A victory for Donald Trump in November’s presidential election could lead to an additional 4bn tonnes of US emissions by 2030 compared with Joe Biden’s plans, Carbon Brief analysis reveals.
This extra 4bn tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) by 2030 would cause global climate damages worth more than $900bn, based on the latest US government valuations.
For context, 4GtCO2e is equivalent to the combined annual emissions of the EU and Japan, or the combined annual total of the world’s 140 lowest-emitting countries.
Put another way, the extra 4GtCO2e from a second Trump term would negate – twice over – all of the savings from deploying wind, solar and other clean technologies around the world over the past five years.
If Trump secures a second term, the US would also very likely miss its global climate pledge by a wide margin, with emissions only falling to 28% below 2005 levels by 2030. The US’s current target under the Paris Agreement is to achieve a 50-52% reduction by 2030.
Carbon Brief’s analysis is based on an aggregation of modelling by various US research groups. It highlights the significant impact of the Biden administration’s climate policies. This includes the Inflation Reduction Act – which Trump has pledged to reverse – along with several other policies.
The findings are subject to uncertainty around economic growth, fuel and technology prices, the market response to incentives and the extent to which Trump is able to roll back Biden’s policies.
The analysis might overstate the impact Trump could have on US emissions, if some of Biden’s policies prove hard to unpick – or if subnational climate action accelerates.
Equally, it might understate Trump’s impact. For example, his pledge to “drill, baby, drill” is not included within the analysis and would likely raise US and global emissions further through the increased extraction and burning of oil, gas and coal.
Also not included are the potential for Biden to add new climate policies if he wins a second term, nor the risk that some of his policies will be weakened, delayed or hit by legal challenges.
Regardless of the precise impact, a second Trump term that successfully dismantles Biden’s climate legacy would likely end any global hopes of keeping global warming below 1.5C.
- The ‘Trump effect’ on US emissions
- How the Biden administration is tackling warming
- What a second-term Trump might do
- The global climate implications of the US election
- How the analysis was carried out
The ‘Trump effect’ on US emissions
US greenhouse gas emissions have been falling steadily since 2005, due to a combination of economic shifts, greater efficiency, the growth of renewables and a shift from coal to gas power.
Since taking office in early 2021, Biden has pledged under the Paris Agreement to accelerate that trend by cutting US emissions to 50-52% below 2005 levels in 2030 and to net-zero in 2050.
He has implemented a long list of policies – most notably the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act – to keep those targets within reach. (See: How the Biden administration is tackling warming.)
In the “Biden” scenario in the figure below (blue line), all federal climate policies currently in place or in the process of being finalised are assumed to continue. The scenario does not include any new climate policies that might be adopted after November’s election.
The administration’s current climate policies are expected to cut US emissions significantly, bringing the country close to meeting its 2030 target range. Nevertheless, a gap remains between projected emissions and those needed to meet the 2030 and 2050 targets (green).
The “Trump” scenario (red line) assumes the IRA and other key Biden administration climate policies are rolled back. It does not include further measures that Trump could take to boost fossil fuels or undermine the progress of clean energy. (See: What a second-term Trump might do.)
For both projections, the shaded area shows the range of results from six different models, with varying assumptions on economic growth, fuel costs and the price of low-carbon technologies.
In total, the analysis suggests that US greenhouse gas emissions would fall to 28% below 2005 levels by 2030 if Trump secures a second term and rolls back Biden’s policies – far short of the 50-52% target. If Biden is reelected, emissions would fall to around 43% below 2005 levels.
In the Trump scenario, annual US greenhouse gas emissions would be around 1GtCO2e higher in 2030 than under Biden, resulting in a cumulative addition of around 4GtCO2e by that year.
Based on the recently updated central estimate of the social cost of carbon from the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) – which stands at some $230 per tonne of CO2 in 2030 – those 4GtCO2e of extra emissions would cause global climate damages worth more $900bn.
To put the additional emissions in context, EU greenhouse gas emissions currently stand at around 3GtCO2e per year, while Japan’s are another 1GtCO2e. If the EU meets its climate goals, then its emissions would fall to 2GtCO2e in 2030 and to below 1GtCO2e in 2040.
Only eight of the world’s nearly 200 countries have emissions that exceed 1GtCO2e per year – and 4GtCO2e is more than the combined yearly total from the 140 lowest-emitting nations.
Expressed another way, the extra 4GtCO2e would be equivalent to double all of the emissions savings secured globally, over the past five years, by deploying wind, solar, electric vehicles, nuclear and heat pumps.
Carbon Brief’s analysis highlights several key points.
First, that Biden’s climate goals for the US in 2030 and 2050 will not be met, without further policy measures after the next election.
This could include additional state-level action, which could yield an additional 4 percentage points of emissions savings by 2030. Added to the “Biden” pathway, this would take US emissions to 47% below 2005 levels – closer to, but still not in line with the 2030 pledge.
Second, despite this policy gap, Biden’s current climate policies go a significant way towards meeting the 2030 target and could be added to in the future.
Third, if Trump is able to remove all of Biden’s key climate policies, then the US is all but guaranteed to miss its targets by a wide margin.
Given the scale of US emissions and its influence on the world, this makes the election crucial to hopes of limiting warming to 1.5C. (See: The global climate implications of the US election.)
Finally, there is policy uncertainty around which policies will be finalised, how strong any final rules will be, what legal challenges they may face and how easy they prove to roll back.
There is also uncertainty – illustrated by the ranges in the chart – around the impact of Biden’s policies, the response of households, business and industry to those measures, and the rate of economic growth, as well as over future prices for fossil fuels and low-carbon technologies.
These uncertainties are partly – but not entirely – captured by the six models underlying the analysis, which have different model structures and input assumptions.
