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The UK’s electricity was the cleanest ever in 2024, new Carbon Brief analysis shows, with carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit falling by more than two-thirds in a decade.

This is because the UK has phased out coal and is now getting less than half as much electricity from burning fossil fuels as a decade ago, while renewable generation has more than doubled.

In total, fossil fuels made up just 29% of the UK’s electricity in 2024 – the lowest level on record – while renewables reached a record-high 45% and nuclear was another 13%.

As a result, each unit of electricity generated in 2024 was associated with an average of just 124g of CO2, compared with a “carbon intensity” of 419gCO2 per kilowatt hour (kWh) in 2014.

Other key insights from the data include:

  • In 2024, the country generated just 91 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity from fossil fuels – mainly gas, as coal was phased out in September – down from 203TWh in 2014 (-55%).
  • Renewable sources more than doubled from 65TWh in 2014 to 143TWh in 2024 (+122%).
  • Gas-fired power stations remained the UK’s single-largest source of electricity in 2024, generating some 88TWh (28%), just ahead of wind at 84TWh (26%).
  • The remaining sources of electricity in 2024 were nuclear (41TWh, 13%), biomass (40TWh, 13%), imports (33TWh, 11%) and solar (14TWh, 4%).
  • Some 61% of electricity – or 68% excluding imports – came from clean sources, both records, but a long way off the government’s target of at least 95% clean power by 2030.
  • The emissions associated with UK electricity supplies has fallen from 150m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) in 2014 to below 40MtCO2 in 2024, down 74%.
  • The reduction in the carbon intensity of electricity means that an electric vehicle (EV) now has lifecycle CO2 savings of 70% over a petrol car, up from only 50% in 2014.
  • Similarly, a household using a heat pump instead of a gas boiler is now cutting its heat-related CO2 emissions by 84% per year, rather than only 45% in 2014.

While figures from the National Energy System Operator (NESO) show wind having generated more electricity than gas in 2024, these numbers exclude significant amounts of gas generation, particularly from “combined heat and power” units at industrial sites.

When accounting for all plants burning gas for power in the UK, the fuel remained as the single-largest source of electricity in 2024, slightly ahead of wind.

However, increasing wind power capacity as new projects are completed in the coming months – and below-average wind speeds in 2024 – mean wind is likely to generate more electricity than gas in 2025.

Carbon Brief has published an annual analysis of the UK’s electricity generation in 2023, 2021, 2019, 2018, 2017 and 2016.

Cleanest ever

Having risen to global dominance on the back of coal-fired industrial might, the UK has made significant progress in cleaning up its power supplies over the past 75 years.

It opened the world’s first civil nuclear power plant in the 1950s, burned oil to generate electricity in the 1960s, made a “dash for gas” in the 1990s, and built renewables in the 2000s and 2010s.

In addition, electricity demand has been falling for nearly two decades, as appliances have become more efficient and the economy has shifted away from heavy industry.

These shifts culminated in the closure of the UK’s last coal-fired power station, at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire, in September of 2024. This ended a 142-year era of burning the fuel for electricity, and made the UK the first country in the G7 to completely phase out coal power.

The end of coal power, combined with the rise of renewables, means the UK’s electricity was the cleanest ever in 2024, as shown in the figure below.

Specifically, the carbon intensity of electricity fell to just 124gCO2/kWh in 2024. This is 70% lower than it was in 2014 when each unit of electricity was associated with 419gCO2/kWh.

Carbon intensity of UK electricity generation, gCO2/kWh, 1951-2024.
Carbon intensity of UK electricity generation, gCO2/kWh, 1951-2024. Source: Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), NESO and Carbon Brief analysis.

Combined with a reduction in demand, the emissions associated with UK electricity supplies have dropped from 150MtCO2 in 2014 to less than 40MtCO2 in 2024, a reduction of 74%. This includes emissions embedded in imported electricity and lifecycle emissions associated with imported biomass.

Under the government’s target for clean power by 2030, the carbon intensity of electricity generation should fall by another two-thirds by the end of the decade, according to NESO.

In its advice on how to reach the target, NESO set out pathways to clean power by 2030 that would see carbon intensity falling to 50gCO2/kWh or lower, depending on how it is measured.

