Estimating Earth’s climate sensitivity, the global average warming from doubling CO2 above pre-industrial levels, is an urgent task as it governs how much the world will warm from fossil-fuel emissions.
There is an active debate about the likely upper bound of climate sensitivity, which informs the worst-case projections of warming over the coming decades.
One way to narrow this down is to study the major climate changes of Earth’s past seen in palaeoclimate “proxy data”. These records are scattered across the planet, found in everything from ice cores and ocean sediments to tree rings and coral reefs.
Combining proxy data with climate models helps scientists understand what past changes were caused by natural fluctuations in CO2 and what changes we can expect from human-caused CO2 increases in the future.
In our new study, published in Science Advances, we find that the Last Glacial Maximum – a period of extensive ice cover about 21,000 years ago – provides even stronger evidence for modern-day climate sensitivity than previously thought.
Our estimates suggest a central estimate of “equilibrium” climate sensitivity of 2.9C, with a very likely range of 2.1-4.1C.
Our findings give us more confidence that very high climate sensitivity is unlikely. They also support the IPCC’s central estimate for climate sensitivity of around 3.0C and lower estimate of 2.0C, confirming that warming would still be severe if we do not reduce fossil-fuel emissions.
Progress in climate sensitivity
For many years, the estimated range for equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) remained stubbornly wide.
After the landmark Charney report established a “consensus” position from a study group convened by the US National Research Council back in 1979, many IPCC assessments over several decades were unable to narrow it further.
This is illustrated in the chart below, which shows the Charney report estimated range for ECS (grey bar) on the left, followed by each IPCC report in sequence, from the first in 1990 (“FAR”, light blue) through to the most recent AR6 range on the right (red). Central estimates are shown with a dot, where available. The coloured bars indicate the estimated likely range for ECS and very likely ranges are marked with whiskers.
Estimates of ECS published in successive IPCC assessments since the Charney report in 1979. Dots show central estimates. The coloured bars show the likely range and the very likely range is given by whiskers. Chart by Carbon Brief
Ahead of the IPCC’s sixth assessment report (AR6), a four-year project from an international team of scientists made a significant advance.
The resulting paper by Prof Steven Sherwood, Dr Mark Webb and colleagues, published in the Review of Geophysics in 2020, formally combined multiple lines of evidence from observed data to improve understanding of the climate “feedbacks” that can amplify or dampen surface warming. The paper played a key role in the narrower ECS range in AR6 (red bar in chart above) – particularly in raising the lower bound to 2.0C and setting the upper bound at 5.0C.
However, observed data from recent warming are not as useful for constraining the upper end of ECS estimates. This is because climate feedbacks – especially how warming affects cloud properties that either enhance or reduce their overall cooling effect – depend on spatial patterns of temperature change. Climate scientists have dubbed this phenomenon the “pattern effect”.
Pattern effects
Temperature patterns over recent decades differ substantially from what we expect in the long-term. This means that climate feedbacks are likely to change in the future too, making observed warming a relatively poor predictor of how high climate sensitivity could be.
This is where palaeoclimate data comes in. The Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) has been touted as the best evidence for or against high values of climate sensitivity. By estimating how much colder the Earth was when CO2 levels were so much lower during the LGM, scientists can predict how much warmer the Earth would be with higher CO2 levels decades from now.
However, doing so requires isolating how much of the LGM cooling came from lower CO2 and correcting for how the climate’s sensitivity to CO2 differs between the cold LGM and the warm modern-day climate. Prior to our study, no one had quantified the impact of temperature patterns on climate sensitivity in the palaeoclimate record.
Traditionally, the additional cooling effect of the vast LGM ice sheets, which covered much of Canada and northern Eurasia, has been estimated from the amount of sunlight they directly reflect. But the ice sheets also caused the nearby northern Pacific and Atlantic oceans to cool and produce more low clouds, amplifying global cooling by reflecting even more sunlight. This ocean cooling is illustrated by the dark blue shading in the left-hand map below.
By linking these adjacent cloud changes to the ice sheets, we found that relatively more of the LGM cooling was caused by the ice sheets and relatively less came from the lowered CO2.
Cooling pattern (left) of sea surface temperatures during the Last Glacial Maximum, 21,000 years ago, compared to projected warming patterns (right) from doubling CO2. The pattern of strong glacial cooling over the northern oceans was caused by ice sheets and led to more low clouds, which reflected more sunlight and amplified the global cooling. Source: Cooper et al. (2024)
Importantly, these amplifying cloud feedbacks are unique to the climate during the ice age and, therefore, do not apply to modern CO2-driven warming that will not have similarly large ice-sheet changes.