How the Biden administration is tackling warming
In 2015, the then-president Barack Obama pledged a 26-28% reduction in US emissions below 2005 levels by 2025 as an intended “nationally determined contribution” (iNDC) to the Paris Agreement.
On taking office in 2017, the climate-sceptic president Trump then pulled the US out of the Paris Agreement, attracting global opprobrium. He then rolled back or replaced Obama-era climate policies, including the Clean Power Plan, while attempting – unsuccessfully – to prop up coal.
Trump’s successor as president, Joe Biden, campaigned in 2020 on a platform of a “clean energy revolution”. On gaining office in 2021, he immediately rejoined the Paris Agreement and then issued a more ambitious pledge to cut US emissions to 50-52% below 2005 levels by 2030.
Biden also pledged to decarbonise the electricity grid by 2035 and joined roughly 150 other countries in committing the US to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 – the global benchmark, if the world is to keep warming below 1.5C.
In order to keep these targets within reach, the Biden administration has ushered in a series of climate policies. Most notable is the 2022 IRA, unexpectedly passed by Congress after a 51-50 Senate vote, with the tie broken by the vice president Kamala Harris.
This has been called the largest package of domestic climate measures in US history. It offers incentives covering a broad swathe of the economy from low-carbon manufacturing to clean energy, electric vehicles, “climate-smart” agriculture and low-carbon hydrogen.
The IRA accounts for the most significant part of the emissions reductions expected as a result of Biden’s climate policies to date and shown by the blue line in the figure above.
It includes grants, loans and tax credits initially estimated to be worth $369bn. However, most of the tax credits are not capped, meaning the overall cost and impact on emissions is uncertain.
In general, cost estimates have risen since its passing, as investments triggered by the bill’s incentives have rolled in, with some now putting its ultimate cost above $1tn.
However, a recent analysis of progress since the bill passed in 2021 shows that while electric vehicle sales are running at the top end of what was expected in earlier modelling of the IRA’s impact, the deployment of clean electricity – in particular, wind power – is falling slightly behind.
(Another recent study looks at the behavioural challenges that could affect the success or failure of the IRA, including as a result of political polarisation. Separately, gas power expansion plans from several major US utilities also pose a challenge to the IRA.)
Other Biden administration initiatives with important implications for US emissions include the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, loans for nuclear power plants and new standards on appliance efficiency issued by the Department of Energy.
Meanwhile, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) has finalised rules on methane emissions from oil and gas facilities. It has also proposed – but not yet finalised – rules on vehicle fuel standards, power plant greenhouse gas standards and power plant air pollution.
The administration is now rushing to finalise these rules within the next couple of months, so that they could not be overturned easily after the election using the Congressional Review Act.
The administration is reportedly planning to weaken its proposed vehicle fuel standards. The final version would retain the original aim of having two-thirds of new sales be all-electric by 2032, but would ease the trajectory to reaching that target, according to the New York Times. This would reduce the emissions-cutting impact, relative to what is assumed in the “Biden” scenario.
Separately, the administration is reported to be exempting existing gas-fired units from its proposed power plant emissions rules, focusing for now on existing coal and future gas-fired units. The New York Times quotes EPA administrator Michael Regan saying this will “achieve greater emissions reductions”, but the timescales could also affect the scenario projection.
Meanwhile, Biden has also overseen a rare Senate approval of an international climate treaty, when it ratified the Kigali Amendment on tackling climate-warming hydrofluorocarbons in 2022, with the US EPA issuing related rules the following year.
In addition, Biden’s time in office has seen further state-level action on emissions. This includes California’s clean car standards, as strengthened in 2022 and adopted by six other states.
What a second-term Trump might do
For his part, former president and Republican front-runner Donald Trump has made no secret of his desire to roll back his predecessor’s climate policies, just as he did during his first term.
For example, in 2018, the Trump administration lifted Obama-era rules on toxic air pollution from electricity generating and industrial sites – with Biden now moving to reverse the reversal.
Similarly, in 2020, his administration rolled back an Obama-era EPA rule on methane emissions from the oil and gas industry. The Biden administration’s methane rule could face a similar fate under a second Trump term.
Trump also has form when it comes to energy efficiency regulations, which he rolled back in 2020.
In November 2023, the Financial Times reported that Trump was “planning to gut” the IRA, increase investment in fossil fuels and roll back regulations to encourage electric vehicles. The newspaper added that Trump had called the IRA the “biggest tax hike in history”.
It quoted Carla Sands, an adviser to Trump, as saying:
“On the first day of a second Trump administration, the president has committed to rolling back every single one of Joe Biden’s job-killing, industry-killing regulations.”
Indeed, Republicans in the US House of Representatives have already made multiple attempts to repeal parts of the IRA. While some analysts think a full repeal of the act is unlikely, it is clear that a second-term Trump could – as Politico put it – ”hobble the climate law”.
A February 2024 commentary from investment firm Trium Capital argues that the impact on IRA will depend not only on whether Trump wins victory in November, but also on whether the Republicans retain control of the House and gain a Senate majority.
Even if the Republicans win all three races, the commentary suggests that some parts of IRA might survive beyond the election. It says that consumer incentives for electric vehicles and home heating are “most at risk”, whereas tax credits for clean energy might only be modified.
Equally, MIT Technology Review says that clean energy and EV tax credits both “appear especially vulnerable, climate policy experts say”. The publication adds:
“Moreover, Trump’s wide-ranging pledges to weaken international institutions, inflame global trade wars, and throw open the nation’s resources to fossil-fuel extraction could have compounding effects on any changes to the IRA, potentially undermining economic growth, the broader investment climate, and prospects for emerging green industries.”