This will be a very significant challenge. Nevertheless, the power sector has already been transformed over the past decade. It was the UK’s largest source of CO2 until 2014 and is now only the fifth largest, after transport, buildings, industry and agriculture.

Fossil fuel decline

The swift reductions in the carbon intensity of UK electricity are due to a rapid shift away from burning fossil fuels to generate power.

In addition to phasing out coal power, the UK has also seen significant reductions in the amount of gas generation over the past decade, while oil-fired electricity generation is negligible.

In total, fossil-fired power generation has fallen by more than half in the past decade. It has dropped from 203TWh in 2014 to 91TWh in 2024 (-55%), reaching the lowest level since 1955.

This reduction is illustrated in the figure below, which shows how the decline of fossil fuel generation has mainly been offset by the rise of renewables.

Combined electricity generation from wind, biomass, solar and hydro has more than doubled from 65TWh in 2014 to 143TWh in 2024 (+122%). Combined with falls for coal and gas, this means that renewables now generate significantly (57%) more electricity in the UK than fossil fuels.

UK electricity generation by type, TWh, 1920-2024.
UK electricity generation by type, TWh, 1920-2024. Source: DESNZ, NESO and Carbon Brief analysis.

Notably, the carbon intensity of electricity did not fall during the 2000s, because nuclear generation was starting to decline as the nation’s oldest reactors closed down.

With renewables only just starting to ramp up in this period, the country turned back to fossil fuels to replace lost nuclear generation.

In contrast, carbon intensity has fallen rapidly since 2014, despite further nuclear retirements. Nuclear decline and the coal phase out have been more than offset by renewables, imports and falling demand, meaning gas use has also dropped, as shown in the figure below.

Change in UK electricity generation by fuel, TWh, 2014-2024.
Change in UK electricity generation by fuel, TWh, 2014-2024. Source: DESNZ, NESO and Carbon Brief analysis.

While looking ahead to 2030 and beyond, electricity demand is expected to rise as transport and heat are increasingly electrified via EVs and heat pumps (see below).

According to NESO’s recent advice on reaching clean power by 2030, demand for electricity is expected to grow 11% by 2030 and to nearly double by 2050.

Wind powered

Wind has seen the largest increase of any power source in the UK over the past decade. Moreover, it is expected to form the backbone of the nation’s electricity system by 2030.

The rise of wind power and the decline of fossil fuels means that the UK now gets nearly as much electricity from wind as from gas, as shown in the figure below.

Electricity generation by source, TWh, 2012-2024.
Electricity generation by source, TWh, 2012-2024. Source: DESNZ, NESO and Carbon Brief analysis.

Notably, the rise in wind power output has levelled off over the past two years. The main reason for this is that very little new wind capacity has been added.

In 2022, the UK added 3.5 gigawatts (GW) of new wind capacity, including 3.2GW of offshore wind. This dropped to 1.6GW in 2023, of which 1.1GW came from the Seagreen offshore windfarm off the coast of Scotland, which is currently the nation’s largest and the third-largest in the UK.

However, no new offshore windfarms were added in 2024 and only 0.7GW of new onshore capacity was built, mainly the 0.4GW Viking project in the Shetland Islands.

A further reason for the levelling off in wind power output is that windspeeds have been below average for the past two years.

October and November 2024 have seen particularly poor wind conditions in the UK, respectively 7% and 22% below average – and it has been calm elsewhere in Europe too.

Nevertheless, a new record for wind generation was hit on 19 December 2024, with output reaching 22.5GW for the first time, according to NESO.

National Energy System Operator on X: Great Britain has achieved a new maximum wind record for the second time this week

Several large new offshore windfarms are under construction and due to open in 2025 or 2026.

These include Dogger Bank A, a 1.2GW development in the North Sea due to open next year, as are the 0.9GW Moray West and 0.5GW Neart na Goithe windfarms off Scotland.

In 2026, these projects are due to be followed by the 1.2GW Dogger Bank B and 1.4GW Sofia windfarms, also in the mid-North Sea region.

