Ten years ago, switching from burning coal to gas was a key element of China’s policy to reduce severe air pollution.
However, while gas is seen in some countries as a “bridging” fuel to move away from coal use, rapid electrification, uncompetitiveness and supply concerns have suppressed its share in China’s energy mix.
As such, while China’s gas demand has more than doubled over the past decade, the fuel is not currently playing a decisive role in the country’s strategy to tackle climate change.
Instead, renewables are now the leading replacement for coal demand in China, with growth in solar and wind generation largely keeping emissions growth from China’s power sector flat.
While gas could play a role in decarbonising some aspects of China’s energy demand – particularly in terms of meeting power demand peaks and fuelling heavy industry – multiple factors would need to change to make it a more attractive alternative.
Small, but impactful
The share of gas in China’s primary energy demand is small and has remained relatively unchanged at around 8-9% over the past five years.
It also comprises 7% of China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fuel combustion, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Gas combustion in China added 755m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) into the atmosphere in 2023 – double the total amount of CO2 emitted by the UK.
However, its emissions profile in China lags well behind that of coal, which represented 79% of China’s fuel-linked CO2 emissions and was responsible for almost 9bn tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2023, according to the same IEA data.
Gas consumption continues to grow in line with an overall uptick in total energy demand. Chinese gas demand, driven by industry use, grew by around 7-8% year-on-year in 2024, according to different estimates.
This rapid growth is, nevertheless, slightly below the 9% average annual rise in China’s gas demand over the past decade, during which consumption has more than doubled overall, as shown in the figure below.

The state-run oil and gas company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) forecast in 2025 that demand growth for the year may slow further to just over 6%.
The majority of China’s gas demand in 2023 was met by domestic gas supply, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).
Most of this supply comes from conventional gas sources. But incremental Chinese domestic gas supply in recent years has come from harder-to-extract unconventional sources, including shale gas, which accounted for as much as 45% of gas production in 2024.
Despite China’s large recoverable shale-gas resources and subsidies to encourage production, geographical and technical limitations have capped production levels relative to the US, which is the world’s largest gas producer by far.
CNPC estimates Chinese gas output will grow by just 4% in 2025, compared with 6% growth in 2024. Nevertheless, output is still expected to exceed the 230bn cubic metre national target for 2025.
Liquified natural gas (LNG) is China’s second most-common source of gas, imported via giant super-cooled tankers from countries including Australia, Qatar, Malaysia and Russia.
This is followed by pipeline imports – which are seen as cheaper, but less reliable – from Russia and central Asia.
One particularly high-profile pipeline project is the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project. However, Beijing has yet to explicitly agree to investing in or purchasing the gas delivered by the project. Disagreements around pricing and logistics have hindered progress.
Evolving role
Beijing initially aimed for gas to displace coal as part of a broader policy to tackle air pollution.
A three-year action plan from 2018-2020, dubbed the “blue-sky campaign”, helped to accelerate gas use in the industrial and residential sectors, as gas displaced consumption of “dispersed coal” (散煤)”– referring to improperly processed coal that emits more pollutants.
Meanwhile, several cities across northern and central China were also mandated to curtail coal usage and switch to gas instead. Many of these cities were based in provinces with a strong coal mining economy or higher winter heating demand.
China’s pollution levels saw “drastic improvement” as a result, according to a report by research institute the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).
(In January 2026, there were widespread media reports of households choosing not to use gas heating despite freezing temperatures, as a result of high prices following the expiry of subsidies for gas use.)
Industry remains the largest gas user in China, with “city gas” – gas delivered by pipeline to urban areas – trailing in second, as shown in the figure below. Power generation is a distant third.

Gas has never gained momentum in China’s power sector, with its share of power generation remaining at 4% while wind and solar power’s share has soared from 4% to 22% over the past decade, Yu Aiqun, a research analyst at the US-based thinktank Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief.
Yu adds that this stagnation is largely due to insufficient and unreliable gas supply, which drives up prices and makes gas less competitive compared to coal and renewables. She says:
“With the rapid expansion of renewables and ongoing geopolitical uncertainties, I don’t foresee a bright future for gas power.”
Average on-grid gas-fired power prices of 0.56-0.58 yuan per kilowatt hour (yuan/kWh) in China are far higher than that of around 0.3-0.4 yuan/kWh for coal power, according to some industry estimates. Recent auction prices for renewables are even cheaper than this.
Meanwhile, the share of renewables in China’s power capacity stood at 55% in 2024, compared with gas at around 4%.