Meanwhile, Trump has also criticised Biden’s infrastructure act and previously revoked California’s ability to set tougher car emissions standards, which are also adopted by other states.
In 2022, the California “waiver” was reinstated by Biden, who also opposed a 2023 Republican bill designed to remove California’s right to regulate. Yet the waiver is now embroiled in legal action brought by Republican states, expected to end up in the Supreme Court.
If he emerges victorious in November, Trump would also “plan to destroy the EPA”, according to a Guardian article published earlier this month. It reported:
“Donald Trump and his advisers have made campaign promises to toss crucial environmental regulations and boost the planet-heating fossil fuel sector. Those plans include systematically dismantling the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the federal body with the most power to take on the climate emergency and environmental justice, an array of Trump advisers and allies said.”
The paper cites Project 2025, described as “a presidential agenda put forth by the Heritage Foundation and other conservative organisations”. It also quotes Mandy Gunasekara, Trump’s EPA chief of staff and a contributor to the Project 2025 agenda.
After Trump was elected for the first time, many scientists, politicians and campaigners argued that his presidency would only have a relatively short-term effect on emissions and climate goals.
Many of his first-term efforts to rollback climate rules and boost fossil fuels ended in failure.
While some modelling suggested that his first presidency would delay hitting global emissions targets by a decade, Carbon Brief analysis found that US states and cities might be able to take sufficient steps to meet the country’s then-current climate goal without federal action.
However, another recent Guardian article says that a second-term Trump would be “even more extreme for the environment than his first, according to interviews with multiple Trump allies and advisers”. It adds:
“In contrast to a sometimes chaotic first White House term, they outlined a far more methodical second presidency: driving forward fossil fuel production, sidelining mainstream climate scientists and overturning rules that curb planet-heating emissions.”
Carbon Brief’s “Trump” scenario does not include additional fossil fuel emissions as a result of policies supporting coal, oil and gas production or use, as the success or otherwise of any such efforts are highly uncertain.
In addition, higher US fossil fuel production would not all be consumed domestically and would not increase global demand on a one-for-one basis.
While it would be likely to raise demand and emissions, both domestically and internationally, the precise impact would depend on the response of markets and overseas policymakers.
The global climate implications of the US election
If Biden – or another Democrat – wins the election in November and if his party regains control over the House and Senate, then they could push to implement new climate policies in 2025.
There is a clear need for further policy, if US climate goals are to be met. Moreover, the expiration of a large number of tax cuts at the end of 2025 could present an opportunity to deploy carbon pricing in support of raising revenues – and cutting emissions – according to a recent study.
It suggests that a price on emissions, described as a “carbon fee”, could significantly boost US chances of hitting its 2030 target, even if paired with a partial repeal of the IRA.
(Note that the “Repeal IRA; no new emissions rules” scenario in this study is similar to the “Trump” scenario in Carbon Brief’s analysis. However, the model used in the study finds a relatively weak 2030 emissions impact of the IRA compared with most of the five others, with which it is aggregated by Carbon Brief.)
An additional point of leverage is the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which will put a carbon price on US exports unless they face an equivalent price domestically, according to Democratic senator Sheldon Whitehouse, speaking at a launch event for the study:
“The 2025 opportunity when the Trump tax cuts collapse [creates] huge room for negotiation. Then you’ve got the CBAM happening in Europe that puts enormous pressure to get a price of carbon, if you want to avoid being tariffed at the EU and UK level.”
Whether a second-term Biden administration would attempt to put a price on carbon or not, it would be likely to push forward new policies in pursuit of US climate targets.
In contrast, a victory for Donald Trump could be expected, at a minimum, to result in full or partial repeal of the IRA and rollbacks of Biden’s climate rules, including power plants, cars and methane.
This is reflected in Carbon Brief’s “Trump” scenario, which would add a cumulative 4GtCO2e to US emissions by 2030, as shown in the figure below.
Moreover, assuming no further policy changes, this cumulative total would continue to climb beyond 2030, reaching 15GtCO2e by 2040 and a huge 27GtCO2e by 2050.
The increases in cumulative emissions under the “Trump” scenario are so large that they would imperil not only the US climate targets, but also global climate goals. (Under the 22nd amendment of the US constitution, Trump would not be allowed to run for a third term.)
In 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sixth assessment report (AR6) said that it would be “impossible” to stay below 1.5C without strengthening current pledges:
“[F]ollowing current NDCs until 2030…[would make] it impossible to limit warming to 1.5C with no or limited overshoot and strongly increas[e] the challenge to likely limit warming to 2C.”
The corollary of this is that if the US – the world’s second-largest emitter – misses its 2030 target by a wide margin, then it would be likely to end any hope of keeping global warming below 1.5C.
How the analysis was carried out
The two scenarios set out in this analysis are based on an aggregation of modelling published by Bistline et al. (2023) and the Rhodium Group (2023).
The first study was explained by the authors in a Carbon Brief guest post. It compares the impact of the IRA using results from 11 separate models, some of which only cover the power sector. Carbon Brief’s analysis uses results from the six models that cover the entire US economy.
The “Trump” scenario is based on the “reference” pathway in this study, corresponding to the average of the six models. The only modification is that the Trump scenario is set to match the Biden scenario below until 2024.
The “Biden” scenario is based on the average IRA pathway from this study, extended using modelling from the Rhodium Group to include the impact of further Biden administration policies.
Carbon Brief’s analysis uses the “mid-emissions” pathway from the Rhodium study’s “federal-only” scenario, which includes the impact of vehicle fuel standards, power plant greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions rules, and energy efficiency regulations.
This additional Rhodium Group modelling is based on draft rules which have not yet been finalised and are subject to change, as well as to potential legal challenge, as discussed above.
