Last month, Germany became the first major economy to commit to a target to reach “net-negative” emissions later this century.
While “net-zero” describes a state where a country’s emissions are balanced by the amount of greenhouse gases it can remove from the atmosphere, “net-negative” describes a state of removals exceeding emissions.
Therefore, when a country achieves “net-negative” emissions, it has not only stopped its contribution to climate change, but is actively helping to reduce warming.
Many of the scenarios for achieving the world’s most ambitious climate goals require the world to become net-negative in the second half of this century.
In these scenarios, failure to cut emissions fast enough in the near term causes the world to “overshoot” its climate targets, meaning they can only be met later on in the century by removing billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.
Some experts have also called on developed countries to aim to reach net-negative emissions earlier on this century, arguing they have a moral responsibility to reduce climate change and to create space for other countries to emit as they develop.
However, the ability of countries to remove CO2 from the atmosphere is defined by a range of factors, including their land area, forest cover and population size.
There is also a risk that setting distant net-negative targets could become a “distraction” from the urgent need to reduce emissions this decade, a researcher tells Carbon Brief.
Below, Carbon Brief explores which countries are or have targets to be net-negative, as well as the moral and scientific arguments for setting such a milestone.
- What is meant by ‘net-negative’ emissions?
- Which countries are already at net-negative emissions?
- Which countries are aiming for net-negative emissions?
- Does the world need to be net-negative to meet global climate goals?
- Do some countries need to be net-negative to meet climate goals fairly?
What is meant by ‘net-negative’ emissions?
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “net-negative emissions” is achieved when human-caused greenhouse gas removals exceed human-caused greenhouse gas emissions.
The specification of “greenhouse gases” rather than CO2 ”makes a very big difference” when it comes to net-negative emissions, says Prof Joeri Rogelj, an IPCC lead author and climate scientist at Imperial College London.
The reason for this, he explains, is that there are some non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions that will be almost impossible to eliminate completely. This is true even if the world makes every effort to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, the global deal aimed at keeping temperatures well below 2C by the end of the century, with an ambition of keeping them below 1.5C.
This includes, for example, methane emissions from rice production. There are currently no technologies available to eliminate these emissions completely – and it is unrealistic to expect rice production to cease entirely in the future.
Scientists call these kinds of emissions “residual non-CO2 emissions”. Rogelj explains:
“Because of residual non-CO2 emissions, we will always reach net-zero CO2 emissions before we reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions.”
To reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, some additional CO2 removal will be needed to compensate for impossible-to-eliminate non-CO2 emissions, he adds:
“To reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, we already need to reach net-negative CO2 emissions – because we know that non-CO2 emissions will always be an emissions contribution.”
Because of this, a national target to reach net-negative greenhouse gas emissions can always be interpreted as “significantly more ambitious” than a net-negative CO2 target over the same timescale, he adds.
Which countries are already at net-negative emissions?
Though the vast majority of countries are not close to being net-zero – let alone net-negative – there are a small number of global south countries that already remove more CO2 from the atmosphere than they emit each year.
This net-negative group includes Suriname in South America, Panama in Central America and Bhutan in south Asia.
Suriname is one of the most highly forested countries in the world. It has trees over 97% of its land surface.
Trees absorb CO2 as they grow and can store it in their leaves, trunks and roots. Tropical forests are particularly carbon dense, storing a quarter of all the world’s land carbon.
As well as being heavily forested, Suriname is also the smallest country in South America by population, with just 618,000 people.
Its low consumption combined with its ability to remove large amounts of CO2 through its forests each year has allowed Suriname to remain a net-negative country.
However, Suriname’s UN climate plan, known as its “nationally determined contribution” (NDC), says that “significant international support is needed” from developed countries in order for its forests to keep being protected.
In 2023, Reuters reported that Suriname has plans to sell forest carbon offset credits to developed nations under the Paris Agreement.
This means that Suriname wants to sell off some of its ability to remove CO2 from the atmosphere through its forests to more-polluting developed countries, who can then claim that they have effectively paid to reduce their own emissions.
Suriname argues this will bring in finance needed to protect its forests, Reuters said.