As a result, the amount of cooling from lower CO2 at the LGM is not consistent with very high values of modern-day climate sensitivity above around 4C.
Accounting for differences between the LGM and modern climates allows us to lower the upper end of climate sensitivity estimates, representing a major shift in how palaeoclimate data is used to inform our future.
Combining palaeoclimate data with climate models
Quantifying the climate differences mentioned above for the LGM requires estimating temperature patterns and climate feedbacks from 21,000 years ago.
An obvious challenge is that our instrumental temperature records span only centuries and our satellite observations of clouds span only decades. Fortunately, there have been two major advances in recent years that allowed us to quantify the pattern effects from the distant past.
First, palaeoclimate data assimilation is a recently developed method that combines climate model simulations with proxy data, producing globally complete reconstructions of surface temperatures during the LGM. However, there are still major uncertainties in this method. Various groups have recently reconstructed the ice age, finding somewhat different temperature patterns. To assess this uncertainty, we use four available reconstructions.
Second, we use these reconstructed surface temperatures in global atmosphere models to estimate climate feedbacks during the LGM and compare them to feedbacks expected from CO2 doubling. Because different models produce different climate feedbacks – even when given the same reconstructed surface temperatures – we assess this feedback uncertainty using five different atmosphere models.
Despite the uncertainties, a consistent story emerged. Climate feedbacks strongly amplified LGM temperature changes, much more so than climate feedbacks under modern-day warming from CO2 alone. We traced these differences primarily to cloud feedbacks in the North Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans where the patterns of temperature change strongly differ between the LGM – due to the presence of large ice sheets – and future warming from CO2.
At first glance, the extra amplifying feedbacks of the LGM could appear to suggest that climate sensitivity is higher than we thought. A recent study led by Dr James Hansen, former director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, reported that some of the same reconstructions used here are consistent with a modern-day climate sensitivity of around 4.8C.
However, that interpretation is reversed when we recognise that those amplifying feedbacks are unique to the ice age climate and do not apply to the modern-day climate.
The result is that modern-day climate sensitivity, as estimated from the LGM, is actually lower than has been reported by studies such as Hansen’s that have not accounted for the unique effect of ice sheets on climate feedbacks.
Our findings also challenge a common assumption that warmer climates are more sensitive than colder climates. While that assumption appears likely to be true for climates warmer than today, it appears to be false for climates colder than today when the effect of ice sheets on temperature patterns and feedbacks is included.
Implications for future warming
The LGM, after accounting for how temperature patterns impact climate feedbacks, ends up being an even stronger constraint on modern-day climate sensitivity – especially the upper bound.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that considering pattern effects has helped constrain climate sensitivity instead of adding to its uncertainty for modern-day climate.
Given the importance of combining multiple lines of evidence, we use the community framework from the Sherwood, Webb et al (2020) study, updated to include our estimate of how climate feedbacks differ between the LGM and modern-day warming.
As the chart below shows, our revised best estimate of climate sensitivity (blue) becomes 2.9C with a very likely range of 2.1-4.1C, a substantial narrowing of uncertainty by reducing the upper bound.
In contrast, the IPCC AR6 very likely range was 2.0-5.0C with a best estimate of 3C (red), while the Sherwood, Webb et al (2020) study reported 2.3-4.7C and central estimate of 3.1C (yellow).
Modern-day ECS estimates from recent assessments, including the Sherwood, Webb et al (2020 study (yellow), IPCC AR6 (red) and this study (blue). Dots show central estimates. The coloured bars show the likely range and the very likely range is given by whiskers. Chart by Carbon Brief based on data provided by V Cooper and K Armour
While the lower bound and central estimates are mostly unchanged, our findings reduce the upper bound by approximately 1C.
Based on the modelled relationship between climate sensitivity and future warming, lowering the upper bound on climate sensitivity from 5C to 4.1C translates to a reduction of 0.4-0.8C in the upper end of global warming estimates by 2100 (the range reflects uncertainty in future emissions). In other words, this is a substantial reduction in the likelihood of extremely high warming.
Our results for the LGM show that temperature patterns and their effects on climate feedbacks must be accounted for when using past climates to estimate modern-day climate sensitivity.