The uncertainty shown for the “Trump” and “Biden” scenarios corresponds to the range in the six economy-wide models from Bistline et al. (2023).
Carbon Brief’s analysis does not include any additional post-2025 climate policies that could be adopted by a second Biden administration. Nor does it include the potential impact of pro-fossil fuel policies that could be introduced by a second Trump administration.
Finally, it also does not include additional subnational climate policies that could be introduced, nor does it consider the risk that current or future state action could be hit by federal or legal challenge.
Historical US greenhouse gas emissions are taken from the US EPA inventory through to 2021. Figures for 2022 and 2023 are based on estimated annual changes from the Rhodium Group.
The post Analysis: Trump election win could add 4bn tonnes to US emissions by 2030 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Trump election win could add 4bn tonnes to US emissions by 2030
The European Commission has rejected requests by green groups to review the status of 16 controversial projects it has designated as “strategic” to shore up the bloc’s supply of critical minerals needed for the energy transition, despite environmental concerns.
Campaigners accused the European Union’s executive arm of being more interested in labelling projects as “strategic” to accelerate their development than ensuring they meet its environmental standards.
Legal experts told Climate Home News that despite the EU’s rhetoric on developing sustainable mining standards, it will be very difficult for local communities and NGOs to use the judicial system to enforce compliance with environmental safeguards.
Earlier this year, the European Commission labelled 47 mineral extraction, processing and recycling projects within EU member states as “strategic“, granting them preferential treatment for gaining permits and easier access to EU funding.
-
Europe’s lithium rush leaves mineral-rich communities in the dark
Local residents are seeking more information and want stronger guarantees that mining won’t harm the nature on which their incomes depend -
South Africa’s platinum mine dumps get a second look as clean energy lifts demand
Mining firms say extracting minerals from tailings is a sustainable way to boost global supplies, but local communities want to see benefits this time around -
COP30 draft text includes energy transition minerals in UN climate first
A draft negotiating text on defining principles for a just transition to clean energy systems recognises the social and environmental risks associated with mining critical minerals
Spanning from the north of Sweden to Portugal and southern Spain, these projects are due to help the EU reach targets for sourcing more of the minerals it needs for clean energy and digital technologies within its own borders in an environmentally friendly way, while reducing its dependence on imports from China.
However, NGOs and local communities have accused the European Commission of a lack of transparency and of failing to engage civil society over the selection of these projects, most of which are in the early stages of development and are yet to obtain the necessary permits or conduct detailed environmental impact assessments.
Civil society groups challenged the decision to include around a third of projects on the strategic list, arguing that the commission had not properly assessed their sustainability. They also cited risks of social and environmental harm and human rights violations.
EU: Environmental compliance lies with member states
In total, 11 requests for review covering 16 of the projects planned within the EU were filed under the Aarhus Regulation, which gives NGOs the right to ask the European Commission to review administrative decisions if they are considered to violate the bloc’s environmental law.
In a single response shared with green groups this week, and seen by Climate Home News, the commission found that the requests to review the projects’ status were “unfounded”.
“A thorough assessment confirmed that all points raised by the NGOs had already been properly addressed during the selection process. All the projects concerned therefore retain their status as strategic projects,” a European Commission spokesperson told Climate Home News. They did not respond to detailed questions about their assessment.
Under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, which was adopted last year, the commission can designate mineral projects as strategic if they meet a shortlist of criteria, including that the project “would be implemented sustainably” and monitor, prevent and minimise environmental and adverse social impacts.
The strategic status can be revoked if projects no longer meet the criteria.
However, the commission said it was not its job to carry out a full and detailed assessment of whether the projects fully comply with EU environmental laws, adding that it is only required to make an “overall assessment”.
Rather, it argued, member states have the responsibility to ensure the projects fully comply with EU environmental standards including impacts on biodiversity and ground water as well as waste management.
The commission also refused to examine the social impacts of the projects on community livelihoods, health and human rights – which could arise from environmental degradation – arguing that this was outside the scope of the review mechanism under the Aarhus Regulation.
Campaigners have strongly criticised the response.
“Cosmetic”sustainability criteria
Ilze Tralmaka, a lawyer at Client Earth, told Climate Home News the commission’s decision showed that the designation of mineral projects as “strategic” doesn’t make them safe or sustainable, despite creating a legal presumption that they serve the public interest and protect public health and safety.
“While on paper, there is mention of sustainability, in practice, it’s almost cosmetic,” she said. “It seems the environmental standards are just briefly looked at and that the policy of declaring these projects as strategic is more important than real engagement with the sustainability criteria.”
Client Earth argues that while securing supplies of minerals for the energy transition is a legitimate goal, the status of strategic project is being “misused” to fast-track questionable mining projects.
Tralmaka said the European Commission should engage where there are “unanswered questions, or if there is credible information about these projects being potentially unsafe”.
Client Earth was part of a group of NGOs that challenged the decision to designate the Barroso lithium project in Portugal as a strategic project.
“Textbook example of how not to do a green transition”
London-listed Savannah Resources is planning to dig four open pit mines in the northern Barroso region to extract lithium from Europe’s largest known deposit. The company says it will extract enough lithium every year to produce around half a million batteries for electric vehicles.
However, local groups have staunchly opposed the mining project, citing concerns over waste management and water use as well as the impact of the mine on traditional agriculture in the area.
Earlier this year, a UN committee found that Portugal had failed to respect citizens’ rights to information and public participation in the case of the Barroso project. Portuguese authorities denied the breach.
Efforts to green lithium extraction face scrutiny over water use
The commission said it was satisfied with the project’s overall sustainability credentials and that campaign groups should take a case to their national court if they are concerned about the legality of any project.