Given these new developments and the likelihood that windspeeds will return towards average levels, it is likely that the UK will get more electricity from wind than from gas in 2025.

Biomass is the second largest source of renewable electricity in the UK, generating 40TWh in 2024. This is up 17% from 34TWh in 2023, but roughly the same as in 2022.

The UK’s largest biomass generator, the Drax former coal plant in Yorkshire, had seen subdued output in recent years due to planned outages for refurbishment.

Note that Drax only accounts for around a third of biomass generation, with other biomass power sources, including landfill gas, sewage gas and anaerobic digestion of organic waste.

The UK’s net imports of electricity also reached a record high in 2024, with cheaper prices on the continent and new interconnector capacity meaning more power flowed into the country.

Lower lifecycle

The UK’s cleaner electricity generation in 2024 makes electrified heat and transport far more beneficial in terms of reducing CO2 emissions.

For example, an average petrol car in the UK generates 2.7 tonnes of CO2 (tCO2) per year. In 2014, an EV would have generated 830kg of CO2 – but in 2024 this was just 245kg.

Based on the CO2 intensity of electricity in 2014, it would have taken 16,000 miles (2.2 years) for an EV to pay off the “carbon debt” associated with producing its battery, relative to a petrol car.

Based on the cleaner electricity generated in 2024, this payback is just 12,000 miles (1.6 years).

Put another way, an EV driven on 2014 electricity across its full lifetime would have had lifecycle CO2 emissions that were 50% lower than a petrol car. Now, the lifecycle saving is 70%.

There have been similar benefits for CO2 emissions from household energy use, particularly those that use an electric heat pump.

In 2014, a household with average demand would have been responsible for 1.1tCO2 from its electricity use. Today, that figure has fallen to 0.3tCO2.

For a household with a heat pump, emissions from home heating will have fallen from 1.4tCO2 in 2014 to just 0.4tCO2 in 2024. This means that instead of cutting their annual CO2 emissions from heat by 45%, as they were in 2014, they are now reducing their CO2 output by 84%.

Methodology

The figures in the article are from Carbon Brief analysis of data from DESNZ Energy Trends chapter 5 and chapter 6, as well as from NESO. The figures from NESO are for electricity supplied to the grid in Great Britain only and are adjusted here to include Northern Ireland.

In Carbon Brief’s analysis, the NESO numbers are also adjusted to account for electricity used by power plants on site and for generation by plants not connected to the high-voltage national grid.

NESO already includes estimates for onshore windfarms, but does not cover industrial gas combined heat and power plants and those burning landfill gas, waste or sewage gas.

Carbon intensity figures from 2012 onwards are taken directly from NESO. Pre-2012 estimates are based on the NESO methodology, taking account of fuel use efficiency for earlier years.

The carbon intensity methodology accounts for lifecycle emissions from biomass. It includes emissions for imported electricity, based on the daily electricity mix in the country of origin.

DESNZ historical electricity data, including years before 2012, is adjusted to align with other figures and combined with data on imports from a separate DESNZ dataset. Note that the data prior to 1951 only includes “major” power producers.

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Big banks behind “net zero” alliance continued lending to coal firms

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Several major banks that helped set up the UN’s now-defunct Net-Zero Banking Alliance (NZBA) in 2021 have since continued to lend money to coal companies, a new report has revealed.

Bank of America, Barclays, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and Santander were heavily involved in the NZBA and the associated Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) when it was launched by Mark Carney, then a UN climate envoy and now Canada’s leader, in the run-up to the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow.

Despite their involvement, data released this week shows those banks and some others did not reduce the amount of money they lent, nor the value of their underwriting, to coal activities between 2022 and 2025. Around half of the NZBA members who were engaged in coal financing over that time increased it and half cut it, according to the report by German environmental research group Urgewald.

Ana Botín, executive chair of Santander, was a member of the GFANZ CEO principals’ group and said at the time of the NZBA launch that her Spanish bank was “proud to be part of the founding members of this new alliance and to accelerate progress towards net zero”.

Since then, the report’s data documents that Santander has provided loans and underwriting worth hundreds of millions of dollars each year to coal companies, particularly American coal-power plant operators Duke Energy and the Southern Company. Santander did not respond to a request for comment.