Generation from wind and solar in particular has increased by more than 1,250 terawatt-hours (TWh) in China since 2015, while gas-fired generation has increased by just 140TWh, according to IEEFA.
As the share of coal has shrunk from 70% to 61% during this period, IEEFA suggests that renewables – rather than gas – are displacing coal’s share in the generation mix.
However, China’s gas capacity may still rise from approximately 150 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 to 200GW by 2030, Bloomberg reports.
A report by the National Energy Administration (NEA) on development of the sector notes that gas will continue to play a “critical role” in “peak shaving”, where gas turbines can be used for short periods to meet daily spikes in demand. As such, the NEA says gas will be an “important pillar” in China’s energy transition.
In 2024, a new policy on gas utilisation also “explicitly promoted” the use of gas peak-shaving power plants, according to industry outlet MySteel.
China’s current gas storage capacity is “insufficient”, according to CNPC, reducing its ability to meet peak-shaving demand. The country built 38 underground gas storage sites with peak-shaving capacity of 26.7bn cubic metres in 2024, but this accounts for just 6% of its annual gas demand.
Transport use
Gas is instead playing a bigger part in the displacement of diesel in the transport sector, due to the higher cost competitiveness of LNG as a fuel – particularly in the trucking sector.
CNPC expects that LNG displaced around 28-30m tonnes of diesel in the trucking sector in 2025, accounting for 15% of total diesel demand in China.
This is further aided by policy support from Beijing’s equipment trade-in programme, part of efforts to stimulate the economy.
However, gas is not necessarily a better option for heavy-duty, long-haul transportation, due to poorer fuel efficiency compared with electric vehicles (EVs).
In fact, “new-energy vehicles” (NEVs) – including hydrogen fuel-cell, pure-electric and hybrid-electric trucks – are displacing both LNG-fueled trucks and diesel heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs).
In the first half of 2025, battery-electric models accounted for 22% of all HDV sales, a year-on-year increase of 9%, while market share for LNG-fueled trucks fell from 30% in 2024 to 26%.
Gas can be cheaper than oil but is not competitive with EVs and – with the emergence of zero-emission fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia – gas may eventually lose even this niche market, says Yu.
Supply security
Chinese government officials frequently note that China is “rich in coal, poor in oil and short of gas” (“富煤贫油少气”). Concerns around import dependence have underpinned China’s focus on coal as a source of energy security.
However, Beijing increasingly sees electrification as a more strategic way to decarbonise its transport sector, according to some analysts.
“Overall, electrification is a clear energy security strategy to reduce exposure to global fossil fuel markets,” says Michal Meidan, head of the China energy research programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
Chinese oil and gas production grew dramatically in the last few years under a seven-year action plan from 2019-25, as Beijing ordered its state oil firms to ramp up output to ensure energy security.
Despite this, gas import dependency still hovers at around 40% of demand. This, according to assessments in government documents, exposes the country to price shocks and geopolitical risks.
The graph below shows the share of domestically produced gas (dark blue), LNG imports (mid-blue) and pipeline imports (light blue), in China’s overall gas supply between 2017 and 2024.

“Gas use is unlikely to play a significant role in decarbonising the power system, but could be more significant in industrial decarbonisation,” Meidan tells Carbon Brief.
She estimates that if LNG prices fall to $6 per million British thermal units (btu), compared to an average of $11 in 2024-25, this could encourage fuel switching in the steel, chemical manufacturing, textiles, ceramics and food processing industries.
The chart below shows the year-on-year change in gas demand between 2001-2022.

Growth in gas demand has been decelerating in some industries in recent years, such as refining. But it also remains unclear if Beijing will adopt more aggressive policies favouring gas, Meidan adds.
A roadmap developed by the Energy Research Institute (ERI), a thinktank under the National Development and Reform Commission’s Academy of Macroeconomic Research, finds that gas only begins to play an equivalent or greater role in China’s energy mix than coal by 2050 at the earliest – 10 years ahead of China’s target for achieving carbon neutrality.
Both fossil fuels play a significantly smaller role than clean-energy sources at this point.
Wang Zhongying and Kaare Sandholt, both experts at the ERI, write in Carbon Brief:
“Gas does not play a significant role in the power sector in our scenarios, as solar and wind can provide cheaper electricity while existing coal power plants – together with scaled-up expansion of energy storage and demand-side response facilities – can provide sufficient flexibility and peak-load capacity.”