“This decision shows that the EU is willing to trade rural lives and irreplaceable landscapes for a political headline,” said Nik Völker of MiningWatch Portugal. “The truth is, the Mina do Barroso mine offers minimal benefits and enormous risks: a textbook example of how not to do a green transition.”
Savannah Resources did not respond to a request for comment.
“Murky” standards make legal challenge hard
Simon Simanovski, a business and human rights attorney with German law firm Günther Rechtsanwälte, has advised dozens of communities affected by projects designated as “strategic” under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act over the past year.
For him, the commission’s response creates a disconnect between its role as a decision-making body and the responsibility for enforcing the bloc’s environmental laws, by pushing it to member states. That, he said, creates “murky standards”.
This, he added, will make it “really difficult” to challenge inadequate environmental safeguards through the courts. “It means that there is no effective judicial protection… and that the projects will happen,” he told Climate Home News.
However, Simanovski still expects some campaign groups to try filing a case before the general court of the European Court of Justice to challenge the European Commission’s response and ask it to review its assessment of the projects.
Simanovski represents communities in Serbia that are also challenging the “strategic” designation of the Jadar lithium mine – one of an additional 13 “strategic projects” located outside EU countries – which has seen massive local opposition.
The commission is expected to respond to requests to review those external strategic projects in January.
The post EU refuses to review “strategic” mineral projects for energy transition appeared first on Climate Home News.
EU refuses to review “strategic” mineral projects for energy transition
Climate Change
DeBriefed 28 November 2025: COP30’s ‘frustrating’ end; Asia floods; UK ‘emergency’ climate event
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
‘Lukewarm’ end to COP30
BYE BELÉM: The COP30 climate talks in Belém ended last weekend with countries agreeing on a goal to “triple” adaptation finance by 2035 and efforts to “strengthen” climate plans, Climate Home News reported. The final deal “fell short on the global transition away from oil, gas and coal”, the outlet said, as Brazil announced that it would bring forward voluntary roadmaps to phase out fossil fuels and deforestation, before the next COP. It was a “frustrating end” for more than 80 countries who wanted a roadmap away from fossil fuels to be part of the formal COP agreement, BBC News said.
WHAT HAPPENED?: Carbon Brief published its in-depth analysis of all the key outcomes from COP30, spanning everything from negotiations on adaptation, just transition, gender and “Article 6” carbon trading through to a round-up of pledges on various issues. Another Carbon Brief article summed up outcomes around food, forests, land and nature. Also, Carbon Brief journalists discussed the COP in a webinar held earlier this week.
ART OF THE DEAL: The “compromise” COP30 deal – known as the “global mutirão” – “exposed deep rifts over how future climate action should be pursued”, Reuters noted. The “last-ditch” agreement was reached after fossil-fuel wording negotiations between the EU and Saudi Arabia, according to the Guardian. Meanwhile, Carbon Brief revealed the “informal” list of 84 countries said to have “opposed” the inclusion of a fossil-fuel roadmap in the mutirão decision, but analysis of the list exposed contradictions and likely errors.
UNITY, SCIENCE, SENSE: The final agreement received “lukewarm praise”, said the Associated Press. Palau ambassador Ilana Seid, who chaired the coalition of small-island nations, told the newswire: “Given the circumstances of geopolitics today, we’re actually quite pleased…The alternative is that we don’t get a decision and that would have been [worse].” UN climate chief Simon Stiell said that amid “denial, division and geopolitics”, countries “chose unity, science and economic common sense”, reported the Press Trust of India.
Around the world
- Floods and landslides killed more than 200 people in Thailand and Indonesia this week, reported Bloomberg. At least 90 people also died in recent floods in Vietnam, said Al Jazeera.
- New measures to cut energy bills and a “pay-per-mile” electric-vehicle levy were among the announcements in the UK’s budget, said Carbon Brief.
- The Group of 20 (G20) leaders signed off on a declaration “addressing the climate crisis” and other issues, reported Reuters, which had no input from the US who boycotted last week’s G20 summit in South Africa.
- Canadian prime minister Mark Carney signed a deal with the province of Alberta “centred on plans for a new heavy oil pipeline”, said the Guardian, adding that Canadian culture minister and former environment minister, Steven Guilbeault, resigned from cabinet over the deal.
- Greenpeace analysis, covered by Reuters, found that permits for new coal plants in China are “on track to fall to a four-year low” in 2025.
27
The number of hours that COP30 talks went over schedule before ending in Belém last Saturday, making it the 11th-longest UN climate summit on record, according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- The risk of night-time deaths during heatwaves increased “significantly” over 2005-15 in sub-Saharan Africa | Science Advances
- Almost half of climate journalists surveyed showed “moderate to severe” symptoms of anxiety | Traumatology
- Lakes experienced “more severe” heatwaves than those in the atmosphere over the past two decades | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
The key COP30 agreement – termed the “global mutirão” – contained 69 inactive verbs, which require no action from countries, compared to 32 active ones. “Recognises”, “recalls” and “acknowledges” were used far more often than more active verbs, such as “decides”, “calls” and “requests”, showed Carbon Brief analysis.
Spotlight
Nine warnings from a UK climate and nature ‘emergency’ briefing
This week, Carbon Brief’s Orla Dwyer reports from an event where experts and campaigners sounded the alarm bell on climate change and nature loss.
Naturalist and broadcaster Chris Packham urged attendees at a climate and nature “emergency briefing” in London yesterday to “listen to the science” on climate change amid a “dangerous wave of misinformation and lies”.
The “first-of-its-kind” event heard from nine experts on the links between climate change, nature loss, health, food production, economics and national security.
