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Government negotiators at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) are likely to agree next week to put a price on at least some shipping emissions, with most of the money going to subsidise clean fuels and help ports and workers adjust to their use, sources close to the talks told Climate Home.
The negotiations in London run until April 11 – and nothing has yet been finally agreed. But governments are discussing the details of a proposal put forward by the talks’ Norwegian chair Sveinung Oftedal in an attempt to reach a compromise on the first such system for a global sector.
The proposal says that revenues raised for the new IMO Net Zero Fund should be spent within the shipping sector and its fuel supply chain.
It specifies that the money should be allocated to green fuels and the infrastructure and workers needed to transition to them, to protecting the maritime industry from climate change, and to addressing negative impacts from a carbon price on shipping emissions, such as food inflation caused by rising shipping costs.
A source with knowledge of the IMO discussions told Climate Home that “the predominant view is that how the revenue is spent has to be somehow connected to the sector”.
Climate campaigners – and some countries, particularly small island and African nations – had hoped that at least some of the revenue would be spent on climate action in developing countries outside the shipping sector, on things like solar panels, drought-resistant seeds and rebuilding roads destroyed by floods.
Last week, Kenyan climate envoy Ali Mohamed wrote in a piece for Climate Home that the money raised should “transcend the maritime sector” and support “broader climate projects” including in landlocked states.
But some other developing countries do not want this money – much of which will be paid by shipowners in their nations – to replace the climate finance that rich governments are supposed to provide under the UN climate convention.
Friederike Roder, director of the secretariat for the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, a multi-government initiative looking into international taxes to support climate and development, told Climate Home, “we need a solidarity contribution” from shipping.
“Negotiations are still under way,” she said, adding that the IMO “still has the possibility to deliver a historic agreement which doesn’t leave anyone behind”.
Size of fund up for debate
While negotiators agree that international shipping emissions should be priced, they remain sharply divided on how much of a ship’s greenhouse gas pollution should be covered and how high the price should be. This will determine how much money goes into the IMO Net Zero Fund.
Shipowners will have to pay if they don’t reduce emissions by a certain percentage by set years.
The chair’s proposal is to use the targets agreed for global shipping in 2023 – a 20% reduction in emissions by 2030 and 70% by 2040.
Loss and damage fund proposes helping governments first, local communities later
If a ship does not meet these targets, it will have to buy a permit known as a “remedial unit” from the IMO’s Net Zero Fund. This is likely to be several hundreds of dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emitted above the agreed level.
There is likely to be another, more ambitious stretch target. This could be the emissions goals that governments agreed to “strive” for in 2023 – 30% by 2030 and 80% by 2040.
The penalty for not meeting these stretch goals will be much less than not meeting the basic goals. Fees of between $50 and $150 per tonne of CO2e have been discussed.
Price on all emissions?
The Marshall Islands wants these stretch goals to be 100%, starting as soon as the rules come into place in 2028 so that all emissions would be subject to a charge from that year. The Pacific nation’s envoy for maritime decarbonisation Albon Ishoda said a tax on all shipping emissions “remains on the table – and that’s essential”.
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Some fossil fuel-reliant nations and shipping-dependent emergent economies like Brazil, China and Saudi Arabia do not support such a levy, and last week island nations expressed fears that the EU was backing away from the idea.
“A growing bloc of countries, particularly from Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific, is united in its focus on delivering ambition and equity for the Global South,” Ishoda added. “But when it comes to equity, our voices continue to be ignored. I have real concerns that the package being shaped may not be one that truly protects the most vulnerable or ensures no one is left behind.”
The post Hopes fade for climate cash from carbon price on shipping appeared first on Climate Home News.
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Prepared by a coalition of nine Western Australian union, industry, conservation, and community organisations—including UnionsWA, the Conservation Council WA, and the Smart Energy Council—the WA Clean Energy, Jobs & Industry Plan provides a practical roadmap to transform Western Australia into a clean energy powerhouse while creating thousands of secure local jobs.
