England will soon introduce one of the world’s most ambitious biodiversity policies in “Biodiversity Net Gain”.
This policy effectively mandates that any new development leaves biodiversity in a better state than before it was constructed. It was initially meant to go into effect in November, but the government has pushed back its implementation until 2024.
In order to understand the potential impacts of the Biodiversity Net Gain, our team has been tracking development projects approved over the last three years in six councils across England that were early adopters of the policy.
Our latest paper, published this month, reveals several fundamental challenges that threaten the integrity of the policy’s environmental and economic outcomes.
We find that the oversight, monitoring and enforcement of biodiversity improvements supposedly delivered under the policy need urgent attention.
For example, there is a clear “governance gap”, where the system for monitoring biodiversity gains delivered on the site of new developments is weaker than for gains purchased from elsewhere. The process is overseen by local planning departments, which are typically lacking in capacity and ecological expertise.
Biodiversity Net Gain is an essential pillar of the country’s plans for attracting private finance into nature conservation to achieve its overarching environmental objectives.
Ultimately, the challenges we identify threaten the integrity of one of England’s most important environmental markets – and with it, the environmental outcomes of the government’s nature markets strategy.
Biodiversity Net Gain
Under the Biodiversity Net Gain policy, developers have three ways to offset their “biodiversity liability” – the damage their project does to nature. Biodiversity Net Gain applies to most developments, such as housing and smaller infrastructure projects. The policy will apply to major infrastructure projects from 2025 onwards.
First, they can enhance biodiversity somewhere within the development – so-called “on-site” gains. These on-site gains can take the form of, for example, sowing wildflowers along road verges or managing some of the grassland within a housing development to promote wildlife, rather than for traditional landscaping.
If developers can’t meet their liabilities on-site, their second option is to use biodiversity “units” from ecological improvements elsewhere. Under the policy, these units are supposed to mirror the habitat that is impacted by the development, so that when developers damage habitats, they must replace them with habitats that are at least as valuable, from a conservation perspective, as those lost.
Some of these units might come from the new “net-gain market”. Land managers create these units by implementing conservation actions on their land, such as converting low-productivity pasture into a field managed for wildflowers. Then, they sell these units to developers.
Alternatively, some developers are developing their own habitat banks, creating biodiversity units in one place to offset the impacts of their developments elsewhere.
Last, if no units are available through either of these pathways, developers can buy “statutory biodiversity credits” directly from the national government.
These credits loosely resemble the units sold via the market. The government holds a stock of these units as a last resort for developers who cannot offset their damage in other ways. For example, they may offset damage to particularly rare types of habitat for which there may not be suitable credits available on the standard market.
Importantly, the price levels for these statutory units have been set deliberately high, in an attempt to disincentivise developers from relying on these credits.
The ‘governance gap’
Our dataset spans around 1,600 hectares of development footprint that have been submitted or approved for development over the last three years in these six early-adopter councils: West and South Oxfordshire, Vale of White Horse, Cornwall, Leeds City and Tunbridge Wells.
Our team has been collating and analysing the biodiversity assessments submitted to these authorities for each project.
We’ve analysed the trades occurring under the policy and the rules that govern them. Additionally, we have quantified any errors embedded in the developers’ biodiversity assessments. Our research has identified several shortfalls that need addressing for this nature market to be able to deliver on its goals.
Our first key finding is that around one-quarter of all the biodiversity units delivered under the policy so far fall within a “governance gap” – meaning that they are likely to go unmonitored, and may even be legally unenforceable.
As a result, there is a very high probability that regulators will not be able to take any action if these promised gains are not delivered.
This will likely translate into a large chunk of these units not materialising in reality, as there is little incentive for developers to deliver these units in full if there is no credible enforcement mechanism.
The problem is that the standards and regulations of the three offset pathways vary considerably.
There is reasonably stringent governance to ensure that biodiversity units purchased on the offsetting market are delivered in reality. Sellers will have to submit their offsets to a national database, monitor biodiversity changes and report on the ecological development of the site at regular intervals.
Contrary to these standards, the system for monitoring, reporting and enforcing units delivered “on-site” is much weaker. The government has suggested that the existing planning enforcement system can be used to oversee on-site units.