However, experts have questioned whether developed nations should be able to claim that they have reduced their own emissions by protecting Suriname’s forests. This is because these forests may have remained intact even without developed nations’ investment. If this were the case, it would mean that no real emissions reduction would have taken place.
(See Carbon Brief’s in-depth carbon offsets series to understand more about the accounting problems associated with forest carbon offset schemes.)
Much like Suriname, Bhutan in south Asia is characterised by high forest cover and a small population. It has trees covering 71% of its land, and 51% of its total land area is covered by strict laws ensuring forest cover is maintained.
At the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow in 2021, Bhutan started a “carbon-negative” club with Suriname as a founding member.
During the summit, Panama’s president declared that the country was also net-negative and that it would be joining the carbon-negative club.
According to Panama’s NDC, its emissions are currently more than balanced by its CO2 removals, which come largely from its forests. This is despite the country’s tree cover declining by 8.5% between 2000 and 2022.
The country has targets to restore 50,000 hectares of forest by 2050 and to cut its energy emissions by at least 24% by 2050, when compared to a business-as-usual baseline, according to its NDC.
At COP28 in Dubai in 2023, Panama also joined the Group of Negative Emitters, a small alliance of countries that are or are aiming to be net-negative led by Denmark (more on this below).
Aside from these three countries, there are other global south countries that claim to be “carbon sinks” in their NDCs – implying that they remove more CO2 than they emit each year.
This includes the heavily forested nations Gabon in Central Africa and Guyana in South America, as well as small island nations the Comoros, a volcanic archipelago off Africa’s east coast, and Niue, a south Pacific island.
The African island Madagascar has also claimed to be a carbon sink, but it is worth noting that the nation has lost 27% of its tree cover since 2001.
Which countries are aiming for net-negative emissions?
The past few years have seen a small number of global north countries commit to becoming net-negative on a variety of different timescales – and for a variety of different reasons.
Most recently in February 2024, Germany announced that it intends to introduce a target to reach net-negative greenhouse gas emissions by 2060.
In a document laying out the key features of its proposed target, the German government argues that reaching net-negative emissions, at least in some parts of the world, will be necessary to balance out unavoidable greenhouse gas emissions, such as methane from farming.
The government also says that, given the current pace of global emissions, limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C is looking “increasingly unlikely”.
It alludes to a situation in which the world first overshoots 1.5C and then uses CO2 removal techniques to bring temperatures back down, saying:
“Beyond carbon neutrality, net-negative emissions must therefore be used to reduce the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere again in order to meet the 1.5C target and thus minimise the risks of serious and irreversible consequences for humans and ecosystems on Earth.”
(More on this below in: Does the world need to be net-negative to meet global climate goals?)
Back in 2022, both Denmark and Finland announced targets to reach net-negative emissions.
Finland announced targets to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2035, and net-negative greenhouse gas emissions by 2040.
According to the climate not-for-profit Carbon Gap, Finland’s 2035 and 2040 goals represent the most ambitious legally-binding CO2 removal targets of any country globally.
Climate Home News reported that Finland’s targets were based on an analysis by the country’s independent climate panel. The analysis aimed to calculate what Finland’s “fair share” of global emissions should be, based on its share of the global population, its ability to pay to reduce emissions and its historic responsibility for causing climate change.
Finnish environment minister Emma Kari told Climate Home it was “very important” that the target was underpinned by research, adding:
“High income countries have to take a progressive and active role when it comes to tackling climate change.”
(More on this below in: Do some countries need to be net-negative to meet climate goals fairly?)
Denmark, meanwhile, announced targets to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045 and to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 110% by 2050, achieving net-negative emissions.
In a document explaining the rationale behind the new targets to the people of Denmark, the government said that the country has “an opportunity and an obligation to promote the spread of green solutions in the EU and globally”.
It said its new targets will “increase the implementation of already decided initiatives”, likely referring to the Paris Agreement.
At COP28 in December 2023, Denmark announced it was starting the Group of Negative Emitters, an alliance of countries that are at or are aiming for net-negative emissions. The group included Denmark, Finland and Panama.
However, it was neighbouring Sweden that was the first global north country to set a net-negative target.
Back in 2017, it committed to reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045 and net-negative emissions shortly after.
Reporting on Sweden’s climate law in 2017, New Scientist said it was the first country to significantly update its climate targets in light of the Paris Agreement.
