Published

2 years ago

June 29, 2024

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Floods in the south, drought in the north

EXTREME WEATHER: China has been hit by extreme weather over the past two weeks. About 35% of its corn production was affected by severe drought in north China where some rivers had “dried up a month ago”, reported Reuters. In the south, torrential rain and flooding killed at least 38 people in Guangdong province – China’s most populated – as well as eight people in Hunan province and two in Anhui province. Local newspaper Guangxi Daily reported that this week’s floods in Guilin, capital city of Guangxi province, were the largest in the area since 1998. Chinese president Xi Jinping “has urged all-out efforts to fight floods and droughts, and to ensure solid work in disaster relief”, said state agency Xinhua. Some 33 rivers in China “exceeded warning levels”, according to Xinhua.

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GLOBAL WARNING: Yang Pingjian, director of the environmental sociology department at the Chinese Academy of Environmental Sciences, wrote in China Environment News that “the adverse effects of climate change have become more and more obvious: heavy rainfall, typhoons, hail and other extreme weather occur” in China. The National Climate Center said that China is “experiencing more frequent and intense heatwaves due to global warming”, reported China Daily. The “average onset of high temperatures (those exceeding 35C) has advanced by 2.5 days per decade” and the average heatwave starting date has moved from 24 June in 1981-1990 to 7 June in 2011-2020, the outlet added. New research covered by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post found that “widespread heat stress will be felt by most of China’s population by the end of the century due to climate change, with the north of the country expected to be hit hardest”.

SUMMER PRESSURE: These high temperatures may cause peak electricity consumption to grow by more than 100 gigawatts (GW) year-on-year during this summer’s peak period, putting pressure on “ensuring power supply”, China Securities Journal reported. Writing in financial newspaper Caixin, Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) noted that this expected 100GW increase is “similar to 2022’s growth, which saw power shortages and blackouts”, adding that this “highlighted the need for a more flexible inter-provincial electricity trading mechanism”. She also pointed to the need for flexible grid operations and demand-side measures to help China “effectively manage peak demand pressures without compromising its climate commitments”.

Renewable energy pushed thermal power into decline

THERMAL DECLINE: A surge in solar power and hydropower in China in May led to a 4.3% decline in thermal power – mainly coal – that month, Bloomberg reported, adding that this supported earlier Carbon Brief analysis finding China’s emissions may fall this year. The drop in thermal power was the largest since 2022 and could continue as long as China does not “reprioritise carbon-heavy investment to revive growth”, the outlet added. Hydropower generation rose 38.6% year-on-year in May 2024 and solar by 29.1%, state-run industry newspaper China Energy Net said.

SOLAR CAPACITY: China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) pledged in a press conference to “guide production capacity expansion” and “prevent unnecessary investments” in the country’s solar manufacturing sector, following a call for help from industry participants “grappl[ing] with a surge in capacity”, according to finance newswire Yicai. Economic news outlet Jiemian quoted Li Chuangjun, director of the NEA’s new energy and renewable energy department, saying at the press conference that the industry should “avoid repetitive construction of low-end solar capacity”.

NO OVERCAPACITY?: NEA head Zhang Jianhua said at the same press conference that “whether from the perspective of comparative advantage or of global market demand, China’s new energy industry does not have a so-called ‘overcapacity’ problem”, state-run newspaper Science and Technology Daily reported. Zhang added that “supply moderately exceeding demand is helpful for achieving technological progress and reducing product costs”, and that the solar industry specifically is characterised by a strong private sector, “sufficient” competition and companies “choosing to expand production” due to “optimistic outlooks towards future markets”, according to the newspaper.

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EU and China to discuss electric vehicle tariffs

NEW TALKS: After expressing opposition to the EU’s additional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and announcing an anti-dumping investigation into pork products from the EU, China agreed to a new discussion over the tariffs this week, the Financial Times reported. Bloomberg said the talks “may buy time” for China to “sow enough opposition” between EU member states, as Beijing suggested German luxury automakers “could benefit if Berlin convinces the EU to drop tariffs”.