Spatial reconstructions of past climates are a necessity and there are opportunities for further progress in constraining climate sensitivity by analysing temperature patterns and feedbacks in other past climates.
Coal power generation fell in both China and India in 2025, the first simultaneous drop in half a century, after each nation added record amounts of clean energy.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that electricity generation from coal in India fell by 3.0% year-on-year (57 terawatt hours, TWh) and in China by 1.6% (58TWh).
The last time both countries registered a drop in coal power output was in 1973.
The fall in 2025 is a sign of things to come, as both countries added a record amount of new clean-power generation last year, which was more than sufficient to meet rising demand.
Both countries now have the preconditions in place for peaking coal-fired power, if China is able to sustain clean-energy growth and India meets its renewable energy targets.
These shifts have international implications, as the power sectors of these two countries drove 93% of the rise in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 2015-2024.
While many challenges remain, the decline in their coal-power output marks a historic moment, which could help lead to a peak in global emissions.
Double drop
The new analysis shows that power generation from coal fell by 1.6% in China and by 3.0% in India in 2025, as non-fossil energy sources grew quickly enough in both countries to cover electricity consumption growth. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Growth in coal-fired power generation in China and India by year, %, 1972-2025. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief. Further details below.
China achieved this feat even as electricity demand growth remained rapid at 5% year-on-year. In India, the drop in coal was due to record clean-energy growth combined with slower demand growth, resulting from mild weather and a longer-term slowdown.
The simultaneous drop for coal power in both countries in 2025 is the first since 1973, when much of the world was rocked by the oil crisis. Both China and India saw weak power demand growth that year, combined with increases in power generation from other sources – hydro and nuclear in the case of India and oil in the case of China.
China’s recent clean-energy generation growth, if sustained, is already sufficient to secure a peak in coal power. Similarly, India’s clean-energy targets, if they are met, will enable a peak in coal before 2030, even if electricity demand growth accelerates again.
In 2025, China will likely have added more than 300 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 100GW of wind power, both clear new records for China and, therefore, for any country ever.
Power generation from solar and wind increased by 450TWh in the first 11 months of the year and nuclear power delivering another 35TWh. This put the growth of non-fossil power generation, excluding hydropower, squarely above the 460TWh increase in demand.
Growth in clean-power generation has kept ahead of demand growth and, as a result, power-sector coal use and CO2 emissions have been falling since early 2024.
Coal use outside the power sector is falling, too, mostly driven by falling output of steel, cement and other construction materials, the largest coal-consuming sectors after power.
In India’s case, the fall in coal-fired power in 2025 was a result of accelerated clean-energy growth, a longer-term slowdown in power demand growth and milder weather, which resulted in a reduction in power demand for air conditioning.
Faster clean-energy growth contributed 44% of the reduction in coal and gas, compared to the trend in 2019-24, while 36% was contributed by milder weather and 20% by slower underlying demand growth. This is the first time that clean-energy growth has played a significant role in driving down India’s coal-fired power generation, as shown below.
Change in power generation in China and India by source and year, terawatt hours 2000-2025. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief. Further details below.
India added 35GW of solar, 6GW wind and 3.5GW hydropower in the first 11 months of 2025, with renewable energy capacity additions picking up 44% year-on-year.
Power generation from non-fossil sources grew 71TWh, led by solar at 33TWh, while total generation increased 21TWh, similarly pushing down power generation from coal and gas.
The increase in clean power is, however, below the average demand growth recorded from 2019 to 2024, at 85TWh per year, as well as below the projection for 2026-30.
This means that clean-energy growth would need to accelerate in order for coal power to see a structural peak and decline in output, rather than a short-term blip.
Meeting the government’s target for 500GW of non-fossil power capacity by 2030, set by India’s prime minister Narendra Modi in 2021, requires just such an acceleration.
Historic moment
While the accelerated clean-energy growth in China and India has upended the outlook for their coal use, locking in declines would depend on meeting a series of challenges.
First, the power grids would need to be operated much more flexibly to accommodate increasing renewable shares. This would mean updating old power market structures – built to serve coal-fired power plants – both in China and India.
Second, both countries have continued to add new coal-fired power capacity. In the short term, this is leading to a fall in capacity utilisation – the number of hours each coal unit is able to operate – as power generation from coal falls.
(Both China and India have been adding new coal-power capacity in response to increases in peak electricity demand. This includes rising demand for air conditioning, in part resulting from extreme heat driven by the historical emissions that have caused climate change.)