The planning enforcement system was never designed for such a task, and in its current form, is unsuitable for fulfilling this role.
Under the current system, local authorities are explicitly advised to only take enforcement action, such as warnings or fines, if a developer’s violation of a planning condition results in “serious harm to a local public amenity”. Although it is unclear how this will apply to the Biodiversity Net Gain policy, the failure to deliver a habitat that a developer promised in a planning application a few years prior is extremely unlikely to trigger this threshold.
Developers also do not have to log their on-site gains on the national Biodiversity Net Gain register, which means that many of these projects are likely to go unmonitored. Even if they underperform relative to the original promise in the planning application, there is no credible system in place to hold developers to account for such non-delivery.
Risk of non-delivery
In our research, we have found that around one-quarter of all the units delivered under the policy are at a high risk of non-delivery because of this governance gap.
While the regulation of a specific kind of biodiversity unit within a single policy might sound unimportant, this actually has serious implications for how England’s nature markets function.
The core pillar of England’s ambitions for drawing private finance into nature conservation is the Biodiversity Net Gain market. Any biodiversity units that are delivered on-site by developers are units they will not need to purchase from the off-site market. So the less stringent the standards in the on-site system, the more this will drain demand for units from the off-site market, which is relatively more ecologically robust.
Although we recognise our data is preliminary, we estimate that if these under-regulated biodiversity units were to be delivered via the off-site market instead, the demand for biodiversity units could rise by a factor of four.
This could significantly increase the amount of conservation implemented on private land and, therefore, the amount of private finance flowing into conservation projects on private land.
There is precedent for this. The English scheme was partially informed by the US wetland mitigation markets. In 2008, those markets underwent reform to address a similar governance gap.
In the US case, the standards applied to developer-led and third-party projects diverged enormously, meaning a range of low-quality mitigation projects were being implemented by developers. The 2008 compensation rule in the US wetland mitigation system addressed this disparity by ensuring that the same standards were applied across all forms of compensation.
Lacking capacity
Our research also reveals other interesting, consequential patterns. Perhaps the most important to the integrity of this emerging market is the current lack of capacity in local authorities to be able to deliver on the Biodiversity Net Gain policy.
Local authorities do the best they can with the resources they have, but they have undergone stringent funding cuts since 2008.
At the last count, around 60% of local planning authorities have no in-house ecological expertise – which is essential for delivering biodiversity gains effectively.
In our study, we evaluated how many of the applications contained a basic error in their calculations: we checked to see if the area of the site before and after development added up to the same amount.
We found that the areas did not add up in around one-fifth of all projects. Of these, around half had already been accepted by the local planning authorities. One explanation for this oversight could be that planners were so rushed they did not have time to examine the calculations included with the application.
This suggests we have not yet addressed the serious capacity shortages in the councils – who are ultimately going to be the public bodies overseeing the delivery of Biodiversity Net Gain at local scales. This is clear evidence that further investment in local planning capacity is required.
Environmental markets have the potential to be powerful mechanisms for improving nature, but one of the fundamental features of biodiversity compensation markets is that they deliver biodiversity gains that make up for an equal and opposite loss elsewhere.
This means that every biodiversity unit that is promised by developers in order to secure planning permission, but then not delivered in reality, has legitimised the loss of biodiversity elsewhere.
Making sure that these policies lead to direct, robust gains in the quality of nature is therefore absolutely essential to ensure that the markets-focused approach to drawing private finance into nature recovery in England leaves the environment better, rather than worse, off.
The post Guest post: Fixing the gaps in England’s ‘biodiversity net-gain’ policy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: Fixing the gaps in England’s ‘biodiversity net-gain’ policy
Claver Gatete is Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Jason Veysey is Energy Modeling Program Director and Senior Scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute. Lisa Sachs is Director of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University.
The case for global energy transition has rarely been clearer. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year exposed the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems, while the falling cost of renewables, the rising penetration of electric vehicles, and the growing value of demand flexibility have made the direction of travel obvious. The benefits of a clean, secure, integrated system are no longer in dispute. What remains unclear is how to build it.