MIDDLEMAN GERMANY?: Germany’s economy minister Robert Habeck, who visited China last weekend, showed there was an “open attitude of China and some politicians in the EU in seeking dialogue and cooperation amid trade friction”, said a Global Times’ editorial. Habeck said the EU’s tariffs measures were “not a punishment” and its “doors are open for discussions”, Reuters reported. The German Chamber of Commerce in East China, a business advocacy group, also argued that the EU tariffs “cannot offer protection to German carmakers or increase their competitiveness”, SCMP reported. Reuters said that China’s share of Germany’s EV imports rose to 40.9% in the first quarter of this year.

CHINA COMPROMISE?: China’s state-controlled Global Times newspaper wrote “observers said the best outcome the Chinese side wants is that the EC, the executive body of the EU, scrap its tariff decision before 4 July and abide by WTO rules”. Another state-run newspaper China Daily said in an editorial that Beijing is “willing…to try and resolve the reasonable concerns of the EU” and hopes that Brussels will avoid escalating frictions “by meeting China halfway”. In an interview with the Financial Times, Zhu Min, a member of China’s “five-year plan” committee, argued there was no “overcapacity” or “dumping” of cheap EVs on the European market. He said the price of EVs is higher overseas than in the domestic market and that China’s domestic buyer rebate also applied to foreign EV brands, such as Tesla in China, added the outlet.

EU-China climate dialogue and Li’s new commitment

CHINA-EU TALKS: Amid their ongoing tariff dispute, China and the EU held the fifth “high-level environment and climate dialogue” on 18 June, said Xinhua. The Chinese vice premier Ding Xuexiang and the European Commission’s Maroš Šefčovič agreed there were “common interests” and discussed “climate change and protecting the ecological environment”, the state news agency continued. Ding also said the EU’s tariff plan was “typical protectionism” which is “not conducive to the EU’s green transformation”, added the agency. China’s minister of ecology and environment, Huang Runqiu, and the EU’s commissioner for climate action, Wopke Hoekstra, signed “an updated memorandum of understanding to enhance cooperation on emissions trading”, the Chinese International Environment Net reported.

PREMIER’S REMARKS: The Chinese premier Li Qiang announced yesterday that “China is committed to addressing climate change and has been proactively developing green industries such as new energy” at the World Economic Forum’s “summer Davos” meetings in Dalian, China, Xinhua reported. Li said “the green transition itself holds immense potential for development” and that all nations should “create more growth drivers for the green economy”, added Xinhua. Reuters said Li also “hit back” at overcapacity accusations from the US and EU, arguing that China’s production of clean energy technologies “first met our domestic demand, but also enrich[es] global supply”. At a domestic conference, president Xi encouraged technology innovation and said Chinese EVs “add[ed] new momentum to the global automotive industry”, according to Xinhua.

Spotlight

How is China adapting to increasingly frequent flooding?

In recent years, China has seen more frequent floods caused by heavy rains. Dozens of people have died in south China this month due to torrential rain and flooding. In April, floods caused damage worth 12bn yuan ($1.65bn) – “the worst [losses] in 10 years”.

In this issue, Carbon Brief looks at the reasons for China’s recent floods and how the country is trying to adapt. A full version of this article will be published on Carbon Brief’s website.

Rising floods

There are various factors behind the frequent heavy rain and flooding in China in recent years.

In a press briefing covered by China Daily, Zheng Zhihai, chief forecaster at the National Climate Centre of the China Meteorological Administration (CMA), said that “higher than normal temperatures” were behind frequent heavy rainfall in southern provinces since April.

China Daily noted: “This temperature increase has elevated the atmospheric moisture levels, intensified convective processes, and led to more frequent occurrences of heavy rainfall.”

Sea level rise has also been cited as a primary factor behind China’s coastal floods, as it increases the intensity and frequency of storm surges and raises baseline water levels.