If under-construction and permitted coal-power projects are completed, they would increase coal-power capacity by 28% in China and 23% in India. Without marked growth in power generation from coal, the utilisation of this capacity would fall significantly, causing financial distress for generators and adding costs for power users.
In the longer term, new coal-power capacity additions would have to be slowed down substantially and retirements accelerated, to make space for further expansion of clean energy in the power system.
Despite these challenges ahead, the drop in coal power and record increase in clean energy in China and India marks a historic moment.
Power generation in these two countries drove more than 90% of the increase in global CO2 emissions from all sources between 2015-2024 – with 78% from China and 16% from India – making their power sectors the key to peaking global emissions.
About the data
China’s coal-fired power generation until November 2025 is calculated from monthly data on the capacity and utilisation of coal-fired power plants from China Electricity Council (CEC), accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.
For December, year-on-year growth is based on a weekly survey of power generation at China’s coal plants by CEC, with data up to 25 December. This data closely predicts CEC numbers for the full month.
Other power generation and capacity data is derived from CEC and National Bureau of Statistics data, following the methodology of CREA’s monthly snapshot of energy and emissions trends in China.
For India, the analysis uses daily power generation data and monthly capacity data from the Central Electricity Authority, accessed through a dashboard published by government thinktank Niti Aayog.
The role of coal-fired power in China and India in driving global CO2 emissions is calculated from the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Balances until 2023, applying default CO2 emission factors from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
To extend the calculation to 2024, the year-on-year growth of coal-fired power generation in China and India is taken from the sources above, and the growth of global fossil-fuel CO2 emissions was taken from the Energy Institute’s Statistical Review of World Energy.
The time series of coal-fired power generation since 1971, used to establish the fact that the previous time there was a drop in both countries was 1973, was taken from the IEA World Energy Balances. This dataset uses fiscal years ending in March for India. Calendar-year data was available starting from 2000 from Ember’s yearly electricity data.
After the United States announced last week it would withdraw from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), effectively slashing more than a fifth of its core budget, the organisation’s head said it could “manage” the US exit, as top officials argued the energy transition is “unstoppable”.
Speaking to reporters at IRENA’s 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, Director-General Francesco La Camera said the US had yet to formally notify the agency it would be leaving. IRENA’s statute says withdrawal of a member country takes effect at the end of the year in which it is notified.
Until that point, they remain a member with all its rights, including the right to vote, but also “the duty to pay”, La Camera added.
The decision will make the US the only country to leave the UNFCCC, with the UN climate chief calling it a “colossal own goal” that will harm the US economy
The surge in employment linked to clean energy equipment and installation is slowing as large-scale plants and increasing automation require less labour
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On Sunday, IRENA’s member countries – around 170 in total – adopted a budget for the coming two years, which shows the US is expected to contribute 22% of IRENA’s core funding, with its share amounting to nearly $5.7 million for 2026.
La Camera said IRENA is already talking to governments and the private sector to fill the potential financial hole if the US does not deliver on its financial obligations, as has been the case in previous years with the UN climate secretariat and the Green Climate Fund.
“We know that some of these usual donors are considering to put something in our budget – we are also trying to get some money from the companies that are part of our initiatives… and we will see other ways that we can pursue,” he added. “I know that we can manage one way or another.”
During country statements made on Sunday afternoon, which were closed to the media, there had been expectations that China might step up to close the gap, but that did not happen.
The United Arab Emirates, Germany and other European nations are substantial government donors to IRENA, although the agency’s core budget has barely risen since 2018, documents show. That has limited its ability to expand its activities even as demand rises across developing countries and small island states for greater technical and policy support to boost renewables.
La Camera noted that, following the US decision to pull out under Donald Trump, IRENA’s council may need to propose amendments to its approved budget for 2026-2027 ahead of its next meeting in May.
Melford Nicholas, minister of information technologies, utilities and energy for Antigua and Barbuda, who is also a newly elected vice president of IRENA, told Climate Home News the US move would “not be an insignificant development” but Europeans had indicated they could help make up the shortfall.
Clean energy for “opportunity and necessity”
At the opening session of the two-day assembly, La Camera and other top officials affirmed the importance of renewable energy as the best choice for energy and economic security at a time of rising geopolitical tensions driven by fossil fuel interests.
Selwin Hart,special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Climate Action and Just Transition, said the world is clearly changing its energy system to clean sources “not out of idealism, but out of opportunity and necessity”.