Ultimately, China’s push for gas will be contingent on its own development goals. Its next five-year plan, from 2026-2030, will build a framework for China’s shift to controlling absolute carbon emissions, rather than carbon intensity.
Recent recommendations by top Chinese policymakers on priorities for the next five-year plan did not explicitly mention gas. Instead, the government endorses “raising the level of electrification in end-use energy consumption” while also “promoting peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
The Chinese government feels that gas is “nice to have…if available and cost-competitive but is not the only avenue for China’s energy transition,” says Meidan.
The post Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy
Climate Change
Cited 9 June 2026: Europe’s ‘exceptional’ heatwave | Warming forecast | AMOC observations ‘at risk’
Welcome to Cited, your essential guide to new climate research.
In the news
SPRING HEATWAVE: Temperature records for May fell across western Europe as the region baked in an “exceptionally early” heatwave, reported the Associated Press. The outlet noted that temperatures reached 35.1C in the UK and 36C in France at the end of last month, with the latter’s national weather service stating that a “heat dome” had produced temperatures more than 10C higher than “usual”. BBC News said temperatures reached 40.3C in Portugal. Carbon Brief explored how the media covered the extreme weather and the role of climate change.
CLIMATE RESEARCH ‘STYMIED’: The White House released draft regulations that would “give political appointees the final word” on federal research grants and other funding across government agencies, reported Scientific American. According to Bloomberg, climate experts said the “sweeping” changes would “stymie research in the field”. At the same time, the Guardian reported the National Science Federation – a US government agency – announced it would be dismantling a $368m deep-sea observation system that provides “crucial” data on ocean systems and climate change. [For more, see ‘Spotlight’ below].
WMO WARNING: A report from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UK Met Office, covered by Reuters, found that average global temperatures are forecast to reach “near-record levels” in the next five years. The newswire said the report projected that average temperatures each year over 2026-30 will range between 1.3-1.9C above pre-industrial levels, with one year where temperatures will top the warmest year on record, set in 2024.
Research picks
Impacts
- Climate change and population growth have led to a 51% increase in global exposure to extreme daytime heat in cities over the past two decades | Communications Earth & Environment
- Global warming interacts with poverty to “magnify educational disruption” and “deepen existing inequities” among children and young people | The Lancet
- Human-caused greenhouse gas emissions has increased the likelihood of “landfalling” oceanic heatwaves by a factor of nine | One Earth
Nature
- Wildfire “disturbances” have been shifting Canada’s forests from a carbon sink to a carbon source since the 2000s | Global Change Biology
- Following decades of rapid decline, mangrove forests around the world have been recovering since 2010, with both forest loss and degradation rates slowing | Science
- Large-scale cultivation of macroalgae has “low potential” for carbon dioxide removal and unintended consequences that “can be substantial” | Biogeosciences
Projections
- Global hailstorm-induced damage potential could increase by 37-42% by the late 21st century, depending on the emission scenario | Nature
- Even under a low-emissions scenario, 45% and 35% of mountain bird and mammal species, respectively, are at risk of seeing losses in habitat range by 2050 that outweigh any gains by at least 20% | Conservation Biology
- Future warming will likely boost natural methane emissions from freshwater, as methane-oxidising bacteria fail to keep pace | Nature Climate Change
Captured
China accounts for more “conventional” carbon dioxide removal (CDR), such as afforestation and reforestation, than any other country in the world. That is according to the third edition of the annual state of carbon dioxide removal report, published last week and covered in detail by Carbon Brief. China’s average conventional CDR of 539m tonnes of CO2 over 2014-23 is more than double that of the US, the next-highest country.
625
How many times greater cities in the global south experienced “compound” exposure to extreme heat and air pollution than global-north cities over 2003-20, according to an npj urban sustainability study.
Spotlight
AMOC observations at risk

The Irminger Sea, a patch of frigid ocean east of Greenland, plays an outsized role in the Earth’s climate.
Here, surface water that has travelled thousands of kilometres from the tropics grows cold and dense enough to sink to the ocean’s depths – a transformation that must occur for the water to begin a long journey back to the southern hemisphere.
This makes the Irminger Sea an “action centre” for the mighty Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), the vast system of ocean currents that keeps temperatures in Europe mild.
Last week, the US government announced plans to dismantle ocean moorings installed in the Irminger Sea which, among other things, collect data on the health of the AMOC.
This came as part of a programme to “descope” the Ocean Observatories Initiative, a $368m network of ocean sensors installed in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
Two of the moorings earmarked for removal in the Irminger Sea form part of an internationally funded, trans-Atlantic AMOC monitoring array, known as OSNAP, that stretches from Canada to Scotland.
Experts told Carbon Brief the move by the Trump administration highlights the vulnerability of AMOC observation systems around the world. These deep-sea moorings – scattered across the Atlantic – collect real-time data on, among other things, ocean current, temperature, pressure and biochemistry.
Prof Penny Holliday, chief scientific officer of the UK National Oceanography Centre, told Carbon Brief that the OSNAP array, as well as the RAPID array at 26N, are “entirely dependent” on research grants that have to be “continually reapplied for”.
“Funding is perilous all the time,” she said.
A report prepared last month by scientists for Nordic ministers exploring the security of funding for AMOC observing systems warned that RAPID and OSNAP were in “critical condition” and faced “material exposure over an 18-month horizon”. Meanwhile, other key basin-wide and global components of the global AMOC observing system were rated as “at risk”.
It is not just US funding that is uncertain. The report notes, for example, that the five-yearly funding the UK provides to RAPID and OSNAP is “at risk from 2027 due to year-on-year budget reductions” at the Natural Environmental Research Council.
(RAPID is funded by the US and UK, whereas OSNAP is backed by five different countries, with the US contributing half of the total financial support.)
Report co-author Dr Femke de Jong from the Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research told Carbon Brief that “continued AMOC observations” are under pressure in “multiple countries”. She said:
“While the risk of a declining AMOC to society is starting to be recognised, there is not yet a system or institution in place to guarantee a way to monitor it.”
AMOC monitoring arrays are still in their infancy – RAPID, the oldest, was launched in 2004. Two decades of data captured so far shows that the AMOC is slowing down. However, scientists will need many more years of data to be able to confidently link the decline to climate change, rather than natural variability in the ocean.
NOC’s Holliday points to the disconnect between scientific and funder timelines:
“The timescale of observations needed in order to be able to detect a climate change signal from the very naturally variable ocean is around 40-60 years…. [And yet], in the Netherlands, they have to apply for a new grant for their ocean moorings every two years. They are going to have to do that for 40 years.
“This is a very inefficient way of getting funding for what should be critical infrastructure.”
Preprints to watch
Carbon Brief’s pick of new papers still going through peer review
- Urban areas were responsible for two-thirds of CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels in 2022 | Nature portfolio
- Climate adaptation measures are responsible for one-quarter of greenhouse gas emissions and three-quarters of human freshwater withdrawals | Earth System Dynamics
- Global food miles – the emissions generated from transporting food – could be “lower than previously estimated”, at around 0.82bn tonnes per year | Nature portfolio
Noticeboard
- 10 June: AMS Washington Forum early registration deadline
- 10-12 June: Fourth international conference on carbon dioxide removal, Milan
- 11 June: Application deadline for postdoctoral research position in the political economy of net-zero at the University of Oxford; Salary: £39,424-47,779
- Mid-June: AGU annual meeting abstract submissions open
- 17 June: World Weaving climate research programme funding application deadline
- 17 June: CCMC lecture (online): “Temperature, health and adaptation: What actually protects people?”
- 21 June: Application deadline for postdoctoral research position in extreme event health impacts at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Salary: £42,552-66,456
Cited is researched and written by Cecilia Keating, Robert McSweeney, Ayesha Tandon, Daisy Dunne and Dr Giuliana Viglione.
Please send tips, feedback and upcoming climate research to cited@carbonbrief.org
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cited email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post Cited 9 June 2026: Europe’s ‘exceptional’ heatwave | Warming forecast | AMOC observations ‘at risk’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Cited 9 June 2026: Europe’s ‘exceptional’ heatwave | Warming forecast | AMOC observations ‘at risk’
Climate Change
The UN climate process needs ambition – the law demands it
Bill Hare is the CEO of Climate Analytics, a global climate science and policy institute working to accelerate climate action.
The word ‘implementation’ has featured long and loud recently in discussions about the UN climate process.
The host government of last year’s COP30 summit, Brazil, argued that it should be an “implementation COP”. And if you talk regularly to influential participants in the UN process, you’d be surprised how many will tell you that in the current political climate, it’s all about implementing the pledges and targets governments have already made, rather than aiming to raise them.