The El Niño-Southern Oscillation, a natural climate cycle that entered its warmer El Niño phase in mid 2023, was partly to blame as it raised sea surface temperatures and directed vast amounts of water vapour from the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal towards southern China, found one analysis.

Dr Faith Chan, head of the School of Geographical Sciences at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China, told Carbon Brief that the rainfall pattern in Guangdong during this April was quite similar to the intensive rainstorm on 6-8 September in 2023 after Typhoon Haikui.

In addition to the natural causes, human activity also played a role. Chan said:

“Of course, the El Niño effect enhanced the wet and low-pressure moist current in the east coast of China and the west Pacific. But human-induced climate change led to the greenhouse effect and caused sea temperature to rise, which caused more storms and low-pressure rain belts. That is a fact.”

Indeed, Prof Yang Chen of the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences told Carbon Brief that human-caused intensification of heavy rainfall over China had been even larger than expected.

Adaptation measures

China has built a number of large water projects to prevent flooding, such as the south-north water transfer projects in the Yangtze river that was launched in 2002.

In the most recent “national water network construction planning outline” published by the State Council – China’s top administrative authority – constructing “national water networks” by 2035 is labelled as the “backbones” of future flood prevention.

China also launched the “sponge city programme (SCP)” in 2015.

Sponge cities cost the government 1.5–1.8bn yuan ($210-250m) between 2015 and 2018. They are designed to collect, purify and re-use at least 70% of the floodwaters through “green-blue facilities”, such as green roofs, permeable pavements and stormwater parks, in urban areas. The overall system was meant to resolve the issues of urban heating, freshwater scarcity and flooding all at once.

But the 2021 floods in Zhengzhou, a showcase sponge city, laid bare the inadequacy of the SCP in the face of climate change.

A paper suggested the SCP, which is designed to withstand one-in-30-year rain events, has limited effectiveness against more intense downpours.

Additionally, SCP can create a false sense of security, which encourages more people to move to high-risk areas, leading to an increase in population and assets in exposed areas that require ever-increasing protection in a cycle referred to as a “levee effect”, said Chen.

Meanwhile, a lack of coordination added another layer of difficulties. Zheng Yan, researcher at China Academy of Social Sciences, noted in the aftermath of the 2023 Beijing flood that government bodies often looked after their own jurisdiction and aimed only to move the problem and divert the floods quickly, which piled pressure on cities in downstream areas.

Looking abroad

As flooding is a challenge faced by cities across the world, there is a plethora of ideas and technologies that China can draw on.

Rotterdam, a Dutch delta city of 600,000 people that is surrounded by water on four sides, has built water storage facilities, such as an underground parking garage with a basin the size of four Olympic swimming pools. It has also installed green roofs and facades to absorb rainwater.

Japan has built an intricate network of concrete tunnels and vaults about 14 storeys beneath the Saitama prefecture in the outskirts of Tokyo, Japan’s capital city, that could hold more than 1,000 Olympic pools of rainwater.

Both cities’ underground flood diversion facilities are often used as a prime example of a viable flood defence system for urban cities on the frontline of climate change.

Hong Kong has a similar underground stormwater storage system beneath the sport pitches of the Happy Valley Racecourse, designed to withstand one-in-50-years flood events.

Chan said it is difficult to compare flood mitigation measures as each city is very different in terms of geography, demographic, densities and topography.

Nevertheless, he told Carbon Brief:

“In my opinion, China’s megacities should think about using underground spaces to store the sudden extreme discharge from super intensive rainstorms…Tokyo and Rotterdam are quite wise in that regard for using their underground spaces.”

This Spotlight is written by freelance climate journalist Jia Ning Tan for Carbon Brief.

Watch, read, listen

CHINA IN SPACE: The Economist’s “The Intelligence” podcast aired an episode about China becoming a “superpower” in the physical sciences.

RUSSIA-CHINA PIPELINE: A Financial Times podcast said Russia and China are “deadlocked” over a gas pipeline deal.