Event host, Prof Mike Berners-Lee from Lancaster University, called for a “World War II level of leadership” to tackle the interconnected crises.
Hundreds of people showed up, including Green Party, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, leader of the Greens Zack Polanski, musician Brian Eno and actress Olivia Williams.
Here is a snapshot of what the nine speakers said in their short, but stark, presentations.
Prof Kevin Anderson, professor of energy at University of Manchester
Anderson focused on the risks of a warmer world and the sliver of emissions left in the global carbon budget, noting:
“We have to eliminate fossil fuels or temperatures will just keep going up.”
He urged a “Marshall-style” plan – referencing the 1948 post-war US plan to rebuild Europe – to ramp up actions on retrofitting, public transport and electrification.
Prof Nathalie Seddon, professor of biodiversity at University of Oxford
Nature is not a “nice to have”, but rather “critical national infrastructure”, Seddon told attendees. She called for the “need to create an economy that values nature”.
Prof Paul Behrens, British Academy global professor at University of Oxford
Behrens discussed the food security risks from climate change. Impacts such as poor harvests and food price inflation are “barely acknowledge[d]” in agricultural policy, he said.
He also emphasised the “unsustainable” land use of animal agriculture, which “occupies around 85% of total agricultural land” in the UK.
Prof Tim Lenton, chair in climate change and Earth system science at Exeter University
Lenton outlined the “plenty” of evidence that parts of the Earth system are hurtling towards climate tipping points that could push them irreversibly into a new state.
He discussed the possibility of the shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, which he said could cause -20C winters in London. He also noted positive tipping points, such as momentum that led the UK to stop burning coal for electricity last year.
Prof Hayley Fowler, professor of climate change impacts at Newcastle University
One in four properties in England could be at risk of flooding by 2050, Fowler said, and winters are getting wetter.
She discussed extreme weather risks and listed the impacts of floods in recent years in Germany, Spain and Libya, adding:
“These events are not warnings of what might happen in the future. They’re actually examples of what is happening right now.”
Angela Francis, director of policy solutions at WWF-UK
Francis factchecked several claims made against climate action, such as the high cost of achieving net-zero.
She noted that the estimated cost for the UK to achieve net-zero is about £4bn per year, which is less than 0.2% of GDP.
Lieutenant general Richard Nugee, climate and security advisor
Discussing the risks climate change poses to national security, Nugee said:
“Climate change can be thought of as a threat multiplier, making existing threats worse or more frequent and introducing new threats. Climate shocks fuel global instability.”
Tessa Khan, environmental lawyer and executive director of Uplift
Khan said the rising cost of energy in the UK is “turning into a significant political risk for the energy transition”.
She discussed the cost of fossil-fuel dependency and the fact that these fuels cost money to burn, but renewable “input[s], sun or wind [are] free forever”.
Prof Hugh Montgomery, professor of intensive care medicine at University College London
Montgomery discussed the health and economic benefits of climate actions, such as eating less meat and using more public transport, noting:
“The climate emergency is a health emergency – and it’s about time we started treating it as one.”
Watch, read, listen
WATER WORRIES: ABC News spoke to three Iranian women about the impacts of Tehran’s water crisis amid the “worst drought in 60 years”.
CLIMATE EFFORT: The BBC’s Climate Question podcast looked at the main outcomes from COP30 and discussed the “future of climate action” with a team of panelists.
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR:New Scientist interviewed criminal psychologist Julia Shaw about the psychology behind environmental crimes.
Coming up
- 24 November-5 December: COP20 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
- 29-30 November: First part of global youth environment assembly, Nairobi, Kenya
- 3-4 December: Second round of Egyptian parliamentary elections
- 5 December: World soil day, global
Pick of the jobs
- Aldersgate Group, head of policy | Salary: £56,650-£66,950 per year. Location: London
- Ofgem, climate resilience expert | Salary: £61,446-£86,547. Location: Cardiff, Glasgow or London
- Green Climate Fund, integrity risk management lead | Salary: $171,200. Location: Incheon, South Korea
- Isles of Scilly Wildlife Trust, project manager – seabird recovery | Salary: Up to £45,000 per year. Location: Isles of Scilly, UK
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 28 November 2025: COP30’s ‘frustrating’ end; Asia floods; UK ‘emergency’ climate event appeared first on Carbon Brief.
DeBriefed 28 November 2025: COP30’s ‘frustrating’ end; Asia floods; UK ‘emergency’ climate event
Climate Change
Revealed: Leak casts doubt on COP30’s ‘informal list’ of fossil-fuel roadmap opponents
A confused – and, at times, contradictory – story has emerged about precisely which countries and negotiating blocs were opposed to a much-discussed “roadmap” deal at COP30 on “transitioning away from fossil fuels”.
Carbon Brief has obtained a leaked copy of the 84-strong “informal list” of countries that, as a group, were characterised across multiple media reports as “blocking” the roadmap’s inclusion in the final “mutirão” deal across the second week of negotiations at the UN climate summit in Belém.
During the fraught closing hours of the summit, Carbon Brief understands that the Brazilian presidency told negotiators in a closed meeting that there was no prospect of reaching consensus on the roadmap’s inclusion, because there were “80 for and 80 against”.
However, Carbon Brief’s analysis of the list – which was drawn up informally by the presidency – shows that it contains a variety of contradictions and likely errors.
Among the issues identified by Carbon Brief is the fact that 14 countries are listed as both supporting and opposing the idea of including a fossil-fuel roadmap in the COP30 outcome.
In addition, the list of those said to have opposed a roadmap includes all 42 of the members of a negotiating group present in Belém – the least-developed countries (LDCs) – that has explicitly told Carbon Brief it did not oppose the idea.