Urgewald’s research adjusts the value of loans and underwriting provided to coal companies based on how much of a company’s revenues come from the most polluting fossil fuel. So a hypothetical $100 million loan to German utility RWE is valued at $21 million, as 21% of RWE’s revenue is from coal.

The research does not take account of whether companies are expanding their coal business or phasing it out for greener alternatives. Some banks have said their coal clients need to put in place transition plans by a certain date. Some also say that, by a certain date, they will stop lending money to clients that get more than a set percentage of their revenue from coal.

    Most companies expanding coal are in Asian nations like China, India and Indonesia and are largely financed by banks from their own countries. But there are examples of NZBA founding members supporting companies that are actively prolonging the life of their coal businesses.

    For example, Glencore, a Switzerland-based multinational that gets 4% of its revenue from coal, has just won preliminary regulatory approval to keep on coal mining in Australia’s Hunter Valley until 2045. Last year, the company was supported by loans and underwriting from Bank of America, Citigroup, Santander, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Standard Chartered.

    Good and bad news

    Some NZBA founding members like Swiss giant UBS have reduced their loans and underwriting for coal companies, the data suggests. Others – like Triodos and Kenya Commercial Bank – have provided no support for coal companies since at least 2021.

    Urgewald researcher Hannah O’Neill told Climate Home News that “the banking sector is not moving in one direction. There is a growing divide between banks that are tightening their coal policies and reducing their exposure, and those where coal policies remain weak or where financing continues.”

    Unlike the UN’s Race to Zero campaign, with which it partnered, the NZBA did not require its members to end financing for fossil fuels like coal, leading to accusations by climate campaigners that its rules were too weak.

    Despite this, after Donald Trump’s re-election as US president in November 2024, several North American banks quit the alliance and the NZBA’s requirements were diluted in April 2025. After further withdrawals, the group shut itself down in October 2025.

    Globally, the Urgewald report found that many banks in the European Union, Thailand, Malaysia, India and Taiwan have reduced their coal finance since governments agreed at COP26 to phase down coal power.

    But with Chinese, American, Indonesian and South Korean banks increasing their support, total bank financing for the coal industry has remained broadly the same each year since 2022. 

    “Coal financing is not disappearing – but it is concentrating in banks and markets where coal policies are either missing or weak,” said Heffa Schücking, director of Urgewald.

    Urgewald’s definition of coal companies includes firms and their subsidiaries that explore for, process, trade, transport and mine coal, or burn it in power plants to produce electricity, or manufacture equipment for the coal industry. It does not include companies that use coal to make cement or steel – and an adjustment is made to account for how much of the business model is coal-related.

    Banks defend delays

    At the time of publication, most of the banks named in the report for increasing their coal finance had not responded to requests for comment. But a spokesperson for Deutsche Bank pointed Climate Home News to its May 2026 announcement that it was delaying its requirement for existing clients to present it with transition plans and cut their coal exposure.

    Instead of having to present these plans by the end of 2025, the bank has given them until the end of 2027. They will also have to ensure that their revenue share from thermal coal falls below half by then, the bank added. New clients need energy transition plans to access finance.

    Deutsche Bank said at the time it was delaying its requirements because of the “increasingly complex regulatory environment as well as differing speeds of energy transition in various regions beyond what was anticipated by Deutsche Bank in 2023”.

    Big banks’ lending to coal backers undermines Indonesia’s green plans 

    A spokesperson for Barclays told Climate Home News: “Many companies in this report are diversified energy or mining companies. We do not provide financing to companies that generate more than 30% of revenues from thermal coal mining or power generation, and we will phase out all financing by 2035.”

    The Barclays spokesperson added: “Barclays is financing an energy sector in transition, providing finance to meet current energy needs and also financing the scaling of clean energy. Over the past three years, we have facilitated more than $300 billion of sustainable and transition finance, including billions to cleaner energy projects, and invested millions into climate tech.”

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    As COP31 co-host, Australia should make its polluters pay for climate damage

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    Harjeet Singh is the global convenor of the Fill the Fund campaign and founding director of the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation. Julie-Anne Richards is strategic campaign lead for the Make Big Polluters Pay campaign in Australia.

