrification. India’s policy shows that the government views CCUS as a helpful tool. It can cut emissions in tough sectors, but only if storage, regulation, and project delivery happen quickly.
Where the Money Goes Will Matter Most
The headline figure—₹20,000 crore over five years—sets the scale. What matters next is how the money is used.
Project selection will shape outcomes. A focus on a few large hubs could support shared CO₂ transport and storage. A scattered approach may fund pilots but limit infrastructure build-out.
Sector priorities also matter. Budget signals point to power, steel, cement, refineries, and chemicals—all high-emitting industries with large and, in some cases, concentrated CO₂ streams.
Rules will be just as important as funding. India is developing an Indian Carbon Market under the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme. Companies will need clarity on whether captured and stored CO₂ can earn credits and under what standards.
Storage readiness remains a final test. Proven sites, test drilling, and long-term monitoring will be essential to move from plans to scale. If these pieces align, public funding could accelerate real deployment. If not, it may support pilots without delivering deep emissions cuts.
For now, the budget line makes one point clear. India is putting real public funding behind carbon capture, and it is doing so with an amount large enough to change corporate planning in several heavy industries.
The post India Puts $2.2 Billion for Carbon Capture in 2026-2027 Budget appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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