He noted that three out of four people live in countries that are net importers of fossil fuels, exposing them to geopolitical shocks, volatile prices and balance of payment pressures.
Examples of this include the rise in gas prices in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2024 led to sanctions.
“The energy transition is taking place… not only based on climate considerations, but based on costs, based on competitiveness and energy security and energy independence,” Hart added. “These are the driving forces now – hardcore economic, hardcore national security [and] strategic reasons.”
In a video message, Annalena Baerbock, president of the UN General Assembly and former foreign minister of Germany, said “we are living in heavy, challenging times” – but despite setbacks and political headwinds, “the march to a renewable energy future has proven unstoppable”.
She added that global renewable capacity has now reached more than 4,400 gigawatts, almost 30 times that of 2015 when the Paris climate agreement was adopted, while a record $2.4 trillion was invested in the energy transition in 2024. “There is no way back,” she added.
However, she and Hart both noted that more needs to be done to support African countries to unlock finance for clean energy, as it lags far behind other regions and receives only around 2% of investment in the sector.
Challenges for small island states
The substantial needs of small island developing states (SIDS) are also front and centre at the IRENA Assembly, where ministers have discussed the challenges of shifting away from costly diesel and other polluting fuels while being exposed to rising climate shocks such as destructive cyclones.
Antigua and Barbuda’s minister Nicholas pointed to the difficulty of gaining insurance for renewable energy facilities as a key barrier in an era when storms can cause huge damage.
This happened in Barbuda in 2017 when Hurricane Irma wiped out a solar plant that was not insured. Governments including the United Arab Emirates and New Zealand helped to rebuild it.
Antigua and Barbuda’s Minister Melford Nicholas speaks at the IRENA 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on January 11, 2026 (Photo: IRENA)
Antigua and Barbuda’s Minister Melford Nicholas speaks at the IRENA 16th Assembly in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on January 11, 2026 (Photo: IRENA)
Nicholas said SIDS are still in need of concessional finance, which could “become increasingly challenging for us” in the current international environment.
“It’s an issue, because that retards the speed at which we’re able to get to renewable energy transition,” he added, noting his country is likely to reach an energy mix of around 60% renewables by 2030 rather than the 100% it had aimed for.
Despite the obstacles, ministers from Caribbean countries like St Kitts and Nevis and Dominica showcased examples of planned geothermal plants that will enable them to phase down fossil fuels dramatically.
IRENA’s La Camera said he was optimistic the world would get very close to realising a global goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade, but was still lagging behind on a twin target of doubling energy efficiency by 2030.
To help catalyse a global transition away from fossil fuels, he added that IRENA would work with COP host nations on a roadmap to that end, which they are due to present at the COP31 UN climate summit in Turkey in November, as well as a potential target for electrification consistent with that plan.
Jobs in renewable energy expanded only slightly in 2024 to reach 16.6 million worldwide, new figures show, suggesting that the industry’s ability to create employment is slowing as it matures.
According to an annual report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the number of renewables jobs rose by just 2.3% between 2023 and 2024. This was partly due to Chinese solar manufacturers already producing more components than they could sell, and laying off workers to cut costs.
Other factors included a shift from rooftop solar installations to utility-scale systems in major markets like India and Germany, as well as increasing automation in the sector – a trend that is expected to accelerate with the use of robots, drones and artificial intelligence.
Employment in the sector has risen steadily from 7.3 million in 2012, when the data series began, along with the increase in solar, wind and geothermal energy, hydropower and biofuels around the world. But far fewer new jobs were created in 2024 – 400,000 – compared with 2023, which saw a jump of 2.5 million.
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In a foreword to the report released on Sunday, IRENA Director-General Francesco La Camera and ILO Director-General Gilbert F. Houngbo wrote that the slowdown in the rate of job creation points to “the emergence of a new phase in the energy transition”.
“Growing automation and economies of scale mean that comparatively less human labour is required for each new unit of capacity – although impacts vary across countries, technologies and segments of the renewable energy value chain,” they said.
IRENA currently projects that, with the right policies in place, the renewable energy workforce could expand to 30 million jobs by 2030. But the latest figures – which do not reflect the impact of Donald Trump’s squashing of US renewables incentives in 2025 – indicate reaching that level could be a stretch.
Michael Renner, IRENA’s head of socioeconomics and policy, told Climate Home News on the sidelines of the agency’s assembly in Abu Dhabi that, in the past 10-20 years, the renewable energy sector has been far more labour-intensive than the fossil fuel industry – which has largely been automated – but the difference is starting to narrow.