One global north nation that has not yet set a net-negative target but has been advised to do so is Scotland.
Scotland has committed to reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045 – five years before the overall UK target of 2050.
The UK’s independent climate advisers, the Climate Change Committee (CCC), says that its central scenario for how the UK as a whole can reach its 2050 net-zero target sees Scotland becoming net-negative “well before” 2050.
Under this central scenario – known as the “balanced pathway” – Scotland reaches net-negative emissions sooner to compensate for slower action in Wales, England and Northern Ireland.
This reflects that Scotland has the largest remaining intact forests of any nation in the UK – and that Wales and Northern Ireland face a particularly steep challenge in reducing emissions in agriculture, the CCC says.
(Under the CCC’s most ambitious net-zero scenario – known as “tailwinds” – the UK as a whole reaches net-negative emissions shortly after 2042. The UK government has not indicated that it intends to act based on the CCC’s most ambitious scenario – and is currently behind on meeting its less ambitious targets.)
Another global north power that has been advised to set a net-negative target is the EU.
In advice published ahead of a recommendation for a new EU 2040 target in February, the bloc’s science advisers said that the EU could “improve the fairness” of its contribution to global climate action by adopting a net-negative target for “beyond 2050”.
EU members have not yet indicated that they are considering such a target.
Does the world need to be net-negative to meet global climate goals?
The question of whether, scientifically speaking, the world needs to reach net-negative greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets depends on what actions countries take in the next few years.
In its latest assessment of how the world can tackle climate change, the IPCC presents a range of scenarios for how the world can meet its temperature goals by the end of the century.
In some of these scenarios, global emissions fall extremely rapidly, avoiding the need for the world to reach net-negative greenhouse gas emissions.
However, because global emissions have remained so high in recent years, the path to limiting global warming to 1.5C or 2C is getting steeper and steeper, the IPCC says.
Many of its scenarios for keeping temperatures well below 2C by 2100 do rely on the world reaching net-negative greenhouse gas emissions in the second half of this century.
In these scenarios, failure to cut emissions fast enough in the next few years would see the world temporarily overshoot 1.5C. This is before large-scale CO2 removal techniques are rolled out globally, alongside ambitious measures to slash emissions, including rapid declines in fossil-fuel use.
At the point when greenhouse gas removals exceed emissions – when the world becomes net-negative – temperatures will be in decline and, depending on the scenario, may fall below 1.5C or 2C by the end of the century.
Summarising what the IPCC scenarios say about net-negative emissions, Rogelj says:
“Net-zero CO2 is a geophysical necessity, we need that to stop warming increasing. Net-zero greenhouse gases is more of a policy milestone. When we reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions – let alone net-negative greenhouse gas emissions – global warming will be slowly reducing at the rate of a couple of tenths of a degree per century.”
Although many of the IPCC scenarios see the world turning net-negative this century, there are some scenarios where the world takes immediate action to rapidly cut emissions – meaning temperatures can be kept at 1.5C without large amounts of CO2 removal.
The charts below, adapted from the IPCC’s report on how to tackle climate change, illustrate how global greenhouse gas emissions change under various scenarios where temperatures are kept to 1.5C or well below 2C by 2100.
In the first scenario, “Neg”, temperatures are highly likely to overshoot 1.5C this century before returning to this level of warming by 2100. In this scenario, the extensive use of CO2 removal techniques sees the world reach net-negative greenhouse gas emissions (turquoise dotted line) by 2080.
(CO2 removal techniques include direct air capture (DAC – purple), land-use change such as tree planting (blue) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS – green). All of these methods are discussed in more detail below.)
In the second scenario, GS, there is a gradual strengthening of climate policies, giving the world a 66% chance of limiting warming to well below 2C by 2100. In this scenario, the world reaches net-negative greenhouse gas emissions around 2090.
In the third scenario, LD, a low demand for energy coupled with a rapid fossil fuel phaseout sees net greenhouse gas emissions drop to near – but not below – zero, limiting warming to below 1.5C without the world becoming net-negative.
(For a more thorough look at scenarios for keeping global warming below 1.5C or 2C, see Carbon Brief’s recently published interactive on the topic.)