    This year, a glacier collapse in Nepal’s Himalayan valleys swept away the lives of at least 1,500 people, with recovery costs of US$5 billion, or 10% of national GDP. But this was not a tragedy for which no one can be blamed. This was a crime with a balance sheet – one whose costs are paid by people who did nothing to cause it, and whose profits are booked by polluting corporations that did everything.

    Across the Pacific, the calculation of injustice is now brutally clear. According to Oxfam Australia, the average yearly GDP loss of Pacific countries from climate disasters has increased four-fold over the last decade, reaching 14.3% of GDP. The number of Pacific people battered by climate disasters has risen by 700% in a decade. Whole villages are being packed up and moved as the sea takes the land beneath them.

      Let’s look at the other ledger. This year, as climate change and an oil shock drove up the cost of living for ordinary families, Woodside – touted as “one of Australia’s biggest winners” from the war in the Middle East – reported revenues jumping nearly 30% to AUD$6 billion in just three months.

      In Australia, Oxfam finds that in 2023-2024, fossil fuel corporations paid only AUD$22.8 billion in corporate income tax – just 5% of their AUD$436 billion in total reported income – while 26 out of 80, or one in every three large fossil fuel corporations, did not pay corporate income tax at all.

      The polluters are not struggling to pay for the damage they cause. They are choosing not to.

      This is the moral obscenity at the heart of the climate crisis: the money exists. It is simply flowing in the wrong direction. And nowhere is that clearer than in the funds the world built to protect the vulnerable, now left to languish.

      Funds struggle to fill their coffers

      The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) has received US$2.8 billion in requests from 119 countries. And Nepal has sought an urgent US$20 million for immediate needs. Yet the Fund has only US$342 million in total to give.

      The Pacific Resilience Facility – a fund the Pacific designed for itself, to prepare its own communities – sits well short of even its modest US$500 million capitalisation target. And the Adaptation Fund is running on empty. While adaptation needs in developing countries could reach US$387 billion a year by 2030, according to the latest UNEP Adaptation Gap report, the Fund’s resource mobilisation target of a modest US$300 million for 2025 fell far short, with only US$135 million pledged.

      This is a matter of priorities, not of resources. For decades, the world has accepted a simple principle – the polluter pays principle – whether through the OECD, of which Australia is a member, or Europe’s carbon pricing. New York and Vermont have already passed laws to make Big Oil pay into climate superfunds, and ten more US states are moving to follow.

      The idea is neither radical nor new. It’s time to make big polluters pay.

      Comment: After Hormuz, Nepal and wildfires, people want action to make polluters pay

      What is urgently needed is the courage to apply it to the fossil fuel corporations that have spent decades avoiding it. In November, Australia takes up the presidency of the COP31 negotiations, committing to stand shoulder to shoulder with its Pacific neighbours.

      Australia, together with the Turkish COP31 Presidency, must guide and inspire progress at the upcoming climate conference, including on new climate finance pledges by developed countries (which agreed to mobilise at least $300 billion by 2035) and triple the funds available to the FRLD, the Adaptation Fund and the other UN climate funds.

      Rich countries agreed to these goals two years ago at COP29. Yet, the reality is that developing countries’ need for climate finance is in the trillions annually, while developed countries continue to delay providing even what they have already committed. A clear signal recognising the importance of delivering the promised climate finance must come at next week’s Pre-COP in the Pacific, and COP31 in Antalya must go on to deliver against existing promises or risk an irreparable breakdown in trust.

      Time for a climate pollution levy

      Countries must also ensure funding for loss and damage takes its rightful place as the third pillar of climate finance, alongside mitigation and adaptation, in negotiations regarding the UNFCCC climate finance work programme and Article 9 on shifting finance flows towards a low-carbon, resilient world.

      Australia, as President of Negotiations and as a Pacific nation, cannot ask the world to fill these funds while it lets its own coal and gas giants off the hook. Australia should not only stop approving new and expanded coal and gas mines, it should also introduce a Climate Pollution Levy on big coal, oil and gas corporations – a charge on every tonne of carbon pollution they extract and profit from. Independent analysis shows such a levy could raise tens of billions of dollars a year, and can be designed so the cost falls on the corporations, not on households.