Moreover, one particularly notable entry on the list, Turkey – which is co-president of COP31 – tells Carbon Brief that its inclusion is “wrong”.
Negotiating blocs
COP28, held in Dubai in 2023, had finalised the first “global stocktake”, which called on all countries to contribute to global efforts, including a “transition away from fossil fuels”.
Since then, negotiations on how to take this forward have faltered, including at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, where countries were unable to agree to include this fossil-fuel transition as part of existing or new processes under the UN climate regime.
Ahead of the start of COP30, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made a surprise call for “roadmaps” on fossil-fuel transition and deforestation.
While this idea was not on the official agenda for COP30, it had been under development for months ahead of the summit – and it became a key point of discussion in Belém.
Ultimately, however, it did not become part of the formal COP30 outcome, with the Brazilian presidency instead launching a process to draw up roadmaps under its own initiative.
This is because the COP makes decisions by consensus. The COP30 presidency insisted that there was no prospect of consensus being reached on a fossil-fuel roadmap, telling closed-door negotiations that there were “80 for and 80 against”.
The list of countries supporting a roadmap as part of the COP30 outcome was obtained by Carbon Brief during the talks. Until now, however, the list of those opposed to the idea had not been revealed.
Carbon Brief understands that this second list was drawn up informally by the Brazilian presidency after a meeting attended by representatives of around 50 nations. It was then filled out to the final total of 84 countries, based on membership of negotiating alliances.
The bulk of the list of countries opposing a roadmap – some 39 nations – is made up of two negotiating blocs that opposed the proposal for divergent reasons (see below). Some countries within these blocs also held different positions on why – or even whether – they opposed the roadmap being included in the COP30 deal.
These blocs are the 22-strong Arab group – chaired in Belém by Saudi Arabia – and the 25 members of the “like-minded developing countries” (LMDCs), chaired by India.
For decades within the UN climate negotiations, countries have sat within at least one negotiating bloc rather than act in isolation. At COP30, the UN says there were 16 “active groups”. (Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has not sat within any group.)
The inclusion on the “informal list” (shown in full below) of both the LMDCs and Arab group is accurate, as confirmed by the reporting of the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), which is the only organisation authorised to summarise what has happened in UN negotiations that are otherwise closed to the media.
Throughout the fortnight of the talks, both the LMDCs and Arab group were consistent – at times together – in their resistance to proscriptive wording and commitments within any part of the COP30 deal around transitioning away from fossil fuels.
But the reasons provided were nuanced and varied and cannot be characterised as meaning both blocs simply did not wish to undertake the transition – in fact, all countries under the Paris Agreement had already agreed to this in Dubai two years ago at COP28.
However, further analysis by Carbon Brief of the list shows that it also – mistakenly – includes all of the members of the LDCs, bar Afghanistan and Myanmar, which were not present at the talks. In total, the LDCs represented 42 nations in Belém, ranging from Bangladesh and Benin through to Tuvalu and Tanzania.
Some of the LDC nations had publicly backed a fossil-fuel roadmap.
‘Not correct’
Manjeet Dhakal, lead adviser to the LDC chair, tells Carbon Brief that it is “not correct” that the LDCs, as a bloc, opposed a fossil-fuel roadmap during the COP30 negotiations.
He says that the group’s expectations, made public before COP, clearly identified transitioning away from fossil fuels as an “urgent action” to keep the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal “within reach”. He adds:
“The LDC group has never blocked a fossil-fuel roadmap. [In fact], a few LDCs, including Nepal, have supported the idea.”
Dhakal’s statement highlights a further confusing feature of the informal list – 14 countries appear on both of the lists of supporters and opposers. This is possible because many countries sit within two or more negotiating blocs at UN climate talks.
For example, Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu are members of both the “alliance of small island states” (AOSIS) and the LDCs.
As is the case with the “informal list” of opposers, the list of supporters (which was obtained by Carbon Brief during the talks) is primarily made up of negotiating alliances.
Specifically, it includes AOSIS, the “environmental integrity group” (EIG), the “independent association of Latin America and the Caribbean” (AILAC) and the European Union (EU).
In alphabetical order, the 14 countries on both lists are: Bahrain; Bulgaria; Comoros; Cuba; Czech Republic; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Hungary; Kiribati; Nepal; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Timor-Leste; and Tuvalu.
This obvious anomaly acts to highlight the mistaken inclusion of the LDCs on the informal list of opposers.
The list includes 37 of the 54 nations within the Africa group, which was chaired by Tanzania in Belém.
But this also appears to be a function of the mistaken inclusion of the LDCs in the list, many of which sit within both blocs.
Confusion
An overview of the talks published by the Guardian this week reported:
“Though [Brazil’s COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago] told the Guardian [on 19 November] that the divide over the [roadmap] issue could be bridged, [he] kept insisting 80 countries were against the plan, though these figures were never substantiated. One negotiator told the Guardian: ‘We don’t understand where that number comes from.’
“A clue came when Richard Muyungi, the Tanzanian climate envoy who chairs the African group, told a closed meeting that all its 54 members aligned with the 22-member Arab Group on the issue. But several African countries told the Guardian this was not true and that they supported the phaseout – and Tanzania has a deal with Saudi Arabia to exploit its gas reserves.”
Adding to the confusion, the Guardian also said two of the most powerful members of the LMDCs were not opposed to a roadmap, reporting: “China, having demurred on the issue, indicated it would not stand in the way [of a roadmap]; India also did not object.”
Writing for Climate Home News, ActionAid USA’s Brandon Wu said:
“Between rich country intransigence and undemocratic processes, it’s understandable – and justifiable – that many developing countries, including most of the Africa group, are uncomfortable with the fossil-fuel roadmap being pushed for at COP30. It doesn’t mean they are all ‘blockers’ or want the world to burn, and characterising them as such is irresponsible.
