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According to industry experts, the cobalt market is currently under pressure due to an oversupply and slow demand. The heat is palpable more on cobalt sulfate prices, which are gradually declining, indicating weaker demand. One reason is China’s passenger electric vehicle (PEV) sector, which strongly prefers lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) batteries that do not rely on cobalt.

However, as revealed by S&P Global Commodity Insights, the Platts-assessed European cobalt price has held steady at approximately $11.00/lb since October 11, but with suppressed trading activity.

Let’s see what the report reveals further about the current and future cobalt market.

China’s Move to LFP Batteries Weakens Cobalt Market

The report revolved around the cobalt market in China. It highlighted that China’s cobalt metal price stabilized after hitting a low in late September. From September 25 to November 21, the price rose by 5.6% and increased another 2.0% month to November 21, despite some fluctuations.

This recovery was driven by stronger feedstock costs, as cobalt hydroxide prices remained more stable compared to refined cobalt products.

China Cobalt

However, according to Shanghai Metals Market, margins for cobalt sulfate production using imported cobalt hydroxide turned negative in Q3 2023. This strained margin significantly impacted China’s cobalt sulfate output.

  • From January to October 2023, combined production dropped by 28.1% compared to the same period last year.

The reason for the decline remains the same- a slowdown in the PEV sector. The other significant reason is automakers shifting to lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) batteries as they are cost-effective and avoid using critical minerals like cobalt and nickel. This transition has reduced the demand for cobalt-containing batteries in China.

Additionally, S&P Global noted, that in October 2024, cobalt-containing batteries accounted for only 20.6% of vehicle installations in China. This figure is a steep drop from nearly 50% in 2021.

Unlocking Cobalt’s Role in Battery Chemistry

Cobalt remains a vital component in many battery chemistries, offering stability and safety benefits. In 2023, demand for cobalt-containing chemistries grew by 15% year-over-year (y/y) to approximately 500 GWh, accounting for 55% of total battery demand.

While this represents a decline from 63% in 2022, cobalt chemistries are expected to maintain a significant market share in the medium to long term as demand continues to grow. Let’s study how experts explain this evolving landscape…

A Shifting Landscape

Cobalt Institute’s latest report revealed that demand for cobalt was mainly driven by high and mid-nickel chemistries driving this growth in 2023. High-nickel chemistries saw a 32% increase, while mid-nickel grew by 15%. Meanwhile, low-nickel and lithium cobalt oxide (LCO) chemistries experienced declines of 11% and 13% y/y, respectively.

It further highlighted,

  • Demand for cobalt-containing chemistries rose 15% y/y in 2023, to ~ 500
    GWh. This equated to around 55% of battery demand in 2023, down from 63% in 2022.

High-nickel chemistries also increased their market share to 11%, while low-nickel chemistries fell behind nickel-cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) chemistries for the first time.

These cobalt-free chemistries now make up 45% of global cathode demand, driven largely by lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. For the first time, LFP overtook nickel cobalt manganese (NCM) cathodes, claiming a 45% market share compared to NCM’s 43%. While manganese-based chemistries also contributed, their impact was minor.

Beyond batteries, cobalt is needed in aviation, energy storage, and electronics and its recyclability makes it sustainable.

Image: LFP vs. NCM: the share of NCM battery cells declines

cobalt battery

Source: Cobalt Institute report

Pressures Facing Cobalt

Cobalt, despite its critical role in batteries, faces significant challenges in the supply chain related to cost, composition, and sourcing. Cobalt is costly, but falling prices have improved battery cell cost competitiveness.

The report highlighted that in 2023, NCM and LFP chemistries dominated the global lithium-ion battery market, making up 88% of cathode demand. Automakers in North America and Europe preferred NCM batteries for their higher energy density and longer range and they were mainly used in high-performance EVs.

On the other hand, LFP batteries have gained market share globally, particularly in China, where their lower cost and reduced reliance on critical minerals like cobalt make them a popular choice. This also means that although NCM chemistries have high energy density they are globally less widely adopted.

Image: 2023 Cathode active materials (CAM) product mix from the major ex. China CAM suppliers, %cobalt cathode anode mix

Additionally, ethical and environmental concerns regarding cobalt sourcing, particularly from the DRC and Indonesia are extensively scrutinized over its sustainability and responsible extraction practices.

Cobalt Forecast 2024: Price and Production

As cobalt demand continues to face challenges with automakers favoring lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) batteries, cobalt-containing batteries are considerably losing market share. CMOC expects cobalt-containing batteries to eventually make up less than 10% of the total battery mix.

This declining demand is further reflected in price forecasts as rolled out by S&P Global Commodity Insights noted below:

  • Analysts now estimate the cobalt market surplus will widen significantly in 2024, reaching 53,000 metric tons, which is more than 2X of its earlier predictions.
  • The growing surplus has also led to a downward revision of cobalt price estimates, with prices now expected to fall to $12.72/lb by 2028.

Batteries now drive three-quarters of global cobalt demand, making the market highly sensitive to changes in cathode chemistries and technologies. As demand for EVs grows, cobalt’s role remains crucial, but the rise of alternatives like LFP will reshape the landscape.

The EV sector’s trajectory in key regions, including the US, China, and the EU, will play a critical role in shaping cobalt’s future. However, with battery technology shifting rapidly and economic policies uncertain, the path ahead remains unpredictable.

Supply Surge from CMOC, DRC, Australia, and Indonesia

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Australia, and Indonesia are the three major countries that control about 73% of the world’s cobalt reserves. Last year, DRC topped the list, accounting for more than 70% of global production.

cobalt supplySource: Cobalt Institute

S&P Global forecasts that cobalt production is expected to soar in 2024. It will be significantly driven by Indonesia’s high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects and surge in output from the DRC. Additionally, China’s CMOC, a major producer, has already surpassed its 2023 full-year cobalt production guidance by 21% within the first nine months.

In H1 2024, the company secured the position of the world’s largest cobalt producer with an impressive output of 54,024 tons, marking a staggering 178.22% year-over-year (YoY) growth. This surge not only reflects the company’s pivotal role in the global cobalt supply chain but also signifies a contribution to meet rising demand for battery-grade cobalt.

Notably, CMOC’s production surge is primarily linked to its copper-focused strategy that resulted in increased cobalt inventories.cmoc cobalt

From this report, we can fairly infer that cobalt can still hold its ground as a key material in high-performance batteries, particularly in Western markets. However, its future will depend on balancing cost, sustainability, and evolving technology trends.

The post Cobalt at Crossroads: How Will Oversupply, Price Drops, and LFP Boom Impact Its Future? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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