      This is not charity – it is compensation. It is the beginning of accountability. And the public is far ahead of its leaders: eight in 10 people worldwide, and a clear majority of Australians, want fossil fuel firms taxed to pay for the damage they cause.

      Fossil fuel expansion threatens COP31 hosts’ credibility, experts warn

      The money must go where the harm lands. A Climate Pollution Levy should feed the funds frontline communities are relying on – fully capitalising the Pacific Resilience Facility this year, replenishing the Adaptation Fund, and delivering the billions the loss and damage fund needs.

      It is essential for these funds to be able to provide grant-based finance that reaches communities directly, not more loans that push drowning nations deeper into debt. With Nepal’s recovery costs estimated at around 10% of the country’s GDP, if we leave it to fend for itself without loss and damage funding, Nepal will likely be saddled with debt and could fail to recover adequately, increasing poverty and inequality.

      We have heard enough empty pledges. We have watched enough funds announced with fanfare, only then to be starved in silence. The era of asking polluters politely is over. Australia, as COP31 president, has a rare chance to prove that the polluter pays principle means something and apply it to those who have profited the most.

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      What’s on the climate calendar for October 2026?

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      This is a republication of October’s edition of The Climate Agenda – a subscriber-only newsletter designed to keep you informed of the key events, negotiations and announcements happening every month. If you want to receive The Climate Agenda straight to your inbox at the start of each month, sign up as a subscriber today.

      This month, we’ll be on the ground reporting from the Convention on Biological Diversity summit in Yerevan, Armenia later this month and following all the developments as we build towards COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye next month. Here’s what you need to know for October, why it matters and what to expect.

      Brazilian Election

      First round: Sunday 4 October – Second round: Sunday 25 October

      This poll is being closely watched by Brazilian environmentalists as it’s likely to make a big difference to Brazil’s international climate politics and the health of the Amazon rainforest.

      The two clear front-runners are current left-wing President Lula and right-wing Flávio Bolsonaro. Flávio is the son of Jair Bolsonaro, who ruled from 2019 to 2023 but was declared ineligible to hold public office because of his attacks on the electoral system and is now under house arrest.

      In the unlikely event that either candidate wins more than half the votes in the first round, they will be elected as the country’s leader. Latest polls have Lula on 39% and Bolsonaro on 35% (though the numbers are shifting) with several minor candidates in the single-digits. If none of them get a majority, there will be a one-on-one run-off on October 25.

      The Latin American nation is set to record its lowest-ever level of deforestation, as efforts to rein in illegal clearing and restore Indigenous rights progressed under Lula. But Brazilian experts are warning that the huge agribusiness lobby in Congress, whose interests shape what happens in the Amazon, will be emboldened if Bolsonaro takes power, with the Supreme Court also risking a turn to the right.

      As for climate politics, some seasoned watchers fear that Flávio – a climate change denier like his dad – could even try to pull Brazil out of the Paris Agreement. That would leave other countries to take forward Brazil’s COP30 global roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels (TAFF) and ending deforestation – both of which are due to be delivered by COP31.

      For Brazil’s own TAFF roadmap – commissioned earlier this year but so far nowhere to be seen – the election may have less of an impact, given Lula is as keen as any other politician to extract oil and gas from the Amazon, amid cross-party support for fossil fuel production.

      Read more: Brazil leads “encouraging” decline in global rainforest destruction in 2025

      What does the UN say about countries protecting oceans?
      The Pacific nation of Tuvalu is facing an existential threat due to the impact of climate change on rising seas. (Photo: Theo Rouby / Hans Lucas via REUTERS)

      Pre-COP

      Monday 5 October – Thursday 8 October – Fiji and Tuvalu

      The annual Pre-COP meeting is usually a business-like gathering of government negotiators, sounding out each other’s positions and laying the groundwork for deals at the main COP summit. But this year’s “pre” has been jazzed up by Australia’s partnership with Pacific governments keen to elevate their climate issues on the international stage.