Countries around the world have called for faster renewable energy deployment and alternative energy arrangements. A secure, affordable, resilient, decarbonised system requires specific investments in specific places in a specific sequence, optimised across sectors and borders. But very few governments have the analytical foundation to translate those imperatives into investment.
The two instruments that are supposed to determine investment priorities for decarbonisation – Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and country platforms – cannot answer the most basic question facing any country undertaking an energy transition: what should the energy system look like?
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To close this gap, every country needs a bankable, economy-wide optimisation model for its energy system. A model is not a plan, but it can help answer the critical question of what the future energy system should look like. It shows how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, calculates investment requirements and sequencing, and quantifies how system costs are affected by assumptions, policies, and exogenous variables like trade policy and financing terms.
Tool for efficient investment
Optimisation is a simplified way of simulating an energy system, but it can be an extremely powerful tool for moving energy planning from reactive (how do we manage the disparate actions in the energy system?) to intentional (what energy system underpins our national objectives?). A model can show how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, and how investment requirements are quantified and sequenced.
Optimisation models can treat the energy system and the sectors it serves as an integrated whole, optimising across sectors and projects in ways that can be mutually reinforcing. If considered independently, growth in industrial demand, transport electrification, and digital infrastructure can add stress to the energy system. But an optimised plan can arrange these and other changes in an efficient, synergistic way.
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New load can be added where low-cost power is available; industrial customers can ensure the viability of investments in energy supply; electric vehicle charging policy can smooth load curves and reduce costs for all consumers.
Additionally, optimisation modeling can also change the financeability of investments. Taken alone, each project faces uncertainty about the rest of the system, which raises the cost of capital and causes projects to stall or unwind after contracts are signed. A coherent, optimised plan makes visible the coordination that private capital would otherwise have to bet on: identified offtake, sequenced and committed transmission, contracted power supply, and so on.
What COP31 and COP32 should do
The upcoming COPs in Turkey and Ethiopia can shift the center of gravity of international climate cooperation from fragmented commitments to planning. Three moves are urgently needed.
First, optimised, economy-wide, long-term energy system planning must be the foundation on which any meaningful NDC, country platform, or finance commitment rests. NDCs are typically drafted by environment or single-line ministries, with limited cross-sectoral input from ministries of energy, finance, and planning. They contain targets, derived from sectoral strategies or national commitments, not from an analytically grounded picture of what the energy system should look like and what investments would make it work. Country platforms are generally a portfolio of investments assembled from existing project pipelines, rather than derived from a system-level analysis of what an optimised, decarbonised energy system would require.
Second, recognise regions as a key planning unit. Modern integrated energy systems are inherently regional. Renewable endowments are unevenly distributed; balancing variable supply across borders lowers aggregate cost, reduces redundant backup capacity, and unlocks economies of scale no individual nation can achieve. Many energy investments in Southeast Asia, East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Asia may only be financeable in a regional context. Assessing domestic infrastructure without regional optimisation perpetuates the perception that decarbonisation is more expensive than it is.
COP31 leaders unveil global targets, with spotlight on electrification
Third, finance the planning capacity. A coordinated commitment by multilateral development banks, bilateral donors, and philanthropic partners to help every region and its constituent countries develop and maintain their own modelling capability, with open-source tools and regional analytical hubs, would close the most consequential gap in the current architecture. The cost is small relative to current spending on country platforms, failed project preparation, and misallocated infrastructure investment.
This includes supporting regional institutions such as the ASEAN Centre for Energy, the African Energy Commission, regional power pools, and the Latin American and Caribbean Energy Organization to determine what optimised regional systems require. Country-by-country pledging, repeated at every COP, will not deliver what meaningfully integrated systems can.
The 2026 energy crisis made the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems newly visible. That window of clarity will close. The international community should seize the moment to build the planning foundation that has been missing for thirty years, rather than commissioning another round of NDCs or pledges, striving for outcomes neither was designed to deliver.
The post Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition appeared first on Climate Home News.
Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition
The world is currently experiencing what is expected to become the strongest El Niño on record – dubbed a “super El Niño” by many.
El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere.
This temporarily raises global temperatures and reshapes rainfall and extreme weather around the world – impacting the lives of billions of people.