“I think renewables are still looking favourable [for job creation], and I don’t think that advantage will be lost – but I think it will be less massive, less dramatic,” he added.
Notes:
a) Includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas.
b) Direct jobs only.
c) “Others” includes geothermal energy, concentrated solar power, heat pumps (ground based), municipal and industrial waste,
and ocean energy.
Source: IRENA / Renewable Energy and Jobs
Annual Review 2025
Notes:
a) Includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas.
b) Direct jobs only.
c) “Others” includes geothermal energy, concentrated solar power, heat pumps (ground based), municipal and industrial waste,
and ocean energy.
Source: IRENA / Renewable Energy and Jobs
Annual Review 2025
Geographical imbalances
The world needs to add a huge amount of solar, wind, hydro and geothermalcapacity to meet a global goal of tripling renewable power capacity to reach 11.2 terawatts (TW) by the end of the decade. That will require installing an average of about 1.1 TW each year from 2025 to 2030, which is about double the power added in 2024, IRENA says.
In a statement on the jobs report, La Camera noted that renewable energy deployment is “booming, but the human side of the story is as important as the technological side”.
He pointed to geographical imbalances in the deployment of clean energy and related job creation. Africa has particularly struggled to attract foreign investment in building out renewables, with much of the growth currently concentrated in Asia.
“Countries that are lagging behind in the energy transition must be supported by the international community,” La Camera said. “This is essential not only to meet the goal of tripling renewable power capacity by 2030, but also to ensure that socioeconomic benefits become lived realities for all, helping to shore up popular support for the transition.”
Some countries like Nigeria are trying to boost their solar equipment manufacturing supply chains, with the government saying it plans to ban solar panel imports, and two large assembly plants announced to support public electrification programmes.
China leads on jobs but solar stumbles
In 2024, China was home to nearly half – 44% – of the world’s renewable energy jobs with an estimated 7.3 million. But in that year, employment in its solar photovoltaics (PV) sector actually contracted slightly, as five leading manufacturers cut their workforce.
This was in response to efforts by the Chinese government to curb what it has dubbed “disorderly” competition by reducing excess capacity across the solar PV supply chain, in a bid to boost prices and product quality.
Renewables jobs stayed flat in the European Union in 2024, meanwhile, at 1.8 million jobs, and India and the US saw small rises, accounting for 1.3 million and 1.1 million respectively. Brazil was also a big employer, with 1.4 million jobs, partly thanks to its biofuels industry based on soy and sugarcane.
On the impact of Trump’s efforts to roll back incentives and subsidies for green energy in the US, Renner said it will likely mean fewer new renewable power installations, with the report documenting examples of solar and wind projects that were cancelled or halted in 2025.
He also noted the dampening effects of US tariff hikes on the production of solar panels in Southeast Asia, which has led to job losses in some countries including Thailand, while others such as India have been able to increase their exports to the US thanks to relatively lower taxes on their exports.
Limited opportunities for women and people with disabilities
The report also highlights a lack of progress on increasing women workers in the renewables industry. While higher than in fossil fuels, it has plateaued at about one job in three.
Those jobs are concentrated in administrative roles, which account for 45% of female employment in renewable energy, as well as in technical positions unrelated to science, technology or engineering, such as legal work.
The report calls for greater efforts by companies, education and skills training bodies to open up more opportunities for women in clean energy, as well as for people with disabilities who face high barriers to participating in labour markets across the board, with only three in 10 being employed worldwide.
There are some positive cases where proactive policies have made a difference, such as in India’s electric vehicle industry, which has a relatively high level of women at the management level.
In Brazil, meanwhile, national legislation requires companies with more than 100 employees to reserve 2-5% of jobs for people with disabilities, including those in renewable energy.
And in Spain, energy utility Endesa and municipalities trained over 300 people with intellectual and psycho-social disabilities in tasks like vegetation management and composting at solar energy sites, with nearly 40% securing jobs after six months.
ILO’s Houngbo called for greater efforts on disability inclusion in the clean energy transition, not just as a matter of justice but also to advance resilient labour markets and sustainable development.
“This requires accessible training systems, inclusive hiring practices, and workplaces that accommodate, welcome and respond to diverse needs and respect every worker’s rights,” he added.
Climate Home News received support from IRENA to travel to Abu Dhabi to covers its 16th Assembly.
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