      “We will bring the eyes of the world to our region, highlight the threat that climate change poses to it, and show how Pacific voices are shaping global action to counter it,” Australian PM Anthony Albanese said of the event.

      On Monday, before the Pre-COP officially starts, a group of senior government figures – including a handful of leaders – will visit the world’s second lowest-lying nation Tuvalu, as UN boss Antonio Guterres did in 2019.

      They will visit areas affected by sea level rise, see climate resilience projects and meet local communities before flying 2.5 hours south to Fiji to join up with the Pre-COP – which starts on Tuesday – and speak at a “Leaders’ plenary session” that evening.

      The Pre-COP runs until Thursday. Governments are expected to try to advance on some kind of a roadmap for protecting oceans from climate change, while Fiji says Pacific nations will emphasise the need to follow science and step up efforts to limit warming to 1.5C.

      Australia is also due to present an action plan to improve access to climate finance for small island nations and least-developed countries, so that governments, development banks and climate funds can endorse it ahead of the Antalya summit.

      Alongside the official Pre-COP discussions, a “green zone” will host talks organised by civil society on topics like public transport, carbon markets and the International Court of Justice advisory opinion. Unfortunately, these events won’t be available to follow online.

      Read more: Threatened by rising seas, small islands secure right to keep their statehood

      Read more: At regional summit, Pacific islands ask for COP31 support for clean energy and finance

      Forest clearance for a palm oil plantation in Indonesia on 1/4/2018 (Ulet Ifansasti/ Greenpeace)

      Article 6.4 Supervisory Body

      Monday 5 October – Friday 9 October – Bonn, Germany

      The UN carbon market’s rule-making body meets for one last jam-packed session ahead of COP31, with decisions pending on several high-stakes issues that could shape the future of the new crediting mechanism.

      Top of the agenda is a rulebook for clean cooking projects, which aim to cut greenhouse gas emissions by distributing more efficient cookstoves. These projects generate some of the most popular carbon credits but have also drawn some of the heaviest criticism for overstating their climate benefits through lax accounting.

      Technical experts have recommended the Supervisory Body tighten the rules compared to existing crediting programmes, including by forcing cookstove project developers for the first time to guard against the risk of the climate benefits of their credits – the trees saved from becoming cooking fuel – being wiped out by fire, drought or logging.

      The proposal on the so-called reversal risk assessment has sparked a “coordinated” lobbying campaign from the industry, some conservation NGOs and UNEP, arguing that stronger protections could hike project costs and restrict the supply of credits.

      Read more: Industry and NGOs lobby to weaken UN carbon credit rules in “coordinated” push

      Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) plenary

      Monday 12 October – Friday 16 October – Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

      Scientists and government officials will try, once again, to agree on a timeline to produce the highly influential AR7 assessment report from the UN’s climate science body.

      The faultlines that have blocked a deal at several previous sessions are well established: a large group of predominantly developed countries, small island and progressive Latin American states and the poorest nations want the reports to be ready in time to inform the UN’s next global assessment of climate action, due to be completed in November 2028.

      A small group of primarily big emerging economies disagree, claiming this timeline would put a burden on developing countries with limited resources and restrict their ability to provide scientific input into the process.

      Three options will be on the table in Addis Ababa. Two of them would see all three flagship assessment reports approved by July 2028 and September 2028 respectively, just in time to feed into the second Global Stocktake.

      The third, based on proposals from Saudi Arabia and India, would deliver only the Working Group 1 report, on the physical science of climate change, by May 2028. The reports from Working Groups 2 and 3, covering climate impacts and ways to cut emissions, would not be approved until mid-2029, well after the stocktake concludes at COP33.

      Delegates are also expected to discuss the IPCC’s increasingly strained budget, made worse by a funding gap left by the withdrawal of the United States. The panel has warned that, without a sustained increase in contributions, its trust fund’s cash balance would run out by the end of 2028, putting the delivery of the AR7 set of reports at risk and forcing cuts to in-person meetings, translation and outreach.