The current El Niño event began in June and is expected to last into 2027.
El Niño is part of a wider climate pattern called the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle.
The ENSO cycle also has a cool phase, known as La Niña, as well as a “neutral” phase. El Niño and La Niña events typically last between nine and 12 months, but can go on longer.
Below, Carbon Brief explains how the ENSO cycle works, its impacts on extreme weather and global temperatures and why this El Niño event is projected to be the most intense since records began.
The post Explainer: How the ‘super El Niño’ will reshape the world’s weather appeared first on Carbon Brief.
https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/el-nino-explainer/index.html
The second-largest reservoir in the US reached a record-low water height on Saturday – just days after the country’s largest reservoir broke its own record.
Both Lake Mead and Lake Powell are located on the Colorado River.
They provide water for populations across seven US states in the south-western US, with around 40 million people getting some or all of their municipal water from the Colorado River.
The river also provides water for around 5.5m acres (22,258 square kilometres) of farmland across Colorado, Arizona, California and the other states in the river basin.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that climate change, population growth and over-consumption are all contributing to the current record-low levels of the reservoirs.
Record lows
At full capacity, Lakes Mead and Powell can hold a combined 68 cubic kilometres of water – enough to supply all household consumption in the contiguous US for nearly 1.5 years. However, the water level in both reservoirs has been declining for decades.
The chart below shows the water level of Lake Mead, in metres above mean sea level. The reservoir, which began to fill in 1935 following the construction of the Hoover Dam, has a “full pool” maximum capacity of 347.60 metres. The water level in Lake Mead reached a record low of 317.11 metres on 7 August.
The following chart shows the water level of Lake Powell, in metres above mean sea level. Lake Powell’s full-pool level is 1,127.76 metres.
While the reservoir reached its maximum capacity several times in the 1980s, it has not done so since. On 15 August, the water level in Lake Powell was recorded at a new record-low of 1,072.87 metres.
Both reservoirs have continued to decline in the days since breaking their respective records. The downward trend will largely continue in both lakes until next spring, when the snowpack in the mountains of the Upper Colorado River Basin begins to melt, says Dr Jack Schmidt, a senior research scientist at Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. He tells Carbon Brief:
“The big dilemma of the moment is that we’re only in the middle of August, and we have no assurance of what the coming winter will be. The only thing we can be sure of is that we will be depleting overall total basin reservoir storage from now until, roughly, early April.”
Compounding factors
The record lows across the two reservoirs are the result of several compounding factors, experts tell Carbon Brief.
Since the turn of the 20th century, the amount of water flowing along the Upper Colorado River has declined by about 20%. Research suggests that half of this decline can be attributed to human-induced climate change.
Most of the river’s streamflow comes from the snowpack of the Upper Colorado River Basin, which stretches across five western US states but is primarily located in Colorado and Utah.
This region has been gripped by a historic “megadrought” for more than a quarter of a century. Nearly half of the megadrought’s intensity over 2000-18 is attributable to climate change, according to a 2020 study.
At the same time, the increasing population in the US south-west has put added pressure on the Colorado River’s water supply. The number of people obtaining some or all of their water from the Colorado system has grown by 15 million (around 60%) since 1992.
Schmidt tells Carbon Brief:
“There’s an ultimate cause of the present water crisis, and there’s a proximate cause. The ultimate cause is a warming climate, a warming planet and a pretty clear correlation between warming conditions and decreased runoff in the Colorado River Basin.
“The proximate cause is that in this messy democratic republic of ours, big policy decisions that match the variability of the climate occur painfully slowly – with intense political negotiations – and only incrementally.”
On 31 July, the US Bureau of Reclamation, which manages water resources in the western US, released an environmental impact statement on its proposed post-2026 strategy for managing Lakes Powell and Mead. The strategy itself has not been released yet.
Schmidt notes that the statement does appear to give the Bureau flexibility to “respond to crisis” by reducing the delivery of water to several states. However, he adds:
“They acknowledge it won’t work if we just stay critically dry, and of course every climate model for the 21st century, especially with a continually warming planet, says that that’s exactly what’s going to happen.”
The post Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels
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