“The core package of just transition, public finance – including for adaptation and loss and damage – and phasing out fossil fuels and deforestation is exactly that: a package. The latter simply will not happen, politically or practically, without the former.”
Carbon Brief understands that Nigeria was a vocal opponent of the roadmap’s inclusion in the mutirão deal during the final hours of the closed-door negotiations, but that does not equate to it opposing a transition away from fossil fuels. This is substantiated by the ENB summary:
“During the…closing plenary…Nigeria stressed that the transition away from fossil fuels should be conducted in a nationally determined way, respecting [common, but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities].”
The “informal list” of opposers also includes three EU members – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
The EU – led politically at the talks by climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra, but formally chaired by Denmark – was reportedly at the heart of efforts to land a deal that explicitly included a “roadmap” for transitioning away from fossil fuels.
Carbon Brief understands that, as part of the “informal intelligence gathering” used to compile the list, pre-existing positions on climate actions by nations were factored in rather than only counting positions expressed at Belém. For example, Hungary and the Czech Republic were reported to have been among those resisting the last-minute “hard-fought deal” by the EU on its 2040 climate target and latest Paris Agreement climate pledge.
(Note that EU members Poland and Italy did not join the list of countries supporting a fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30.)
The remaining individual nations on the informal list either have economies that are heavily dependent on fossil-fuel production (for example, Russia and Brunei Darussalam), or are, like the US, currently led by right-leaning governments resistant to climate action (for example, Argentina).
Turkey is a notable inclusion on the list because it was agreed in Belém that it will host next year’s COP31 in Antalya, but with Australia leading the negotiation process. In contrast, Australia is on the 85-strong list of roadmap supporters.
However, a spokesperson for Turkey’s delegation in Belem has told Carbon Brief that it did not oppose the roadmap at COP30 and its inclusion on the list is “wrong”.
Media characterisations
Some media reporting of the roadmap “blockers” sought to identify the key proponents.
For example, the Sunday Times said “the ‘axis of obstruction’ – Saudi Arabia, Russia and China – blocked the Belém roadmap”.
Agence France-Presse highlighted the views of a French minister who said: “Who are the biggest blockers? We all know them. They are the oil-producing countries, of course. Russia, India, Saudi Arabia. But they are joined by many emerging countries.”
Reuters quoted Vanuatu’s climate minister alleging that “Saudi Arabia was one of those opposed”.
The Financial Times said “a final agreement [was] blocked again and again by countries led by Saudi Arabia and Russia”.
Bloomberg said the roadmap faced “stiff opposition from Arab states and Russia”.
Media coverage in India and China has pushed back at the widespread portrayals of what many other outlets had described as the “blockers” of a fossil-fuel roadmap.
The Indian Express reported:
“India said it was not opposed to the mention of a fossil-fuel phaseout plan in the package, but it must be ensured that countries are not called to adhere to a uniform pathway for it.”
Separately, speaking on behalf of the LMDCs during the closing plenary at COP30, India had said: “Adaptation is a priority. Our regime is not mitigation centric.”
China Daily, a state-run newspaper that often reflects the government’s official policy positions, published a comment article this week stating:
“Over 80 countries insisted that the final deal must include a concrete plan to act on the previous commitment to move beyond coal, oil, and natural gas adopted at COP28…But many delegates from the global south disagreed, citing concerns about likely sudden economic contraction and heightened social instability. The summit thus ended without any agreement on this roadmap.
“Now that the conference is over, and emotions are no longer running high, all parties should look objectively at the potential solution proposed by China, which some international media outlets wrongly painted as an opponent to the roadmap.
“Addressing an event on the sidelines of the summit, Xia Yingxian, deputy head of China’s delegation to COP30, said the narrative on transitioning away from fossil fuels would find greater acceptance if it were framed differently, focusing more on the adoption of renewable energy sources.”
Speaking to Carbon Brief at COP30, Dr Osama Faqeeha, Saudi Arabia’s deputy environment minister, refused to be drawn on whether a fossil-fuel roadmap was a red line for his nation, but said:
“I think the issue is the emissions, it’s not the fuel. And our position is that we have to cut emissions regardless.”
Neither the Arab group nor the LMDCs responded to Carbon Brief’s invitation to comment on their inclusion on the list.
The Brazilian COP30 presidency did not respond at the time of publication.
While the fossil-fuel roadmap was not part of the formal COP30 outcome, the Brazilian presidency announced in the closing plenary that it would take the idea forward under its own initiative, drawing on an international conference hosted in Colombia next year.
Corrêa do Lago told the closing plenary:
“We know some of you had greater ambitions for some of the issues at hand…As president Lula said at the opening of this COP, we need roadmaps so that humanity, in a just and planned manner, can overcome its dependence on fossil fuels, halt and reverse deforestation and mobilise resources for these purposes.
“I, as president of COP30, will therefore create two roadmaps, one on halting and reverting deforestation, another to transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner. They will be led by science and they will be inclusive with the spirit of the mutirão.
“We will convene high level dialogues, gathering key international organisations, governments from both producing and consuming countries, industry workers, scholars, civil society and will report back to the COP. We will also benefit from the first international conference for the phase-out of fossil fuels, scheduled to take place in April in Colombia.”
Fossil-fuel roadmap
‘Supporters’
Both ‘supporter’ and ‘opposer’
‘Opposers’
Additional reporting by Daisy Dunne.
The post Revealed: Leak casts doubt on COP30’s ‘informal list’ of fossil-fuel roadmap opponents appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Revealed: Leak casts doubt on COP30’s ‘informal list’ of fossil-fuel roadmap opponents
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