      Read more: Science ‘under attack’ from fossil fuel interests at UN climate talks

      Read more: As science comes under attack at UN talks, climate movement splits over how to respond

      A small group of climate activists gather in front of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group 2025 Annual Meeting on October 16, 2025 in Washington, DC.
      A small group of climate activists gather in front of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group 2025 Annual Meeting on October 16, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

      World Bank & IMF Annual Meetings

      Tuesday 12 October – Sunday 18 October – Bangkok, Thailand

      With their biggest shareholder – the US – resolutely opposed to climate action, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are likely to try to avoid mentioning climate change at their annual meetings in Bangkok – and there are no headline events on the subject.

      But they aren’t in complete control of the agenda. Thailand will host a discussion on financing a green resilient economy and World Bank President Ajay Banga is likely to be challenged on climate at a live-streamed civil society townhall on October 12.

      With tricky negotiations on the World Bank’s climate finance target concluded earlier this year (it was dropped), talks are moving on to the sustainability framework of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, which invests in the private sector. Civil society is calling for its rules on protecting people and the planet to be maintained and strengthened.

      The IMF’s guidance note to staff – which shapes the circumstances under which climate can be included in IMF programmes – will also be negotiated. Longer term, the Resilience and Sustainability Trust, which channels funding to green projects, will be reviewed but not before 2028 at the earliest.

      Read more: World Bank’s climate work can endure without finance target, experts say

      Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) COP17

      Monday 19 October – Friday 30 October – Yerevan, Armenia

      The biodiversity COP – a sister convention to the UN climate process – will for the first time take stock of progress towards key goals in its 2022 landmark agreement, the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF). These include a headline target to protect and conserve at least 30% of the planet’s land and marine ecosystems by 2030.

      A draft report prepared by a scientific panel warns that “unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved”. In fact, governments are failing on 22 out of 23 targets. The final report is expected to be published ahead of COP17, where governments are expected to react strongly.

      UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker told journalists earlier this month that the most significant progress is expected to occur towards the end of the decade, as 174 countries took the first four years to develop national targets.

      Finance, meanwhile, is set to become a contentious issue, as the draft report says developed countries fell short on a target to provide $20bn per year in international public finance for nature protection, reaching only about $17bn per year from 2020 to 2023. They have also yet to meet a wider goal to mobilise $200bn per year counting all kinds of finance.

      Much like in climate talks, the EU has proposed to broaden the base of donors to include emerging economies who want to “voluntarily assume the obligations” of developed countries. Saudi Arabia and Qatar want nothing to do with this proposal. China has said bringing in new contributors should not weaken the obligations of developed countries. Expect a fight in Yerevan.

      A preliminary meeting in Nairobi in August resulted in a heavily bracketed text that delegates will have to unravel in Armenia. One observer said countries had “overall missed the level of urgency” needed.

      Keep an eye out for our webinar live from Yerevan later this month, where we’ll provide an update on the talks and how governments are responding to science’s demands for quicker action.

      Read more: Mombasa ocean summit drives progress on marine protection, but threats persist

      Read more: UN biodiversity talks agree finance roadmap, postponing decision on a new fund

      European Climate Resilience & Risk Management Framework

      Wednesday 28 October – Brussels, Belgium

      Following a torrid summer beset by recurring heatwaves, drought and outbreaks of forest fires across the continent, the European Commission will present its keenly awaited climate resilience and risk management framework to help member states protect their populations from worsening climate change impacts.

      As part of the policy package, the Commission will identify 100 of Europe’s most climate-vulnerable territories. And alongside an assessment of the risks, there will be guidance at which level they should be managed – regional, national or by the EU. Currently, confusion often arises over who is responsible for preventing, preparing for and managing disasters across the bloc.

      The framework will also aim to make Europe a “champion in adaptation technologies” – such as drought-resistant crops, flood prevention or energy-efficient cooling – which have been described by EU President Ursula von der Leyen as “a huge emerging market”.

      With only around a quarter of catastrophe losses in Europe covered by private insurance, the Commission also plans to set up a Climate Insurance Alliance to boost that figure.

      READ MORE: WHO issues new guidance on heat-health action plans, as El Niño sets in

      The post What’s on the climate calendar for October 2026? appeared first on Climate Home News.

      What’s on the climate calendar for October 2026?

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