For years, wind energy has symbolized the clean energy transition. Towering turbines onshore and offshore have driven significant progress in reducing carbon emissions. However, recent setbacks in the global offshore wind industry have raised concerns about its future.
Rising costs, delayed projects, and shifting investment priorities force governments and companies to reassess their ambitious wind energy targets. While countries like China continue dominating the sector, others, including the United States and European nations, struggle to keep pace.
Profit vs. Progress: Why Energy Giants Are Scaling Back Offshore Ambitions
The offshore wind sector faces mounting challenges, with profitability concerns leading to significant withdrawals. Most recently, five energy companies, including Shell and Lyse, pulled out of Norway’s first large-scale floating offshore wind tender. The project, slated for 1.5 GW of capacity, has been deemed too risky due to profitability, timelines, and industrial maturity concerns.
Norway’s government capped state support at NOK 35 billion (EUR 3 billion), which critics argue is insufficient to attract large-scale investments. Energy Minister Terje Aasland defended the cap, stating it would be enough to launch 500 MW of floating wind capacity.
However, energy companies like Fred. Olsen Seawind and Hafslund have opted out, citing Norway’s restriction on mainland-only connections, which limits the profitability of exporting energy to other countries.
This follows a pattern seen elsewhere in Europe, where rising costs and regulatory constraints are driving companies to reconsider offshore wind projects. Denmark’s Ørsted, a global leader in renewables, has also exited several offshore wind opportunities, highlighting broader challenges within the sector.
Skyrocketing Costs Blow Offshore Wind Goals Off-Course
Globally, the offshore wind industry is grappling with escalating costs.
- Over the past two years, the average cost of offshore wind projects has risen by 30% to 40%, reaching $230 per megawatt-hour (MWh). This is more than 3x the cost of onshore wind, placing significant pressure on developers.

Inflation, supply chain disruptions, and high interest rates have further exacerbated the financial strain.
Equinor, a leading player in renewable energy, recently withdrew from offshore wind projects in Vietnam, Spain, and Portugal, citing unsustainable costs. Paal Eitrheim, Equinor’s head of renewables, noted that:
“It’s getting more expensive, and we think things are going to take more time.”
- RELATED: The “Northern Lights” Shines: Shell, Equinor, and TotalEnergies JV Powers the Norway CCS Project
Similarly, Shell, another energy giant, is scaling back its offshore wind ambitions. Shell sold its stakes in projects across Massachusetts, South Korea, Ireland, and France, signaling a strategic retreat from leading offshore developments. A company’s spokesperson stated in an email to S&P Global:
“While we will not lead new offshore wind developments, we remain interested in offtakes where commercial terms are acceptable and are cautiously open to equity positions if there is a compelling investment case.”
Shell CEO Wael Sawan admitted that the company lacks the competitive advantage to generate material returns in renewable generation. This sentiment is echoed by other oil majors like BP.
The withdrawal of these energy giants underscores a fundamental shift in priorities, with many companies now favoring onshore renewables like solar and wind, which are less affected by rising costs and regulatory hurdles. These challenges come at a time when global governments have set lofty targets for offshore wind energy.
Global Shortfalls and Missed Targets
Governments around the world have pinned their hopes on offshore wind as a key driver of the clean energy transition. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) initially projected a need to increase global offshore wind capacity from 73 GW to 494 GW by 2030 to meet climate goals.

- However, revised estimates now suggest the industry will fall short by one-third, delaying this milestone until after 2035.
The U.S. Offshore Wind Dilemma
The U.S. offshore wind industry, for instance, is at a crossroads. The country aimed to install 30 GW of offshore wind by 2030 but has less than 200 MW operational as of mid-2024.
Despite federal support through tax credits and lease auctions, the sector faces significant challenges. The outgoing administration of President Joe Biden issued permits for 15 GW of projects and held six lease sales. However, the recent election of President-elect Donald Trump raises concerns about future policy support, as his campaign promised to dismantle the industry’s progress.
Carl Fleming, a renewable energy policy advisor, noted that market conditions alone make it unlikely for the U.S. to meet its 2030 goals, regardless of political leadership. Delays in project approvals and a lack of supply chain investment have hindered progress. Analysts predict the country will achieve less than half of its target due to these challenges.
The European Wind Shortfall
Europe, which currently accounts for 40% of global offshore wind capacity, is also falling behind. Rising costs and lengthy approval processes have slowed progress.
Nations like the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands are projected to meet only 60% to 70% of their 2030 targets. Even Norway, a country with abundant wind resources, is struggling to attract developers due to perceived risks and limited support mechanisms.
Future auctions will require far larger investments to meet the targets, putting additional pressure on developers and governments alike.
Rebecca Williams, deputy CEO of the Global Wind Energy Council, expressed cautious optimism, stating that with the right policies, targets remain achievable. However, delays and financial constraints make it increasingly unlikely that Europe will meet its goals within the set timelines.
China’s Offshore Wind Boom
While Western markets struggle, China continues to dominate the offshore wind sector.
- In 2023, China accounted for more than half of the world’s new offshore wind installations, adding 6.3 GW of capacity.

The country’s state-owned enterprises benefit from low financing costs, subsidies, and locally produced components, enabling rapid deployment.
China’s dominance is expected to grow further, with annual installations projected to reach 16 GW over the next few years. However, the country’s closed market limits opportunities for international developers to participate or benefit from its advancements.
The Winds of Change: Adapting to a Shifting Energy Landscape
Remarkably, a recent market development suggests renewed enthusiasm. Energy giants BP and JERA have partnered to create JERA Nex BP, a $6 billion joint venture aimed at becoming one of the world’s largest offshore wind developers. Combining their existing assets, the venture boasts a potential net generating capacity of 13 GW.
BP CEO Murray Auchincloss emphasized the company’s “capital-light” growth approach, while JERA CEO Yukio Kani highlighted offshore wind’s critical role in the energy transition.
With 1 GW of current capacity, 7.5 GW in development, and 4.5 GW of secured leases, this collaboration seems to bring back confidence in offshore wind’s role in the energy transition.
Ultimately, the offshore wind industry is facing significant headwinds, but it remains a vital part of the clean energy transition. The current challenges highlight the need for governments and developers to adapt, innovate, and collaborate to ensure wind energy remains viable.
China’s rapid progress offers valuable lessons on the benefits of state support and localized manufacturing, while the struggles in Western markets underscore the importance of addressing financial and regulatory barriers.
The question is not whether offshore wind will survive but how it can evolve to meet the demands of a rapidly changing energy landscape.
- FURTHER READING: Sweden’s 100 GW Offshore Wind Power Ambition: Unlocking a Renewable Energy Powerhouse
The post Gone with the Wind: Is This the End for Wind Energy? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
![]()
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy10 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits

