The Trump administration in the US has imposed tariffs on all imports from China, Mexico and Canada, as well as on steel, aluminium and cars from around the world.
In response, the US has been hit with retaliatory tariffs from major trading partners, including the EU.
US president Donald Trump has said he intends to launch a further round of reciprocal tariffs on 2 April, targeting a broader range of countries.
This escalating “trade war” is expected to slow global growth and has also triggered warnings of a US recession.
Global energy flows and efforts to tackle climate change are already being affected by the escalating trade tensions.
The tariffs are expected to disrupt the global trade in clean technologies, from electric cars to the materials used to build wind turbines.
At the same time, as high-emitting industries face higher costs, some commentators have suggested that tariffs could hamper US plans for fossil-fuel expansion.
And as clean technology becomes more expensive to manufacture in the US, other nations – particularly China – are likely to step up to fill in any gaps.
Carbon Brief has asked a range of researchers and policy experts what they think Trump’s tariffs could mean for global climate action and energy supplies.
These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:
- Dr Kyle Chan: “With US automakers struggling to compete, Chinese electric vehicle companies will likely gain a stronger position.”
- Elisabetta Cornago: “China may redirect its exports towards the relatively open EU market, challenging homegrown clean-tech industries at a time when the EU is trying to support and revitalise them.”
- Dr Bentley Allan and Dr Tim Sahay: “G7 and G20 countries are strengthening their domestic economies with deficit financing and directed investments into strategic sectors, such as green and digital sectors”
- Alex Muresianu: “A less productive US economy, which must pay higher prices for key inputs, is one that can spare fewer resources to address climate change.”
- Antoine Vagneur-Jones: “The administration’s fondness for data centres requires significant grid investment and yet the US relies on its neighbours for its supply of large power transformers.”
- Jimena Blanco: “The US is mainly or wholly import-reliant for around four-fifths of its identified 50 critical minerals, including from its partners Canada and Mexico.”
- Dr Simi Thambi: “An increase in trade protectionism is not good for climate action.”
- Robert Rozansky: “One upside to Trump’s trade war is that it might stymie his efforts to push US liquified natural gas (LNG) expansion into overdrive.”
- Chris Severson-Baker: “The Canadian oil and gas lobby…has been using this moment to make the case for more oil and gas production and infrastructure.”
- Anne-Sophie Corbeau: “Trump’s tariffs have already had an impact on LNG trade…China has not imported a single US LNG cargo since 6 February.”
- Avantika Goswami: “Tariffs – if imposed widely – may hurt the exports of countries like India, which nurture aspirations to mimic China’s role as an exporter of green goods.”
- Tu Le: “If manufacturers have to move multiple factories, that changes, reduces or eliminates what would have likely been more investment in research and development for clean energy vehicles.”
- Ellie Belton: “A more unpredictable US could create opportunities for the UK and EU to attract low-carbon investment and gain a competitive edge in the energy transition.”
- Eileen Torres Morales: “The effects of Trump’s tariffs on the global transition to green iron and steelmaking are still uncertain.”
- Dr Aurélien Saussay: “When faced with increased economic pressures from tariffs, countries could be more tempted to relax environmental standards to maintain competitiveness.”
Dr Kyle Chan
Postdoctoral researcher and author of High Capacity
Trump’s tariffs will likely have wide-ranging effects on China’s clean-tech industry and global climate progress. Higher tariffs on China will directly impact US imports of Chinese clean tech goods, such as lithium batteries, which reached $1.9bn in December 2024.
Chinese solar manufacturing firms will also be hit indirectly through tariffs on production sites in south-east Asia, which collectively supplies 80% of US solar imports. Meanwhile, China’s retaliation could disrupt US access to critical minerals for its own clean-tech industry. This includes graphite for battery anodes and rare earth metals for wind turbines.
The impact on China’s electric vehicle industry in particular will be consequential, albeit less direct. Chinese electric vehicle imports to the US, which were already minimal, will not be significantly affected by Trump’s new tariffs.
However, the broader disruption to automotive supply chains across Mexico and Canada – along with rising steel and aluminium costs – will weaken the ability of US automakers to transition to electric vehicles. This will benefit Chinese electric vehicle makers, which continue to innovate and drive down costs.
With US automakers struggling to compete, Chinese electric vehicle companies will likely gain a stronger position, not just in China’s domestic market, but globally as well.
Elisabetta Cornago
Senior research fellow, EU energy and climate policy
Centre for European Reform
The Trump administration is walking back on US climate commitments, both domestically by threatening to cut back Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) support for clean-tech industries and internationally, [by] withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. US tariffs can also affect climate action and the energy transition globally, hitting global value chains for clean technologies.
The Trump administration has levied tariffs on primary materials, such as steel and aluminium, on the EU as well as on China. This will increase manufacturing costs for US-based producers of goods that rely on imports of those materials, such as wind turbines and electric vehicles.
But, at the same time, because of interconnections in global value chains, the EU will also be impacted by US tariffs that are currently limited to China.
Tariffs on Chinese exports of solar panels, electric vehicles and batteries to the US, for example, will reinforce China’s overcapacity in manufacturing in all these sectors, relative to weak Chinese demand. As a consequence, China may redirect its exports towards the relatively open EU market, challenging homegrown clean tech industries at a time when the EU is trying to support and revitalise them.
Trump’s self-harming retreat on climate and tariffs has caused uncertainty for clean energy, industry and trade. There is a macroeconomic slowdown that could negatively impact the rising green investments of the last decade.
However, countries are strategic actors, not just passive victims of US trade policy. We are observing G7 and G20 countries take anticipatory steps.
First, they are strengthening their domestic economies with deficit financing and directed investments into strategic sectors, such as green and digital sectors. A few examples:
- The monumental shift in German fiscal policy will now enable investments in climate.
- The overhaul of EU’s fiscal rules and greater funding of the EU’s industrial deal with over €100bn to support clean manufacturing.
- Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has unfurled Nova Industria Brasil to build green industrialisation.
- Mexican president Claudia Sheinbaum has announced and funded Plan Mexico for strategic investments.
Many nations are also diversifying their markets and multilateralist diplomacy. Targets of Trump tariff threats are involved in a flurry of trade and investment deals:
- Within Asia, there are negotiations to green the world’s largest trade bloc – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
- Trade deals between Mexico-EU, EU-Brazil and Canada-EU are being revamped to allow more green trade.
- Countries such as Brazil and South Africa are leading diplomatic efforts through their presidencies of BRICS and G20 this year to articulate new trading and financial architecture that gives them the policy space to pursue green structural transformation to meet domestic and global climate goals.
Alex Muresianu
Senior policy analyst
Tax Foundation
At the most basic level, gains from trade are valuable. Historically, trade barriers have slowed the spread and adoption of new technology. The fight against climate change is just one example of the many economic challenges these tariffs will make more difficult.
Tariffs on important inputs make building more expensive and distort the US economy toward less productive activity. A less productive US economy, which must pay higher prices for key inputs, is one that can spare fewer resources to address climate change.
Advocates of Trump’s approach to trade often invoke competition with China as a justification. However, most of Trump’s tariffs are targeted at allied or friendly nations, such as Canada, Mexico and members of the EU. US policymakers are worried about losing an innovation race with China in areas like electric vehicles or other green technologies, but putting up barriers to other markets will make us less – not more – competitive in the long term.
Antoine Vagneur-Jones
Head of trade and supply chains
BloombergNEF
The tariffs jar with priorities that are – at least rhetorically – at the heart of the Trump presidency.
The administration’s fondness for data centres requires significant grid investment and yet the US relies on its neighbours for its supply of large power transformers. Expanding manufacturing is another apparent priority, but increasing the cost of inputs will crimp domestic industry.
And by hurting cross-border value chains and taxing imported crude, the tariffs could conceivably disadvantage traditional internal combustion engine vehicles more than their electrified equivalents.
Jimena Blanco
Chief analyst
Verisk Maplecroft
Against a background of tariffs and disrupted trading relationships, we are seeing a more protectionist stance towards critical minerals emerging, further complicating clean-tech supply chains.
Our research shows resource nationalism is accelerating. Among the emerging markets, 17 major critical mineral producers have seen a significant increase in risk in the past five years, including Chile and Peru – both key sources of lithium and copper.
Exact details of the new US tariff regime won’t be known until 2 April, but it is likely that the next batch of tariffs will be levied most heavily on countries with the largest trade imbalances. These countries represent the majority of Washington’s key global trade partners, meaning disruptions to supply chains – including in minerals essential for the energy transition – are increasingly likely.
The US is mainly or wholly import-reliant for around four-fifths of its identified 50 critical minerals, including from its US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) partners Canada and Mexico. If Canada, for example, responds to the imposition of tariffs by the US with new export taxes, bans or restrictions on mineral exports, increasing costs or supply shortages are a prospect that US businesses will have to adapt to.
There is potential for US tariffs to slow the rollout of green policies if nations view renewables mandates or more stringent carbon regulation as adding additional burdens to their economy at a time of increasing trade friction. However, this could be counterbalanced somewhat by investments in low-carbon solutions such as carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) or hydrogen.
Dr Simi Thambi
Climate economist
FAIRR
An increase in trade protectionism is not good for climate action. Climate scientists have conceptualised this as a scenario of rising retaliatory tariffs – Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 3 (SSP3) – where challenges to mitigation and adaptation are high, making it unlikely for the world to limit temperature rise to 1.5C by the end of the century. This scenario could lead to up to four times more emissions than a sustainability-focused pathway with low challenges to mitigation and adaptation.
Mitigation is very challenging in this scenario because reducing emissions is more expensive, as investments needed to scale clean technologies are not prioritised. As a result, these technologies fail to penetrate well into the markets that need them most cost-effectively. For example, according to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2024 electric vehicle outlook, electric vehicle sales in emerging markets remain very low. Lowering global emissions without greening the transport sector in developing economies would be highly challenging.
Adaptation also faces considerable challenges in SSP3, because one can expect deforestation and cropland expansion to rise in this scenario, as countries focus on their national ambitions. Extensive deforestation would reduce ecosystems and biodiversity, reducing their adaptive capacity.
Robert Rozansky
Global LNG analyst and project manager, Europe gas tracker
Global Energy Monitor
The Trump administration has gone all in on promoting US LNG under its “America first”, “energy dominance” agenda. As it seeks to boost new LNG production projects that are still on the drawing board, such as the Alaska LNG project touted in the State of the Union address, the US could further exacerbate a global overbuild of LNG infrastructure that threatens international climate targets. At the same time, the Trump administration’s trade war may make these same proposed LNG projects more difficult to build and finance.
Tariffs will raise the cost of raw materials, such as steel, the “backbone of LNG facilities”. If tariffs lead to economy-wide inflation, labour could become more expensive, too. The LNG industry is no stranger to the toll of inflation. For example, the cost of the under-construction Golden Pass LNG Terminal rose by $2bn after its main contractor declared bankruptcy in May citing pandemic-related cost inflation and delays.
If it becomes more expensive to build LNG export terminals in the US, financiers committed to projects under construction may struggle to recover their investments and those evaluating proposed facilities may be hesitant to invest.
The longer proposed projects sit without financial backers, the less likely it is they will get off the ground at all. New US LNG terminals are already set to face steep competition from an incoming wave of export projects abroad and increasingly cheap renewable power, as an alternative to gas.
Given that LNG may be roughly as bad for the climate as coal, if not worse, one upside to Trump’s trade war is that it might stymie his efforts to push US LNG expansion into overdrive.
Chris Severson-Baker
Executive director
Pembina Institute
In Canada, this is unfolding into a national debate about how best to strengthen our economic resilience and ensure long-term prosperity in the face of a hostile US.
There is a risk that what president Trump is doing could cause knee-jerk reactions here in Canada. The Canadian oil and gas lobby, for example, has been using this moment to make the case for more oil and gas production and infrastructure, to get more of its products to markets outside the US.
While we agree that Canada needs to diversify its trading partners, doubling down on oil and gas exports would not provide the long-term economic resiliency and energy security our country is seeking right now. We should look instead at Europe, where governments are aggressively decarbonising their economies, not only for climate reasons. They also understand that clean energy and new technologies are associated with less price volatility and more secure supplies, as well as health and affordability benefits for citizens.
The EU’s forthcoming carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) will give an advantage to low-carbon exports of steel, aluminium and cement. These are all industries that Canada is well-placed to lead on, given our abundance of emissions-free electricity to power them. However, this can only happen if we retain our nationwide industrial carbon pricing system.
That is also why the next big nation-building project we foresee in Canada is not oil and gas infrastructure, but widespread electrification, supported by a buildout and modernisation of our electricity grid. This would help Canadians become more resilient, both to the economic impacts of trade disputes and the physical and economic impacts of climate change.
Anne-Sophie Corbeau
Global research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy
Columbia University
Trump’s tariffs have already had an impact on LNG trade. After the Trump administration imposed new tariffs on China in early February 2025, China retaliated by announcing, among other things, a 15% tariff on US LNG. China and the US are not too dependent on each other in LNG trade, with US LNG representing only 6% of China’s LNG supply in 2024. But China has not imported a single US LNG cargo since 6 February, as Chinese offtakers of US LNG are diverting their cargoes to other regions to avoid tariffs.
However, China and the US are respectively the largest LNG importer and exporter globally. Chinese buyers have contracted significant amounts of US LNG between 2021 and 2023. Should tariffs persist or even increase, US LNG will likely continue to be diverted to other countries, making the whole global LNG market less efficient. Meanwhile, Chinese buyers may become hesitant to contract more US LNG.
Another country that may be at risk if trade relations deteriorate is Mexico. Mexico’s energy system is very dependent on gas. It is also uniquely dependent on imports of US pipeline gas, which is cheaper than LNG imports. There are also a few Mexican LNG export projects at different stages of advancement that rely on US gas supplies and are therefore in competition with US-based LNG projects. Uncertainties over the bilateral relationship could become a source of risk for Mexico.
Avantika Goswami
Programme manager, climate change
Centre for Science and Environment
Donald Trump’s use of tariffs as an economic weapon is an attempt to regain dominance in the US’ trade relationships, for varying reasons – one being the US’ massive trade deficit.
From a climate perspective, tariffs need to be situated within a larger picture. They are likely to raise costs for general goods in the US – and green goods are not excluded from this calculus. This comes at a time when the US is lagging behind east and south-east Asia in the manufacturing of green technologies and has been slow in its domestic energy transition.
Tariffs may further raise the cost of the transition in the US. In tandem with attempts to expand oil and gas production in the domestic energy mix as Trump promises – and also any successful reindustrialisation efforts – this could see a rise in US domestic emissions. Meanwhile, fossil fuel exports will raise emissions elsewhere.
Tariffs – if imposed widely – may hurt the exports of countries like India, which nurture aspirations to mimic China’s role as an exporter of green goods. There has been an increase in the export of solar technology from India to the US, with India’s share of the country’s module imports rising from 2.5% in 2022 to 10.7% in 2024, amounting to approximately $2bn in 2023-24. For a country with aspirations in green manufacturing, tariffs on green goods could undermine this positive momentum for India.
This shift toward protectionism in the US does not necessarily spell the collapse of the global green goods market. Instead, it may serve to strengthen China’s role in the global green technology supply chain.
Lastly, the return to protectionism, particularly green protectionism, is an act of hypocrisy by nations like the US, which have spent years denouncing the same policies at the World Trade Organization when undertaken by developing countries.
Tu Le
Managing director
Sino Auto Insights
It is important to take the Trump administration’s individual actions in totality, while also keeping in the back of your mind that the US is the second largest passenger vehicle market in the world. That drives the need for legacy automakers to sell into this market.
The tariffs force companies to review their long-term manufacturing strategy. If they have to move multiple factories, that changes, reduces or eliminates what would have likely been more investment in research and development for clean energy vehicles, due to their limited capital.
The Trump administration is also poised to eliminate the more stringent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) vehicle emissions standards that would have taken effect in 2027. If successful, that would substantially reduce the urgency for global original equipment manufacturers to launch products with more efficient powertrains. And it pushes out the need for oil companies in Russia, the Middle East and the US to alter or reduce their investments in clean energy initiatives.
Legacy manufacturers play a role in this as well, since their leadership years ago seemed to be so bullish in their ability to easily move over to clean energy vehicles. Their initial sales forecasts for this timeframe were never realistic and it put a spotlight on this being a left versus right issue, when it should have been a discussion on energy independence all along.
The US and EU governments are likely to push out their net-zero targets [for vehicles]. They were arbitrary to begin with. Now, with the Trump administration in place and European automakers whining about their inability to meet the more stringent requirements, they seem more than likely to be delayed past 2035.
Ellie Belton
Senior policy advisor – trade and climate
E3G
It is hard to imagine a scenario in which higher tariffs will benefit the global energy transition. Even if clean technologies are not directly targeted, the complex nature of international supply chains means that there will inevitably be knock-on effects, such as through increased costs for component parts like steel and aluminium.
Retaliatory tariffs against the US will also create a domino effect, distorting trade flows worldwide and altering countries’ comparative advantage in the clean economy. The biggest risk to climate action is the uncertainty this creates, which will damage investor confidence and distract governments from driving green ambition.
But a more unpredictable US could create opportunities for the UK and EU to attract low-carbon investment and gain a competitive edge in the energy transition. Continued efforts to provide public support for decarbonisation and seek mutual gains with cooperative trade partners will enable Europe to capitalise on the growing demand for renewable technologies globally.
Trade policy may have become a geopolitical game, but the urgent need to deliver a safe climate remains as critical as ever. The world is currently stuck in crisis response mode, but it is vital that we do not lose sight of the long-term direction of travel.
Eileen Torres Morales
Research associate
Stockholm Environment Institute
The effects of Trump’s tariffs on the global transition to green iron and steelmaking are still uncertain. It will take some time to see the impact, if any, such as increased steel prices in the short term, changed trade dynamics or long-term impacts on global green steel production.
The announcement of steel tariffs has forced exporting countries to rapidly reconsider how to stay competitive in the US market. The tariffs might benefit steel producers in the US, but a likely outcome is that both public and private consumers within the US will face rising steel prices regardless of whether the steel is green or not.
Trump’s administration’s interest in research and development of US-based green iron and steel production also remains unclear. It is not yet known if incentives for steel decarbonisation considered in the IRA will remain. For example, will the negotiations to advance green iron and steel production under the US Department of Energy’s industrial demonstrations programme continue or not?
Although the imposition of tariffs by the US may temporarily shift attention away from international competition and policies focused on heavy industry transition, this should not distract from progress in establishing a market for low-carbon products.
Policy instruments, such as the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS) and CBAM, should continue to be prioritised. Such tools can support the construction of a strong internal market for green steel, thus steering attention away from tariffs, back to driving innovation in low-carbon technology and emissions reductions that contribute to global climate action.
Dr Aurélien Saussay
Assistant professor at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
London School of Economics and Political Science
The looming threat of Trump’s tariffs is already reshaping energy policy decisions in concerning ways.
Perhaps most alarming, from a European standpoint, is European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s recent suggestion that Europe should increase its imports of US shale gas-derived LNG to appease the Trump administration and avoid tariffs. This move would seriously undermine the EU’s 2050 net-zero commitment.
This potential shift illustrates how trade tensions can indirectly sabotage climate progress. I’m particularly concerned by how these tariffs could undermine the viability of carbon-pricing schemes in major economies. When faced with increased economic pressures from tariffs, countries could be more tempted to relax environmental standards to maintain competitiveness.
The steel and aluminium sectors – already struggling to decarbonise – would be especially vulnerable. Many mills have begun investing in cleaner technologies, but tariffs could force them to prioritise cost-cutting over emissions reduction.
Furthermore, the uncertainty created by trade wars makes low-carbon investments riskier. Clean energy technologies, many of which are capital intensive, require stable policy environments to attract investments. The constant threat of retaliatory tariffs dampens investor confidence.
Perhaps most importantly, retaliatory tariffs on clean-energy technologies could significantly slow the global energy transition. This is particularly the case for tariffs targeting China, which is a leader in many of the key decarbonisation technologies. By increasing costs for solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles, these measures would hamper deployment rates precisely when acceleration is needed.
The post Experts: What do Trump’s tariffs mean for global climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Experts: What do Trump’s tariffs mean for global climate action?
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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