Western Australia stands at a pivotal crossroads: lead the global clean energy economy or watch investment, future industries, and secure jobs go elsewhere. The WA Clean Energy, Jobs & Industry Plan outlines a transformative blueprint to harness the state’s world-class solar and wind resources. Discover how legislated renewable targets, green iron manufacturing, and a dedicated regional training strategy can generate tens of thousands of local jobs, lower household bills, and build a resilient, net-zero future for all Western Australians.
WA needs a clear and forward-thinking plan if it is going to become a competitive renewable energy powerhouse and maintain its economic strength through the energy transition.
“Western Australians know a faster renewable energy transition will lower their household expenses and prevent harmful climate pollution. But the community also needs clear direction to ensure this transition will create jobs, lower costs and not cause undue environmental harm.
“Here, sectors representing a broad range of interests have laid the groundwork for those outcomes, clearly outlining what is needed to create a future for WA that is good for the environment, for the climate, for workers and for the economy.
Summary
The WA Clean Energy, Jobs & Industry Plan sets out a strategic roadmap to position Western Australia as a global clean energy superpower while creating thousands of secure local jobs.
The report establishes three overarching goals:
- Creating local employment.
- Maintaining industrial competitiveness.
- Lowering household energy costs
To realize this vision, the framework details actionable measures to follow on from the recent WA Government announcement of a 75% Renewable Energy Target by 2031 for the South West Interconnected System. This includes developing a statewide Renewable Energy Target, coordinating statewide workforce and training pipelines, strategically planning regional infrastructure to safeguard high-value biodiversity and cultural heritage, and ensuring equitable benefit-sharing through household electrification incentives and First Nations equity partnerships. Ultimately, the plan highlights that establishing clear policy and regulatory certainty will unlock lower energy bills, boost power reliability, and secure the state’s global competitiveness in emerging green commodity export markets.
Key Findings
- Statewide Renewable Energy Target and Emissions Reduction Targets: The report calls for a statewide RET and 1.5°C aligned emission reduction targets to remove policy risk, lower capital costs, and attract clean energy investment.
- Transformative Job Creation: Accelerating the transition offers massive employment prospects, including up to 8,800 solar and battery jobs by 2050, as well as 24,000 ongoing and 11,000 construction jobs in a commercial green iron industry.
- Industrial Electrification & Competitiveness: Requiring large gas users to adopt binding electrification timetables and providing concessional financing will protect existing energy-intensive manufacturers from rising energy costs and impending domestic gas shortfalls.
- Green Commodity Export Leadership: Western Australia can build new export markets in green iron, green ammonia, and offshore oil/gas decommissioning by constructing shared common-user infrastructure and setting dedicated Green Commodity Export Targets.
- Coordinated Workforce & Training Pipeline: To address critical skill shortages the plan recommends establishing a WA Clean Energy Jobs Plan 2050, three regional training hubs, and dedicated pathways for female and under-represented apprentices.
- Environmental Safeguards & Community Benefits: Fast-tracked development must be paired with State Planning Policies that avoid high-biodiversity and cultural heritage lands, mandate new data centres to run on additional renewable power, and deliver household electrification rebates and First Nations equity partnerships.
What you can do
WA has an opportunity to lead on sustainable, clean energy and associated industries. You can help by:
- Sending an email to Environment Minister Murray Watt and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, calling on them to reject Browse.
- Sharing this story to help more Australians understand what’s at stake.
- Encouraging your friends and family to take action.
Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.
The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.
It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.
Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.
Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.
This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.
It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.
The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.
During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.
Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later.
Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.
Formal negotiations
Finance
Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.
At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.
The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.
As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.
The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.
Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.
Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya.
Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.
Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.
However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.
Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.
The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.
Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature.
The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.
The list was last amended in 2006.
(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)
Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.
The first “non-paper” had four differe