FARMING LAND: The Chinese communist party’s magazine Qiu Shi published an article by Hunan province’s communist theory study group on protecting arable land and the “political responsibilities” related to it.

CARBON FOOTPRINT: Finance outlet Southern Finance Omnimedia’s social media account 21 Low Carbon published an explanation of China’s new “national unified carbon footprint management system”.

$940m

The total value of an international “sustainability bond” issued by the Bank of China for investment in “renewable energy, sustainable water resources and wastewater management infrastructure projects” in the countries that joined China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). (The total value of loans for BRI countries reached $87bn in 2016 and $3.7bn in 2021.)

New science

A comparative review of methane policies of the US and China in the context of US – China climate cooperation

Climate Policy

China and the US – two of the world’s biggest methane emitters – should make their methane policies more “climate-centric”, according to a new study. Existing policies relating to methane are concentrated in the energy sector and are “largely driven” by safety, pollution concerns and use of resources, rather than reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the study said. The researchers suggested that both countries should focus on methane mitigation and “consider more climate-centric policies”.

Warming climate apathy to mitigate the disparity in climate policy support across distinct income strata

Energy Policy

The Chinese government has employed economic incentives to offset the financial impact of the clean energy transition, but “these measures may not fully address the underlying issue of climate apathy, wherein individuals prioritise immediate interests over long-term climate concerns”, a new study said. Surveying 4,700 Chinese adults each year for three years, the study found that those on low incomes were less likely to support climate policy, with “climate apathy” explaining a much larger share of this effect – some 38% – than “economic burden”, which only explained 8% of the effect on policy support. The authors concluded: “Addressing climate apathy is a cost-effective strategy to boost policy support.”

Investigating the impact of weather on stroke in summer

International Journal of Biometeorology

A new study collected data of stroke hospitalisation in the city of Tianjin, China, from 2016 to summer 2022. The study found a direct link between temperature extremes and hospitalisation: “83% of the Inpatient-heavy events within the study period were caused by a combination of dramatic temperature changes and continuous high temperatures.” The authors concluded: “More attention should be paid to the combined effects of continuous high temperature and sudden temperature changes in summer stroke prevention.”

China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

The post China Briefing 27 June 2024: Extreme weather; New talks on EV tariffs; Coal power decline appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 27 June 2024: Extreme weather; New talks on EV tariffs; Coal power decline

Climate Change

Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage

Published

9 hours ago

April 29, 2026

Alice Rush

Weather extremes fuel wildfires that have burned through tens of thousands of acres across Georgia, Florida and other states.

By Kiley Price

Drought and fire are a dangerous duo. The Southeastern United States is witnessing this firsthand as several major blazes burn tens of thousands of acres across the parched region, destroying homes and prompting evacuations in some areas. Florida and Georgia have been particularly hard hit, and strong winds and unusually low humidity have made it difficult to combat the flames.

Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage

Climate Change

Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate

Published

19 hours ago

April 28, 2026

Alice Rush

When the land no longer answers the stars the way it once did, Indigenous peoples are among the first to notice — and the first to ask why.

A Sky Full of Knowledge

Look up on a clear night on Turtle Island and you’re seeing a sky that has guided human life for thousands of years. Across Indigenous nations in Canada, detailed systems of celestial knowledge developed not as abstract science but as living, practical guides —telling people when to plant, when to harvest, when herds would move, and when ice would come. This astronomical knowledge was woven into language, ceremony, and everyday life, passed down through generations with remarkable precision.

The Mi’kmaq and the Celestial Bear

Among the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada, star stories are ecological calendars, precise and functional. The story of Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters connects the annual movement of what Western astronomy calls Ursa Major to the seasonal cycle of hunting and harvest: the bear rises in spring, is hunted through summer, and falls to earth in autumn. This knowledge was brought to broader public attention in 2009 during the International Year of Astronomy, when Mi’kmaq Elders Lillian Marshall of Potlotek First Nation and Murdena Marshall of Eskasoni First Nation shared the story through an animated film produced at Cape Breton University narrated in English, French, and Mi’kmaq.¹ The story encodes specific observations about when and where to hunt, and which species to expect at which time of year. It is science in narrative form.