Although almost all IPCC scenarios limiting warming to 1.5C – and most that stay below 2C – see a role for large-scale CO2 removal, the report also notes that the techniques available for doing this are at varying levels of readiness and pose different challenges and trade-offs.
Currently, tree-planting and ecosystem restoration are the only “widely deployed” forms of CO2 removal, according to the IPCC.
However, research suggests that relying too much on land-based CO2 removal methods, such as tree-planting and BECCS – a still emerging technique involving burning crops to produce energy before capturing the resultant CO2 – could take up large areas of land, threatening wildlife and food production.
DAC – which involves directly removing CO2 from air using giant fans that use chemical reactions to filter out the greenhouse gas – is currently limited by its large energy requirements and by cost, the IPCC says.
It is also worth noting that, while the IPCC sets out various scenarios for meeting the 1.5C and 2C targets, it does not map out the role that individual countries can or should play in meeting these goals.
Some argue that, given their wealth and historic responsibility for climate change, it is only fair that developed countries reach net-negative emissions in order to create space for ongoing emissions in developing nations. This is discussed in more detail below.
Do some countries need to be net-negative to meet climate goals fairly?
When setting its net-negative target, Finland made it clear that the rationale was to do its “fair share” when it comes to tackling climate change.
Under the Paris Agreement adopted by nearly every country in the world in 2015, it is officially recognised that developed nations should “take the lead” with slashing their emissions. Additionally, developed nations committed to providing financial assistance to help developing nations transition their economies.
This reflects the fact that developed nations hold the most historic responsibility for climate change. For example, the US and Europe have produced nearly half of all of the greenhouse gas emissions released into the atmosphere since the 1800s.
It also reflects the fact that developed nations have the most resources for addressing climate change.
It follows that developed nations should take the lead when it comes to reaching net-negative emissions, says Rogelj:
“Developed countries should decline emissions first and farthest. That also includes going net-negative, both CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions.”
Getting to net-negative emissions sooner could provide more room for developing nations to transition their economies while still prioritising development, he adds:
“When we think of the global pathway that needs to be achieved, the more ambitious that any country that is in a position to do so can be, the more leeway this provides for developing regions to pursue alternative paths.”
However, it is worth noting that not all countries will feasibly be able to go net-negative, he adds.
The ability of a country to go net-negative is defined by a variety of factors, including its land size, forest cover, economy and population size.
For example, heavily forested nations with relatively small populations will be more able to get to a position where they are removing more CO2 from the atmosphere than they are emitting each year.
Two out of three of the countries that are already at net-negative emissions, Bhutan and Suriname, are heavily forested with small populations.
Finland, which has the world’s most ambitious CO2 removal goals, has forests over nearly three-quarters of its land area.
Rogelj adds:
“I think countries that have CO2 removal potential should [set net-negative goals]. However, countries without CO2 removal potential, it’s useless to say you have to go net-negative.”
Prof David Reiner, a researcher of climate policy at the University of Cambridge, was part of a research effort to work out how the responsibility for CO2 removal could be shared equally between countries.
He says that trying to figure out who should be responsible for reaching net-negative greenhouse gas emissions is fraught with complicated questions, beyond which countries have the technical capacity. He tells Carbon Brief:
“It’s challenging to impose historical responsibility for climate change. We’ve seen in many areas, people chafe or resist what their grandparents might have done. One example is reparations for slavery. It becomes difficult to assign that. There are people here [in the UK] whose parents moved from the Indian subcontinent, whose emissions are they responsible for?”
He adds that there is a risk that more attention on setting net-negative targets could be a distraction from the urgent need for countries to reduce their emissions this decade:
“What I wouldn’t want to see is a rush for more and more countries to adopt net-negative targets to divert attention from the fact that they haven’t established how they’re going to get their net-zero targets. Or to say: ‘Well, now it’s even easier for us to justify missing our 2030 target, because look how tough our 2070 target is going to be.’”
Rogelj agrees that, while net-negative targets could have an important role to play in addressing climate change, there is a risk they could be a distraction unless coupled with more near-term action. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Any long-term target without a near-term plan is not credible.”
The post Explainer: Why some countries are aiming for ‘net-negative’ emissions appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Explainer: Why some countries are aiming for ‘net-negative’ emissions
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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