This interpretation of ‘implementation’ is dangerously wrong. You can see that it is wrong by simply going back to the Paris Agreement. Article 4 states that Parties (countries) “shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), and that each new NDC “will represent a progression” beyond the Party’s previous one and “reflect its highest possible ambition”.
In other words, regularly increasing ambition is a central element of implementing the Paris Agreement. Governments pledged to increase ambition regularly, and the community of people who care about climate change needs to hold them to that pledge.
Raised expectations
Even a cursory look at the current state of emissions shows that without increased ambition, the other central pillars of the Paris Agreement will not be realised. The global emissions peak will not come “as soon as possible”, net zero will not be reached in the second half of this century, and global warming will race beyond the 1.5°C limit, with catastrophic impacts beginning in the most vulnerable countries and risks increasing for everyone.
Since the Paris summit in 2015, expectations and obligations on governments to step up on decarbonising their economies have increased. In 2021 and 2022, governments declared via the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly that the right to a healthy environment is a universal human right. An environment of dangerous climate change is not a healthy one, so the obligation to cut emissions further and faster is clear.
Last year, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that 1.5°C is the primary limit of the Paris Agreement and constitutes a legally binding target. It clarified that states have obligations, not only under the UN climate convention, but under customary international law, human rights law and the Law of the Sea.
It also reaffirmed that governments’ NDCs must reflect their highest possible ambition. Last month, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the ICJ ruling, with governments voting 141 for, and only eight against.
Failing on ambition
Nonetheless, most governments are not showing the ambition required by their international obligations. Fifty-two countries have not submitted their third NDC with emission-cutting targets for 2035, which they were supposed to do more than a year ago.
Many submitted NDCs fall well short of what is required, with Indonesia, Russia and Saudi Arabia among countries whose level of ambition, if reflected globally, would usher in at least 4°C of global warming.
We know from our own analysis that if countries just implemented their present level of ambition through 2035, the world would warm by 2.6°C above preindustrial levels by 2100, a catastrophic scenario.


But we also know that if countries implemented policies consistent with their highest possible ambition, we can limit overshoot of 1.5°C to about 0.2°C, halt global warming within 25 years, and bring it down to about 1.2°C by the end of the century. Other analyses paint a similar picture.
Make no mistake: this level of overshoot will have serious adverse consequences. But two things are very clear: we can get warming back below 1.5°C before 2100, and countries can be far more ambitious than they are now.
Meanwhile real-world events are demonstrating more clearly than ever that moving quickly and decisively to an economy powered by clean electricity bolsters energy security, reduces energy costs and avoids the geopolitical blackmail and bullying associated with dependence on a continuous supply of fossil fuel imports.
Back the collective process
Because the various UN declarations and decisions outlined above are taken collectively by governments, we can make an interesting deduction: most governments themselves recognise that they need to show more ambition. There are many reasons why each of them doesn’t do so on its own; and one of the key aspects of the UN climate process is that it allows and encourages them to do so with some degree of collectivity.
What all of this speaks to is the need to increase the focus on raising ambition, to continue to use the UN climate process as the key convening forum, and to use COPs as the place where governments are held accountable at a high political level every year. There is no other forum that does that and no other place in which vulnerable countries are at the table on equal terms with the biggest emitters.
Right now, the geopolitical going is tough; and the tough need to get going towards the trouble, not run away from it.
Yes, delivery of existing pledges is absolutely necessary. If governments use this decade to honour the Global Stocktake outcomes from 2024 – if they triple renewable energy capacity, double the rate of energy efficiency improvements and make deep cuts in methane emissions – that will go a long way to keeping global warming below 2°C. Most are not on track – so yes, full implementation of what countries have already agreed is sorely needed.
But ambition must also be strengthened, urgently. It’s not an either-or: ‘implementation’ has to include ‘increasing ambition’. Climate science, international law, climate justice and the needs of the world’s most climate-impacted societies demand nothing less.
The post The UN climate process needs ambition – the law demands it appeared first on Climate Home News.
Climate Change
Alaskans Reel From the Loss of National Science Foundation Ocean-Monitoring Instruments
In the nation’s fastest-warming state with a multi-billion-dollar fishing industry and storm-threatened coastal communities, scientists say the federal government’s decommission of a deepwater sensor system is ill-timed and wrong-headed.
The upcoming loss of a deep-ocean monitoring system is triggering deep anxiety in Alaska, the nation’s top fish-producing state, where temperatures are warming twice as quickly as the global average.
Alaskans Reel From the Loss of National Science Foundation Ocean-Monitoring Instruments
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