The Anishinaabe and the Seasonal Star Map

Among the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes and northern Ontario, celestial knowledge forms part of a comprehensive seasonal understanding. Knowledge keepers like Michael Wassegijig Price of Wikwemikong First Nation have described how Anishinaabe constellations quite different from those of Western astronomy connect the movement of the heavens to naming ceremonies, seasonal gatherings, and land practices.² The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada now offers planispheres featuring Indigenous constellations from Cree, Ojibwe, and Dakota sky traditions, recognizing their value as both cultural heritage and ecological knowledge systems.³

When the Stars and the Land Fall Out of Rhythm

Here’s the challenge that climate change has introduced: the stars still move on their ancient, reliable schedule. But the land no longer always responds as expected. Migratory birds that once arrived when certain constellations appeared are now showing up earlier or later. Ice that once formed in predictable windows is forming weeks late, or not at all. Berry harvests, fish runs, animal migrations, all once timed by celestial cues accumulated over millennia are shifting. Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada describe this as a kind of dissonance: the sky remains faithful, but the land has changed.⁴

Long-Baseline Ecological Records

Far from being historical curiosity, Indigenous celestial knowledge systems are now being recognized by researchers as long-baseline ecological calendars —records of how nature behaved over centuries, encoded in story and ceremony. When an Elder observes that a particular star rising no longer predicts the arrival of certain geese, that observation represents a departure from a pattern that may have held true for hundreds of years. The Climate Atlas of Canada integrates Indigenous knowledge observations alongside western climate data, recognizing that both contribute meaningfully to understanding ecological change.⁵

Keeping the Knowledge Alive

Language revitalization and land-based education programs are helping ensure this knowledge reaches the future. From youth astronomy nights on-reserve to the integration of Indigenous sky stories in school curricula, there is growing recognition that these knowledge systems belong to what comes next, not only what came before. As Canada grapples with accelerating ecological change, the quiet precision of thousands of years of skyward observation offers something no satellite can fully replicate: a continuous record of the relationship between the cosmos and a living land.

Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock

Image Credit: Dustin Bowdige, Unsplash

References

[1] Marshall, L., Marshall, M., Harris, P., & Bartlett, C. (2010). Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters: A Mi’kmaw Night Sky Story. Cape Breton University Press. See also: Integrative Science, CBU. (2009). Background on the Making of the Muin Video for IYA2009. http://www.integrativescience.ca/uploads/activities/BACKGROUND-making-video-Muin-Seven-Bird-Hunters-IYA-binder.pdf

[2] Price, M.W. (Various). Anishinaabe celestial knowledge. Wikwemikong First Nation. Referenced in: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada Indigenous Astronomy resources.

[3] Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. (2020). Indigenous Skies planisphere series. RASC. https://www.rasc.ca/indigenous-skies

[4] Neilson, H. (2022, December 11). The night sky over Mi’kmaki: A Q&A with astronomer Hilding Neilson. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/hilding-neilson-indigenizing-astronomy-1.6679072

[5] Climate Atlas of Canada. (2024). Prairie Climate Centre, University of Winnipeg. https://climateatlas.ca/

The post Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.

https://indigenousclimatehub.ca/2026/04/night-skies-and-shifting-stars-how-indigenous-celestial-knowledge-tracks-a-changing-climate/

Climate Change

World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis

Published

1 day ago

April 28, 2026

Alice Rush

A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.

The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.

Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.

While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.

In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.

Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.

‘Return to coal’

The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.

A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.

(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)

With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.

These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.

Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.

This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia.

In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.

Gas to coal

So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.

Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.

However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.

To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.

For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.

It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.

Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.

(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)

Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.

Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.

Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:

“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”

Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:

“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”

‘Structural decline’

Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.

Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.

Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:

“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”

In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power.

Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.

Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:

“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”

With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia.

Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:

“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”

Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:

“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”